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SELECTED READINGS AND DOCUMENTS ON POSTWAR AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY

VOLUME I

ORIGINAL

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Compiled by

R. Joseph DeSutter, Jr.

Spring, 1985

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VOLUME I

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Index

Volume I

Title	Pages
1 Yalta Agreement	1-6
2 "The Future of Yalta"	7-30
3 The Einstein Letter	31-32
4 "Atomic Bombs and the Postwar Position of the United States in the World"	33-38
5 Announcement of the Dropping of an Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima	39-41
6 "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb"	42-54
7 "International Control of Atomic Energy"	55-65
8 "A Choice Between the Quick and the Dead"	66-71
9 "Postwar Foreign Policy"	72
10 The Truman Doctrine	73-76
11 The Marshall Plan	77-79
12 "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"	80-86
13 NSC-68	87-141
14 Debate on the North Atlantic Treaty	142-150
15 "The Point Four Program"	150-154
16 "U.N. Police Action in Korea"	155
17 "The Hydrogen Bomb Program"	156
18 "A Policy of Instant Retaliation"	157-162
19 "Strategy of Massive Retaliation"	163-165
20 "Massive Retaliation"	166-180
21 "Forward" to _The Uncertain Trumpet_	181-185
22 "The Great Fallacy"	186-195
23 "The Rise of the Doctrine of Massive Retaliation"	195-206

[illegible] AVAILABLE

24 "Rockets and Missiles" 207-237

25 "Consequences -- A Case in Point" 238-261

26 Eisenhower: Farewell Address 262-266

27 Kennedy: Inaugural Address 266-268

28 "The Missile Gap" 269-281

29 "Open Skies" 282-283

30 "The Course of Postwar Disarmament Negotiations" 284-292

31 "The Basic Need" 293-309

32 "The Prevention of War" 310-316

33 "On Einstein's Support for World Gov't" 317-321

34 "Einstein Replies" 322-326

35 "Forewarned but not Forearmed" 327-333

36 "A Case for Graduated Unilateral Disengagement" 334-341

37 "The Delicate Balance of Terror" 342-365

38 "The Technological Arms Race" 366-383

Bibliographical information

T COPY AVAILABLE

Index

Volume II

Title	Pages
39 The Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 1961	384-392
40 "The Objectives of Arms Control"	393-419
41 "Disarmament and Arms Control"	420-424
42 "Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community"	425-430
43 "1961 -- The Kennedy Shift"	431-444
44 "City-Avoidance"	445-462
45 "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy"	463-470
46 "Assured Destruction"	471-482
47 "Nuclear Strategy and Forces"	483-513
48 "Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Research"	514-636
49 The ABM Debate (1969)	637-757
50 "New Concepts and Tools to Shape the Defense Program"	758-799
51 "Yardsticks of Sufficiency"	800-845
52 "Origins", chapter 2 of Cold Dawn	846-881
53 Basic Agreements on Detente	882-921
Basic Principles of Relations...	
ABM Treaty	
Interim Agreement	
Protocol	
Report of Secretary of State	
Initialed Statements	
Common Understandings	
Unilateral Statements	
Shanghai Communique	
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War	
Vladivostok Accords	
54 Remarks of Kissinger and Gerard Smith	922-932

55 News Conf. Remarks of Kissinger on SALT 932-945

56 Remarks by Nixon at Congressional Briefing 945-950

57 Remarks by Kissinger 950-977

58 Testimony on SALT 978-1000

Bibliographical information

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Index

Volume III

Title — Pages

59 "Political and Negotiating Assymetries: Insult in SALT II" 1001-1021

60 "SALT Nonviolations and the Evolution of a Compliance Policy" 1022-1096

61 "Detente with the Soviet Union" 1097-1122

62 Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU 1122-1133

63 1972 DOD Report (Excerpts) 1134-1141

64 1973 DOD Report (Excerpts) 1142-1156

65 1974 DOD Report (Excerpts) 1157-1166

66 1975 DOD Report (Excerpts) 1167-1180

67 1976 DOD Report (Excerpts) 1181-1196

68 "Why Arms Control Has Failed" 1197-1206

69 "What Deters? The Ability to Wage Nuclear War" 1207-1223

70 "The Soviet Approach to Deterrence" 1224-1241

71 "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War" 1242-1254

72 "Delusions of Soviet Weakness" 1255-1261

73 SALT II -- Text 1262-1308

Special Reports

74 "Now the Great Debate" 1309-1324

75 "SALT II: Can it End the Arms Race?" 1325-1331

76 Senate Testimonies on SALT II 1332-1420

77 "After Detection -- What?" 1421-1433

78 "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements" 1434-1439

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

79 "Intelligence vs. Verification..." 1440-1460

80 State Dept. Special Reports 1461-1476
- Strength and Diplomacy...
- Importance of MX
- SDI
- ...More Stable Peace
- ... New Arms Control Negotiations

81 "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Modernization Program 1477-1496

82 News Articles (Jan-Apr 85) on Reagan Administration Arms Control and Strategic Modernization 1497-1510

83 "Defense Policy: The Carter-Reagan Record" 1511-1526

84 President's Commission on Strategic Forces 1527-1556

85 Strategic Defense Initiative -- 6 part series in New York Times 1557-1594

86 "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance" 1595-1613

87 "European Security, East-West Policy and the INF Debate" 1614-1671

88 "History of Conflict and Cooperation" excerpt from report to Committee on Foreign Relations, Apr 72 1672-1691

Bibliographical information

YALTA AGREEMENT

1

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61.

The Yalta Agreement

The scene of the famous Yalta Conference of February 4-11, 1945, was the summer palace of Czar Nicholas II on the Black Sea coast of the ravaged Crimea, only recently liberated from the Nazis. The last meeting of the "Big Three" Allied leaders — Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin — opened as victory in Europe was imminent. Roosevelt had been advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Japan was capable of continued resistance and that Russian participation in the Pacific war would save a million American casualties. The major questions to be resolved were, besides Russian aid in the war against Japan, the partition of Germany, the future of the liberated nations of Eastern Europe, and the establishment of an international organization to keep the peace. The most heated discussion revolved around the future of Poland, by then almost wholly occupied by the Red Army, but the question uppermost in Roosevelt's mind was probably the creation of a peace-keeping organization. Both Roosevelt and Churchill came to the conference firmly convinced that Russian cooperation was essential, not only for ending the war quickly but also for the future success of the United Nations. The Yalta Agreement was signed on February 11.

Source: PRFA, Department of State Publication 6199: "The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945."

THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE of the heads of the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4 to 11 came to the following conclusions.

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(*a*) the United Nations as they existed on the 8 February, 1945, and

(*b*) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United

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Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist republics, *i.e.*, the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

Invitation

The government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the government of ——— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. *Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the government of ——— desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments.

Territorial Trusteeship

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (*a*) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (*b*) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (*c*) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (*d*) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the

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United Press International

Working session at the conference of the "Big Three" in Yalta. Joseph Stalin and the Russian delegation, upper left. President Roosevelt with George Marshall, Admiral Leahy and other members of the United States delegation, right; Winston Churchill and the British delegates, left foreground with backs to camera

United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live — the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (*a*) to establish conditions of internal peace; (*b*) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (*c*) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (*d*) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

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The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (*a*) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

> The United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization, and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden (chairman), Mr. Winant, and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied Nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses, and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(*a*) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself, as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(*b*) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(*c*) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany, an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Mos-

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cow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom, and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

> The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (*a*) and (*b*) of the paragraph 2 should be $20 billion and that 50 percent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. Major War Criminals

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three foreign secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

VII. Poland

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National

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Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

1. That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

2. That as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare:

(*a*) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament and

(*b*) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly. And that this statement should be published in the communique of the conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER; ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the foreign secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(*a*) the Control Commission in Bulgaria

(*b*) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(*c*) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The conference agreed that the permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three foreign secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three foreign secretaries to be held in London they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their governments. The Turkish government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

6

THE FUTURE OF YALTA

by

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE FUTURE OF YALTA

Yalta is unfinished business. It has a longer past and it may have a more ominous future than is generally recognized. Forty years after the fateful Crimean meeting of February 4–11, 1945, between the Allied Big Three of World War II, much of our current preoccupation with Yalta focuses on its myth rather than on its continuing historical significance.

The myth is that at Yalta the West accepted the division of Europe. The fact is that Eastern Europe had been conceded de facto to Josef Stalin by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill as early as the Teheran Conference (in November–December 1943), and at Yalta the British and American leaders had some halfhearted second thoughts about that concession. They then made a last-ditch but ineffective effort to fashion some arrangements to assure at least a modicum of freedom for Eastern Europe, in keeping with Anglo-American hopes for democracy on the European continent as a whole. The Western statesmen failed, however, to face up to the ruthlessness of the emerging postwar Soviet might, and in the ensuing clash between Stalinist power and Western naïvete, power prevailed.

Yalta's continuing significance lies in what it reveals about Russia's enduring ambitions toward Europe as a whole. Yalta was the last gasp of carefully calibrated Soviet diplomacy designed to obtain Anglo-American acquiescence to a preponderant Soviet role in all of Europe. At Yalta, in addition to timidly reopening the issue of Eastern Europe, the West also deflected, but again in a vague and timorous fashion, Soviet aspirations for a dominant position in the western extremity of the Eurasian land mass.

Yalta thus remains of great geopolitical significance because it symbolizes the unfinished struggle for the future of Europe. Forty years after Yalta that struggle still involves America and Russia, but by now it should be clear that the issue is unlikely

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Zbigniew Brzezinski was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 to 1981. He is currently Professor of Government at Columbia University and Senior Adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. His most recent book is *Power and Principle*. Copyright © 1984 by Zbigniew Brzezinski.

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to be resolved in a historically constructive manner until a more active role is assumed by the very object of the contest, Europe itself.

II

The setting for Yalta was prostrated Europe. That once globally dominant civilization had committed historical suicide in the course of two devastating wars fought within the span of a mere quarter-century. When the two leaders of the British and American democracies met with the Georgian tyrant of the Great Russian Empire to resolve the future of Europe, continental Europe was absent from the deliberations. In the meantime, much of Europe's future was being decided on the ground, by the great extra-European armies pushing from the east and the west into Germany, the heart of Europe.

Until Yalta, the key issue perplexing the wartime alliance was Poland, the key to control of Eastern Europe. Thereafter, the issue has increasingly been Germany, the key to control over Western Europe. Poland represented to Moscow the gate to the West, and thus the Kremlin in its wartime diplomacy adopted an attitude of utter intransigence on the question of Poland's future. Though in his memoirs Churchill later described the Polish issue as "the first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance," neither he nor his Atlantic partner, President Roosevelt, seemed to grasp the central strategic importance of the Polish issue; nor was either of them inclined to exploit Russia's initial weakness to obtain a satisfactory resolution of the Polish-Soviet dispute, initiated by the Soviet seizure of almost half of Poland in 1939 as a result of the Stalin-Ribbentrop agreement.

Stalin correctly saw in the territorial dispute the opportunity to transform Polish independence into dependence on Moscow. So did the Poles. Prior to the Teheran meeting, the Polish prime minister desperately warned Churchill (as recorded by Sir William Strang on September 9, 1943) that "what was at stake between Poland and Russia was not merely a question of frontiers but a question of general relations and indeed the question of the survival of Poland as an independent state. . . ."[1] A month later, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden reported to the British War Cabinet that the Polish prime

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[1] This, and the other documents cited, are contained in the very useful collection edited by A. Polonsky, *The Great Powers and the Polish Question*, London: L.S.E., 1976. See also V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

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minister had told him on October 6, "The general attitude of Stalin towards Poland, towards Germany and the Free German movement and towards questions touching other occupied countries, as well as his record and his whole mentality, implied more extensive ambitions than ambitions only in the eastern provinces of Poland which were strategically important to Poland but in no sense vital to Russia." Finally, on the eve of the Teheran meeting, Eden briefed the War Cabinet on November 22 that the Poles feared "that Russia's long-term aim is to set up a puppet government in Warsaw and turn Poland into a Soviet republic. . . ."

The British took a more benign view of Stalin's goals. Eden assured the Poles "that British experience suggested that Stalin was much less intransigent . . .," and his internal memorandum on preparations for the forthcoming Teheran Conference makes it clear that the United Kingdom was prepared to satisfy Stalin's territorial goals in the hope that this would produce acceptable political arrangements. If anything, the Americans were even more inclined to gratify Stalin. In keeping with the foregoing, at Teheran in late November and early December 1943, both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to changes in the Polish frontiers, without any further consultation with the Poles, and more generally conceded to Moscow a preponderant role in the Balkans.

To make matters worse, while pressing the Poles to make territorial concessions to Moscow in the hope of assuaging Russian desires, the British and Americans were unwilling to offer the Poles any assurances regarding compensation in the West. Adopting the position that changes in Germany's frontiers must await the end of the war, London and Washington made the Polish plight more desperate. As a result, most Poles simply refused any compromise on the grounds that a truncated Poland could not survive as an independent entity, while others, shocked and embittered, increasingly saw in Moscow the only sponsor of major Polish territorial acquisition of German territory as a compensation for what was to be absorbed by Russia. The price, however, was the inevitable emergence of Polish dependence on Russia, and through it Soviet domination over Eastern Europe.

By the time of Yalta, not only was Poland occupied by the Red Army, but a new government, sponsored by Stalin, had been installed in Warsaw. At Yalta, the West exacted Soviet promises that the Soviet-installed government would be enlarged and would hold free elections, following which the West would recognize it, but Western leaders agreed not to have any binding obligations regarding the elections inserted into the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Yalta Conference. As a result, how free elections were to be organized remained an exclusive Soviet prerogative, with the outcome thereby predetermined. (Indeed, the Western powers recognized the Warsaw government in mid-1945, even though—contrary to the Yalta agreement—no elections had been held.)

III

By finally foreclosing the issue of Poland in Russia's favor, Yalta opened the battle for the future of Germany. Eastern Poland had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, but the West continued to oppose major Polish expansion at Germany's expense. The Russians at first hesitated in deciding how extensively they ought to support Polish claims. But at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, following Germany's final collapse, Stalin apparently concluded that with his armies firmly implanted in the middle of Germany he could afford to satisfy Polish needs (thereby permanently cementing Polish dependence on Russia), while continuing to wage his struggle for a preeminent Soviet role in Western Europe.

For Stalin, that struggle was the vital substance of his wartime alliance with the West. Late in 1943, on the eve of the Teheran Conference, Stalin, whose armies were then still fighting on Soviet soil, had succeeded in obtaining Western accord for a major Soviet role in both postwar Germany and Italy, and Western acquiescence to the scuttling of the Polish-Czechoslovak plans for a Central European confederation which might have presented an obstacle to Soviet domination over the region.

The Teheran Conference further nurtured Stalins's grandiose hopes that the British would be unable and the Americans unwilling to oppose his larger designs, which he revealed cautiously, while continuously probing the intentions and the will of his British and American interlocutors. Throughout, Stalin and his associates skillfully played on the anti-imperialist sentiments of the Americans to weaken the British role in any postwar arrangements and on the British rivalry with France to make certain that no center of effective power would emerge in postwar Western Europe. In the Soviet interpretation, Roosevelt's penchant for speaking of the world's "four policemen" could have had only one geopolitical meaning: America's central concern would be the Western Hemisphere, a weak China would be preoccupied with its own problems, and a bankrupt Britain would be enmeshed in its imperial dilemmas, leaving most of Eurasia to the care of the fourth policeman.

In testing Western reactions to his design, Stalin used as bait two somewhat varying schemes for Europe. Though one will never know to what extent these plans were alternative scenarios or competing concepts, both plans provided for a major Soviet role in all of Europe. The two options were succinctly summed up in a conversation on August 31, 1943, between British Foreign Minister Eden and the Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, as reported by Eden:

> . . . Maisky continued that there were two possible ways of trying to organize Europe after the war. Either we could agree each to have a sphere of interest, the Russians in the East and ourselves and the Americans in the West. He did not himself think this was a good plan, but if it were adopted we should be at liberty to exclude the Russians from French Affairs, the Mediterranean and so forth, and the Russians would claim similar freedom in the East. If, on the other hand, we would both, and the United States also, agree that all Europe was one, as his Government would greatly prefer, then we must each admit the right of the other to an interest in all parts of Europe. If we were concerned with Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the United States with the Baltic States, then we must understand Russian concern in respect of France and the Mediterranean. . . .[2]

The latter variant was apparently advocated at least until Yalta by Maxim Litvinov, the former Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to Washington. Postulated on the unstated assumption that America would disengage militarily from Europe but that at least a semblance of congeniality between the Soviet Union and its principal wartime allies would continue even after the war, and bound to appeal to the idealistic American dislike of spheres of influence, the plan envisaged not only a Soviet role in all of occupied Germany but in effect a thinly camouflaged arrangement for a Europe dominated indirectly by the Soviet Union, the only effective power in the region. British influence was to be confined to several narrow maritime enclaves, France was to play a negligible role, while continued Soviet-American accommodation would be tacitly premised on American noninvolve-

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[2] Polonsky, *op cit.*

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ment in European affairs. There can be little doubt that the Soviets took seriously Roosevelt's repeated hints both at Teheran and even later at Yalta that the United States would not maintain a postwar military presence in Europe. Given their ideological cast, they must also have been reassured by Roosevelt's tendency to speak privately to Stalin in most negative terms both of the British and of the French, seeing in that confirmation of their theory of "inherent capitalist contradictions."

The alternative to this strategy of domination through Western acquiescence was associated with Litvinov's principal rival and successor at the helm for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. It took more for granted that an American-Soviet collision would eventually occur, presumably after the expected U.S. disengagement from Europe and probably in the context of sharpened intercapitalist conflicts. Molotov's alternative strategy of exclusive control by fait accompli put more emphasis, therefore, on directly subordinating eastern Europe and as much of central Europe as possible, while vigorously asserting Soviet claims to a major role in the West and to a coequal veto-wielding status in relations with the United States. In more specific discussions regarding postwar arrangements for Germany, Stalin was careful to keep his options open. At times he seemed to be favoring a central German government, at other times he would opt for the fragmentation of Germany into several constituent states. In either case, he was always insistent that the Soviet Union have a major say in all of Germany, while making certain that no major West European power was reconstituted.

As the Soviet armies marched westward, Stalin's claims became more explicit both territorially and politically. In addition to retaining everything seized during the collaboration with Hitler, by late 1944 and early 1945 the Soviet Union made territorial demands on Norway (Bear Island and the Spitzbergen) and regarding the Far East (southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and a preponderant role in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia). Stalin also sought a share in controlling Tangier and a slice of the Italian colonies on the Mediterranean, in addition to proposals for joint action against Franco's Spain and increased political pressure on neutral Switzerland and Sweden. This was followed later by demands for territorial concessions by Turkey. Moreover, the Soviets consistently spoke of France as totally demoralized and worthless, underlining the proposition that Europe was a political vacuum.

Anglo-American surprise and protracted failure to come to grips with the scope of these Soviet ambitions is all the more remarkable when one considers the extent to which Stalin's aspirations mirrored traditional Russian goals. Indeed, they so closely replicated Tsarist objectives in World War I that one may suspect that old Russian planning papers were disinterred for Stalin's and Molotov's use. Some 30 years earlier, in late 1914, the Russian Council of Ministers had also considered the related problems of Poland and of Russian postwar objectives. The majority report focused on the restoration of a Polish kingdom, but under Imperial Russian sway, as Russia's major postwar objective. However, the minority report prepared by the more reactionary members went beyond that priority and defined Russian war objectives much more ambitiously.

Russia's general aims were stated as involving the "strengthening of Russia herself, in an ethnic, economic and strategic way"; in addition to "the possible weakening of Germanism as the chief enemy of Slavdom and Russia at the present time"; and to "the possible liberation of other Slavic peoples from the authority of Germany and Austria-Hungary (insofar as such liberation does not conflict with the direct interests of Russia)." To accomplish the above, Russia was to attain the following specific goals in order of importance:

> (1) Completion of the historic task of uniting all sections of the Russian people by reuniting eastern Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpathian Rus' with Russia.
>
> (2) Realization of the historic tasks of Russia in the Black Sea by the annexation of Tsar'grad (Constantinople) and the Turkish Straits.
>
> (3) Rectification of the borders of the Russian state at the expense of East Prussia and also in Asiatic Turkey.
>
> (4) The weakening of Germany internally in every possible way by means of her complete territorial reconstruction on a new basis, with a possible decrease in Prussian territory to the advantage of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark and the smaller German states as well, and, perhaps, the restoration of the Kingdom of Hanover, Hesse-Nassau, etc.
>
> (5) Unification and liberation of Poland within the widest possible boundaries, but, in any case, within limits which are ethnographic rather than historic (which would be contrary to the basic interest and entire history of Russia).
>
> (6) Liberation of the remaining Austrian Slavs.[3]

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[3] Gifford D. Malone, quoting *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia v period mirovoi voiny* (Moscow, 1926), in *Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914–1917*, New York: King's Crown, 1963, pp. 20–21, 139–40.

What is striking about these war aims, drafted by the more nationalistic and reactionary members of the Council, is their identity with Soviet post-World War II objectives defined by Stalin and Molotov. Every one of the objectives became Stalin's: the incorporation of parts of Polish Galicia never previously held by Russia and of Czechoslovak Sub-Carpathia were identical with the first 1914 goal; the second objective was denied to the Soviets, but they did press for it in their conversations with the Western allies (presumably recalling that in the spring of 1915 France and Britain had conceded as much to Tsarist Russia); the third objective was obtained in East Prussia (again a surprise to Westerners), and the Soviets in 1945 pressed for territorial concessions from Turkey but without success; the fourth was achieved in a different form in Germany; the fifth pushed Poland further west than was thought possible in 1914 but with functionally the same result—the creation of a Poland highly dependent on Russia for its territorial integrity.

One can thus classify Soviet wartime objectives as falling into three categories: first, recovery of the territorial status quo ante as of June 1941; second, securing politically acquiescent regimes in east-central Europe; third, gaining a preponderant voice regarding the political organization of the rest of Europe. The Soviets were totally unyielding and quite open about the first objective; they were prepared, however, to camouflage the second objective if it served to promote the attainment of the third goal. It is easy to forget how uncertain at the time was America's postwar role in Europe, while American unwillingness during wartime to focus concretely on postwar issues fortified the expectation that it would again turn inward. As Soviet forces moved westward, their pursuit of the second objective became more brazen, and it assumed brutal manifestations when it dawned upon the Soviets that there might not be an American acquiescence to the attainment of the third objective. That realization dawned on Stalin and his colleagues with increasing intensity after Yalta.

IV

Yalta can therefore be said to have initiated the postwar struggle for Europe. Yet it was hailed in the West as an unmitigated diplomatic triumph, foreshadowing a period of prolonged East-West accommodation. Forty years later this very same Yalta continues to evoke equally simplistic—though opposite—emotions. It is now the synonym for betrayal. At the time its decisions were said (according to a *New York Times* editorial of February 13, 1945) to "justify and surpass most of the hopes placed on this fateful meeting . . . they show the way to an early victory in Europe, to a secure peace and to a brighter world."

Sumner Wells might be accused of some partiality when he announced (in *The Washington Post* on February 28, 1945) that ". . . the Declaration of Yalta, whatever the future may bring forth, will always stand out as a gigantic step forward toward the ultimate establishment of a peaceful and orderly world." But even such an experienced observer as Walter Lippmann was not to be outdone. Writing in *The New York Herald Tribune* on February 15, 1945, Lippmann informed his readers that Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt "have checked and reversed the normal tendency of a victorious coalition to dissolve as the war, which called it into being, approaches its end. . . . The military alliance is proving itself to be no transitory thing, good only in the presence of a common enemy, but in truth the nucleus and core of a new international order."

Skeptical voices were few and far between. *The Wall Street Journal* warned on February 16, 1945, that the Yalta deal on central Europe "can only lead to increasingly unsatisfactory relations between the United States and Russia"; while a perceptive Frenchman, Andre Visson, (writing in *The Washington Post* on February 18, 1945, in an article entitled "Big Powers and Small Nations") noted that the United States was finally becoming committed to the future of Europe and was showing signs of a willingness even to contest the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe—unlike at Teheran, where it seemed uninterested in postwar arrangements and willing to settle for "the division of Europe into two zones of influence."

In fact, Yalta was the last effort by the wartime partners to construct the postwar world jointly. Unlike Teheran, where Churchill was still clearly Roosevelt's equal, at Yalta the lead was taken by the Americans, foreshadowing the bipolar world that was in fact emerging. The real collision at Yalta was between Roosevelt's well-meaning vagueness about arrangements for Europe's postwar future and Stalin's studied vagueness about the extent of Russia's desire to dominate that future. The former desperately wanted to believe in postwar cooperation while the latter deliberately exploited that faith to create facts on the ground while pressing for Western acceptance of

Soviet claims in both the west and the far east of the Eurasian continent.

As a result, the Yalta declarations were manifestly escapist in character. The provisions regarding free elections in Poland were at best a transparent fig leaf for outright Soviet domination, while the rhetoric concerning future peace simply obscured the emerging and very basic differences between the major powers. However, that rhetoric did serve to further delude Western public opinion regarding Russia's true intentions, thereby making it more difficult for the Western democracies to cope effectively with the emerging East-West confrontation.

By failing to construct an agreed-upon world, while in effect sanctioning the concessions made earlier at Teheran, Yalta became subsequently the symbol of Europe's partition. The follow-on meeting at Potsdam was merely a contentious session to carve the spoils. It was at Yalta that the Westerners belatedly had their first inklings that the concession of Eastern Europe to Soviet domination might be the beginning of the contest for central and Western Europe, while to Stalin Western reticence regarding satisfaction of the wider Soviet goals foreshadowed a more difficult political struggle than apparently anticipated earlier. Henceforth, the increasingly overt preoccupation of Soviet policy became one of driving the United States out of Eurasia.

V

That preoccupation has endured for the 40 subsequent years—and today it is still the central motif of Soviet foreign policy. Its concomitant is the determination to prevent the emergence of a genuine Europe motivated by shared political will. The last four decades, however, also reveal an important strategic lesson: what has come to be seen as the legacy of Yalta—namely the partitioned Europe—can only be undone either in Soviet favor through Litvinov's more subtle design of domination through acquiescence, or to Europe's historical advantage by the emergence of a truly European Europe capable both of attracting Eastern Europe and of diluting Soviet control over the region. America does not have the power or the will to change basically the situation in Eastern Europe, while crude and heavy-handed Soviet efforts to intimidate West Europe merely consolidate the Atlantic connection.

Of the two principal sides, it has been the Soviet that has sought much more persistently than the American to achieve a geopolitical breakthrough, settling the fate of Eurasia. Yalta had stimulated Soviet anxieties that America might not in fact disengage totally from Europe; Potsdam reinforced them, while the subsequent announcement of the Marshall Plan confirmed Moscow's worst fears: America, contrary to Stalin's hopes and expectations, was becoming implanted on the continent, de facto checking the expansion of Soviet power.

Subsequent history has been punctuated by more overt and direct Soviet efforts to challenge that reality head-on—above and beyond the relentless attempts to undermine it. The political campaign against the Marshall Plan, and Stalin's open decision to keep both Czechoslovakia and Poland out of it, were undertaken in the context of the strategic conclusion that not only would America remain engaged in European affairs but that a protracted political conflict was now inevitable. The subsequent Berlin crisis was thus an important test of will, designed to challenge America's suddenly improvised determination to play a major role in the truncated Germany.

It is important to be clear about it: neither Stalin's blockade of Berlin, nor Khrushchev's Berlin crisis of a decade later, was about Berlin itself. In both cases, the stake was the American security connection with Western Europe. This is why both Stalin and Khrushchev were willing to risk even a period of very high tension—dangerously high tension—with America, something which Berlin itself did not merit. Had the Soviets prevailed, Germany would have been panicked, and the vaunted American commitment to the defense of Europe would have been rendered impotent. The geopolitical effect of a Soviet success in Berlin would have been to establish Soviet paramountcy over Western Europe.

Though the two Berlin crises were the most overt indicators of the enduring Soviet determination to sever the Atlantic security connection, Soviet diplomacy throughout the postwar era has pursued also the cardinal objective of ensuring that a geopolitically vital Europe does not surface as a competitor or even as a neighbor. Soviet foreign policy—using all its diplomatic leverage as well as such overt and hidden tools as the West European Communist parties and the myriad of fellow travelers—has been active in opposing such schemes as the European Defense Community, and it has above all persistently tried to place obstacles in the way of the Common Market's evolution toward a political personality. Even if Western Europe cannot be severed from America, it must at least be kept divided and weak.

The commitment to the goal of expelling America from Europe is not just lingering in the Kremlin. It animates the current Soviet leadership, a leadership more Stalinist in substance than any since 1953. Attempting to exploit the West European "peace movements" and unease regarding the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Reagan Administration, the current Soviet leadership decided to elevate the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) issue into a new test of will, again making the Atlantic security connection the ultimate stake. The Soviet decision to refuse to negotiate with the United States on arms control issues unless the United States dismantles and removes its Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles is tantamount to an attempt to impose on America a public humiliation with wide-ranging strategic consequences. It is the functional equivalent to the earlier Berlin crises.

But the Soviet leadership has again overreached itself. Its heavy-handed tactics contributed to the defeat of the neutralist Social Democratic Party in Germany, to the discrediting of the unilateral disarmers in the Labour Party in Britain, and to the strong show of solidarity with America displayed by Europe on this issue. (Parenthetically, one may add that almost simultaneously the present Soviet leadership has stimulated in Japan the highest degree of anti-Sovietism since World War II.) It did so because it overestimated the depth of the neutralist sentiments and the extent of the West European, even the German, stake in the East-West détente. It may also have overestimated the impact on West European public opinion of the greatly increased Soviet strategic power, especially in comparison to the Berlin crises of the late 1940s and the late 1950s. The Soviet leaders may have calculated that the combination of a specifically West European interest in détente with the growing fear of Soviet military power (especially with the massive deployment of the SS-20s targeted on Western Europe) might stampede the West Europeans—even if not the Americans—into a unilateral accommodation. They thus relied too much on simple political intimidation.

Nonetheless, in addition to noting Soviet persistence in seeking to achieve the subordination of Western Europe, it is important not to be overly reassured by the Soviet failure. For that failure is due more to the crudeness of the Soviet tactics than to the resilience of Western Europe. The fact is that

Western Europe as such has not emerged politically. In that respect the Soviet Union can be said to have achieved at least a part of what it has been seeking since Yalta. In the meantime, the continued division of Europe breeds growing resentment not only of the direct Soviet domination over Eastern Europe but also of the American role in Europe, a situation which more skillfull Soviet diplomacy could at some point more intelligently exploit.

The political reality is that America cannot undo Europe's partition, but the existence of that partition intensifies the American-Soviet rivalry which in turn perpetuates the partition. Though America has at times sought to loosen the bonds that both tie and subordinate Eastern Europe to Moscow, at the truly critical junctures America has chosen not to contest Soviet domination directly. American policy has aimed at carefully encouraging the peaceful evolution of a somewhat more pluralistic Eastern Europe, a process that is bound to take time and which can periodically be reversed by force, as through martial law in Poland in 1981. However, when the East German regime collapsed in 1953, when Hungary arose in 1956, when Czechoslovakia peacefully emancipated itself in 1968 only to be invaded by Soviet armed forces, the United States adopted a passive posture masked by anti-Soviet rhetoric. Whether more could have been done is debatable, but that not much *was* done is undeniable.

VI

American prudence is one reason why the Europeans sense that America cannot undo the division of Europe. The other reason is even more basic. America cannot undo the partition of Europe without in effect defeating Russia. And that the Russians must and will resist firmly—just as the direct expulsion of America from Western Europe would be resisted by America as an intolerable defeat. At the same time, the partition of Germany in the context of the partition of Europe makes both partitions a live issue. It ensures a continuing political struggle for the future of Germany and thus for the future of Europe. It locks America and Russia into a strategically central conflict, but with the stakes so high that neither can countenance a direct defeat. With divided Germany thus serving as the permanent catalyst for change, the issue of the future of Europe remains a live issue, despite the stalemate of the last 40 years.

The situation might have been altogether different if the division of Europe had not entailed simultaneously the division of Germany. If instead of the Elbe the geopolitical American-Soviet frontier had been fixed on the Rhine or on the Oder-Neisse line, the division of Europe into two spheres of influence would have been neater and politically easier to maintain. With the Rhine as the dividing line, the West European rump would have felt so threatened by the Soviet presence, backed by a Sovietized Germany, that henceforth its enduring preoccupation would have been to insure the closest possible ties with America, forgetting altogether about the fate of the Soviet-dominated central and eastern Europe. If, on the other hand, Soviet sway had been extended only to the Oder-Neisse line, the Poles and the Czechs would have been so fearful that an American-backed Germany might resume its traditional *Drang nach Osten* that the partition of Europe would have been of very secondary concern.

As it happens, the existing stalemate is increasingly resented by all Europeans. The Germans—no longer dominated by feelings of war guilt, less mesmerized by the American ideal, distressed by the failure of Europe to become an alternative to divisive nationalisms—are naturally drawn to a growing preoccupation with the fate of their brethren living under an alien system. The notion that the destiny of a united Germany depends on a close relationship with Russia is not a new one in German political tradition. Frustration with the nation's division is giving it a new lease on life.

Moreover, for Germany especially but also for Western Europe as a whole, the East holds a special economic attraction. It has been the traditional market for West European industrial goods. As Western Europe discovers that in its fragmented condition it is becoming less competitive with the high-tech economies of America and Japan, the notion of a special economic relationship with the East becomes particularly appealing. The fear that America may be turning from the Atlantic to the Pacific has in this connection a self-fulfilling and a self-validating function: it justifies a wider economic, and potentially even a political, accommodation between an industrially obsolescent Western Europe and the even more backward Soviet bloc, a logical consumer for what Western Europe can produce.

More than most Europeans, the East Europeans, no longer expecting American liberation, long for a genuine Europe, which would free them from the Soviet yoke. That longing explains the extraordinary standing to this day in Eastern Europe of de Gaulle—simply because he raised the standard of "Europe to the Urals." It explains also the special appeal of the Pope, whose vision of Europe's spiritual unity has obvious political implications. But the East Europeans will settle for half a loaf if they cannot have the whole. Faced with the choice of exclusive Soviet domination, only occasionally contested by American policy, or of at least growing ties with even a politically weak Western Europe, the East Europeans clearly prefer the latter.

To register all of this is not to say that Europe will simply drift into a separate accommodation with the Soviet Union, fulfilling long-standing Soviet ambitions. It is to note, however, the potential and growing West European susceptibility to a Soviet policy based more on Litvinov's prescriptions than on Stalinist practices. A Soviet policy designed to exploit more subtly the continued absence of a united Europe, the mounting American frustration with the low level of the European defense effort, and the inevitable appeal of escapist notions regarding disarmament, nuclear freezes, and the like could have a significant impact on both American and European public opinion. Indeed, under certain circumstances, one can even envisage a spontaneous American inclination to disengage from Europe, with conservatives advocating it out of irritation with European unwillingness to do more for common defense, and with liberals propounding it because of their current tendency to deal with difficult security matters by evasion. The U.S. deficit will, in any case, drive Congress toward a more critical look at the cost of the U.S. NATO commitment.

In Europe itself, such a more subtle Litvinov-type Soviet policy would aim not at the dismantling of NATO as such but at depriving it of any political or military substance. Exploiting the duality of German feelings and the growing ties between Bonn and East Berlin, it would seek to transform Germany into a quasi-neutral member of NATO, thereby alarming and further fragmenting Western Europe. Instead of concentrating on trying to inflict on America a visible and direct political defeat in Europe, it would play on European unwillingness to associate itself with America in the wider global and ideological rivalry with Russia, in order to achieve European acquiescence to a subordinate relationship with Moscow.

It is not self-fulfilling pessimism to note that a Europe dependent militarily, fragmented politically, and anachronistic economically remains a Europe more vulnerable to such blandishments. In brief, a sustained Soviet peace offensive poses the greater danger that Moscow finally might succeed in splitting Europe from America and thus, taking advantage of Europe's continued historical fatigue, attain finally a Yaltanized Europe.

VII

As President Mitterrand put it some two years ago, "*tout ce qui permettera de sortir de Yalta sera bon. . . .*" But how to escape from Yalta? Forty years later, there must be a better option for both Europe and America than either a partitioned and prostrated Europe that perpetuates the American-Soviet collision, or a disunited Europe divorced from America acquiescing piecemeal to Soviet domination over Eurasia. And there is such a third option: the emergence of a politically more vital Europe less dependent militarily on the United States, encouraged in that direction by an America guided by a timely historic vision, and leading eventually to a fundamentally altered relationship with Eastern Europe and with Russia.

This third option requires a long-term strategy of the kind that the West simply has not devised in dealing with the enduring post-Yalta European dilemma. The point of departure for such a long-term strategy has to be joint recognition of the important conclusion which the experience of the last several decades teaches: *the historic balance in Europe will be changed gradually in the West's favor only if Russia comes to be faced west of the Elbe rather less by America and rather more by Europe.*

Thoughtful Europeans realize, moreover, that the future of Europe is intertwined with the future of Germany and of Poland. Without spanning, in some non-threatening fashion, the division of Germany, there will not be a genuine Europe; but continuing Russian domination of Poland makes Russian control over East Germany geopolitically possible. Thus the relationship between Russia on the one hand and Germany and Poland on the other must be peacefully transformed if a larger Europe is ever to emerge.

Both Americans and Europeans must also face up to the implications of the fact that the division of Europe is not only the unnatural consequence of the destruction of Europe in the course of two world wars; in the long run it is also an inherently unstable and potentially dangerous situation. It is likely to produce new explosions in Eastern Europe and it could also generate a basic and destabilizing reorientation in Western Europe, especially since for many Europeans the existence of the two alliances across the dividing line in the middle of Europe is seen as an extension of superpower efforts to perpetuate the status quo.

Accordingly, concentration on the purely military dimension of the East-West problem, or trying to get the West Europeans to hew to the U.S. line in the Middle East or in Central America, is not going to preserve Western unity. America has to identify itself with a cause which has deeply felt emotional significance to most Europeans. Undoing the division of Europe, which is so essential to its spiritual and moral recovery, is a goal worthy of the Western democracies and one capable of galvanizing a shared sense of historic purpose.

But that objective, so essential to Europe's restoration, cannot be accomplished as an American victory over Russia. Nor will it be achieved by an explicit Russian acceptance, through a negotiated agreement, of Eastern Europe's emancipation from Russian vassalage. Moscow will not yield voluntarily. A wider Europe can only emerge as a consequence of a deliberately but subtly induced process of change, by historical stealth so to speak, which can neither be quickly detected nor easily resisted.

The West must shape that process and give it historical direction. As the point of departure for seeking the common goal, one can envisage a strategy combining five broad political, economic and military dimensions. Some involve relatively simple acts and can be summarized succinctly; some require more complicated processes of change, are bound to be more controversial, and thus require a fuller justification.

First, on the symbolic plane, it would be appropriate for the heads of the democratic West as a whole, perhaps on February 4, 1985, to clarify jointly, through a solemn declaration, the West's attitude toward the historic legacy of Yalta. In publicly repudiating that bequest—the partition of Europe—the West should underline its commitment to a restored Europe, free of extra-European control. It should stress its belief that there now exists a genuine European political identity, the heir to Europe's civilization, which is entitled to unfettered expression. It should affirm the right of every European nation to choose its sociopolitical system in keeping with its history and tradition.

It should explicitly reject and condemn Moscow's imposition on so many Europeans of a system that is culturally and politically so alien to them. Finally, by drawing attention to the positive experience of neutral Austria and Finland, it should pledge that a more authentic Europe would not entail the extension of the American sphere of influence to the European state frontiers of the Soviet Union.

Second, and in direct connection with the renunciation of Yalta's burden, the West should simultaneously reconfirm its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act. This is absolutely essential, for otherwise the repudiation of Yalta could give the Soviets the convenient argument that the territorial integrity of Poland and of Czechoslovakia is thereby again endangered. The Helsinki agreements confirmed the durability of the existing frontiers in central and eastern Europe, and the eastern nations must be reassured on this score. At the same time, the Helsinki agreements legalized and institutionalized the notion that the West has a right to comment on the internal practices of East European governments and that respect of human rights is a general international obligation. Accordingly, the repudiation of Yalta's historic legacy should be accompanied by the reaffirmation of the West's commitment to peaceful East-West relations, to the maintenance of the existing territorial status quo, and to the indivisibility of the concepts of freedom and human rights.

Moreover, reaffirmation of the continued Western commitment to the Helsinki Final Act could help to resolve the potentially fatal European ambivalence regarding Germany. The fact is that, while the Europeans resent their historic partition, they fear almost as much a reunited Germany. Therefore, the renunciation of Yalta's legacy—the division of Europe—should be accompanied by an explicit pledge, through the reaffirmation of Helsinki's continued relevance, that the purpose of healing the East-West rift in Europe is not to dismantle any existing state but to give every European people the opportunity to participate fully in wider all-European cooperation. In that context, the division of Germany need not be undone through formal reunification but by the gradual emergence of a much less threatening loose confederation of the existing two states.

Third, much in keeping with the spirit of these symbolic acts, Western Europe should strive to create the maximum number of opportunities for East European participation in various all-

European bodies. There is today a proliferation of such institutions, both private and public. East Europeans should be encouraged quietly but systematically to increase their participation—even if initially only as observers—in such bodies as the European Parliament, as well as the myriad of more specialized technical agencies. The fostering in Eastern Europe of the European spirit, and of greater East European recognition that there is more to Europe today than meets the eye, is clearly in the interest of all Europe. But a new burst of energy in this regard is much needed.

It would also be appropriate for the major West European nations, as well as for America, to sponsor during the Yalta year of 1985—on either a private or public basis—a series of seminars and conferences on the future of post-Yalta Europe. A special effort should be made to invite East Europeans to participate, on whatever basis is possible, in deliberations designed to forge during that year a wider consensus on how best to undo peacefully Yalta's legacy.

In addition, Western Europe should reactivate efforts previously initiated but lately dormant designed to encourage closer contacts and eventually even some form of collaboration between the Common Market and Eastern Europe. In different ways, both East Germany and Yugoslavia today have practical relationships with that important West European entity. Precisely because the present Soviet leadership has stepped up its efforts to integrate Eastern Europe into COMECON and thus to bind it to the Soviet economy, additional initiative on the part of the Common Market is now badly needed. Even if the East Europeans, under Soviet pressure, were to rebuff such Western efforts at closer contacts, exchange of information and some cooperative projects, the Western initiative would still have a positive effect. The recent East German willingness to risk Soviet displeasure at growing inter-German ties reflects the widespread desire as well as economic need of Eastern Europe for closer links with the rest of Europe. The continued economic stagnation of the Soviet-type economies makes the timing for greater Western activism in this regard particularly propitious.

Fourth, and in no way in conflict with the preceding, Europe should intensify its aid to those East Europeans who are struggling actively for the political emancipation of Eastern Europe. That struggle is the necessary concomitant and at least partially also the cause of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe. Only too often do West European well-wishers of a more independent Eastern Europe look askance at those in the East who undertake more direct forms of struggle. While cultivation of East European officials enjoys a certain fashionable prestige in Western circles, tangible assistance to those resisting totalitarianism is viewed only too frequently as somehow "in the spirit of the cold war."

Yet a division of labor between America and Europe in which the former is seen as alone in supporting dissident "subversion" while the latter engages exclusively in official courtship would be self-defeating. West Europeans should undertake to provide support for some of the activities that America has quite generously, for Europe's sake as well as for its own, sustained for more than three decades. The French recently have done so for the Polish Solidarity movement, and so have some other Europeans. Radio Paris has been gaining more East European listeners. But much more needs to be done. Germany, for example, after Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in effect endorsed Wojciech Jaruzelski's martial law in Poland, confined itself to truly humanitarian private philanthropy; it has not been as active as it could be in sustaining various forms of East European political activity designed to induce the existing regimes to transform themselves.

In subtle but sustained fashion West Europe could aid the East Europeans in such efforts, because in the age of transistors and mass communications totalitarian control can be pierced, with positive political effect. Western Europe should, after all, be a direct partner in the struggle for Europe's future, and a well-funded Franco-British-German-Italian consortium (a Foundation for a Post-Yalta Europe) to aid East European efforts to emancipate peacefully the eastern portion of Europe would be an appropriate and long overdue contribution.

Fifth, the time has come for a more fundamental rethinking of the relationship between Western security and political change in Europe as a whole. The West can make the needed adjustment, and America—since it plays the central military role—should take the lead to that end. America is needed in Europe to deter Russia not only from military aggression but from political intimidation. That is obvious and it justifies NATO and the American military presence on the continent. But an American military presence that reduces the incentive for the Europeans to unite politically, yet simultaneously increases the incentive for the Soviets to stay put militarily in central and

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eastern Europe, is a military presence not guided by a subtle political-historical calculus. A more sensitive calibration of the political-military equation is needed in order to safeguard Western Europe while promoting change in the East-West relationship.

If Europe is to emerge politically, it must assume a more direct role in its own defense. A Europe that plays a larger defense role will require a lesser, or at least a redefined, American military presence. A Europe that can defend itself more on its own is a Europe that is also politically more vital, while less challenging to the Soviet Union from a purely military point of view, than a Europe with a large American military presence in its very center. Such a Europe would then be better able to satisfy the East European yearning for closer association without such association being tantamount to an American defeat of Russia.

But Europe must be prodded to move in that direction. Left as it is, Europe's cultural hedonism and political complacence will ensure that not much is done. Even the modest 1978 NATO commitment to a three percent per annum increase in defense expenditures was not honored by most European states. America should, therefore, initiate a longer-term process to alter the nature of its military presence in Europe gradually, while making it clear to the Europeans that the change is not an act of anger or a threat (à la the Mansfield resolution) but rather the product of a deliberate strategy designed to promote Europe's unity and its historic restoration.

Ultimately, the United States in NATO should be responsible primarily for offsetting Soviet strategic power, thus deterring both a Soviet attack or nuclear blackmail. But on the ground, the defense of Europe over the next decade should become an even more predominantly European responsibility. The needed process of replacing gradually but not totally (and certainly not in Berlin) the U.S. ground combat forces could perhaps be accelerated if, through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks or otherwise, the Soviet Union were willing to reciprocate by comparable withdrawals of its own ground forces. But, in any case, it should be accompanied by appropriate European efforts to assume greater responsibility for the defense of Europe not only on a purely national basis but through enhanced European defense coordination.

The United States should particularly encourage efforts at increased Franco-German military cooperation and eventual

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integration. France has a historic awareness of a European identity while Germany chafes under Europe's partition. A Franco-German army would have the manpower, the resources, and the fighting potential to pick up the slack created by a gradual decrease in the American combat presence on the ground. The eventual fusion of these two national forces into a joint combat force would represent a giant step toward a politically more vital Europe, yet a Europe which would be less conflictual with the Soviet Union than a Europe hosting a large U.S. army and less threatening to Eastern Europe than a Europe with a powerful separate German army. A gradually reduced U.S. ground presence would in turn create pressure from even the existing East European regimes for a commensurate Soviet redeployment, thereby gradually creating a more flexible political situation.

To move Europe in this direction, the United States will have to take the first steps, even perhaps unilaterally through a ten-year program of annual cuts in the level of the U.S. ground forces in Europe. But these steps should be taken in the context of an articulated strategy that has a constructive political as well as military rationale. Its political purpose should be openly proclaimed: to create the setting for Europe's restoration and, through it, also for a more stable East-West relationship. It would also have to be made clear that some American combat forces would remain in Europe, as they do in Korea, thereby ensuring immediate American engagement in the event of hostilities. Moreover, continued American strategic protection of Europe should not remain confined only to the possible employment of nuclear weaponry. It should over time, with technological advance, be enhanced to include also some strategic defense. As strategic defense for America becomes more viable, it should be a major American goal to extend some of its protection to Europe as well.

A division of labor in NATO along the foregoing lines would make it much easier to consider by Yalta's fiftieth anniversary also those East-West security and political arrangements which at the moment seem premature, unrealistic, or excessively threatening to America or to Russia. These could include demilitarized or nuclear-free zones or extension of the Austrian-type neutrality to other areas, including later even to a loosely confederated Germany. It would encourage a process of change permitting the latent or frustrated West and East European impulses for the restoration of Europe gradually to surface. Eventually, it would permit Europe to emerge, and to play a major role on the Eurasian continent, along with the Soviet Union, India and China, while helping to ensure through its links with America that no single power dominates that geopolitically vital continent.

VIII

The fiftieth anniversary of Yalta is only ten years away. It should be our shared goal to fashion by then political-military arrangements which, instead of perpetuating the division of Europe—and perhaps even prompting West Europe's political decay, create the preconditions for peacefully undoing Yalta. A Western Europe essentially self-reliant in regional defense, while covered by the U.S. system of nuclear deterrence and also eventually by U.S. strategic defense, would be a Western Europe more capable of pursuing a positive policy toward the East without fear of domination by Moscow. In the final analysis, only Europeans can restore Europe; it cannot be done for them by others.

To be sure, Moscow will resist the aspirations of the Europeans. No empire dissolves itself voluntarily—at least not until it becomes evident that accommodation to gradual dissolution is preferable to the rising costs of preserving the imperial system. So it will be also with the Soviet empire. Moscow will violently protest any Western disavowal of Yalta's legacy and will accuse the West of worsening East-West relations; that is only to be expected. But such public disavowal is the necessary point of departure for more focused efforts by all the Europeans gradually to undo their continent's division. Once that historic commitment has been made, these efforts, as recommended here, need not be either aggressive or initially even very explicit. As time passes, with the organic growth of a larger Europe gathering momentum, it will become more and more difficult for the Kremlin to resist a process that over time may acquire the hallmarks of historical inevitability. At some point, then, even the Soviets may find it useful to codify some new neutrality arrangements in central Europe and to reduce and eventually to remove their occupation forces.

One should not underestimate in this connection Moscow's adaptability. Despite his ruthlessness, even Stalin accommodated himself to the reality of an independent Catholic Church in Poland; Khrushchev to a Polish peasantry free from collectivization and to a separate Romanian foreign policy; Brezhnev to "goulash communism" in Hungary and to army rule in Poland. Why then should not the next generation of Soviet leaders be pressed also to come to terms with the fact that even the interests of the Soviet people would be better served by a less frustrated and oppressed east-central Europe, partaking more directly of the benefits of all-European cooperation?

As divided Europe enters the fifth decade after Yalta, it is important to reiterate that undoing Yalta cannot involve a precise blueprint or a single dramatic initiative. The shape of the future cannot be reduced to a neat plan, with specific phases and detailed agreements. Rather, it requires an explicit commitment and a sense of strategic direction for a process of change that is bound to have also its own dynamic. In any case, for America the emergence of a more vital Europe would be a positive outcome, for ultimately a pluralistic world is in America's true interest. Moreover, such a development would avert the major danger that if Yalta's legacy is not deliberately—though peacefully—undone in the East, it will eventually become the reality in the West. In other words, Yalta must be consigned to Europe's past if it is not to become Europe's future.

THE EINSTEIN LETTER

by

ALBERT EINSTEIN

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The Einstein Letter

Albert Einstein AUGUST 2, 1939

F. D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations:

In the course of the last four months it has been made probable—through the work of Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America—that it may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future.

This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable—though much less certain—that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by air.

The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is Belgian Congo.

In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of achieving this might be for you to entrust with this task a person who has

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your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an inofficial capacity. His task might comprise the following:

a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further development, and put forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the United States;

b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on within the limits of the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds be required, through his contacts with private persons who are willing to make contributions for this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the co-operation of industrial laboratories which have the necessary equipment.

I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizsäcker, is attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin where some of the American work on uranium is now being repeated.

Yours very truly,
(signed) Albert Einstein

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ATOMIC BOMBS AND THE POSTWAR POSITION OF THE U.S. IN THE WORLD

by

LEO SZILARD

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Atomic Bombs and the Postwar Position of the United States in the World

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Leo Szilard MARCH 1945

The development of the atomic bomb is mostly considered from the point of view of its possible use in the present war, and such bombs are likely to be available in time to be used before the war ends. However, their role in the . . .* years which will follow can be expected to be far more important, and it seems that the position of the United States in the world may be adversely affected by their existence. The following might very well turn out to be the future course of events:

Before the end of the war we shall use atomic bombs against Japan. These bombs will be much less powerful than we know could be made and which in all likelihood will be made within . . . years, yet the first bomb that is detonated over Japan will be spectacular enough to start a race in atomic armaments between us and other nations.

In a few months Russia's war with Germany may be over. The work on uranium will then undoubtedly be given a high priority there, but it will perhaps still not be carried out on a large industrial scale until we detonate our first atomic bomb and thus demonstrate the success of this development. For a few years after that we shall almost certainly be ahead of Russia. But even if we assume that we could keep ahead of her in this development all the time, this may neither offer us protection from attack nor necessarily give us substantial advantage in case of war . . . years from now.

. . . years from now Russia may have accumulated enough of some of the active elements which may be used for constructing atomic bombs to have an equivalent to. . . .

Clearly, if such bombs are available, it is not necessary to bomb our cities from the air in order to destroy them. All that is necessary is to place a comparatively small number of such bombs in each of our major cities and to detonate them at some later time.

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* The dots in this article represent classified figures which were omitted from the memorandum when it was published in the *Bulletin*.

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The United States has a very long coastline which will make it possible to smuggle in such bombs in peacetime and to carry them by truck into our cities. The long coastline, the structure of our society, and our very heterogeneous population may make an effective control of such "traffic" virtually impossible. One can easily visualize how a "friendly" power in time of peace may have such bombs placed in all of our major cities under the guidance of agents. This might be done free from aggressive intent. Such a power might know or suspect that we have accumulated a quantity of atomic bombs and fear our defenses are so strong that after the outbreak of hostilities it would be difficult to reach our cities by air. In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult for its "government" to refuse to take "precautions" which its "army" considers necessary. . . .

So far it has not been possible to devise any methods which would enable us to detect hidden atomic bombs buried in the ground or otherwise efficiently protected against detection.

If there should be great progress in the development of rockets after this war, it is conceivable that it will become possible to drop atomic bombs on the cities of the United States from very great distances by means of rockets.

The weakness of the position of the United States will largely be due to the very high concentration of its manufacturing capacity and of its population in cities. Thirty million people live here in cities of over 250,000. This concentration is so pronounced that the destruction of the cities may easily mean the end of our ability to resist. Keeping constantly ahead of the Russians in our production of these heavy elements will not restore us to a strong position. No quantity of these "active" materials which we may accumulate will protect us from attack, and so far as retaliation is concerned, we might not be able to do more than to destroy the large cities of Russia which are few in number and the economic importance of which is in no way comparable to the economic importance of our own cities. Thus it would appear that we would not gain an overwhelmingly strong position in a war with Russia merely by accumulating an enormous quantity of these elements or by increasing, as we might, the efficiency of our bombs from . . . to a much higher value.

The strong position of the United States in the world in the past thirty years was essentially due to the fact that the United States could outproduce every other country in heavy armaments. It takes a very large number of tanks, airplanes, and guns to bring about a decision in a war, and as long as tanks, airplanes, and guns are the major instruments of war the large production capacity of the United States gives it an advantage which may be considered decisive.

The existence of atomic bombs means the end of the strong position of the United States in this respect. From now on the destructive power which can be accumulated by other countries as well as the United States can easily reach the level at which all the cities of the "enemy" can be destroyed in one single sudden attack. The expenditure in money and material which is necessary to reach this level is so small that any of the major powers can easily afford it provided. . . . For us to accumulate active materials in quantities beyond that necessary to destroy the cities of the "enemy" would probably give us some advantage in the war, but it is difficult to say whether the importance of such "excess" amounts of material would be really substantial. Out-producing the "enemy" might therefore not necessarily increase our strength very much.

The greatest danger arising out of a competition between the United States and Russia, which would lead to a rapid accumulation of vast quantities of atomic bombs in both countries, consists in the possibility of the outbreak of a preventive war. Such a war might be the outcome of the fear that the other country might strike first, and no amount of good will on the part of both nations might be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of a war if such an explosive situation were allowed to develop.

One of the questions that has to be considered is whether it might be possible to set up some system of controls of the production of these active materials. Such controls would ultimately have to extend to every territory on the earth. Whether it is politically and technically feasible to set up effective controls and what we could do to improve our chances in this respect are questions that urgently require study and decisions. Some further remarks on these questions are made below, but other considerations might be put forward as soon as the question receives the attention of the government.

A system of controls could be considered successful only if we could count on a period of grace in case the controls were denounced or obstructed by one of the major powers. This means that the system would have to be of such a nature that at least . . . would lapse between the time the nations began to convert their installations for the purpose of manufacturing atomic bombs and the time such bombs became available in quantity. . . .

From a formal point of view all countries may be considered as potential enemies, but it is perhaps not too optimistic to assume that we may disregard the possibility of a war with Great Britain in the next fifteen years. It appears, however, rather unlikely that jointly with Great Britain we could police the world and thus prevent by force the manufacture of all of the "active materials" anywhere in the world, including Russia.

It might perhaps be possible to set up with Great Britian and Russia some sort of joint control of the manufacture of the active materials everywhere in the world if we could get Russia to agree to such a control, which of necessity would have to extend to her territory. The purpose of such a control would be to prevent the active elements from becoming available in a form in which they could be used for the manufacture of atomic bombs.

35

This would not necessarily mean that the development of atomic power has to be suppressed but only that the elements involved must not be prepared in certain forms and degree of purity.

This point raises the following question: What forms of atomic power can we permit to be organized if we want to make sure that the available materials and facilities cannot easily be converted for the manufacture of atomic bombs? Some thought has already been given to this question with the following result.

There are two types of active materials. Materials of the first type can be diluted by the abundant isotope of uranium in such a way as to rule out the possibility of using them for atomic bombs while leaving unimpaired the usefulness of the materials for industrial purposes. A chemical separation from the diluting material would be impossible and a conversion into materials which can be used for atomic bombs would take. . . .

Material of the second type which can be used for atomic bombs can be "denatured" by. . . . Whether more elaborate methods can be worked out which will permit the detonation of the denatured material is a question which would have to be carefully scrutinized. These lines merely serve to indicate that there might perhaps be a satisfactory solution to the problem of reconciling the requirements of safety of the United States with the desire not to hamper the development of atomic power for industrial purposes.

Unfortunately it is by no means sure that a satisfactory solution of this problem is in fact possible. It would be much easier, safer, and would require a much less tight control to arrest the development of atomic power by scrapping and outlawing the large and easily visible installations which characterize the first stage of this development.

If Russia, the United States and other countries were willing to forego the use of atomic power for peacetime purposes, one could have a system of control that would be fairly simple since it would be almost sufficient to control the movements of raw materials. Ores of uranium would have to be mined under control and transported to some "neutral" territory. Whether or not it would be permitted to have in a neutral territory installations belonging to . . . and atomic power plants is a question of minor importance. It appears likely that if the major powers were willing to forego the use of atomic power, a system of controls could be set up without encountering too great difficulties.

On the other hand, if the United States, Russia, and other countries should have atomic power installations within their own territory, a very tight system of control would be needed in order to make sure that the nations would not have to face a sudden attack by atomic bombs. For a control of this sort to be effective, it would be necessary that our agents and the agents of Great Britian move freely around in Russia, be permitted to keep contacts with Russian civilians, secretly employ Russian civilians

36

for the purpose of obtaining information, and have entry into every factory or shop throughout the vast territory of Russia.

That there may be dangerous loopholes in control systems which might be set up is illustrated by events that took place in Germany after the first world war. At that time, there were many Germans who were willing to give information to the Inter-Allied Commission about violations of the control regulations, but those who actually did so were publicly tried under the German Espionage Law and were given heavy sentences. The Treaty of Versailles did not stipulate that the German Espionage Law must be revoked.

Clearly, it would be desirable to create a situation which would permit us to appeal in various ways to physicists and engineers everywhere for information that would uncover violations of the controls. This would give us additional assurance that such violations would be detected, but it presupposes that we succeed in creating conditions in which we would guarantee the personal safety of those who volunteer such information and the safety of their families.

Since Russia cannot be expected to agree to such a control unless she obtains the same rights of control in the United States and Great Britain, the question whether Congress and the people of the United States are willing to agree to such a control might become a paramount importance.

As to our chances of persuading the Russians to accept mutual control, much may depend on the proper timing of our approach to Russia. It would appear that such an approach would have to be made immediately after we demonstrated the potency of atomic bombs. . . .

Events may be expected to move so fast that if it is intended to reach an agreement with Russia and other countries such an agreement would have to be complete before the next presidential elections. . . .

While it may be a great step forward to establish a tight control on the atomic power development by a reciprocal agreement with Great Britain and Russia and extend it to all territories of the world, yet we cannot disregard the possibility that one of the major powers, for instance Russia, after a few years—during which the controls may have operated quite successfully—may begin to place difficulties in the way of an effective control of activities conducted on its own territory. It would be quite essential that the people of this country and the world be brought to understand from the start that any difficulties which any nation may place in the way of the established controls would have to be considered as tantamount to a "declaration of war."

Such a "declaration of war" would have the effect that the United States and other countries involved would at once begin to manufacture atomic bombs. If up to that time the control had been effective, it would take . . . to convert the materials and installations involved in the utilization of atomic power to the manufacture of bombs. In such an "armament race"

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in which all countries would have to start, so to speak, from scratch, the position of the United States might be quite favorable, provided the development of atomic power had been kept up at a high level.

Clearly if any major power deliberately wants to start a war, there will be a war and all that we can hope to achieve by the reciprocal control which we have discussed is that a war may not break out as a result of an armament race.

Still, it would seem that if the situation were generally understood there might be some hope that having succeeded in setting up a system of reciprocal control and having kept it in operation for a few years, neither the United States nor Great Britain nor Russia would attempt to interfere with this system of control in such a manner that its acts would be considered by the other partners as a menace. We would then perhaps have a chance of living through this century without having our cities destroyed.

An attempt to manufacture atomic bombs undertaken by any of the smaller countries would be of minor importance since it could be met by immediate armed intervention using ordinary methods of warfare such as tanks and airplanes.

In discussing our postwar situation the greatest attention has been given in this memorandum to the role that Russia might play. This was not done because it was assumed that Russia may have aggressive intentions but rather because it was assumed that if an agreement can be reached with Russia, it will be possible to extend the system of controls to every country in the world. . . .

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DROPPING OF AN ATOMIC BOMB ON HIROSHIMA

by

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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Harry S. Truman: Announcement of the Dropping of an Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima

The leaders of the Allied powers met at Potsdam, Germany, from July 17 to August 2, 1945, to consider the fate of defeated Germany and to plan the final campaign against Japan. The U.S. representative was President Truman, who had succeeded to the presidency on Roosevelt's death three months before; and Clement Attlee replaced Winston Churchill as British prime minister during the course of the conference. The first declaration issued by the conferees was the "unconditional surrender" ultimatum presented to Japan on July 26. Earlier in the conference Truman had informed Churchill that the United States had successfully tested an atomic device on July 16, to which Churchill is supposed to have responded: "This is the Second Coming, in wrath." On July 25, a day before the ultimatum, Truman ordered the 20th Air Force at Saipan to use one of the two atomic bombs in their possession at the first opportunity after August 3 if Japan had not yet surrendered. On July 29 the Japanese cabinet decided to make no immediate comment on the ultimatum, but press reports of their decision indicated to Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they had "ignored" it. This note of defiance, which may actually have been unintended, led to the decision in Washington to use the bombs. The first was dropped on Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, destroying over four square miles of the city and killing or injuring more than 135,000 people. The President's address to the nation on August 6 is reprinted here.

Source: *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, April 12 to December 31, 1945*, Washington, 1961, pp. 197-200.

SIXTEEN HOURS AGO an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It had more than 2,000 times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam," which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid manyfold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production, and even more powerful forms are in development.

It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method of doing it. By 1942,

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however, we knew that the Germans were working feverishly to find a way to add atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V-1's and V-2's late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all.

The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land, and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles.

Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and many priceless helps to our victories have come from that arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.

The United States had available the large number of scientists of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project, and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at that time Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here.

We now have two great plants and many lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We have spent $2 billion on the greatest scientific gamble in history — and won.

Wide World

Smoke rising from the explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima; photo taken from Yoshiura on the other side of the mountain to the north. Spots on film were caused by radiation from the explosion

But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvelous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brainchild of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high pressure and without failure.

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware.

The secretary of war, who has kept in personal touch with all phases of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving further details.

His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and an installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico. Although the workers at the sites have been making materials to be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history, they have not themselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care has been taken of their safety.

The fact that we can release atomic energy ushers in a new era in man's understanding of nature's forces. Atomic energy may in the future supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling water, but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete with them commercially. Before that comes there must be a long period of intensive research.

It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.

I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace.

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THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB

by

HENRY STIMSON

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The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

Henry L. Stimson FEBRUARY 1947

In recent months there has been much comment about the decision to use atomic bombs in attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This decision was one of the gravest made by our government in recent years, and it is entirely proper that it should be widely discussed. I have therefore decided to record for all who may be interested my understanding of the events which led up to the attack on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, on Nagasaki on August 9, and the Japanese decision to surrender on August 10. No single individual can hope to know exactly what took place in the minds of all of those who had a share in these events, but what follows is an exact description of our thoughts and actions as I find them in the records and in my clear recollection.

It was in the fall of 1941 that the question of atomic energy was first brought directly to my attention. At that time President Roosevelt appointed a committee consisting of Vice President Wallace, General Marshall, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and myself. The function of this committee was to advise the President on questions of policy relating to the study of nuclear fission which was then proceeding both in this country and in Great Britain. For nearly four years thereafter I was directly connected with all major decisions of policy on the development and use of atomic energy, and from May 1, 1943, until my resignation as Secretary of War on September 21, 1945, I was directly responsible to the President for the administration of the entire undertaking; my chief advisers in this period were General Marshall, Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and Major General Leslie R. Groves, the officer in charge of the project. At the same time I was the President's senior adviser on the military employment of atomic energy.

The policy adopted and steadily pursued by President Roosevelt and his advisers was a simple one. It was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful development of an atomic weapon. The reasons for this policy were equally simple. The original experimental achievement of atomic fission had occurred in Germany in 1938, and it was known that the Germans had continued their experiments. In 1941 and 1942 they were believed to be ahead of us, and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring atomic weapons into the field of battle. Furthermore, if we should be the first to develop the weapon, we should have a great new instrument for shortening the war and minimizing destruction. At no time from 1941 to 1945 did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war. All of us of course understood the terrible responsibility involved in our attempt to unlock the doors to such a devastating weapon; President Roosevelt particularly spoke to me many times of his own awareness of the catastrophic potentialities of our work. But we were at war, and the work must be done. I therefore emphasize that it was our common objective throughout the war to be the first to produce an atomic weapon and use it. The possible atomic weapon was considered to be a new and tremendously powerful explosive, as legitimate as any other of the deadly explosive weapons of modern war. The entire purpose was the production of a military weapon; on no other ground could the wartime expenditure of so much time and money have been justified. The exact circumstances in which that weapon might be used were unknown to any of us until the middle of 1945, and when that time came, as we shall presently see, the military use of atomic energy was connected with larger questions of national policy.

The extraordinary story of the successful development of the atomic bomb has been well told elsewhere. As time went on it became clear that the weapon would not be available in time for use in the European theater, and the war against Germany was successfully ended by the use of what are now called conventional means. But in the spring of 1945 it became evident that the climax of our prolonged atomic effort was at hand. By the nature of atomic chain reactions, it was impossible to state with certainty that we had succeeded until a bomb had actually exploded in a full-scale experiment; nevertheless it was considered exceedingly probable that we should by midsummer have successfully detonated the first atomic bomb. This was to be done at the Alamogordo Reservation in New Mexico. It was thus time for detailed consideration of our future plans. What had begun as a well-founded hope was now developing into a reality.

On March 15, 1945, I had my last talk with President Roosevelt. My diary record of this conversation gives a fairly clear picture of the state of our thinking at that time. I have removed the name of the distinguished public servant who was fearful lest the Manhattan (atomic) project be "a lemon"; it was an opinion common among those not fully informed.

"The President . . . had suggested that I come over to lunch today . . . First I took up with him a memorandum which he sent to me from ——, who had been alarmed at the rumors of extravagance in the Manhattan project. —— suggested that it might become disastrous and he suggested that we get a body of "outside" scientists to pass upon the project because rumors are going around that Vannevar Bush and Jim Conant have sold the President a lemon on the subject and ought to be checked up on. It was rather a jittery and nervous memorandum and rather silly, and I was prepared for it and I gave the President a list of the scientists who were actually engaged on it to show the very high standing of them and it comprised four Nobel Prize men, and also how practically every physicist of standing was engaged with us in the project. Then I outlined to him the future of it and when it was likely to come off and told him how important it was to get ready. I went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempted control of the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and of access. I told him that those things must be settled before the first projectile is used and that he must be ready with a statement to come out to the people on it just as soon as that is done. He agreed to that . . ."

This conversation covered the three aspects of the question which were then uppermost in our minds. First, it was always necessary to suppress a lingering doubt that any such titanic undertaking could be successful. Second, we must consider the implications of success in terms of its long-range postwar effect. Third, we must face the problem that would be presented at the time of our first use of the weapon, for with that first use there must be some public statement.

I did not see Franklin Roosevelt again. The next time I went to the White House to discuss atomic energy was April 25, 1945, and I went to explain the nature of the problem to a man whose only previous knowledge of our actitivies was that of a Senator who had loyally accepted our assurance that the matter must be kept a secret from him. Now he was President and Commander-in-Chief, and the final responsibility in this as in so many other matters must be his. President Truman accepted this responsibility with the same fine spirit that Senator Truman had shown before in accepting our refusal to inform him.

I discussed with him the whole history of the project. We had with us General Groves, who explained in detail the progress which had been made and the probable future course of the work. I also discussed with President Truman the broader aspects of the subject, and the memorandum which I used in this discussion is again a fair sample of the state of our thinking at the time.

Memorandum discussed with President Truman April 25, 1945:

"1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.

"2. Although we have shared its development with the U.K., physically the U.S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years.

44

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"3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely.

"a. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.

"b. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily mainly within the possession and knowledge of U.S. and U.K., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible for atomic bombs to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a larger nation in a much shorter time.

"4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a wilful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one. [A brief reference to the estimated capabilities of other nations is here omitted; it in no way affects the course of the argument.]

"5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.

"6. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern now likely to be considered, without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of this new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thoroughgoing rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated.

"7. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.

"8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.

"9. As stated in General Groves' report, steps are under way looking towards the establishment of a select committee of particular qualifications for recommending action to the executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect. The committee would also recommend the actions to be taken by the War Department prior to that time in anticipation of the postwar problems. All recommendations would of course be first submitted to the President."

The next step in our preparations was the appointment of the committee referred to in paragraph 9 above. This committee, which was known as the Interim Committee, was charged with the function of advising the President on the various questions raised by our apparently imminent success in developing an atomic weapon. I was its chairman, but the principal labor of guiding its extended deliberations fell to George L. Harrison, who acted as chairman in my absence. It will be useful to consider the work of the committee in some detail. Its members were the following, in addition to Mr. Harrison and myself:

James F. Byrnes (then a private citizen) as personal representative of the President.

Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy.

William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State.

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, and president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington.

Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief of the Office of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, and president of Harvard University.

The discussions of the committee ranged over the whole field of atomic energy, in its political, military, and scientific aspects. That part of its work which particularly concerns us here relates to its recommendations for the use of atomic energy against Japan, but it should be borne in mind that these recommendations were not made in a vacuum. The committee's work included the drafting of the statements which were published immediately after the first bombs were dropped, the drafting of a bill for the domestic control of atomic energy, and recommendations looking toward the international control of atomic energy. The Interim Committee was assisted in its work by a Scientific Panel whose members were the following: Dr. A. H. Compton, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, and Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer. All four were nuclear physicists of the first rank; all four had held positions of great importance in the atomic project from its inception. At a meeting with the Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel on May 31, 1945 I urged all those present to feel free to express themselves on any phase of the subject, scientific or political. Both General Marshall and I at this meeting expressed the view that atomic energy could not be considered simply in terms of military weapons but must also be considered in terms of a new relationship of man to the universe.

On June 1, after its discussions with the Scientific Panel, the Interim Committee unanimously adopted the following recommendations:

1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
2. It should be used on a dual target—that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and
3. It should be used without prior warning [of the nature of the weapon].

(One member of the committee, Mr. Bard, later changed his view and dissented from the third recommendation.)

In reaching these conclusions the Interim Committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed advance warning or a demonstration in some uninhabited area. Both of these suggestions were discarded as impractical. They were not regarded as likely to be effective in compelling a surrender of Japan and both of them involved serious risks. Even the New Mexico test would not give final proof that any given bomb was certain to explode when dropped from an airplane. Quite apart from the generally unfamiliar nature of atomic explosives, there was the whole problem of exploding a bomb at a predetermined height in the air by a complicated mechanism which could not be tested in the static test of New Mexico. Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud—and this was a real possibility. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had.

The Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel also served as a channel through which suggestions from other scientists working on the atomic project were forwarded to me and to the President. Among the suggestions thus forwarded was one memorandum which questioned using the bomb at all against the enemy. On June 16, 1945, after consideration of that memorandum, the Scientific Panel made a report, from which I quote the following paragraphs:

"The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this special weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; *we can propose no technical demonstration* *likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.* [Italics mine.]

"With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power."

The foregoing discussion presents the reasoning of the Interim Committee and its advisers. I have discussed the work of these gentlemen at length in order to make it clear that we sought the best advice that we could find. The committee's function was, of course, entirely advisory. The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to the President rested upon me, and I have no desire to veil it. The conclusions of the committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost.

The facts upon which my reasoning was based and steps taken to carry it out now follow.

The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace.

Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals to the Soviet government, hoping to use the Russians as mediators in a negotiated peace. These vague proposals contemplated the retention by Japan of important conquered areas and were therefore not considered seriously. There was as yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determination to fight rather than accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she had still a great military force.

In the middle of July 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in the home islands, slightly under two million; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over two million; in French Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma, over 200,000; in the East Indies area, including the Philippines, over 500,000; in the by-passed Pacific islands, over 100,000. The total strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at about five million men. These estimates later proved to be in very close agreement with official Japanese figures.

48

The Japanese Army was in much better condition than the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The Navy had practically ceased to exist except as a harrying force against an invasion fleet. The Air Force had been reduced mainly to reliance upon Kamikaze, or suicide, attacks. These latter, however, had already inflicted serious damage on our seagoing forces, and their possible effectiveness in a last ditch fight was a matter of real concern to our naval leaders.

As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death.

The strategic plans of our armed forces for the defeat of Japan as they stood in July had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb, which had not yet been tested in New Mexico. We were planning an intensified sea and air blockade and greatly intensified strategic air bombing through the summer and early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This would be followed in turn by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the spring of 1946. The total U.S. military and naval force involved in this grand design was of the order of five million men; if all those indirectly concerned are included, it was larger still.

We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our allies, and, of course, if our campaign were successful and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own.

It was already clear in July that even before the invasion we should be able to inflict enormously severe damage on the Japanese homeland by the combined application of "conventional" sea and air power. The critical question was whether this kind of action would induce surrender. It therefore became necessary to consider very carefully the probable state of mind of the enemy, and to assess with accuracy the line of conduct which might end his will to resist.

With these considerations in mind, I wrote a memorandum for the President, on July 2, which I believe fairly represents the thinking of the American government as it finally took shape in action. This memorandum was prepared after discussion and general agreement with Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and when I discussed it with the President, he expressed his general approval.

Memorandum for the President, July 2, 1945, on proposed program for Japan:

"1. The plans of operation up to and including the first landing have been authorized and the preparations for the operation are now actually going on. This situation was accepted by all members of your conference on Monday, June 18.

"2. There is reason to believe that the operation for the occupation of Japan following the landing may be a very long, costly, and arduous struggle on our part. The terrain, much of which I have visited several times, has left the impression on my memory of being one which would be susceptible to a last ditch defense such as has been made on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and which of course is very much larger than either of those two areas. According to my recollection it will be much more unfavorable with regard to tank maneuvering than either the Philippines or Germany.

"3. If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last ditch resistance. The Japanese are highly patriotic and certainly susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion. Once started in actual invasion, we shall in my opinion have to go through with an even more bitter finish fight than in Germany. We shall incur the losses incident to such a war and we shall have to leave the Japanese islands even more thoroughly destroyed than was the case with Germany. This would be due both to the difference in the Japanese and German personal character and the differences in the size and character of the terrain through which the operations will take place.

"4. A question then comes: Is there any alternative to such a forceful occupation of Japan which will secure for us the equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a permanent destruction of her power again to strike an aggressive blow at the 'peace of the Pacific'? I am inclined to think that there is enough such chance to make it well worthwhile our giving them a warning of what is to come and a definite opportunity to capitulate. As above suggested, it should be tried before the actual forceful occupation of the homeland islands is begun and furthermore the warning should be given in ample time to permit a national reaction to set in.

"We have the following enormously favorable factors on our side—factors much weightier than those we had against Germany:

"Japan has no allies.

"Her navy is nearly destroyed and she is vulnerable to a surface and underwater blockade which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population.

"She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources.

"She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia.

"We have inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminishing potential.

"We have great moral superiority through being the victim of her first sneak attack.

"The problem is to translate these advantages into prompt and economical achievement of our objectives. I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people, capable in an unprecedentedly short time of adopting not only the complicated technique of Occidental civilization but to a substantial extent their culture and their political and social ideas. Her advance in all these respects during the short period of sixty or seventy years has been one of the most astounding feats of national progress in history—a leap from the isolated feudalism of centuries into the position of one of the six or seven great powers of the world. She has not only built up powerful armies and navies. She has maintained an honest and effective national finance and respected position in many of the sciences in which we pride ourselves. Prior to the forcible seizure of power over her government by the fanatical military group in 1931, she had for ten years lived a reasonably responsible and respectable international life.

"My own opinion is in her favor on the two points involved in this question:

"a. I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender; and

"b. I think she has within her population enough liberal leaders (although now submerged by the terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of nations. I think she is better in this last respect than Germany was. Her liberals yielded only at the point of the pistol and, so far as I am aware, their liberal attitude has not been personally subverted in the way which was so general in Germany.

"On the other hand, I think that the attempt to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidity and antipathy which has no analogy in the case of Germany. We have a national interest in creating, if possible, a condition wherein the Japanese nation may live as a peaceful and useful member of the future Pacific community.

"5. It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan by the chief representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China, and, if then a belligerent, Russia by calling upon Japan to surrender and permit the occupation of her country in order to insure its complete demilitarization for the sake of the future peace.

"This warning should contain the following elements:

"The varied and overwhelming character of the force we are about to bring to bear on the islands.

"The inevitability and completeness of the destruction which the full application of this force will entail.

"The determination of the Allies to destroy permanently all authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking on world conquest.

"The determination of the Allies to limit Japanese sovereignty to her main islands and to render them powerless to mount and support another war.

"The disavowal of any attempt to extirpate the Japanese as a race or to destroy them as a nation.

"A statement of our readiness, once her economy is purged of its militaristic influence, to permit the Japanese to maintain such industries, particularly of a light consumer character, as offer no threat of aggression against their neighbors, but which can produce a sustaining economy, and provide a reasonable standard of living. The statement should indicate our willingness, for this purpose, to give Japan trade access to external raw materials, but no longer any control over the sources of supply outside her main islands. It should also indicate our willingness, in accordance with our now established foreign trade policy, in due course to enter into mutually advantageous trade relations with her.

"The withdrawal from their country as soon as the above objectives of the Allies are accomplished, and as soon as there has been established a peacefully inclined government, of a character representative of the masses of the Japanese people. I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance.

"6. Success of course will depend on the potency of the warning which we give her. She has an extremely sensitive national pride and, as we are now seeing every day, when actually locked with the enemy will fight to the very death. For that reason the warning must be tendered before the actual invasion has occurred and while the impending destruction, though clear beyond peradventure, has not yet reduced her to fanatical despair. If Russia is a part of the threat, the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far. Our own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as possible."

It is important to emphasize the double character of the suggested warning. It was designed to promise destruction if Japan resisted, and hope, if she surrendered.

It will be noted that the atomic bomb is not mentioned in this memorandum. On grounds of secrecy the bomb was never mentioned except when absolutely necessary, and furthermore, it had not yet been tested. It was of course well forward in our minds as the memorandum was written and discussed that the bomb would be the best possible sanction if our warning were rejected.

The adoption of the policy outlined in the memorandum of July 2 was a decision of high politics; once it was accepted by the President, the position of the atomic bomb in our planning became quite clear. I find that I stated in my diary, as early as June 19, that "the last chance warning . . . must be given before an actual landing of the ground forces in Japan, and fortunately the plans provide for enough time to bring in the sanctions to our warning in the shape of heavy ordinary bombing attack and an attack of S-1." S-1 was a code name for the atomic bomb.

There was much discussion in Washington about the timing of the warning to Japan. The controlling factor in the end was the date already set for the Potsdam meeting of the Big Three. It was President Truman's decision that such a warning should be solemnly issued by the U.S. and the U.K. from this meeting, with the concurrence of the head of the Chinese government, so that it would be plain that *all* of Japan's principal enemies were in entire unity. This was done in the Potsdam ultimatum of July 26, which very closely followed the above memorandum of July 2 with the exception that it made no mention of the Japanese Emperor.

On July 28 the Premier of Japan, Suzuki, rejected the Potsdam ultimatum by announcing that it was "unworthy of public notice." In the face of this rejection we could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had meant exactly what it said when it stated that if the Japanese continued the war, "the full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland."

For such a purpose the atomic bomb was an eminently suitable weapon. The New Mexico test occurred while we were at Potsdam, on July 16. It was immediately clear that the power of the bomb measured up to our highest estimates. We had developed a weapon of such a revolutionary character that its use against the enemy might well be expected to produce exactly the kind of shock on the Japanese ruling oligarchy which we desired, strengthening the position of those who wished peace, and weakening that of the military party.

Because of the importance of the atomic mission against Japan, the detailed plans were brought to me by the military staff for approval. With President Truman's warm support I struck off the list of suggested targets the city of Kyoto. Although it was a target of considerable military importance, it had been the ancient capital of Japan and was a shrine of Japanese art and culture. We determined that it should be spared. I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9. These two cities were active working parts of the Japanese war effort. One was an army center; the other was naval and industrial. Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Japanese Army defending southern Japan and was a major military storage and assembly point. Nagasaki was a major seaport and it contained several large industrial plants of great wartime importance. We believed that our attacks had struck cities which must certainly be important to the Japanese military leaders, both Army and Navy, and we waited for a result. We waited one day.

Many accounts have been written about the Japanese surrender. After a prolonged Japanese cabinet session in which the deadlock was broken by the Emperor himself, the offer to surrender was made on August 10. It was based on the Potsdam terms, with a reservation concerning the sovereignty of the Emperor. While the Allied reply made no promises other than those already given, it implicitly recognized the Emperor's position by prescribing that his power must be subject to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander. These terms were accepted on August 14 by the Japanese, and the instrument of surrender was formally signed on September 2, in Tokyo Bay. Our great objective was thus achieved, and all the evidence I have seen indicates that the controlling factor in the final Japanese decision to accept our terms of surrender was the atomic bomb.

The two atomic bombs which we had dropped were the only ones we had ready, and our rate of production at the time was very small. Had the war continued until the projected invasion on November 1, additional fire raids of B-29s would have been more destructive of life and property than the very limited number of atomic raids which we could have executed in the same period. But the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon. In March 1945, our Air Force had launched its first great incendiary raid on the Tokyo area. In this raid more damage was done and more casualties were inflicted than was the case at Hiroshima. Hundreds of bombers took part and hundreds of tons of incendiaries were dropped. Similar successive raids burned out a great part of the urban area of Japan, but the Japanese fought on. On August 6 one B-29 dropped a single atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and the war was over. So far as the Japanese could know, our ability to execute atomic attacks, if necessary by many planes at a time, was unlimited. As Dr. Karl Compton has said, "it was not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought surrender; it was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, *plus the dread of many more*, that was effective."

The bomb thus served exactly the purpose we intended. The peace party was able to take the path of surrender, and the whole weight of the Emperor's prestige was exerted in favor of peace. When the Emperor ordered surrender, and the small but dangerous group of fanatics who opposed him were brought under control, the Japanese became so subdued that the great undertaking of occupation and disarmament was completed with unprecedented ease.

In the foregoing pages I have tried to give an accurate account of my own personal observations of the circumstances which led up to the use of the atomic bomb and the reasons which underlay our use of it. To me they have always seemed compelling and clear, and I cannot see how any person vested with such responsibilities as mine could have taken any other course or given any other advice to his chiefs.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

by

ROBERT J. OPPENHEIMER

7

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7

International Control of Atomic Energy

J. Robert Oppenheimer JUNE 1946

Within a few weeks the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission will meet. If their meetings are successful, there will come out of them some sort of charter or set of treaties. If these are any good, if they follow proposals which have hope of effectiveness, they will require ratification by the Senate of the United States, because they will involve a partial abrogation of our national sovereignty, a giving up of what may appear to be at least a temporary security: a loss in our monopolistic position of technical advantage in the field of atomic energy. At that time, and in the period leading up to that time, it is of the utmost importance that the officers of the government feel that they have behind them an informed and enlightened and courageous citizenry.

You may think it odd that I should be dealing with a problem of statecraft. For that I have two apologies. One is that I had the privilege of working on these questions with a board of consultants to the State Department. The five of us had rather different backgrounds; and although we felt we were not qualified to discuss many of the more finely diplomatic aspects, the agreement that we reached, the intercourse and interchange of ideas that went into writing our report, gives me some confidence that the views I am presenting are not purely personal views. For another thing, it may be permitted that men who have no qualifications in statecraft concern themselves with the control of atomic energy. For I think that the control of atomic energy is important, in part, because it enables us to get away from patterns of diplomacy which are, in some respects at least, unsatisfactory as a model for the relations between nations, and to set up instead a working relationship between the peoples of different countries, which has in it some promise for the future.

I don't need to review the arguments for seeking international control: the appalling and revolutionary character of the weapon, the inadequacy of military defenses, the impossibility of any permanent monopoly which might protect us. Every American knows that if there is a third world war, this country will be wounded, maybe fatally wounded, will in any case come through it with nothing like the freedom from injury which we have had in the last two. Every American knows that if there is another major war, atomic weapons will be used, and that the problem we are dealing with is the problem of the elimination of war. We know this because in the last war, the two nations which we like to think are the most enlightened and humane in the world—Great Britain and the United States—used atomic weapons against an enemy which was essentially defeated. Under these conditions it is not thinkable that in any future major conflict, where the very life of a nation may be at stake, these weapons will not be used—they are much too effective for that.

This is an important thing to keep in mind, because it shows that we must ask of any proposals for the control of atomic energy what part they can play in reducing the probability of war. Proposals which in no way advance the general problem of the avoidance of war are not satisfactory proposals.

The threat of atomic warfare and the rivalries for raw materials, industrial capacity, power plants, technical know-how, and scientific experience, which are inherent in any struggle to maintain superiority in the field of atomic weapons, must not be allowed to persist and be in themselves a source of war. If you think of the dangerous situations which have arisen in the world because of the struggle for raw materials far less critical than uranium—oil, for instance—you will see what I have in mind.

One may ask, since the problem is the avoidance of war, why do you not attack it more broadly and more generally? Why not start right away on some of the things that we know might lessen the danger of outbreak of war? What are they? Well, I don't know, but I think when people say that universal disarmament—that is, forbidding national armaments—would reduce the chance of war, they have something. When people say, if we had a world government and if, on matters affecting the common security, the sovereignty of the nations was limited, they have something. And I think when people say that if we could provide for all peoples in the world a rising standard of living, better education, more contact with one another, better understanding of each other, and equal access to the technical and raw materials which are needed for improving the standard of living, they have something. It is not my intention to argue that these things should not be done; that would be quite wrong. They must be done. But I think that no one could have looked at the history of the world without being aware of the fact that progress in these fields is rather slow, and is likely to continue very slow. I therefore wish to stress the fact that in the field of atomic energy, certain of the difficulties which exist in other areas are absent. I wish to suggest that in addition to a general effort all along the line, a specific effort focused on this one problem may have a very useful part.

Now, what is to be said specifically about atomic energy? Most important is that one *can* set up a system of control. When I use the word *can*, I mean it is consistent with the technical facts, it is consistent with the way ordinary people behave, it will work in a human sense and a technical sense. One reason for this is that it is a subject of the most extraordinary common concern. I know of nothing which is of as little to the advantage of any men anywhere as that atomic warfare should break out; I know of nothing which is as sure to bring ruin to all as that atomic warfare should break out. I know that in the exploitation of the constructive uses of atomic energy there is a diffuse, not now clearly defined, but certain benefit for all peoples. And I think that the overriding importance in this field of those interests which the various nations have in common, and the relatively secondary although not negligible importance of the separate national interests, make this a field to progress in. It is also a field that has not been limited in the freedom of action by centuries of tradition. It is a new field, and with the exception of the United States, it is a field of which it may be safe to assume that not a terrible lot of progress has been made elsewhere; it is a field in which what you do now is not as much an eradication of past patterns as the building of new ones.

If we ask what the methods are by which one might control atomic energy, we find a rather surprisingly small number of ideas. I think no one would seriously argue that the world is such today that a convention saying "we will not make atomic weapons" would have much value. This is a sad fact; it rests upon the lack of community, the lack of fraternity between various peoples, and the terrible strain which suspicion and fear would put on such a convention. We know very well what we would do if we signed such a convention: we would not make atomic weapons, at least not to start with, but we would build enormous plants, and we would call them power plants—maybe they would produce power; we would design these plants in such a way that they could be converted with the maximum ease and the minimum time delay to the production of atomic weapons, saying, this is just in case somebody two-times us; we would stockpile uranium; we would keep as many of our developments secret as possible; we would locate our plants, not where they would do the most good for the production of power, but where they would do the most good for protection against enemy attack. We would do so, and it is reasonable to believe that all other nations would do so, and with the secrecy which inevitably surrounds such undertakings, suspicion would be very hard to resist. Such a system would be sure to collapse as international tensions grow—and they are sure to grow at one time or another.

So people have thought of methods of reinforcing such conventions. I have heard of three such methods: I wish to disparage two, not as wrong but as inadequate, and I wish to speak up for the third.

The two control methods that I wish to disparage one may call the regulatory, and the retaliatory methods. By regulatory approach, I mean that you may say, all right, let us sign this convention; but we don't trust one another, and therefore the next step is to set up a system of control whereby we can find out whether these conventions are really being observed. This is usually called inspection, and the idea is that you leave in

57

the hands of nations or of nationals, as the custom of the country may be, the development of atomic energy, production of power, research activities, manufacture of fissionable materials. You superimpose on this national development a supernational agency—a corps of refined policemen—whose job it is to go around and see that nothing is happening that is contrary to the convention. There are really two aspects to this: first, you must see that no enterprises are being carried out which are not allowed; second, you must see that the allowed ones are really doing what they say they are doing, and not doing something wicked on the sly. There is a great need for such regulation and any system of international control will have some of it. But I, and the group I worked with, felt completely desperate about the attempt to build this cops-and-robbers scheme into anything really effective, because it seemed to us the robbers always have the advantage and the cops are always dumb cops. It is true that you can't mine uranium in the backyard but there are lots of places you can mine it, and the detection of uranium mining might be difficult even for an outfit which had no other purpose than detecting illegal activities. There is very much more than one way of going from the raw material to the bomb that we know of, perhaps four or five that work today, and we are quite sure that new ones will be discovered. I'm afraid the cops could never know about the new ones, only the robbers. The national rivalries which are permitted to exist under these conditions will cause every nation to come as close to evasion as they can, and instead of having a situation in which it is to the advantage of the operators to do things safely, you will have it to the advantage of the operators to cut corners just as much as possible because the operators are concerned with their own national advantage. You see a great plant that is going up, and you were assured that this plant has as its purpose only the production of power for this poor town that has never had enough, and you look at the records and it looks to you as though there were plenty of power there, and you have to begin worrying about what the real purpose of the people who are building this plant is, and purpose is a hard thing to establish. It's very hard to tell whether a man is mining uranium because he is interested in cancer or interested in war.

We came to the conclusion, not that one could survive without such regulation, but that such regulation must be reduced and that one must make arrangements for converting the regulatory agency into a research agency, a development agency, a constructively operating agency, if it was to have the people, the know-how, the skill, the progressiveness, and in a general way, the power to find out enough even to know what it was looking for. And that is quite a different thing from national operation on which an international supervision or inspection has been superimposed.

Now, the retaliatory approach may also have something in it; but I think it hasn't in the form in which it is usually proposed: let us make a certain number of bombs, 100, 250, and let us give them to an international agency, then this international agency will be able to punish any state which starts atomic warfare or which even looks as though it were going to start atomic warfare. It would be an easy thing to prevent war if you could be sure that whenever any national action were contrary to the general interests, all other nations would gang up and stop it. But experience shows that this tends not to be true, that very broad cleavages, differences of opinion, and vacillations occur and that you do not have the effective operating unity which enables you to put your finger on the transgressor.

Then too, I think that atomic weapons are singularly unsuited as police weapons—they are much too much weapons of total war. And finally, you may say about bombs that they are international and may paint them with the colors of the United Nations, but you have to put them somewhere and if you put them somewhere they are capable of being seized. Now any international control scheme is in some respects an invitation to seizure but this one is an invitation to seizure which pays off in aggression immediately—there is no delay between the time you seize the bombs and the time when you can do damage with them. This temptation in times of international trouble would be just one of the things that is most likely to set off a conflict.

Let us take the fact that this is a field in which useful things can be done, but are hard to do; let us create an international organization responsible for developing atomic energy, getting what good there is out of it, and at the same time for protecting the world against its destructive uses. This is an easy thing to say but what does it mean? It means that all those critical activities which are or may be essential for going from the mine to the weapon are not to be conducted by nations or by nationals—they are not even to be conducted under license by a company or a national atomic energy commission. An international authority is to mine uranium, which is a unique, indispensable raw material; build power plants, which make fissionable materials or which may make fissionable materials; separate isotopes to get explosive materials—jobs which are too easily diverted, too trigger-happy, to be left in national hands. This means that one would regard the mining of uranium by a national operator as a violation of the convention. You wouldn't have to ask whether this mining is being conducted for a legal or an illegal purpose—the fact of the mining would be illegal. This means that the construction of a primary reactor to make plutonium and power at the same time would be an illegal activity for a nation. This means that research on atomic explosives—which I think must be undertaken, because unless you know what the possibilities are, you will not be prepared to prevent their realization—would be an illegal activity for a nation. We have named the international organization which would conduct such activities, the "Atomic Development Au-

59

thority" in order to suggest at least two important aspects of its function: it must have very wide authorities and it must really make for development.

The Atomic Development Authority would be responsible for mining uranium and thorium; this a matter which requires a great deal of detailed study because we don't know enough about the geological distribution, we don't know what the possibilities are of working low-grade deposits (deposits under about one per cent are normally not taken seriously). These are problems of development and research; we want them to be undertaken internationally so that the body which is trying to protect the world will know more about the dangers and about the possibilities than all the other people in the world. You never get experience in mining uranium by sitting at a desk talking about how other people are mining it—you've got to get into the field and get your hands dirty. This would mean that the Atomic Development Authority would be in the position to say, let's not mine the uranium here because it's too hard to prevent diversion, let's not worry about this mine because in it the by-product uranium doesn't amount to enough to be a danger, but in this mine the by-product uranium is so important that we've got to have really close control even though the mine claims to be, in large part, a mine which is putting out vanadium.

At present, there are no power plants, and the first thing the authority would have to do is find out how to make them. This I think will be a matter of years, not decades. The authority would then start building such plants, taking into account the following factors: first, where is power needed; second, how can we do this in such a way that no one nation or political sphere of influence in the world has a preponderance of these plants which, if seized and diverted, could in time make atomic explosives. How can we make these plants so that their seizure and diversion is as little profitable as possible, so that the time needed to convert to the manufacture of explosives is as long as possible? The problems thus include the economics of the power, sociology of the power, strategic balance to make diversion and seizure an unprofitable business, and safe design. These are things that you cannot do by regulation; you can only do them by operation.

As far as research is concerned, most has no essential danger in it. At least it is not my view that knowledge is the source of danger; the source of danger is weapons. Therefore, it was our hope that the Authority would conduct its own investigations, but would in no sense attempt to have a monopoly, even on those investigations which bear directly on the release of atomic energy. There is only one field in which we felt it desirable that there be a monopoly in research: atomic explosives, I think the reason for that is obvious—there is no reason why a nation should explore this if it does not wish to use it. The international organization should explore this because it has the responsibility for seeing that no one does this, and unless it knows what the "this" is, it can't see to that.

We were aware that setting up a monopoly which might in the course of twenty years produce a very substantial part of the power of the world and would be very important to the economy and life of the nations has some dangers, and this we thought we could meet in the following way. Many of the constructive uses, which have to do with making tracers, operating small reactors for research purposes, using radiation to study changes of biological and chemical systems, are not intrinsically dangerous. You can set the reactors up so that they do not make enough fissionable material to be significant from the point of view of atomic weapons. You can set them up so that the material contained in them is not enough to make atomic weapons and not very useful for that purpose, being in such a state that you've got to doctor it in a rather long process before it can be used for bombs.

Another thing: one can build power plants that instead of producing additional plutonium or other fissionable material, burn it up. A plant of that kind is in many ways very much easier to inspect, because if anyone diverts any of the material, the plant has to shut down, and this is a rather easy thing to notice. It can be designed in such a way that you can't smuggle uranium or thorium into it and convert it into fissionable material without that being observable to the most casual inspector. You can use in such plants active materials which are as unsuitable and as difficult and as inefficient for the making of atomic explosives as possible and therefore reduce the temptation to seizure.

These then are the kind of developments which could and should be left to national or private exploitation: research, of course, whether it bears on radiation, power, atomic energy, or anything else but atomic explosives; the use of tracers, the industrial and medical use of radiation, and the power plants which are, by the material in them, their design, and by the fact that they are destroying rather than creating explosive material, rather easy to inspect—you can't forget to watch them, but the watching is a fairly straightforward task. We thought that it would be of great advantage if these things were left open to competition under a system of licensing and inspection, because this will lead to an intercourse and a connection between the technical people of the international authority and the technical people who are not part of it. This will produce several benefits. In the first place, if you have a total monopoly, you are always in danger that something will go sour with the organization and the people will become second-rate, they will get to be friends with each other, and will no longer be exposed to the necessary criticism. In the second place, if you have no organic relation with national undertakings, you will have a much harder time finding out whether they have any dangerous tendency or not. If you are working in a national laboratory trying to show people how to use a reactor and also watching so that nothing wrong is done with this reactor, in the dual role of helper and inspector you're going to pick up the gossip of that laboratory, and you're going to be free to pass on the gossip of your own outfit. There is probably no better way of really having cognizance of what is going on.

This does not in any way eliminate the need for inspection. What I have tried to indicate is that it simplifies the problem enormously because you have valid points of contact with national industry when you are looking, not for a purpose behind an operation, but for the existence of an operation; because you are not a man who is trying to keep up with someone who is running much faster than you can, but the top guy, who knows as much or more than is known to any other group because it is your job to know it.

This, then, is the pattern we had in mind: The setting up of a genuinely international development authority, entrusted with the dual function of rapidly developing the beneficial uses of atomic energy and of being responsible for preventing its abuse; the licensing of activities which would not make for national rivalry, which do not lend themselves to the making of weapons, but which are technically closely enough connected with the atomic energy problem so that by their licensing one would have established a living relationship between national and international experts.

Now the questions of what this authority might look like, how it could be set up, what sort of procedures it would have to follow, are extremely complicated. There are two kinds of considerations involved in the process of arriving at agreement on them. One has to distinguish very clearly between considerations which are essential for the *workability* of the plan of international control, and those which may make this plan *acceptable* to one nation or another. There are many problems we must explore, but I think it is meaningless at the present time to lay down a schedule which would fully protect the United States and be ideally suited to the securing of our national interest, because this is the job which the U.N. Commission must undertake. The Commission must attempt to find some workable compromise between the conflicting national interests. In doing so it must come back again to the fact that, although these interests do conflict, these conflicts are trivial compared to the overwhelming common interest in getting the security we are after.

What kind of security is it? It is not the elimination of war, and, as we have said, if war breaks out, you'll have atomic bombs. It is a guarantee that at a given time there are no atomic bombs, that no nation is either mining uranium, processing fissionable material, manufacturing bombs, or set up to do any of these things. If this plan works, the first step which would have to be taken by a nation bent on aggression would either be the seizure of the facilities belonging to the Authority or the violation of the convention by which the nations agreed not to build certain kinds of plants and not to mine certain ores. Now this may happen—but I don't think it will, because the nation doing it will be coming out and saying, "We're going to make atomic war," and gives you a clear warning. Now the time might not be very long; it may be a year, maybe somewhat longer, conceivably even somewhat shorter, before the seized facilities or the new facilities which a nation can build will make major atomic warfare possible. But the violator will have raised the brightest red flag he can and every other country will know that they are in for it. Now this is, I think, about as much as you can expect if you want to use retaliation as a method of preventing atomic warfare. You can insist that the danger signal flashes early enough and that it be clear enough so that there can be no mistaking the fact and purpose of a violation.

That is one advantage. The other is that the Authority can really get ahead with the uses of atomic energy. I don't regard this as the thing that, in itself, would be worth all the fuss, but the point I have tried to make is that if you don't try to develop atomic energy, you can't control it. You can't say, first we will control it and then we will develop it, because the developmental functions are an essential part of the mechanism for control.

Third, the plan will bring together, in a constructive, collaborative effort, men of various nations on a job of vital interest to the maintenance of peace and the furtherance of human welfare. This is something rather new; you will get not only ambassadors, but chemists, physicists, businessmen, and engineers working together with a purpose which is completely common and in which they will find out how to overcome their national differences, because there is nothing in the set-up which exacerbates their national differences. It is a scheme in which the extreme nationalism which we all feel to be the true poison of today in the world will have no place, and in which the sense of fraternity and common understanding will have a chance to get some place.

It will do more than this, because removing from the world the fear which you don't know today, but which five years from now, eight years from now, you would otherwise know in the most terrible form—the fear that any day now, an attack may be coming—will remove one of the most frightful causes of war itself. Mark my words, if there is no international control of atomic energy, the next war would be fought to prevent an atomic war, but it would not be successful. It will do more than this, because once you have started a program like this, it becomes a natural for many other problems. I don't know very much about bacteriological warfare, but it is clear that the purpose of it is to infect the enemy and not infect yourself. It is clear that even more than atomic energy, it rests on secrecy. Plans of this kind simply cannot be carried out if the enemy knows what you're going to do—he will take the same steps to protect himself that you are taking to protect your own population. And it is also clear that in the field of bacteriology and immunology, generally, there are constructive aspects. I don't see any reason why, once a plan of this kind has been tried

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and works, problems of health, of immunology, cannot be internationalized, too. I think that this would have many advantages from a technical point of view, and would almost completely eliminate the threat of bacteriological warfare.

Another point—we all know how acute rivalry for raw materials has been, and what a part it has played among the causes of past wars. It was so recognized in every declaration this country has ever made about access to raw materials. Well, I think if one can solve the problem of uranium one can solve the problem of oil, and I think that here again there is a healthy pattern for extension. And I would go a little bit further and say, if you have managed to have a working arrangement whereby you forego the worst of all arms, the most effective of all arms, the one you would want to use first in surprise, you have made a big breach in the problem of disarmament. It should not be quite so hard, once that has been done, to generalize disarmament to other weapons of mass destruction and, in fact, to other weapons of war.

Now, you may ask, what is going to happen now? Well, there will be a meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, which is a sort of Security Council with its cap on sideways, but which is attended by certain scientific advisers. Presumably, the ideas that people have had about inspection, retaliation, development, the ADA, will all be aired, and I hope they will be very thoroughly aired. And if there is any agreement on what we are heading for, then there will be much discussion about how to get there, what to do about raw materials, how to get started, when to stop making bombs, what to do with the bombs we have, what sort of accounting do we want, when do we reveal what we know about nuclear physics, or about metallurgy, and so on. These are very tough problems, and it's going to be a terrible game of poker, but if you keep in mind that the poker aspects of it are secondary, that the main thing is to get agreement on a system that will provide security, then I think it looks, not cheerful—and I should not want to have said anything that sounded cheerful—but so worth trying that one cannot fail to get into it.

If, as a result of these discussions, there is something to agree on, it will have to be worked into a treaty or charter because the United Nations Commission has no power. It is only empowered to study, and its power to study is limited by our willingness to make information available—ours as well as that of all other nations. Any delegate can say, "I can't say anymore, my government orders me not to," or "I can't make any more concessions, and I might as well go home." But if this study group manages to produce a document, that document will call for an entirely new kind of international outfit, an Atomic Development Authority, and that authority, once constituted, will have nothing in it corresponding to the veto power in the Security Council. It will be an outfit which may not have the power to compel compliance, but which will know the difference between compliance and non-compliance. The failure of any major nation or any nation

64

which plays a key part in atomic energy to join will mean the scheme doesn't work; if any nation walks out, the scheme is dead; but as long as it lasts, it will be an international authority different from anything we have in the world today; its law will be superior to the law of the land although it will be enforced by the law of the land; and it will be an organization in which people of different countries will work together, forgetting what countries they came from, because they've got a common job to do—not forgetting entirely, just as one doesn't forget that one is from Georgia, but forgetting when it gets in the way.

Putting such a plan into effect will require ratification, and if the United States accepts it, we are going to give up certain advantages which we possess today—which we are sure we would lose anyway, but which we will be scheduling to lose probably faster than we would otherwise. We are going to give these advantages up; we are going to make it a crime for an American to mine uranium or for the government of the United States to mine uranium; we are going to make it a crime for an American or the government of the United States to process plutonium; we are going to leave these things, as are all other nations, to an outfit which has the security of the world at heart.

It is quite clear that this is a long road. I have the feeling that we have come something of a road already, but it is also quite clear that to reach the end will call for a spirit rather different from that that has animated most international discussion, in which the separate national interests have been the overwhelming consideration.

A CHOICE BETWEEN THE QUICK AND THE DEAD

by

BERNARD BARUCH

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Bernard M. Baruch: A Choice Between the Quick and the Dead

Proposals for the international control of atomic energy were first made by the Allied Powers in November 1945. At the first meeting of the UN General Assembly in January 1946 a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was established to devise a workable plan. That spring Secretary of State James F. Byrnes appointed a committee to present an American plan for international control. David E. Lilienthal and J. Robert Oppenheimer drafted a proposal in consultation with Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and Bernard Baruch, the American representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. On June 14 Baruch submitted a reworked version of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report to the UN commission. The Russians objected to the idea of international inspection and countered with their own plan, which called for the immediate destruction of existing atomic weapons and an end to further production. The inspection issue kept efforts toward international control of atomic weapons deadlocked until the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the U.S. was signed in 1963. A portion of Baruch's June 14 address to the commission is reprinted here.

Source: *Bulletin*, June 23, 1946: "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority."

My Fellow Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and My Fellow Citizens of the World:

We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business.

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect world peace or world destruction.

Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing them. For each new weapon a defense has been produced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate defense does not exist.

Science, which gave us this dread power, shows that it *can* be made a giant help to humanity, but science does *not* show us how to prevent its baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate that peril by finding a meeting of the minds and the hearts of our peoples. Only in the will of mankind lies the answer.

It is to express this will and make it effective that we have been assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can prescribe

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individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nuremberg by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States — a formula certain to benefit the world's future.

In this crisis, we represent not only our governments but, in a larger way, we represent the peoples of the world. We must remember that the peoples do not belong to the governments but that the governments belong to the peoples. We must answer their demands; we must answer the world's longing for peace and security.

In that desire, the United States shares ardently and hopefully. The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. But she stands ready to proscribe and destroy this instrument — to lift its use from death to life — if the world will join in a pact to that end. . . .

The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including:

1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.

3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.

I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion.

But I think the peoples we serve would not believe — and without faith nothing counts — that a treaty merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb constitutes effective fulfillment of the instructions to this commission. Previous failures have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation, unsupported by effective guarantees of security and armament limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone.

Now, if ever, is the time to act for the common good. Public opinion supports the world movement toward security. If I read the sign aright, the peoples want a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions — an international law with teeth in it.

We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world and realizing the heavy obligations upon us arising from our possession of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact that it is a part of our armament, are prepared to make our full contribution toward effective control of atomic energy.

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that:

1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;

2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and

3. The authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic knowledge.

Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: My country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject, of course, to our constitutional processes and to an adequate system of control becoming fully effective, as we finally work it out.

Now as to violations. In the agreements, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for:

1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb.

2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb.

3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the authority.

4. Willful interference with the activities of the Authority.

5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five great powers — the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, France, and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed.

As matters now stand, several years may be necessary for another country to produce a bomb, *de novo*. However, once the basic information is generally known, and the Authority has established producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries, an illegal seizure of such plant might permit a malevolent nation to produce a bomb in twelve months, and if preceded by secret preparation and necessary facilities, perhaps even in a much shorter time. The time required — the advance warning given of the possible use of a bomb — can only be generally estimated but obviously will depend upon many factors, including the success with which the Authority has been able to introduce elements of safety in the design of its plants and the degree to which illegal and secret preparation for the military use of atomic energy will have been eliminated. Presumably no nation would think of starting a war with only one bomb.

This shows how imperative speed is in detecting and penalizing violations.

The process of prevention and penalization — a problem of profound statecraft — is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow statement, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom a few months ago.

But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons, it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area but against the illegal users of other weapons — bacteriological, biological, gas — perhaps — and why not? — against war itself.

In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will nations cease to compete with one another in the production and use of dread "secret" weapons which are evaluated solely by their capacity to kill. This devilish program takes us back, not merely to the Dark Ages but from cosmos to chaos. If we succeed in finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When a man learns to say "A" he can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet, too.

Let this be anchored in our minds: Peace is never long preserved by weight of metal

68

United Press International

Presidential adviser Bernard Baruch (right) conferring with Senators Homer Ferguson and Owen Brewster in 1947

or by an armament race. Peace can be made tranquil and secure only by understanding and agreement fortified by sanctions. We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration.

Science has taught us how to put the atom to work. But to make it work for good instead of for evil lies in the domain of dealing with the principles of human duty. We are now facing a problem more of ethics than of physics.

The solution will require apparent sacrifice in pride and in position, but better pain as the price of peace than death as the price of war.

I now submit the following measures as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of the conclusions which I have epitomized.

1. *General* — The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research, and management by competent personnel. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate, and state relationships in the several countries involved.

2. *Raw Materials* — The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion. The precise pattern of control of deposits of such material will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to us all can equitable plans be made for their production, refining, and distribution.

3. *Primary Production Plants* — The Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable ma-

terials. This means that it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

4. *Atomic Explosives* — The Authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best-informed agency will the Authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and nondangerous activities.

5. *Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials* — The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. *Nondangerous Activities* — A function of the Authority should be promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy. Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of nondangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials, whose use we know always also requires suitable safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.

7. *Definition of Dangerous and Nondangerous Activities* — Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and nondangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provision should, therefore, be made to assure constant reexamination of the questions and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. *Operations of Dangerous Activities* — Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the Authority but its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision, and control of the Authority.

9. *Inspection* — By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority.

10. *Freedom of Access* — Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey, and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve affirmative development functions of the Authority but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens.

11. *Personnel* — The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis.

12. *Progress by Stages* — A primary step in the creation of the system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms of the functions, responsibilities, powers, and limitations of the Authority. Once a charter for the Authority has been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which

it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transition from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this commission.

13. *Disclosures* — In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the Authority is actually created, the United States will join the other nations in making available the further information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. As the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the Authority.

14. *International Control* — There will be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies when the Authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority be subordinate to it. This is neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national authorities. The commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

71

POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY

by

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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71.

Harry S. Truman: Postwar Foreign Policy

When Harry S. Truman became President on Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, he was little known to the country as a whole. As vice-president he had been left largely uninformed about general war policy, and the shock of Roosevelt's death left him momentarily bewildered. "Did you ever have a bull or a load of hay fall on you?" he remarked. "If you ever did, you know how I felt last night." But he quickly found his bearings and moved to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, deciding with what was apparently little hesitation to use the atomic bomb against Japan. His real troubles began after the Japanese surrender when, the wartime alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the Western democracies on the verge of dissolution, he encountered strong partisan opposition, combined with public indifference, to his attempt to carry on with Roosevelt's foreign policy. On October 27, 1945, in New York City, Truman delivered an address, part of which is reprinted here, in which he stated his views concerning the nation's foreign policy in the postwar era.

Source: VSD, November 15, 1945: "Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy."

1. We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nations.

2. We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.

3. We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

4. We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.

5. By the combined and cooperative action of our war allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful democratic governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in which Nazism, Fascism, and military aggression cannot exist.

6. We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.

7. We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.

8. We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world.

9. We believe that the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere, without interference from outside the Western Hemisphere, must work together as good neighbors in the solution of their common problems.

10. We believe that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

11. We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression and freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving areas of the world.

12. We are convinced that the preservation of peace between nations requires a united nations organization composed of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if necessary to insure peace.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

by

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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87.

Harry S. Truman: The Truman Doctrine

Throughout 1946 Communist forces, supported by the Soviet satellite states of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, carried on a full-scale guerrilla war against the Greek government. At the same time the U.S.S.R. demanded from Turkey the right to establish bases and the surrender of Turkish territory at the eastern end of the Black Sea. Soviet expansionism threatened not only the Mediterranean but the oil-rich Middle East. The civil war in Greece had reached a critical stage when Great Britain informed the United States on February 24, 1947, that it could no longer give aid to the Greek government. President Truman was advised by military experts that Greece might fall to the Communists unless American aid was immediately forthcoming. Despite anticipated opposition from Congress, Truman decided to commit the United States to the defense of Greece and Turkey. On March 12, before a joint session of Congress, he set forth what has become known as the Truman Doctrine. The doctrine marked the reversal of American foreign policy, from cooperation with the Soviet Union to "containment" of Soviet power.

Source: *Record*, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1980-1981.

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American economic mission now in Greece and reports from the American ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace-loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five percent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.

Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel, and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security so essential for economic and political recovery.

The Greek government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, on the other. Meanwhile, the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.

The British government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.

It is important to note that the Greek government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless, it represents 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war, Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will and their way of life upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350 million which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed $341 billion toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world — and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

by

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

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GEORGE C. MARSHALL: The Marshall Plan

The policy known as the Truman Doctrine successfully checked the spread of Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, but the future of Western Europe remained in jeopardy. The war had devastated its economy and widespread popular discontent was fomented by Communist propaganda, both from within and without. Of the four great European powers before the war, only the Soviet Union remained a power in Europe. As the economic and political situation deteriorated, the United States deemed it necessary to bolster the economic recovery of Europe in order to check the further spread of Communism. In a commencement speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall outlined the principles of what was to become the European Recovery Program, popularly known as the Marshall Plan.

Source: *Record*, *App.*, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., p. A3248.

I NEED NOT TELL YOU gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated; but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken.

The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these diffi-

cult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization.

Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products — principally from America — are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number [of], if not all, European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

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THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT

by

GEORGE F. KENNAN

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GEORGE F. KENNAN: Sources of Soviet Conduct

The forward thrust of Soviet power in the immediate postwar period led to a shift in American foreign policy from one of promoting cooperation with Soviet Russia to one of "containment" of Soviet Communist expansion. The "containment" policy was first formulated by George F. Kennan, counselor of the American Embassy in Moscow in 1945 and later director of the Policy Planning Committee of the State Department. The Truman Doctrine was the first public expression of the "containment" policy, a position that shortly after was elaborated and defined in an unsigned article in Foreign Affairs. *It was soon learned that the article had been written by Kennan, and it attracted widespread attention as a more or less official statement of American policy toward the Soviet Union. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" is reprinted here in part.*

Source: Reprinted by special permission from *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947. Copyright by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York.

THE POLITICAL PERSONALITY of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution.

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89. George F. Kennan

The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: *(a)* that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; *(b)* that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; *(c)* that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and *(d)* that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution. . . .

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad. . . .

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the masters of those whom they were designed to serve.

Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology. . . .

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself — to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*.

Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final *coup de grâce*. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" — that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union — should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic," revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counterrevolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable — nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakeable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power.

Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off.

Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history — of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here, caution, circumspection, flexibility, and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds

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natural appreciation in the Russian or the Oriental mind.

Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand, it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand, it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent, long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries — policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics — with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige. . . .

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community. . . .

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.

To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity, and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases . . . in international affairs.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement — and particularly not that of the Kremlin — can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large

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measure on this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

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I. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions–the Russian and the Chinese–of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires–the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese–and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.

II. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: "... to form a more perfect Union establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

III. FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN OF THE KREMLIN

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

IV. THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IN THE REALM OF IDEAS AND VALUES BETWEEN THE U.S. PURPOSE AND THE KREMLIN DESIGN

A. Nature of conflict:

The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the achievement of its fundamental design. There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.

The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self discipline and self restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breath of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power–the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will–all other wills must be subjegated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system–even Ghandian non-violence is not acceptable–for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all

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Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. Objectives:

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.

2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.

3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our over-all objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in this enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.

The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) and quoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

C. Means:

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends. Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men's minds, the conflict is world-wide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose.

We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict, for although the ability of the Kremlin to threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in the fundamental conflict.

Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

V. SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

A. Political and Psychological.

The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its power and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the U.S.S.R. and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that "the entire coercive force of the socialist state" is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over "the economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people," (Vyshinski, "The Law of the Soviet State," P. 74). Similar evidence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this same policy, in less advanced phases, is being applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.

Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives in these policies is the total subjective submission of the peoples now under its control. The concentration camp is the prototype of the society which these policies are designed to achieve, a society in which the personality of the individual is so broken and perverted that he participates affirmatively in his own degradation.

The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which this policy is directed are the same as those where its control has already been established.

The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrine offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality.

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces, in this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and followed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy is a new form of expression for traditional Russian caution. However, there is no justification in Soviet theory or practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek that solution.

In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less,—it has a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it functioning and its military machine operates effectively with less elaborate equipment and organization.

The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because

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it is the inheritor of Russian imperialism and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.

Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police apparatus, it has a domestic repressive instrument guaranteeing under present circumstances the continued security of the Kremlin. The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations, operating openly or in disguise, in mass or through single agents, is unparallelled in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among many peoples of the free world.

The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin are another great source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with communism, its peace campaigns and its championing of colonial peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the oppressed totalitariat of the Soviet world, but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the Asiatics have been impressed by what has been plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal faith and (b) the model "scientific" society, the Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an international crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.

Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude, with stealth and with speed.

The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.

That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.

In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.

The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vulnerability. In a system where supreme power is acquired and held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may well produce a period of instability.

In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its own dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior force which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counterpressure. Yet the Kremlin cannot relax the condition of crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its dynamism, whereas the seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.

The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses. It must know that in the present world situation they are of secondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchallenged by clearly superior counter-force--spiritual as well as material--its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.

B. Economic.

The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its overall policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with economics, is to utilize economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly the war-making capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitariat is severely subordinated to the interests of the system.

As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with that of the U.S. as

96

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roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national product (1949: U.S.S.R. $65 billion; U.S. $250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. and European Orbit Combined
Ingot Steel (million Met. tons)	80.4	21.5	28.0
Primary Aluminum (thousands Met. tons)	617.6	130-135	140-145
Electric Power (billion kwh.)	410	72	112
Crude Oil (million Met. tons)	276.5	33.0	38.9

Assuming the maintenance of present policies, while a large U.S. advantage is likely to remain, the Soviet Union will be steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the U.S.

But a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be capable of precipitately altering this trend. The U.S.S.R. today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in overall production could be brought about. In the U.S., on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized. The fact remains, however, that so long as the Soviet Union is virtually mobilized, and the United States has scarcely begun to summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, the totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic state.

In other fields–general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.–the gap between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. roughly corresponds to the gap in production. In the field of scientific research, however, the margin of United States superiority is unclear, especially if the Kremlin can utilize European talents.

C. Military.

The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to

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initiate a war which would involve the United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.

Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns:

a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gains in the Far East;

b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western Powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;

c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States. Alternatively, this capability, coupled with other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy" type amphibious operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of Europe.

After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simultaneously conduct:

a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles;

b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;

c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air operations against the North American continent, and air and sea operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and

d. Diversionary attacks in other areas.

During the course of the offensive operations listed in the second and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an air defense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own and its satellites' territories which can oppose but cannot prevent allied air operations against these areas.

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It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war reserves and arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satellite armies or even its own forces throughout a long war. It might not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to equip fully its satellite armies, since the possibility of defections would exist.

It is not possible at this time to assess accurately the finite disadvantages to the Soviet Union which may accrue through the implementation of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. It should be expected that, as this implementation progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, a strong United States military position, plus increases in the armaments of the nations of Western Europe, should strengthen the determination of the recipient nations to counter Soviet moves and in event of war could be considered as likely to delay operations and increase the time required for the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. In all probability, although United States backing will stiffen their determination, the armaments increase under the present aid programs will not be of any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is more than likely that those nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.

We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates, concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:

By mid-1950	10-20
By mid-1951	25-45
By mid-1952	45-90
By mid-1953	70-135
By mid-1954	200

This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities and represents the production capabilities of known or deducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this estimate could lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic stockpile that might be dangerously misleading, particularly with regard to the timing of a possible Soviet offensive. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union experiences operating difficulties, this estimate would be reduced. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring certain materials essential to research on and development of thermonuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic bomb. Our intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the Soviet accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy comparable to ours, but a planning estimate might well place it at 40-60 percent of bombs sortied. For planning purposes, therefore, the date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States for the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country.

At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have programmed, results of those attacks could include:

a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus depriving the Western Powers of their use as a base;

b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of Western Europe, thus precluding effective defense by the Western Powers; and

c. Delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.

The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in tremendously increased damage.

During this decade, the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union will probably be strengthened particularly by the development and use of modern aircraft, aircraft warning and communications devices, and defensive guided missiles.

VI. U.S. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES–ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

A. Political and Psychological.

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.

This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.

The policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in. It was this policy which gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our international economic activities can likewise be explained in terms of this policy.

In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever necessary to our own strength.

As for the policy of "containment," it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations. One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment," the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment." Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"–which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion–is no more than a policy of bluff.

At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy of "containment" that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R. A diplomatic freeze–and we are in one now–tends to defeat the very purposes of "containment" because it raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet retractions and adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It also tends to inhibit our initiative and deprives us of opportunities for maintaining a moral ascendency in our struggle with the Soviet system.

In "containment" it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the possibility for the U.S.S.R. to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure political advantage from the failure of the Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the openings we leave it.

We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment." In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has declined relatively. Partly as a byproduct of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves at a diplomatic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin growing bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have and with ourselves facing difficult decisions.

In examining our capabilities it is relevant to ask at the outset–capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely in the negative terms of resisting the Kremlin design. It includes also our capabilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the United States, and to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive and flourish.

Potentially we have these capabilities. We know we have them in the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them in the political and psychological fields. The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates our society–the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual and the supremacy of reason over will–are valid and more vital than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other peoples–our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement and insecurity.

Essentially, our democracy also possesses a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet system, the solidarity of which is artificially created through force, fear and favor. This means that expressions of national concensus in our society are soundly and solidly based. It means that the possibility of revolution in this country is fundamentally less than that in the Soviet system.

These capabilities within us constitute a great potential force in our international relations. The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of covetousness in our international relations are assets of potentially enormous influence.

These then are our potential capabilities. Between them and our capabilities currently being utilized is a wide gap of unactualized power. In sharp contrast is the situation of the Soviet world. Its capabilities are inferior to those of our Allies and to our own. But they are mobilized close to the maximum possible extent.

The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only through the traditional democratic process: This process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government.

The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect and fulfill the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment and positive participation in the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern world. It demands that he exercise discrimination: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression. A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses–the excesses of a permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective.

In coping with dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and with speed, we are also vulnerable in that the democratic process necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immediate exploitation. This Government therefore cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian challenge to operate on a narrow margin of strength. A democracy can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its most inclusive sense.

The very virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain respects in our relations with our allies. While it is a general source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent rather than compulsion and capitulation, it is also evident that dissent among us can become a vulnerability. Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves, about which we can do something–our native impetuosity and a tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.

The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a potential increment to our own capabilities. It may even be said that the capabilities of the Soviet world, specifically the capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side.

Like our own capabilities, those of the rest of the free world exceed the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own they are far from being effectively mobilized and employed in the struggle against the Kremlin design. This is so because the rest of the free world lacks a sense of unity, confidence and common purpose. This is true in even the most homogeneous and advanced segment of the free world–Western Europe.

As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia and Africa and the real beginnings of awakening among the Soviet totalitariat.

In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power.

In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential strength within others and add it to our own.

B. Economic.

1. **Capabilities.** In contrast to the war economy of the Soviet world (cf. Ch. V-B), the American economy (and the economy of the free world as a whole) is at present directed to the provision of rising standards of living. The military budget of the United States represents 6 to 7 percent of its gross national product (as against 13.8 percent for the Soviet Union). Our North Atlantic Treaty allies devoted 4.8 percent of their national product to military purposes in 1949.

This difference in emphasis between the two economies means that the readiness of the free world to support a war effort is tending to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union. There is little direct investment in production facilities for military end-products and in dispersal. There are relatively few men receiving military training and a relatively low rate of production of weapons. However, given time to convert to a war effort, the capabilities of the United States economy and also of the Western European economy would be tremendous. In the light of Soviet military capabilities, a question which may be of decisive importance in the event of war is the question whether there will be time to mobilize our superior human and material resources for a war effort (cf. Chs. VIII and IX).

The capability of the American economy to support a build-up of economic and military strength at home and to assist a build-up abroad is limited not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, so much by the ability to produce as by the decision on the proper allocation of resources to this and other purposes. Even Western Europe could afford to assign a substantially larger proportion of its resources to defense, if the necessary foundation in public understanding and will could be laid, and if the assistance needed to meet its dollar deficit were provided.

A few statistics will help to clarify this point.

PERCENTAGE OF GROSS AVAILABLE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO INVESTMENT, NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND CONSUMPTION IN EAST & WEST, 1949
(in percent of total)

Country	Gross Investment	Defense	Consumption
U.S.S.R.	25.4	13.8	60.8
Soviet Orbit	22.0[a]	4.0[b]	74.0[a]
U.S.	13.6	6.5	79.9
European NAP [sic] Countries	20.4	4.8	74.8

[a] Crude estimate.

[b] Includes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent.

The Soviet Union is now allocating nearly 40 percent of its gross available resources to military purposes and investment, much of which is in war-supporting industries. It is estimated that even in an emergency the Soviet Union could not increase this proportion to much more than 50 percent, or by one-fourth. The United States, on the other hand, is allocating only about 20 percent of its resources to defense and investment (or 22 percent including foreign assistance), and little of its investment outlays are directed to war-supporting industries. In an emergency the United States could allocate more than 50 percent of its resources to military purposes and foreign assistance, or five to six times as much as at present.

The same point can be brought out by statistics on the use of important products. The Soviet Union is using 14 percent of its ingot steel, 47 percent of its primary aluminum, and 18.5 percent of its crude oil for military purposes, while the corresponding percentages for the United States are 1.7, 8.6, and 5.6. Despite the tremendously larger production of these goods in the United States than the Soviet Union, the latter is actually using, for military purposes, nearly twice as much steel as the United States and 8 to 26 percent more aluminum.

Perhaps the most impressive indication of the economic superiority of the free world over the Soviet world which can be made on the basis of available data is provided in the following comparisons (based mainly on the *Economic Survey of Europe, 1948*):

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ON ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES OF EAST AND WEST

	U.S. 1948-49	European NAT Countries 1948-49	Total	U.S.S.R. (1950 Plan)	Satellites 1948-49	Total
Population (millions)	149	173	322	198[a]	75	273
Employment in non-Agricultural Establishments (millions)	45	-----	-----	31[a]	-----	-----
Gross National Production (billion dollars)	250	84	334	65[a]	21	86
National Income per capita (current dollars)	1700	480	1040	330	280	315
Production Data[b]						
Coal (million tons)	582	306	888	250	88	338
Electric Power (billion KWH)	356	124	480	82	15	97
Crude Petroleum (million tons)	277	1	278	35	5	40
Pig Iron (million tons)	55	24	79	19.5	3.2	22.7
Steel (million tons)	80	32	112	25	6	31
Cement (million tons)	35	21	56	10.5	2.1	12.6
Motor Vehicles (thousands)	5273	580	5853	500	25	525

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[a] 1949 data.

[b] For the European NAT countries and for the satellites, the data include only output by major producers.

It should be noted that these comparisons understate the relative position of the NAT countries for several reasons: (1) Canada is excluded because comparable data were not available; (2) the data for the U.S.S.R. are the 1950 targets (as stated in the fourth five-year plan) rather than actual rates of production and are believed to exceed in many cases the production actually achieved; (3) the data for the European NAT countries are actual data for 1948, and production has generally increased since that time.

Furthermore, the United States could achieve a substantial absolute increase in output and could thereby increase the allocation of resources to a build-up of the economic and military strength of itself and its allies without suffering a decline in its real standard of living. Industrial production declined by 10 percent between the first quarter of 1948 and the last quarter of 1949, and by approximately one-fourth between 1944 and 1949. In March 1950 there were approximately 4,750,000 unemployed, as compared to 1,070,000 in 1943 and 670,000 in 1944. The gross national product declined slowly in 1949 from the peak reached in 1948 ($262 billion in 1948 to an annual rate of $256 billion in the last six months of 1949), and in terms of constant prices declined by about 20 percent between 1944 and 1948.

With a high level of economic activity, the United States could soon attain a gross national product of $300 billion per year, as was pointed out in the President's Economic Report (January 1950). Progress in this direction would permit, and might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United States and the free world; furthermore, if a dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross national product. These are facts of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States (cf. Ch. IX).

2. **Intentions.** Foreign economic policy is a major instrument in the conduct of United States foreign relations. It is an instrument which can powerfully influence the world environment in ways favorable to the security and welfare of this country. It is also an instrument which, if unwisely formulated and employed, can do actual harm to our national interests. It is an instrument uniquely suited to our capabilities, provided we have the tenacity of purpose and the understanding requisite to a realization of its potentials. Finally, it is an instrument peculiarly appropriate to the cold war.

The preceding analysis has indicated that an essential element in a program to frustrate the Kremlin design is the development of a successfully functioning system among the free nations. It is clear that economic conditions are among the fundamental determinants of the will and the strength to resist subversion and aggression.

United States foreign economic policy has been designed to assist in the building of such a system and such conditions in the free world. The principal features of this policy can be summarized as follows:

(1) assistance to Western Europe in recovery and the creation of a viable economy (the European Recovery Program);

(2) assistance to other countries because of their special needs arising out of the war or the cold war and our special interests in or responsibility for meeting them (grant assistance to Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, loans and credits by the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank to Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Iran, etc.);

(3) assistance in the development of under-developed areas (the Point IV program and loans and credits to various countries, overlapping to some extent with those mentioned under 2);

(4) military assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty countries, Greece, Turkey, etc.;

(5) restriction of East-West trade in items of military importance to the East;

(6) purchase and stockpiling of strategic materials; and

(7) efforts to re-establish an international economy based on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers, and convertible currencies (the GATT-ITO program, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, the IMF-IBRD program, and the program now being developed to solve the problem of the United States balance of payments).

In both their short and long term aspects, these policies and programs are directed to the strengthening of the free world and therefore to the frustration of the Kremlin design. Despite certain inadequacies and inconsistencies, which are now being studied in connection with the problem of the United States balance of payments, the United States has generally pursued a foreign economic policy which has powerfully supported its overall objectives. The question must nevertheless be asked whether current and currently projected programs will adequately support this policy in the future, in terms both of need and urgency.

The last year has been indecisive in the economic field. The Soviet Union has made considerable progress in integrating the satellite economies of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy, but still faces very large problems, especially with China. The free nations have important accomplishments to record, but also have tremendous problems still ahead. On balance, neither side can claim any great advantage in this field over its relative position a year ago. The important question therefore becomes: what are the trends?

Several conclusions seem to emerge. First, the Soviet Union is widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the unpreparedness of the free world for war. It is devoting a far greater *proportion* of its resources to military purposes than are the free nations and, in significant components of military power, a greater *absolute* quantity of resources. Second, the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for a further incursion in this troubled area. Although Communist China faces serious economic problems which may impose some strains on the Soviet economy, it is probable that the social and economic problems faced by the free nations in this area present more than offsetting opportunities for Communist expansion. Third, the Soviet Union holds positions in Europe which, if it maneuvers skillfully, could be used to do great damage to the Western European economy and to the maintenance of the Western orientation of certain countries, particularly Germany and Austria. Fourth, despite (and in part because of) the Titoist defection, the Soviet Union has accelerated its efforts to integrate satellite economy with its own and to increase the degree of autarchy within the areas under its control.

Fifth, meanwhile Western Europe, with American (and Canadian) assistance, has achieved a record level of production. However, it faces the prospect of a rapid tapering off of American assistance without the possibility of achieving, by its own efforts, a satisfactory equilibrium with the dollar area. It has also made very little progress toward "economic integration," which would in the long run tend to improve its productivity and to provide an economic environment conducive to political stability. In particular, the movement towards economic integration does not appear to be rapid enough to provide Western Germany with adequate economic opportunities in the West. The United Kingdom still faces economic problems which may require a moderate but politically difficult decline in the British standard of living or more American assistance than is contemplated. At the same time, a strengthening of the British position is needed if the stability of the Commonwealth is not to be impaired and if it is to be a focus of resistance to Communist expansion in South and South-East Asia. Improvement of the British position is also vital in building up the defensive capabilities of Western Europe.

Sixth, throughout Asia the stability of the present moderate governments, which are more in sympathy with our purposes than any probable successor regimes would be, is doubtful. The problem is only in part an economic one. Assistance in economic development is important as a means of holding out to the peoples of Asia some prospect of improvement in standards of living under their present governments. But probably more important are a

109

strengthening of central institutions, an improvement in administration, and generally a development of an economic and social structure within which the peoples of Asia can make more effective use of their great human and material resources.

Seventh, and perhaps most important, there are indications of a let-down of United States efforts under the pressure of the domestic budgetary situation, disillusion resulting from excessively optimistic expectations about the duration and results of our assistance programs, and doubts about the wisdom of continuing to strengthen the free nations as against preparedness measures in light of the intensity of the cold war.

Eighth, there are grounds for predicting that the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious proportions unless more positive governmental programs are developed than are now available.

In short, as we look into the future, the programs now planned will not meet the requirements of the free nations. The difficulty does not lie so much in the inadequacy or misdirection of policy as in the inadequacy of planned programs, in terms of timing or impact, to achieve our objectives. The risks inherent in this situation are set forth in the following chapter and a course of action designed to reinvigorate our efforts in order to reverse the present trends and to achieve our fundamental purpose is outlined in Chapter IX.

C. Military.

The United States now possesses the greatest military potential of any single nation in the world. The military weaknesses of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, however, include its numerical inferiority in forces in being and in total manpower. Coupled with the inferiority of forces in being, the United States also lacks tenable positions from which to employ its forces in event of war and munitions power in being and readily available.

It is true that the United States armed forces are now stronger than ever before in other times of apparent peace; it is also true that there exists a sharp disparity between our actual military strength and our commitments. The relationship of our strength to our present commitments, however, is not alone the governing factor. The world situation, as well as commitments, should govern; hence, our military strength more properly should be related to the world situation confronting us. When our military strength is related to the world situation and balanced against the likely exigencies of such a situation, it is clear that our military strength is becoming dangerously inadequate.

If war should begin in 1950, the United States and its allies will have the military capability of conducting defensive operations to provide a reasonable measure of protection to the Western Hemisphere, bases in the Western Pacific, and essential military lines of communication; and an inadequate measure of protection to vital military bases in the United Kingdom and in the Near and Middle East. We will have the capability of conducting powerful offensive air operations against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.

The scale of the operations listed in the preceding paragraph is limited by the effective forces and material in being of the United States and its allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Consistent with the aggressive threat facing us and in consonance with overall strategic plans, the United States must provide to its allies on a continuing basis as large amounts of military assistance as possible without serious detriment to United States operational requirements.

If the potential military capabilities of the United States and its allies were rapidly and effectively developed, sufficient forces could be produced probably to deter war, or if the Soviet Union chooses war, to withstand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting attacks, and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact on the Soviet capabilities. From the military point of view alone, however, this would require not only the generation of the necessary military forces but also the development and stockpiling of improved weapons of all types.

Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from two to three years is required to produce a material increase in military power. Such increased power could be provided in a somewhat shorter period in a declared period of emergency or in wartime through a full-out national effort. Any increase in military power in peacetime, however, should be related both to its probable military role in war, to the implementation of immediate and long-term United States foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and to the realities of the existing situation. If such a course of increasing our military power is adopted now, the United States would have the capability of eliminating the disparity between its military strength and the exigencies of the situation we face; eventually of gaining the initiative in the "cold" war and of materially delaying if not stopping the Soviet offensives in war itself.

VII. PRESENT RISKS

A. General.

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom. We would face the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is

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becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin design seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this tension without moving toward some kind of order, on somebody's terms.

The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commensurate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between meeting them effectively or being overcome by them.

B. Specific.

It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war. The preferred technique is to subvert by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our society is an instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are obviously the prime targets, labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing opinion. The effort is not so much to make them serve obvious Soviet ends as to prevent them from serving our ends, and thus to make them sources of confusion in our economy, our culture and our body politic. The doubts and diversities that in terms of our values are part of the merit of a free system, the weaknesses and the problems that are peculiar to it, the rights and privileges that free men enjoy, and the disorganization and destruction left in the wake of the last attack on our freedoms, all are but opportunities for the Kremlin to do its evil work. Every advantage is taken of the fact that our means of prevention and retaliation are limited by those principles and scruples which are precisely the ones that give our freedom and democracy its meaning for us. None of our scruples deter those whose only code is, "morality is that which serves the revolution."

Since everything that gives us or others respect for our institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also fits the Kremlin's design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed, particularly in any context which can be used to cast dishonor on our country, our system, our motives, or our methods. Thus the means by which we sought to restore our own economic health in the '30's, and now seek to restore that of the free world, come equally under attack. The military aid by which we sought to help the free world was frantically denounced by the Communists in the early days of the last war, and of course our present efforts to develop adequate military strength for ourselves and our allies are equally denounced.

At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and doomed. In local incidents it threatens and encroaches both for the sake of local gains and to increase anxiety and defeatism in all the free world.

The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability of our prosecuting a preventive war. It also puts a premium on piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our unwillingness to engage in atomic war unless we are directly attacked. We run all these risks and the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each.

The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with ever narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all. For example, it is clear that our present weakness would prevent us from offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure points. The only deterrent we can present to the Kremlin is the evidence we give that we may make any of the critical points which we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.

The risk of having no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points is bad enough in itself, but it is multiplied by the weakness it imparts to our position in the cold war. Instead of appearing strong and resolute we are continually at the verge of appearing and being alternately irresolute and desperate; yet it is the cold war which we must win, because both the Kremlin design, and our fundamental purpose give it the first priority.

The frustration of the Kremlin design, however, cannot be accomplished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in Chapter IX, B. Strength at the center, in the United States, is only the first of two essential elements. The second is that our allies and potential allies do not as a result of a sense of frustration or of Soviet intimidation drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to Soviet domination. If this were to happen in Germany the effect upon Western Europe and eventually upon us might be catastrophic.

But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms. Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. At any point in the process of demonstrating our will to make good our fundamental purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate a general war, or in testing us, may go too far. These are risks we will invite by making ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we seek to avoid. Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that will. No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.

VIII. ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities.

1. The United States now has an atomic capability, including both numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of the U.S.S.R. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would cause the U.S.S.R. to sue for terms or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial blow could, however, so reduce the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to supply and equip its military organization and its civilian population as to give the United States the prospect of developing a general military superiority in a war of long duration.

2. As the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. increases, it will have an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installations and thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to carry out an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite possible that in the near future the U.S.S.R. will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs and a sufficient deliverability to raise a question whether Britain with its present inadequate air defense could be relied upon as an advance base from which a major portion of the U.S. attack could be launched.

It is estimated that, within the next four years, the U.S.S.R. will attain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have programmed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.

Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will require among other measures greatly increased air warning systems, air defenses, and vigorous development and implementation of a civilian defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military defense systems.

In time the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.

3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative and surprise would be very great. A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary security and centralization of decision required to capitalize on this advantage.

4. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably adequate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free peoples. However, when it calculates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly and with stealth. The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such a relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement to war.

5. A further increase in the number and power of our atomic weapons is necessary in order to assure the effectiveness of any U.S. retaliatory blow, but would not of itself seem to change the basic logic of the above points. Greatly increased general air, ground and sea strength, and increased air defense and civilian defense programs would also be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the free world could survive an initial surprise atomic attack of the weight which it is estimated the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering by 1954 and still permit the free world to go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. Furthermore, such a build-up of strength could safeguard and increase our retaliatory power, and thus might put off for some time the date when the Soviet Union could calculate that a surprise blow would be advantageous. This would provide additional time for the effects of our policies to produce a modification of the Soviet system.

6. If the U.S.S.R. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all the free world, or an attack against the U.S., will be greatly increased.

7. If the U.S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. should for the time being be able to bring increased pressure on the U.S.S.R..

B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons.

1. From the foregoing analysis it appears that it would be to the long-term advantage of the United States if atomic weapons were to be effectively eliminated from national peacetime armaments; the additional objectives which must be secured if there is to be a reasonable prospect of such effective elimination of atomic weapons are discussed in Chapter IX. In the absence of such elimination and the securing of these objectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other considerations make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be imperative to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons.

2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the United States employ military force only if the necessity for its use is clear and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelming majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore engage in war except as a reaction to aggression of so clear and compelling a nature as to bring the overwhelming majority of our people to accept the use of military force. In the event war comes, our use of force must be to compel the acceptance of our objectives and must be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

In the event of a general war with the U.S.S.R., it must be anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the manner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view of our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued that we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retaliation against prior use by the U.S.S.R.. To be able to do so and still have hope of achieving our objectives, the non-atomic military capabilities of ourselves and our allies would have to be fully developed and the political weaknesses of the Soviet Union fully exploited. In the event of war, however, we could not be sure that we could move toward the attainment of these objectives without the U.S.S.R.'s resorting sooner or later to the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the U.S.S.R. be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the attainment of our objectives.

In the event the U.S.S.R. develops by 1954 the atomic capability which we now anticipate, it is hardly conceivable that, if war comes, the Soviet leaders would refrain from the use of atomic weapons unless they felt fully confident of attaining their objectives by other means.

In the event we use atomic weapons either in retaliation for their prior use by the U.S.S.R. or because there is no alternative method by which we can attain our objectives, it is imperative that the strategic and tactical targets against which they are used be appropriate and the manner in which they are used be consistent with those objectives.

It appears to follow from the above that we should produce and stockpile thermonuclear weapons in the event they prove feasible and would add significantly to our net capability. Not enough is yet known of their potentialities to warrant a judgment at this time regarding their use in war to attain our objectives.

3. It has been suggested that we announce that we will not use atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such weapons by an aggressor. It has been argued that such a declaration would decrease the danger of an atomic attack against the United States and its allies.

In our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons, such a declaration would be interpreted by the U.S.S.R. as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a declaration would be taken sufficiently seriously by the Kremlin to constitute an important factor in determining whether or not to attack the United States. It is to be anticipated that the Kremlin would weigh the facts of our capability far more heavily than a declaration of what we proposed to do with that capability.

Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic or tactical purposes.

C. International Control of Atomic Energy.

1. A discussion of certain of the basic considerations involved in securing effective international control is necessary to make clear why the additional objectives discussed in Chapter IX must be secured.

2. No system of international control could prevent the production and use of atomic weapons in the event of a prolonged war. Even the most effective system of international control could, of itself, only provide (a)

assurance that atomic weapons had been eliminated from national peacetime armaments and (b) immediate notice of a violation. In essence, an effective international control system would be expected to assure a certain amount of time after notice of violation before atomic weapons could be used in war.

3. The time period between notice of violation and possible use of atomic weapons in war which a control system could be expected to assure depends upon a number of factors.

The dismantling of existing stockpiles of bombs and the destruction of casings and firing mechanisms could by themselves give little assurance of securing time. Casings and firing mechanisms are presumably easy to produce, even surreptitiously, and the assembly of weapons does not take much time.

If existing stocks of fissionable materials were in some way eliminated and the future production of fissionable materials effectively controlled, war could not start with a surprise atomic attack.

In order to assure an appreciable time lag between notice of violation and the time when atomic weapons might be available in quantity, it would be necessary to destroy all plants capable of making large amounts of fissionable material. Such action would, however, require a moratorium on those possible peacetime uses which call for large quantities of fissionable materials.

Effective control over the production and stockpiling of raw materials might further extend the time period which effective international control would assure. Now that the Russians have learned the technique of producing atomic weapons, the time between violation of an international control agreement and production of atomic weapons will be shorter than was estimated in 1946, except possibly in the field of thermonuclear or other new types of weapons.

4. The certainty of notice of violation also depends upon a number of factors. In the absence of good faith, it is to be doubted whether any system can be designed which will give certainty of notice of violation. International ownership of raw materials and fissionable materials and international ownership and operation of dangerous facilities, coupled with inspection based on continuous unlimited freedom of access to all parts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts of the territory of other signatories to the control agreement) appear to be necessary to give the requisite degree of assurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials grows, the amount which the U.S.S.R. might secretly withhold and not declare to the inspection agency grows. In this sense, the earlier an agreement is consummated the greater the security it would offer. The possibility of successful secret production operations also increases with developments which may reduce the size and power consumption of

individual reactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would increase many fold the damage a given amount of fissionable material could do and would, therefore, vastly increase the danger that a decisive advantage could be gained through secret operations.

5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in international control need also to be considered. If it were possible to negotiate an effective system of international control the United States would presumably sacrifice a much larger stockpile of atomic weapons and a much larger production capacity than would the U.S.S.R. The opening up of national territory to international inspection involved in an adequate control and inspection system would have a far greater impact on the U.S.S.R. than on the United States. If the control system involves the destruction of all large reactors and thus a moratorium on certain possible peacetime uses, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to argue that it, because of greater need for new sources of energy, would be making a greater sacrifice in this regard than the United States.

6. The United States and the peoples of the world as a whole desire a respite from the dangers of atomic warfare. The chief difficulty lies in the danger that the respite would be short and that we might not have adequate notice of its pending termination. For such an arrangement to be in the interest of the United States, it is essential that the agreement be entered into in good faith by both sides and the probability against its violation high.

7. The most substantial contribution to security of an effective international control system would, of course, be the opening up of the Soviet Union, as required under the U.N. plan. Such opening up is not, however, compatible with the maintenance of the Soviet system in its present rigor. This is a major reason for the Soviet refusal to accept the U.N. plan.

The studies which began with the Acheson-Lilienthal committee and culminated in the present U.N. plan made it clear that inspection of atomic facilities would not alone give the assurance of control; but that ownership and operation by an international authority of the world's atomic energy activities from the mine to the last use of fissionable materials was also essential. The delegation of sovereignty which this implies is necessary for effective control and, therefore, is as necessary for the United States and the rest of the free world as it is presently unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

It is also clear that a control authority not susceptible directly or indirectly to Soviet domination is equally essential. As the Soviet Union would regard any country not under its domination as under the potential if not the actual domination of the United States, it is clear that what the United States and the non-Soviet world must insist on, the Soviet Union must at present reject.

The principal immediate benefit of international control would be to make a surprise atomic attack impossible, assuming the elimination of large reactors and the effective disposal of stockpiles of fissionable materials. But it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to the elimination of large reactors, unless the impracticability of producing atomic power for peaceful purposes had been demonstrated beyond a doubt. By the same token, it would not now agree to elimination of its stockpile of fissionable materials.

Finally, the absence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R. must be assumed until there is concrete evidence that there has been a decisive change in Soviet policies. It is to be doubted whether such a change can take place without a change in the nature of the Soviet system itself.

The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that "... the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure ... their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field.... As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy."

In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.

IX. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Introduction. Four possible courses of action by the United States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are:

a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;

b. Isolation;

c. War; and

d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.

The role of negotiation. Negotiation must be considered in relation to these courses of action. A negotiator always attempts to achieve an agreement which is somewhat better than the realities of his fundamental position would justify and which is, in any case, not worse than his fundamental position requires. This is as true in relations among sovereign states as in relations between individuals. The Soviet Union possesses several advantages over the free world in negotiations on any issue:

a. It can and does enforce secrecy on all significant facts about conditions within the Soviet Union, so that it can be expected to know more about the realities of the free world's position than the free world knows about its position;

b. It does not have to be responsive in any important sense to public opinion;

c. It does not have to consult and agree with any other countries on the terms it will offer and accept; and

d. It can influence public opinion in other countries while insulating the peoples under its control.

These are important advantages. Together with the unfavorable trend of our power position, they militate, as is shown in Section A below, against successful negotiation of a general settlement at this time. For although the United States probably now possesses, principally in atomic weapons, a force adequate to deliver a powerful blow upon the Soviet Union and to open the road to victory in a long war, it is not sufficient by itself to advance the position of the United States in the cold war.

The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw, and eventually change its policies drastically. It has been shown in Chapter VIII that truly effective control of atomic energy would require such an opening up of the Soviet Union and such evidence in other ways of its good faith and its intent to co-exist in peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.

Clearly under present circumstances we will not be able to negotiate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. What, then, is the role of negotiation?

In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.

The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotiation. They must develop a negotiating position which defines the issues and the terms on which they would be prepared–and at what stages–to accept agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair in the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that they must be consistent with a positive program for peace–in harmony with the United Nations' Charter and providing, at a minimum, for the effective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor organization. The terms must not require more of the Soviet Union than such behavior and such participation in a world organization. The fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossible without such a radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change in the Soviet system would then emerge as a result of the Kremlin's unwillingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.

A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element in the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Berkeley speech by the Secretary of State could be only a tactic.[1] Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war. It is urgently necessary for the United States to determine its negotiating position and to obtain agreement with its major allies on the purposes and terms of negotiation.

In the second place, assuming that the United States in cooperation with other free countries decides and acts to increase the strength of the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses the path of accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary and desirable to negotiate on various specific issues with the Kremlin as the area of possible agreement widens.

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[1] The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet Union could modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in reasonable security. These were:

1. Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation of pressures in the Far East;
2. Withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from satellite area;
3. Cooperation in the United Nations;
4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
6. Proper treatment of official representatives of the U.S.;
7. Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other countries.

The Kremlin will have three major objectives in negotiations with the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capabilities of the United States; the second is to prevent the effective mobilization of the superior potential of the free world in human and material resources; and the third is to secure a withdrawal of United States forces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan. Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability and will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions.

The objectives of the United States and other free countries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological objectives discussed above) are to record, in a formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our position, the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world which will result from adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be supported by the increasing military strength developed as an integral part of that course of action. In short, our objectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by making negotiation, if possible, always more expedient than resort to force.

It must be presumed that for some time the Kremlin will accept agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to do so with impunity, it can derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world. For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are enforceable or that they are not susceptible of violation without detection and the possibility of effective countermeasures.

This further suggests that we will have to consider carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress in building up the strength of the free world in conventional forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western Europe and other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at war, having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.

This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.

To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.

In the third place, negotiation will play a part in the building up of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological strength discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of Germany, Austria and Japan. In the process of building up strength, it may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union, to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world. This will be difficult unless it has been demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept treaties of peace which would leave these countries free, under adequate safeguards, to participate in the United Nations and in regional or broader associations of states consistent with the United Nations' Charter and providing security and adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of their political and economic life.

This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of negotiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the strength of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of closer association–on a regional or a broader basis–among the free countries.

In conclusion, negotiation is not a possible separate course of action but rather a means of gaining support for a program of building strength, of recording, where necessary and desirable, progress in the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war. Ultimately, it is our objective to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable instrument of peace. But it is important to emphasize that such a settlement can only record the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world domination will be complete.

The analysis in the following sections indicates that the building of such a system requires expanded and accelerated programs for the carrying out of current policies.

A. The First Course—Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying out These Policies.

1. **Military aspects.** On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the U.S.S.R., particularly in light of its probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. If war breaks out in 1950 or in the next few years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.

A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the free world, together with the apparent determination of the free world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Kremlin to relax its pressures generally or to give up the initiative in the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a bold foreign policy, modified only when its probing revealed a determination and an ability of the free world to resist encroachment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the free world are declining, with the result that its determination to resist may also decline and that the security of the United States and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.

From the military point of view, the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a precondition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster.

Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the policies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organization and economy. It is, therefore, a base

125

upon which increased strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.

2. **Political aspects.** The Soviet Union is pursuing the initiative in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities, together with its successes in the Far East, have led to an increasing confidence on its part and to an increasing nervousness in Western Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative, nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of the other free countries in reacting to it. There are, however, ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indications that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled. Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nations are not now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking, if it chooses, the military actions outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the free countries to resist probably would lessen and there would be an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.

Politically, recognition of the military implications of a continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of a firm initative in the cold war is closely related to aggregate strength in being and readily available.

This is largely a problem of the incongruity of the current actual capabilities of the free world and the threat to it, for the free world has an economic and military potential far superior to the potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The shadow of Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means–in the form of forces in being–to thwart such expansion locally. The United States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of reacting totally to a limited extension of Soviet control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half measures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore, to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended either by our capitulation or by a defensive war–on unfavorable terms from unfavorable positions–against a Soviet Empire comprising all or most of Eurasia. (See Section B.)

3. **Economic and social aspects.** As was pointed out in Chapter VI, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United States will not produce a solution to the problem of international economic equilibrium,

notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will not create an economic base conducive to political stability in many important free countries.

The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe and has been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the resumption by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will require integrated political, economic and military policies and programs, which are supported by the United States and the Western European countries and which will probably require a deeper participation by the United States than has been contemplated.

The Point IV Program and other assistance programs will not adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the administration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure of economic development. The moderate regimes now in power in many countries, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will probably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and authority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social structure than present programs will make possible.

The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the problem of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing international economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an economic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.

4. **Negotiation.** In short, by continuing along its present course the free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly superior political, economic, and military potential to build a tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic, and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.

This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength.

This is true despite the fact that the United States now has the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agreements. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and of no influence–a "settlement" which the Kremlin could readily exploit to its great advantage. The idea that Germany or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for world domination.

B. The Second Course–Isolation.

Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have confidence in our determination to accelerate our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United States.

This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, because of overextension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy itself from within.)

The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened its threat to our security, some would be tempted to accept "peace" on its terms, while many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.

Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of importance.

It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter decisively the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would wait for such an attack before launching one of its own. But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and after Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.

C. The Third Course—War.

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war—in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies—is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is probably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the

United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.

The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.

Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that it was a "just war" and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, proportionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory international order among nations. Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict.

These considerations are no less weighty because they are imponderable, and they rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow become increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter IV is accepted, it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.

D. The Remaining Course of Action—a Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World.

A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character. The potential strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to meet its political and economic problems.

1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that U.S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon development, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision can only be achieved through offensive action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be successful, calls not only for defensive forces to hold vital positions while mobilizing and preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive forces to attack the enemy and keep him off balance

The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces in being or readily available are support of foreign policy and protection against disaster. To meet the second requirement, the forces in being or readily available must be able, at a minimum, to perform certain basic tasks:

a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;

b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory are being built up;

c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear;

d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and

e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.

In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example, in both World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength, in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily available to prevent the outbreak of war. In part, at least, this was because they had not had the military strength on which to base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.

Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war—for which we are not prepared. This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in its psychological impact—the revival of confidence and hope in the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announcement of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength had been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and care should be taken to minimize, so far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.

2. **Political and economic aspects.** The immediate objectives—to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a

sufficient condition—are a renewed initiative in the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.

At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably involve:

(1) The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.

(2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.

(3) A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to in Section D-1-e.

(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.

(5) A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.

(6) Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.

(7) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.

(8) Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.

(9) Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.

(10) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.

(11) Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends.

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the disproportion between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about $65 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of its gross national product ($255 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use by $60-$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the free world and is of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States.

The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the problems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a successfully functioning system lie not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may require more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice. It also seems clear that a unifying ideal of this kind might awaken and arouse the latent spiritual energies of free men everywhere and obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive program for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run sacrifices.

The threat to the free world involved in the development of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States possesses a marked atomic superiority over the Soviet Union which, together with the potential capabilities of the United States and other free countries in other forces and weapons, inhibits aggressive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build-up of strength which will support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability, might arise in 1954 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and vigorously in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

> "14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system.
>
> "15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries.
>
> "16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

"a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.

"b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.

"17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

"18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments, important among which are:

"a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.

"b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.

"c. Internal political and social disunity.

"d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.

"e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.

"f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.

"g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics."

Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.

The Analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:

"19.

"a. To reduce the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

"b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the U.N. Charter.

"In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

"20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

"a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the U.S.S.R.

"b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

"c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

"d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.

"21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

"a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

"b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

"c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.

"d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.

"e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.

"f. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt."

* * * * *

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program–harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives–is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin–for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the President:

a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions.

b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

* * *

DEBATE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

between

DEAN ACHESON and ROBERT A. TAFT

and

THE POINT FOUR PROGRAM

by

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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115.

Debate on the North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Pact, establishing a mutual defense agreement (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO) among twelve North American and Western European nations, represented the first concerted attempt of the Western democracies to contain Communist expansion. Negotiations to establish NATO began in London in September 1948, and the treaty was made public in March 1949. Debate about the treaty and about America's participation in still another international organization besides the United Nations was carried on in Congress and in the press. The following selection includes arguments pro and con. Secretary of State Dean Acheson defended the treaty in an address of March 19, 1949, part of which is reprinted here. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio voiced the objections of congressional opponents of the treaty in a speech during the Senate debate of July 11, part of which is also reprinted below. The Senate ratified the treaty on July 21.

Source *Record*, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 9111-9113, 9205-9210.

I.

DEAN ACHESON:
For the Treaty

THE TEXT of the proposed North Atlantic Pact was made public today. I welcome this opportunity to talk with my fellow citizens about it.

It has taken many months to work out this text with the representatives of the other nations involved. . . . Public opinion can now be formed on the basis of complete information. Only in this way can your government have what former Secretary of State [Henry] Stimson has termed "the understanding support . . . of the American people," which is essential to the success of any policy.

I think the American people will want to know the answers to three principal questions about the pact: How did it come about and why is it necessary? What are its terms? Will it accomplish its purpose?

The paramount purposes of the pact are peace and security. If peace and security can be achieved in the North Atlantic area, we shall have gone a long way to assure peace and security in other areas as well. The achievement of peace and security means more than that in the final outcome we shall have prevented war and brought about the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

There must be conviction of people everywhere that war will be prevented and that disputes will be settled peacefully. In the most practical terms, true international peace and security require a firm belief by the peoples of the world that they will not be subjected to unprovoked attack, to coercion and intimidation, to interference in their own affairs. . . .

The Atlantic Pact is a collective self-defense arrangement among the countries of the North Atlantic area. It is aimed at coordinating the exercise of the right of self-defense especially recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is designed to fit precisely into the framework of the United Nations and to assure practical measures for maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter.

It is the firm intention of the parties to carry out the pact in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and in a manner which will advance its purposes and principles. Already one such arrangement under the Charter has been established with United States participation. The twenty-one American republics in reorganizing their regional system have specifically brought it within the framework of the United Nations Charter. We are now joining in the formation of a second arrangement, pertaining to the North Atlantic area, likewise within the framework of the United Nations.

It is important to keep in mind that the really successful national and international institutions are those that recognize and express underlying realities. The North Atlantic community of nations is such a reality. It is based on the affinity and natural identity of interests of the North Atlantic powers.

The North Atlantic Treaty which will formally unite them is the product of at least 350 years of history, perhaps more. There developed on our Atlantic Coast a community, which has spread across the continent, connected with western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, because they are based on moral conviction, on acceptance of the same values in life. . . .

Added to this profoundly important basis of understanding is another unifying influence — the effect of living on the sea. The sea does not separate people as much as it joins them, through trade, travel, mutual understanding, and common interests. For this second reason, as well as the first, North America and Western Europe have formed the two halves of what is in reality one community, and have maintained an abiding interest in each other.

It is clear that the North Atlantic Pact is not an improvisation. It is the statement of the facts and lessons of history. We have learned our history lesson from two world wars in less than half a century. That experience has taught us that the control of Europe by a single aggressive, unfriendly power would constitute an intolerable threat to the national security of the United States.

We participated in those two great wars to preserve the integrity and independence of the European half of the Atlantic community in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the American half. It is a simple fact, proved by experience, that an outside attack on one member of this community is an attack upon all members.

We have also learned that, if the free nations do not stand together, they will fall one by one. The strategem of the aggressor is to keep his intended victims divided or, better still, set them to quarreling among themselves. Then they can be picked off one by one without arousing unified resistance. We and the free nations of Europe are determined that history shall not repeat itself in that melancholy particular.

As President Truman has said: "If we can make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur." . . .

What are the principal provisions of the North Atlantic Pact? I should like to summarize them.

First, the pact is carefully and conscientiously designed to conform in every particular with the Charter of the United Nations. This is made clear in the 1st Article of the pact, which reiterates and reaffirms the basic principle of the Charter. The participating countries at the very outset of their association state again that they will settle all their international disputes, not only among themselves but with any nation, by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. This declaration sets the whole tone and purpose of this treaty.

The 2nd Article is equally fundamental. The associated countries assert that they will preserve and strengthen their free institutions and will see to it that the fundamental principles upon which free institutions are founded are better understood everywhere. They also agree to eliminate conflicts in their economic life and to promote economic cooperation among themselves. Here is the ethical essence of the treaty — the common resolve to preserve, strengthen, and make understood the very basis of tolerance, restraint, and freedom — the really vital things with which we are concerned.

This purpose is extended further in Article 3, in which the participating countries pledge themselves to self-help and mutual aid. In addition to strengthening their free institutions, they will take practical steps to maintain and develop their own capacity and that of their partners to resist aggression. They also agree to consult together when the integrity or security of any of them is threatened. The treaty sets up a council, consisting of all the members, and other machinery for consultation and for carrying out the provisions of the pact.

Successful resistance to aggression in the modern world requires modern arms and trained military forces. As a result of the recent war, the European countries joining the pact are generally deficient in both requirements. The treaty does not bind the United States to any arms program. But we all know that the United States is now the only democratic nation with the resources and the productive capacity to help the free nations of Europe to recover their military strength. Therefore, we expect to ask the Congress to supply our European partners some of the weapons and equipment they need to be able to resist aggression. We also expect to recommend military supplies for other free nations which will cooperate with us in safeguarding peace and security.

In the compact world of today, the security of the United States cannot be defined in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat to international peace and security anywhere in the world is of direct concern to this country. Therefore, it is our policy to help free peoples maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe or in the Americas but wherever the aid we are able to provide can be effective. Our actions in supporting the integrity and independence of Greece, Turkey, and Iran are expressions of that determination. Our interest in the security of these countries has been made clear, and we shall continue to pursue that policy.

In providing military assistance to other countries, both inside and outside the North Atlantic Pact, we will give clear priority to the requirements for economic recovery.

We will carefully balance the military-assistance program with the capacity and requirements of the total economy, both at home and abroad.

But to return to the treaty, Article 5 deals with the possibility, which unhappily cannot be excluded, that the nations joining together in the pact may have to face the eventuality of an armed attack. In this article, they agree that an armed attack on any of them, in Europe or North America, will be considered an attack on all of them. In the event of such an attack, each of them will take, individually and in concert with the other parties, whatever action it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, including the use of armed force.

This does not mean that the United States would be automatically at war if one of the nations covered by the pact is subjected to armed attack. Under our Constitution the Congress alone has the power to declare war. We would be bound to take promptly the action which we deemed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. That decision would be taken in accordance with our constitutional procedures. The factors which would have to be considered would be, on the one side, the gravity of the armed attack; on the other side the action which we believed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

That is the end to be achieved. We are bound to do what, in our honest judgment, is necessary to reach that result. If we should be confronted again with a calculated armed attack such as we have twice seen in the 20th century, I should not suppose that we would decide any action other than the use of armed force effective either as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense or as necessary to restore the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. That decision will rest where the Constitution has placed it.

This is not a legalistic question. It is a question we have frequently faced, the question of faith and principle in carrying out treaties. Those who decide it will have the responsibility for taking all appropriate action under the treaty. Such a responsibility requires the exercise of will — a will disciplined by the undertaking solemnly contracted to do what they decide is necessary to restore and maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. That is our obligation under this Article 5. It is equally our duty and obligation to the security of our own country.

All of these provisions of the pact are subject to the overriding provisions of the United Nations Charter. Any measure for self-defense taken under the treaty will be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. These measures will continue only until the Security Council, with its primary responsibility, takes the necessary action to restore peace and maintain security.

The treaty has no time limit, but after it has been in effect twenty years, any member can withdraw on one year's notice. It also provides that, after it has been in existence ten years, it will be reviewed in the circumstances prevailing at that time. Additional countries may be admitted to the pact by agreement of all the parties already signatories.

These are the principal provisions of the treaty.

Will the pact accomplish its purpose? No one can say with certainty. We can only act on our convictions. The United States government and the governments with which we are associated in this treaty are convinced that it is an essential measure for strengthening the United Nations, deterring aggression, and establishing the sense of security necessary for the restoration of the economic and political health of the world.

It seems absurd that it should be necessary, in this era of popular education and highly developed communications, to deal with allegations which have no relation to the truth and could not stand even the crudest test of measurement against realities.

I refer here to the allegations that this treaty conceals aggressive designs on the part of its authors with respect to other countries. Anyone with the most elementary knowledge of the processes of democratic government knows that democracies do not and cannot plan aggressive wars. But for those from whom such knowledge may have been withheld I must make the following categoric and unequivocal statement, for which I stand with the full measure of my responsibility in the office I hold:

This country is not planning to make war against anyone. It is not seeking war. It abhors war. It does not hold war to be inevitable. Its policies are devised with the specific aim of bridging by peaceful means the tremendous differences which beset international society at the present time.

Allegations that aggressive designs lie behind this country's signature of the Atlantic Pact can rest only on a malicious misrepresentation or a fantastic misunderstanding of the nature and aims of American society. . . .

The United States is waging peace by promoting measures for the revival and expansion of world trade on a sound and beneficial basis. We are preparing to carry out an energetic program to apply modern skills and techniques to what President Truman has called the primitive and stagnant economies of vast areas, so that they will yield a better and richer life for their people. The United States is waging peace by throwing its full strength and energy into the struggle, and we shall continue to do so.

We sincerely hope we can avoid strife, but we cannot avoid striving for what is right. We devoutly hope we can have genuine peace, but we cannot be complacent about the present uneasy and troubled peace.

A secure and stable peace is not a goal we can reach all at once and for all time. It is a dynamic state, produced by effort and faith, with justice and courage. The struggle is continuous and hard. The price is never irrevocably ours. To have this genuine peace we must make it clear that armed attack will be met by collective defense, prompt and effective.

That is the meaning of the North Atlantic Pact.

II.

Robert A. Taft:
Against the Treaty

We have to consider here the North Atlantic Treaty as it has been drafted, without the improvements senators would like to see made, but which twelve nations probably would not agree to once this treaty is ratified. We abandoned the chance of getting those when we signed the treaty in its present form. The Atlantic Treaty as drawn is certainly no improvement over the United Nations, nor can it by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as a perfection of or supplement to that Charter. From the point of view of an international organization, it is a step backward. Apart from the obligation to provide arms, the treaty is permitted by the Charter, which says:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The Charter merely recognizes this inherent right as necessary because the veto provision of the Charter may result in complete inaction on the part of the Security Council. But certainly in all other respects the treaty far more resembles a military alliance

146

14

than it does any international association of nations. As the senator from Iowa so forcefully said, it is a step backward in the progress toward international peace and justice.

What is the nature of that treaty?

It is obviously, and I do not think it can be questioned, a defensive military alliance between certain nations, the essence of which is an obligation under Article 5 to go to war if necessary with any nation which attacks any one of the signers of the treaty. Such an attack may come from outsiders or it may come from one of the signers of the treaty itself. The obligation is completely binding for a period of twenty years. It imposes an obligation upon the United States to each member nation whether or not there is consultation or joint action by the Council, or a finding by any court that an unjustified armed attack has occurred. Our obligation is self-executing upon the occurrence of an armed attack.

Some doubt will always remain as to whether the Congress must declare war before our armed forces actually take part. I am inclined to think such action is not necessary if the President chooses to use our armed forces when an ally is attacked. But whether it is or not, the obligation to go to war seems to me binding upon the United States as a nation, so that Congress would be obligated to declare war if that were necessary to comply with the provisions of the treaty. It is pointed out that the President could fail to act and Congress could refuse to declare war, but certainly we are not making a treaty on the theory that we expect to violate it in accordance with our own sweet will.

It is correctly pointed out that the exact measures which we are obligated to take will be determined by us, and that it may not be necessary to go to the extent of a declaration of war. We do reserve a certain discretion, but as I see it, we do not reserve any discretion on the question, for instance, whether the armed attack is justified as a reason for supporting it. If one of the members of the pact provides an attack, even by conduct which we disapprove, we would still apparently be bound to go to its defense. By executing a treaty of this kind, we put ourselves at the mercy of the foreign policies of eleven other nations, and do so for a period of twenty years. The Charter is obviously aimed at possible Russian aggression against Western Europe, but the obligation assumed is far broader than that. I emphasize again that the obligation is much more unconditional, much less dependent on legal processes, and much less dependent on joint action than the obligation of the United Nations Charter.

And yet in spite of these dangers, I have wanted to vote in favor of the Atlantic Pact for one reason and would still do so if the question of arms were not involved. . . .

It is said that the Atlantic Treaty is simply another Monroe Doctrine. I wish it were. That would be much more acceptable to me than the Atlantic Pact, arms or no arms. Let me point out the vital differences. The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration. We were free to modify it or withdraw from it at any moment. This treaty, adopted to deal with a particular emergency today, is binding upon us for twenty years to cover all kinds of circumstances which cannot possibly be foreseen. The Monroe Doctrine left us free to determine the merits of each dispute which might arise and to judge the justice and the wisdom of war in the light of the circumstances at the time. The present treaty obligates us to go to war if certain facts occur. The Monroe Doctrine imposed no obligation whatever to assist any American nation by giving it arms or even economic aid. We were free to fight the war in such a manner as we might determine, or not at all. This treaty imposes on us a continuous obligation for twenty years to give aid to all the other members of the pact, and, I believe, to give military aid to all the other members of the pact.

147

All kinds of circumstances may arise which will make our obligation most inconvenient. The government of one of these nations may be taken over by the Communist Party of that nation. The distinguished senator from Michigan says that we are then released from our obligation, but I see no basis whatever for such a conclusion. If that were true of a Communist government, it might also be true of a Socialist government if we did not happen to approve of socialism at the time. Presumably, it could be true of a Fascist government, one similar, perhaps, to that existing in Spain, which has been denounced recently by the secretary of state and which is not very different from the dictatorship of Portugal, which is a member of the pact and which has not a truly democratic form of government.

I cannot find anything in this treaty which releases us because we do not happen to like the officials in charge of the member nations at the particular moment. . . .

I have come reluctantly to the conclusion, therefore, that the arms program now presented to Congress must be considered an integral part of the Atlantic Treaty.

If that is the fact, we have a very different problem from the one which is urged upon us by the Committee on Foreign Relations, by its distinguished chairman, by the State Department, and by the distinguished senator from Michigan.

First, with the arms in the pact, it is even more clear that the pact is a military alliance, a treaty by which one nation undertakes to arm half the world against the other half, and in which all the pact members agree to go to war if one is attacked. It cannot be described otherwise than a military alliance. Of course, it is not like some of the alliances in the past, although many of them, such as the Franco-British alliance prior to World War I, were entirely defensive in character, or purported to be. Others were offensive and defensive alliances. I quite agree that the purpose of this alliance is not offensive and that we have no offensive purpose in mind. But it is exactly like many defensive military alliances of the past. . . .

Second, the pact standing by itself would clearly be a deterrent to war. If Russia knows that if it starts a war it will immediately find itself at war with the United States, it is much less likely to start a war. I see and believe in the full force of that argument. That is why I would favor the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe. But if Russia sees itself ringed about gradually by so-called defensive arms, from Norway and Denmark to Turkey and Greece, it may form a different opinion. It may decide that the arming of Western Europe, regardless of its present purpose, looks to an attack upon Russia. Its view may be unreasonable, and I think it is. But from the Russian standpoint it may not seem unreasonable. They may well decide that if war is the certain result, that war might better occur now rather than after the arming of Europe is completed. . . .

Third, the pact with the arms obligation, I believe, violates our obligations under the United Nations. The pact apparently is not made under Articles 52 to 54 inclusive, because we do not propose to consult the Security Council as there contemplated, we do plan to take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, and we do not plan to keep them fully informed. . . . It violates the whole spirit of the United Nations Charter. That Charter looks to the reduction of armaments by agreement between individual nations. I do not claim that there is any direct violation of the Charter, but the Atlantic Pact moves in exactly the opposite direction from the purposes of the Charter and makes a farce of further efforts to secure international peace through law and justice. It necessarily divides the world into two armed camps. It may be said that the world is already so divided, but it cannot be said that by en-

148

forcing that division we are carrying out the spirit of the United Nations.

Fourth, the obligation to furnish arms is either a mere token obligation, or it is one of vast extent. I do not know enough about modern military equipment to make any estimate. I have heard that to provide sixty divisions, which is said to be the very minimum necessary and perhaps completely inadequate against Russian attack, would cost a total of $24 billion. We are entering on a new lend-lease. The history of these obligations has been that once begun, they cannot be easily brought to an end. . . .

We have chosen to give economic assistance. That assistance is given on the theory that the Russians do not contemplate aggressive war, but intend to fight their battle by propaganda and a production of chaotic economic conditions. I believe the undertaking of both types of assistance is beyond the economic capacity of the United States. I believe we will have to choose whether we give economic assistance or arms. The first, I believe, has contributed and will contribute to peace. The second, I think, will make war more likely.

Fifth, the justification for the arms aid rests on the necessity of defense against Russia, but remember that once these arms are provided, they are completely within the control of the nation receiving them. They are subject to the orders of those who, at the time, control the government of the country. Those governors may be Communists or Fascists, they may be peace-loving or they may be aggressors. In future years, these arms may be used against us instead of on our side. If Russia should choose to go to war within the next year or two, they might easily be captured by the Russians and turned against us. We would be playing a dangerous game if we encouraged every country in Europe to arm itself to the teeth. Modern arms are not toys. . . .

Sixth, by approving this pact with the arms program, I believe we are committing ourselves to a particular course of action in war which may be unwise at the time when a war may actually develop. It is one thing to agree to go to war with Russia if it attacks Western Europe. It is another to send American ground troops to defend Norway or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England. I cannot assert positively that we are committing ourselves to a particular type of war, but I am inclined to think that we are. . . .

Seventh, finally, Mr. President, it is becoming increasingly apparent that England, at least, intends to trade extensively with Russia, and inevitably the same thing will be true of other Western European nations. They have provided airplane engines for Russia, heavy machinery and other equipment which can aid the Russians' warmaking potential. The more we take off their shoulders the burden of providing for their own defense, the more free they will be to ship steel and heavy machinery to the east. As a matter of fact, trade between Eastern and Western Europe has prevailed for thousands of years, and it is going to go on, no matter what we say about it. Of course, the recent agreement between Russia and England is very clear evidence of that fact. We are providing extensive economic assistance. To a large extent, economic assistance and aid for arms will go into the same pot. I do not think that the American people at this time desire to increase the overall aid we are giving to Western Europe with its tremendous burden on the American taxpayer.

Mr. President, since I feel that this pact is inextricably linked with the arms program, and since I believe that, so linked, the program is a threat to the welfare of the people of the United States, I shall vote against the treaty.

I am quite willing to consider the providing of assistance to particular countries, at particular times, if such aid seems at that time a real deterrent to war, and on that principle I voted for aid to Greece and Turkey. But that is a very different thing from an obligation to build up the armed forces of eleven countries, and a commitment on the American taxpayer for twenty years to give continued aid under circumstances of which we have not the slightest conception today. It is a very different thing from arming half the world against the other half.

My conclusion has been reached with the greatest discomfort. When so many disagree with that conclusion, I must admit that I may be completely wrong. I do not claim to be an expert in questions of foreign policy. I would like to be able to vote for a policy that will commit us to war if Russia attacks Western Europe. I would be glad to join in an agreement to occupy Germany indefinitely to guard against a third attack from that quarter. I would waive my other objections to the Atlantic Pact if I did not feel that it was inextricably involved with the arms program. But I cannot escape the logic of the situation as I see it, and therefore I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world war than it will ever maintain the peace of the world.

116.

HARRY S. TRUMAN: The Point Four Program

The ideological battlegrounds of the Cold War were the underdeveloped nations of the earth, which were exposed to intensive propaganda activities from both sides. Russian claims that Western colonialism was the cause of economic stagnation in such areas and that its own impressive economic growth was the result of its adoption of the Communist system were alluring to the uncommitted nations and disturbing to many Americans. The American response was the so-called Point Four program, proposed by President Truman in his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1949. Whereas the Marshall Plan had been intended to promote economic recovery through capital investment in the war-torn industrial nations of Western Europe, the Point Four program was designed to foster economic development through technical assistance to the nonindustrial nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On June 24 Truman sent a special message to Congress outlining the program, which was launched a year later.

Source: 81 Congress, 1 Session, House Document No. 240.

IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE UNITED STATES, in cooperation with other countries, to assist the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to raise their standards of living, I recommend the enactment of legislation to authorize an expanded program of technical assistance for such areas, and an experimental program for encouraging the outflow of private investment beneficial to their economic development. These measures are the essential first steps in an undertaking which will call upon private enterprise and voluntary organizations in the United States, as well as the government, to take part in a constantly growing effort to improve economic conditions in the less-developed regions of the world.

The grinding poverty and the lack of economic opportunity for many millions of people in the economically underdeveloped

150

15

parts of Africa, the Near and Far East, and certain regions of Central and South America constitute one of the greatest challenges of the world today. In spite of their age-old economic and social handicaps, the peoples in these areas have in recent decades been stirred and awakened. The spread of industrial civilization, the growing understanding of modern concepts of government, and the impact of two world wars have changed their lives and their outlook. They are eager to play a greater part in the community of nations.

All these areas have a common problem. They must create a firm economic base for the democratic aspirations of their citizens. Without such an economic base, they will be unable to meet the expectations which the modern world has aroused in their peoples. If they are frustrated and disappointed, they may turn to false doctrines which hold that the way of progress lies through tyranny.

For the United States the great awakening of these peoples holds tremendous promise. It is not only a promise that new and stronger nations will be associated with us in the cause of human freedom, it is also a promise of new economic strength and growth for ourselves.

With many of the economically underdeveloped areas of the world, we have long had ties of trade and commerce. In many instances today we greatly need the products of their labor and their resources. If the productivity and the purchasing power of these countries are expanded, our own industry and agriculture will benefit. Our experience shows that the volume of our foreign trade is far greater with highly developed countries than it is with countries having a low standard of living and inadequate industry. To increase the output and the national income of the less developed regions is to increase our own economic stability.

In addition, the development of these areas is of utmost importance to our efforts to restore the economies of the free European nations. As the economies of the underdeveloped areas expand, they will provide needed products for Europe and will offer a better market for European goods. Such expansion is an essential part of the growing system of world trade, which is necessary for European recovery.

Furthermore, the development of these areas will strengthen the United Nations and the fabric of world peace. The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states that the economic and social advancement of all people is an essential bulwark of peace. Under Article 56 of the Charter, we have promised to take separate action and to act jointly with other nations "to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development."

For these various reasons, assistance in the development of the economically underdeveloped areas has become one of the major elements of our foreign policy. In my inaugural address I outlined a program to help the peoples of these areas to attain greater production as a way to prosperity and peace. The major effort in such a program must be local in character; it must be made by the people of the underdeveloped areas themselves. It is essential, however, to the success of their effort that there be help from abroad. In some cases the peoples of these areas will be unable to begin their part of this great enterprise without initial aid from other countries.

The aid that is needed falls roughly into two categories: The first is the technical, scientific, and managerial knowledge necessary to economic development. This category includes not only medical and educational knowledge, and assistance and advice in such basic fields as sanitation, communications, road building and governmental services, but also, and perhaps most important, assistance in the survey of resources and in planning for long-range economic development.

The second category is production goods

15

— machinery and equipment — and financial assistance in the creation of productive enterprises. The underdeveloped areas need capital for port and harbor development, roads and communications, irrigation and drainage projects, as well as for public utilities and the whole range of extractive, processing, and manufacturing industries. Much of the capital required can be provided by these areas themselves, in spite of their low standards of living. But much must come from abroad.

The two categories of aid are closely related. Technical assistance is necessary to lay the groundwork for productive investment. Investment, in turn, brings with it technical assistance. In general, however, technical surveys of resources and of the possibilities of economic development must precede substantial capital investment. Furthermore, in many of the areas concerned, technical assistance in improving sanitation, communications, or education is required to create conditions in which capital investment can be fruitful.

This country, in recent years, has conducted relatively modest programs of technical cooperation with other countries. In the field of education, channels of exchange and communication have been opened between our citizens and those of other countries. To some extent, the expert assistance of a number of federal agencies, such as the Public Health Service and the Department of Agriculture, has been made available to other countries. We have also participated in the activities of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international organizations to disseminate useful techniques among nations.

Through these various activities we have gained considerable experience in rendering technical assistance to other countries. What is needed now is to expand and integrate these activities and to concentrate them particularly on the economic development of underdeveloped areas.

Much of the aid that is needed can be provided most effectively through the United Nations. Shortly after my inaugural address this government asked the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to consider what the United Nations and the specialized international agencies could do in this program.

The secretary-general of the United Nations thereupon asked the United Nations Secretariat and the secretariats of the specialized international agencies to draw up cooperative plans for technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. As a result, a survey was made of technical projects suitable for these agencies in such fields as industry, labor, agriculture, scientific research with respect to natural resources, and fiscal management. The total cost of the program submitted as a result of this survey was estimated to be about $35 million for the first year. It is expected that the United Nations and the specialized international agencies will shortly adopt programs for carrying out projects of the type included in this survey.

In addition to our participation in this work of the United Nations, much of the technical assistance required can be provided directly by the United States to countries needing it. A careful examination of the existing information concerning the underdeveloped countries shows particular need for technicians and experts with United States training in plant and animal diseases, malaria and typhus control, water-supply and sewer systems, metallurgy and mining, and nearly all phases of industry.

It has already been shown that experts in these fields can bring about tremendous improvements. For example, the health of the people of many foreign communities has been greatly improved by the work of United States sanitary engineers in setting up modern water-supply systems. The food supply of many areas has been increased as the result of the advice of United States agricultural experts in the control of animal diseases and the improvement of crops. These are only examples of the wide range

152

15

of benefits resulting from the careful application of modern techniques to local problems. The benefits which a comprehensive program of expert assistance will make possible can only be revealed by studies and surveys undertaken as a part of the program itself.

To inaugurate the program, I recommend a first-year appropriation of not to exceed $45 million. This includes $10 million already requested in the 1950 budget for activities of this character. The sum recommended will cover both our participation in the programs of the international agencies and the assistance to be provided directly by the United States.

In every case, whether the operation is conducted through the United Nations, the other international agencies, or directly by the United States, the country receiving the benefit of the aid will be required to bear a substantial portion of the expense.

The activities necessary to carry out our program of technical aid will be diverse in character and will have to be performed by a number of different government agencies and private instrumentalities. It will be necessary to utilize not only the resources of international agencies and the United States government but also the facilities and the experience of the private business and nonprofit organizations that have long been active in this work.

Since a number of federal agencies will be involved in the program, I recommend that the administration of the program be vested in the President, with authority to delegate to the secretary of state and to other government officers, as may be appropriate. With such administrative flexibility, it will be possible to modify the management of the program as it expands and to meet the practical problems that will arise in its administration in the future.

The second category of outside aid needed by the underdeveloped areas is the provision of capital for the creation of productive enterprises. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank have provided some capital for underdeveloped areas, and, as the economic growth of these areas progresses, should be expected to provide a great deal more. In addition, private sources of funds must be encouraged to provide a major part of the capital required.

In view of the present troubled condition of the world — the distortion of world trade, the shortage of dollars, and other aftereffects of the war — the problem of substantially increasing the flow of American capital abroad presents serious difficulties. In all probability novel devices will have to be employed if the investment from this country is to reach proportions sufficient to carry out the objectives of our program.

All countries concerned with the program should work together to bring about conditions favorable to the flow of private capital. To this end we are negotiating agreements with other countries to protect the American investor from unwarranted or discriminatory treatment under the laws of the country in which he makes his investment.

In negotiating such treaties we do not, of course, ask privileges for American capital greater than those granted to other investors in underdeveloped countries or greater than we ourselves grant in this country. We believe that American enterprise should not waste local resources, should provide adequate wages and working conditions for local labor, and should bear an equitable share of the burden of local taxes. At the same time we believe that investors will send their capital abroad on an increasing scale only if they are given assurance against risk of loss through expropriation without compensation, unfair or discriminatory treatment, destruction through war or rebellion, or the inability to convert their earnings into dollars.

Although our investment treaties will be directed at mitigating such risks, they

153

cannot eliminate them entirely. With the best will in the world a foreign country, particularly an underdeveloped country, may not be able to obtain the dollar exchange necessary for the prompt remittance of earnings on dollar capital. Damage or loss resulting from internal and international violence may be beyond the power of our treaty signatories to control.

Many of these conditions of instability in underdeveloped areas which deter foreign investment are themselves a consequence of the lack of economic development which only foreign investment can cure. Therefore, to wait until stable conditions are assured before encouraging the outflow of capital to underdeveloped areas would defer the attainment of our objectives indefinitely. It is necessary to take vigorous action now to break out of this vicious circle.

Since the development of underdeveloped economic areas is of major importance in our foreign policy, it is appropriate to use the resources of the government to accelerate private efforts toward that end. I recommend, therefore, that the Export-Import Bank be authorized to guarantee United States private capital, invested in productive enterprises abroad which contribute to economic development in underdeveloped areas, against the risks peculiar to those investments.

This guarantee activity will at the outset be largely experimental. Some investments may require only a guarantee against the danger of inconvertibility; others may need protection against the danger of expropriation and other dangers as well. It is impossible at this time to write a standard guarantee. The bank will, of course, be able to require the payment of premiums for such protection, but there is no way now to determine what premium rates will be most appropriate in the long run. Only experience can provide answers to these questions.

The bank has sufficient resources at the present time to begin the guarantee program and to carry on its lending activities as well without any increase in its authorized funds. If the demand for guarantees should prove large, and lending activities continue on the scale expected, it will be necessary to request the Congress at a later date to increase the authorized funds of the bank.

The enactment of these two legislative proposals, the first pertaining to technical assistance and the second to the encouragement of foreign investment, will constitute a national endorsement of a program of major importance in our efforts for world peace and economic stability. Nevertheless, these measures are only the first steps. We are here embarking on a venture that extends far into the future. We are at the beginning of a rising curve of activity, private, governmental, and international, that will continue for many years to come. It is all the more important, therefore, that we start promptly.

In the economically underdeveloped areas of the world today there are new creative energies. We look forward to the time when these countries will be stronger and more independent than they are now, and yet more closely bound to us and to other nations by ties of friendship and commerce, and by kindred ideals. On the other hand, unless we aid the newly awakened spirit in these peoples to find the course of fruitful development, they may fall under the control of those whose philosophy is hostile to human freedom, thereby prolonging the unsettled state of the world and postponing the achievement of permanent peace.

Before the peoples of these areas we hold out the promise of a better future through the democratic way of life. It is vital that we move quickly to bring the meaning of that promise home to them in their daily lives.

U.N. POLICE ACTION IN KOREA

by

HARRY S. TRUMAN

16

154 A

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11.

HARRY S. TRUMAN: United Nations Police Action in Korea

The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to create a unified Korea after World War II left that country divided into two hostile parts by an arbitrary line drawn east and west at the 38th parallel of latitude. The southern half of the country became the Republic of Korea in 1948, following UN-sponsored elections. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the northern part, largely as a result of Russian urgings; it claimed jurisdiction over the whole country. Relations between the two halves of Korea became more and more strained as the Cold War intensified in other parts of the world. American occupation troops were withdrawn from South Korea in 1949, leaving the area almost completely unprotected. On June 25, 1950, civil war broke out when North Korean troops invaded the south. Two days later President Truman released the following statement of the American government's attitude toward the Korean crisis.

Source: *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, p. 5

IN KOREA, the government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but, on the contrary, have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

THE HYDROGEN BOMB PROGRAM

by

HARRY S. TRUMAN

17

155 A

1950

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Harry S. Truman: The Hydrogen Bomb Program

In 1945 most American military and political figures believed that the Soviet Union could not build an atomic bomb for many years. However, a number of leading scientists thought it would not take nearly so long and were not surprised when, during the summer of 1949, Russia exploded its first atomic device. By this time the United States had much more powerful atomic bombs, but the Soviet gains alarmed the public and government figures, and the argument that had been going on in the scientific community for several years was won by those who wanted America to take the next step and build not an atomic fission but a hydrogen fusion bomb. President Truman announced the decision to go ahead on a full-scale program to make such a bomb on January 31, 1950.

Source: *Bulletin*, February 13, 1950, p. 229.

It is part of my responsibility as commander in chief of the armed forces to see to it that our country is able to defend itself against any possible aggressor. Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb. Like all other work in the field of atomic weapons, it is being and will be carried forward on a basis consistent with the overall objectives of our program for peace and security.

This we shall continue to do until a satisfactory plan for international control of atomic energy is achieved. We shall also continue to examine all those factors that affect our program for peace and this country's security.

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A POLICY OF INSTANT RETALIATION

by

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

18

156 A

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29.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES: A Policy of Instant Retaliation

Most of the policies (and also the slogans) associated with John Foster Dulles' tenure of office as secretary of state — he served under Eisenhower from 1953 until shortly before his death in 1959 — were adumbrated in statements and articles by him in the year before he entered the Cabinet. "Brinkmanship," "instant and massive retaliation," and "liberation of captive peoples" were all phrases that Dulles had used to try to express his conception of a more effective foreign policy than had obtained (he believed) under President Truman. The basis of Dulles' policy was unyielding opposition to the Soviet system, which, he felt, implied not only containing Russian power but also "rolling it back." In "A Policy of Boldness," reprinted here in part, Dulles indicated the general approach he would take to foreign affairs.

Source: *Life*, May 19, 1952.

SOVIET COMMUNISM confronts our nation with its gravest peril. To meet its long-term strategy of encirclement and strangulation, we have adopted a series of emergency measures which are fantastically costly not only in money but in their warping of our American way of life.

No one would begrudge the cost of what we are doing if, in fact, it was adequate and was ending the peril, and if there was no better way. Actually, our policies are *inadequate* in scope. They are *not* ending the peril. There *is* a better way.

The costs of our present policies are perilously high in money, in freedom, and in friendships.

The Administration's "security policies" would this year cost us, in money, about 60 billion, of which about 99 percent goes for military purposes and for equipment (which will quickly become obsolete and demand replacement indefinitely). Such gigantic expenditures unbalance our budget and require taxes so heavy that they discourage incentive. They so cheapen the dollar that savings, pensions, and Social Security reserves have already lost much of their value.

What is worse, this concentration on military matters is — to use George Washington's words — "inauspicious to liberty." It leads to encroachments on civil rights and transfers from the civilian to the military decisions which profoundly affect our domestic life and our foreign relations.

We are also rapidly expending our friendships and prestige in the world. Increasing numbers turn away from our policies as too militaristic, too costly, too erratic and too inconclusive for them to follow. Our far-flung, extravagant, and surreptitious military projects are frightening many who feel that we are conducting a private feud with Russia, which may endanger them, rather than performing a public service for peace.

All these are, indeed, perilously high costs.

There are times when nations have to pay such costs to win a victory and end a peril. We know that from the last two World Wars. But today our policies are not designed to win a victory conclusively.

If you will think back over the past six years, you will see that our policies have largely involved emergency action to try to "contain" Soviet Communism by checking it here or blocking it there. We are not working, sacrificing, and spending in order to be able to live *without* this peril — but to be able to live *with* it, presumably forever. . . .

A nation with our resourcefulness should be able to devise better policies. But we cannot take it for granted that better policies will automatically result from a change of Administration. Conceivably policies could be worse rather than better.

In Korea, for all our failure to deter attack, we did respond nobly when the attack came. President Truman's decision that the United States should go to the defense of the Korean Republic was courageous, righteous, and in the national interest.

In Europe, thanks in great part to the commanding presence of General Eisenhower, we are promoting a defense community with political and military unity.

In Japan, General MacArthur's loftily conceived occupation policies provided the foundation for a good peace, and we added sound security arrangements with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

There are a few Republicans — and some Democrats — who would turn their backs on all the world's problems and wrap the United States in some magically "impregnable" isolation.

Such policies would really give 100 percent cooperation to the Soviet Communist effort to encircle and isolate us, as a preliminary to a final assault. Once Asia, Europe, Africa, and probably South America were consolidated against us, our plight would be desperate.

The mere fact that such a retreat is seriously discussed shows that the frustration of past hopes is inducing a somewhat morbid state of mind which minimizes our assets pathetically and exaggerates those of Soviet Communism ludicrously. It assumes we are *lacking* strength rather than that we are *misusing* it.

Looked at in any impartial way, we are the world's greatest and strongest power. The only commodity in which we seem deficient is faith. In all material things we have a productivity far exceeding that of Russia: our steel production is about three and one half times that of the Soviet Union, and in aluminum, petroleum, and electric power our superiority is even greater. Our people have a standard of education, an inventive talent, and a technical skill unmatched by any of the peoples under Soviet rule.

On the Soviet side a dozen people in the Kremlin are attempting to rule 800 million human beings — while trying to conquer more. All except a privileged few work under conditions which sternly deny them the "pursuit of happiness." Within Russia itself the discontent can be judged by the 15 million prisoners in forced labor camps — more than twice the membership of the Soviet Communist Party. Even the leaders are suspicious of each other as each wonders whether the other plots his purge.

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In satellite countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, the situation is worse, because there it is aggravated by the repression of patriotism. Leaders in the Czech Communist Party have been liquidated one after another. In China the party tries to frighten the people into subjection by staging wholesale public executions.

All of this reflects not strength but weakness. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is like other tyrannies that went before. They may present a formidable exterior, but they are "like unto whited sepulchers, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness."

The free should not be numbed by the sight of this vast graveyard of human liberties. It is the despots who should feel haunted. They, not we, should fear the future.

As we stop fretting and start thinking, the first problem to tackle is the strictly military one. It comes in the form of a paradox: for we must seek a military formula more effective than any devised to date — that we may no longer be so overridingly preoccupied with purely military necessity.

The dimensions of the problem are plain: at least 3 million Soviet soldiers regularly under arms, another 3 million to 4 million in the Chinese Red armies. These forces, poised in a central area could strike with massive power east, south or west at any one of more than 20 nations along the 20,000-mile boundary which runs from near Alaska down by Japan, through East Asia and South Asia, along the Middle and Near East to Europe and up through Central Europe to the North Cape. By the very existence of this dangerous menace, free governments are intimidated; creative effort is paralyzed, and local Communist parties can exploit mass fear of the Red armies' advance. Thus do these armies serve as a savagely effective political weapon.

Our military program, vast as it is, falls far short of meeting this threat. . . . *There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing.*

The principle involved is as simple as that of our municipal police forces. We do not station armed guards at every house to stop aggressors — that would be economic suicide — but we deter potential aggressors by making it probable that if they aggress, they will lose in punishment more than they can gain by aggression. . . .

Today atomic energy, coupled with strategic air and sea power, provides the community of free nations with vast new possibilities of organizing a community power to stop open aggression before it starts and reduce, to the vanishing point, the risk of general war. So far these weapons are merely part of national arsenals for use in fighting general war when it has come. If that catastrophe occurs, it will be because we have allowed these new and awesome forces to become the ordinary killing tools of the soldier when, in the hands of the statesmen, they could serve as effective political weapons in defense of the peace.

This does not mean that old ways of defending the peace should be abandoned where they can still be efficacious. The United States should maintain a strong military force of a kind befitting our responsibilities. Western Europe, which has historically demonstrated great military power, should promptly redevelop that potential, if only to restore its own self-confidence and sense of self-respect. Everywhere free nations should have ability to resist attack from within so that they will dare to put up sturdy resistance to Communist inroads.

But these old methods are quite inadequate to match the 20,000-mile scope of the present military peril; and if we strain to make them adequate, we shall succumb to the twin evils of militarism and bankruptcy. New methods of defense are needed to save the free nations from the dilemma, which present policies impose, of choosing between murder from without or suicide from within.

That is the enlightened and effective way to proceed. It is a way that we can afford to live with, and until there is effective international disarmament, it is the way we cannot afford to live without.

Once the free world has established a military defense, it can undertake what has been too long delayed — a political offense.

It is ironic and wrong that we who believe in the boundless power of human freedom should so long have accepted a static political role. It is also ironic and wrong that we who so proudly profess regard for the spiritual should rely so utterly on material defenses while the avowed materialists have been waging a winning war with social ideas, stirring humanity everywhere.

There are three truths which we need to recall in these times:

1. The dynamic prevails over the static; the active over the passive. We were from the beginning a vigorous, confident people, born with a sense of destiny and of mission. That is why we have grown from a small and feeble nation to our present stature in the world.

2. Nonmaterial forces are more powerful than those that are merely material. Our dynamism has always been moral and intellectual rather than military or material. During most of our national life we had only a small military establishment and during the last century we had to borrow money abroad to develop our expanding economy. But we always generated political, social and industrial ideas and projected them abroad where they were more explosive than dynamite.

3. There is a moral or natural law not made by man which determines right and wrong and in the long run only those who conform to that law will escape disaster. This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and should be made to pay. This will happen when we ourselves keep faith with that law in our practical decisions of policy.

We should let these truths work in and through us. We should be *dynamic*, we should use *ideas* as weapons; and these ideas should conform to *moral* principles. That we do this is right, for it is the inevitable expression of a faith — and I am confident that we still do have a faith. But it is also expedient in defending ourselves against an aggressive, imperialistic despotism. For even the present lines will not hold unless our purpose goes beyond confining Soviet Communism within its present orbit.

Consider the situation of the 20-odd non-Western nations which are next door to the Soviet world. These exposed nations feel that they have been put in the "expendable" class, condemned in perpetuity to be the ramparts against which the angry waves of Soviet Communism will constantly hurl themselves. They are expected to live precariously, permanently barred from areas with which they normally should have trade, commerce, and cultural relations. They cannot be enthusiastic about policies which would merely perpetuate so hazardous and uncomfortable a position. Today they live close to despair because the United States, the historic leader of the forces of freedom, seems dedicated to the negative policy of "containment" and "stalemate."

As a matter of fact, some highly competent work is being done, at one place or another, to promote liberation. Obviously such activities do not lend themselves to public exposition. But liberation from the yoke of Moscow will not occur for a very long time, and courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, *unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur*. The mere statement of that wish and expectation would change, in an electrifying way, the mood of the captive peoples. It would put heavy new burdens on the jailers and create new opportunities for liberation.

Here are some specific acts which we could take:

1. We could make it clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress, that U.S. policy seeks as one of its peaceful goals the eventual restoration of genuine independence in the nations of Europe and Asia now dominated by Moscow, and that we will not be a party to any "deal" confirming the rule of Soviet despotism over the alien peoples which it now dominates.

2. We could welcome the creation in the free world of political "task forces" to develop a freedom program for each of the captive nations. Each group would be made up of those who are proved patriots, who have practical resourcefulness, and who command confidence and respect at home and abroad.

3. We could stimulate the escape from behind the Iron Curtain of those who can help to develop these programs.

4. The activities of the Voice of America and such private committees as those for Free Europe and Free Asia could be coordinated with these freedom programs. The agencies would be far more effective if given concrete jobs to do.

5. We could coordinate our economic, commercial, and cultural relations with the freedom programs, cutting off or licensing intercourse as seemed most effective from time to time.

6. We could end diplomatic relations with present governments which are in fact only puppets of Moscow, if and when that would promote the freedom programs.

7. We could seek to bring other free nations to unite with us in proclaiming, in a great new Declaration of Independence, our policies toward the captive nations.

We do not want a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals. There can be peaceful separation from Moscow, as Tito showed, and enslavement can be made so unprofitable that the master will let go his grip. Such results will not come to pass overnight. But we can know, for history proves, that the spirit of patriotism burns unquenched in Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Chinese, and others, and we can be confident that within two, five, or ten years substantial parts of the present captive world can peacefully regain national independence. That will mark the beginning of the end of Soviet despotism's attempt at world conquest.

The positive policies we have outlined would create new and refreshing conditions of opportunity. Political aggression can then be ended. The local Communist parties would lose much of their vigor and belligerence as the Soviet Communist Party became ever more preoccupied with its own "home work" of coping with the growing restiveness of the captive peoples. The free governments, no longer intimidated by the Red armies and heartened by their own growing military power, would have the self-confidence and the capacity to deal ruggedly with threats to domestic tranquillity. The free nations could then move ahead to creative accomplishments that would restore the waning prestige of freedom. . . .

Only a united America can unify the free world.

We cannot provide effective leadership if we ourselves are so divided that the President cannot get his treaties ratified, or if he cannot get the money to implement his foreign policies, or if foreign governments know that the President's policies may be reversed by the next congressional or presidential election.

I can testify, from personal knowledge, that the President and the Secretary of

State really want bi-partisanship and congressional cooperation in foreign policy. I know also that leading Republicans and Democrats in and out of Congress accept the need of working together in these dangerous times.

Cooperation, however, requires enough foresight and initiative on the part of the Executive so that his representatives can sit down and talk out *in advance* with congressional leaders of both parties what the United States should do. We had that in relation to the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific Security Treaties. We could have it in relation to the kind of policies which are proposed here, because then the initiative would be ours. But we cannot have an honest meeting of Executive-congressional and Democratic-Republican minds so long as the Administration accepts a purely defensive role in its foreign policy. Such a role means that we are constantly surprised and kept off balance — and enormously preoccupied — by a series of cleverly timed and varied Soviet offensives spotted neatly around the globe. These have condemned us to improvised reactions, which at times have been magnificent, as in the case of the Berlin air lift and some aspects of Korea. But our policy makers have not found policies which would put us in command of the situation. Under these conditions domestic cooperation can only be of the "shotgun" variety. That is not good enough to stand the strains and stresses of these dangerous days.

THE STRATEGY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

by

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

19

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54.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES: The Strategy of Massive Retaliation

John Foster Dulles' foreign policy, particularly with regard to America's Cold War foe, the Soviet Union, was based on two main principles: "liberation of captive peoples" rather than "containment" of Communism, and "massive retaliation" against Communist aggression rather than "limited" military response confined to the area of the attack. One result of the second point was Dulles' emphasis on nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces, and another was the periodic crises, or "brinks," that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. approached from time to time during the 1950s. Dulles explained his policy of overwhelming deterrent force in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on January 12, 1954. Part of the speech is reprinted here.

Source: *Bulletin*, January 25, 1954, pp. 107-110.

WE LIVE IN A WORLD where emergencies are always possible, and our survival may depend upon our capacity to meet emergencies. Let us pray that we shall always have that capacity. But, having said that, it is necessary also to say that emergency measures — however good for the emergency — do not necessarily make good permanent policies. Emergency measures are costly; they are superficial; and they imply that the enemy has the initiative. They cannot be depended on to serve our long-time interests. This "long-time" factor is of critical importance.

The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical era," and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of maneuvers, gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy." Then, said Lenin, "our victory is assured." Then, said Stalin, will be "the moment for the decisive blow."

In the face of this strategy, measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.

When the Eisenhower administration applied this test, we felt that some transformations were needed.

It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves. It is not sound economics or good foreign policy to support permanently other countries; for, in the long run, that creates as much ill will as goodwill. Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to "practical bankruptcy."

Change was imperative to assure the stamina needed for permanent security. But it was equally imperative that change should be accompanied by understanding of our true purposes. Sudden and spectacular change had to be avoided. Otherwise, there might have been a panic among our friends and miscalculated aggression by our enemies. We can, I believe, make a good report in these respects.

We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power. This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost.

What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive.

The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.

So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare — and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition — then we needed to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.

The total cost of our security efforts, at home and abroad, was over $50 billion per annum, and involved, for 1953, a projected budgetary deficit of $9 billion; and $11 billion for 1954. This was on top of taxes comparable to wartime taxes; and the dollar was depreciating in effective value. Our allies were similarly weighed down. This could not be continued for long without grave budgetary, economic, and social consequences.

But before military planning could be changed, the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions. This has been done. The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is *our* policy instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means. As a result, it is now possible to get and share more basic security at less cost. . . .

We do not, of course, claim to have found some magic formula that insures against all forms of Communist successes. It is normal that at some times and at some places there may be setbacks to the cause of freedom. What we do expect to insure is that any setbacks will have only temporary and local significance, because they will leave unimpaired those free-world assets which in the long run will prevail.

If we can deter such aggression as would mean general war, and that is our confident resolve, then we can let time and fundamentals work for us. We do not need self-imposed policies which sap our strength.

The fundamental, on our side, is the richness — spiritual, intellectual, and material — that freedom can produce and the irresistible attraction it then sets up. That is why we do not plan ourselves to shackle freedom to preserve freedom. We intend that our conduct and example shall continue, as in the past, to show all men how good can be the fruits of freedom.

If we rely on freedom, then it follows that we must abstain from diplomatic moves which would seem to endorse captivity. That would, in effect, be a conspiracy against freedom. I can assure you that we shall never seek illusory security for ourselves by such a "deal." We do negotiate about specific matters but only to advance the cause of human welfare.

President Eisenhower electrified the world with his proposal to lift a great weight of fear by turning atomic energy from a means of death into a source of life. Yesterday, I started procedural talks with the Soviet government on that topic.

We have persisted, with our allies, in seeking the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria. Now the Soviet rulers have agreed to discuss these questions. We expect to meet them soon in Berlin. I hope they will come with a sincerity which will equal our own.

We have sought a conference to unify Korea and relieve it of foreign troops. So far, our persistence is unrewarded; but we have not given up.

These efforts at negotiation are normal initiatives that breathe the spirit of freedom. They involve no plan for a partnership division of world power with those who suppress freedom.

If we persist in the courses I outline, we shall confront dictatorship with a task that is, in the long run, beyond its strength. For unless it changes, it must suppress the human desires that freedom satisfies — as we shall be demonstrating. If the dictators persist in their present course, then it is they who will be limited to superficial successes, while their foundation crumbles under the tread of their iron boots.

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The power of positive brinking.

Adlai Stevenson, of the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy

165

MASSIVE RETALIATION

by

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

20

6 Massive Retaliation

The diminishing credibility of a nuclear strategy and the consequent advisability of a more conventional approach impressed the Truman Administration, but not its successor, the Administration of General Dwight Eisenhower. A year after taking office, in January 1954, in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, outlined a change of direction from the strategic doctrines that had been developing under Truman. This new doctrine, known as one of 'massive retaliation', was widely assumed to be founded on an undiscriminating threat to respond to any communist-inspired aggression, however marginal the confrontation, by means of a massive nuclear strike against the centres of the Soviet Union and China. In this chapter the origins of this doctrine will be discussed.

Dulles's speech, and a later article in *Foreign Affairs*, in which he attempted to clarify some of those points where he felt he had been misunderstood, indicated that he was talking more about 'flexible retaliation', with 'massive retaliation' just one option among many. The new policy was based on giving far greater emphasis to nuclear weapons in US strategy, but it was much more complex than a simple belief in the value of all-out nuclear threats as a deterrent to virtually any unwelcome Soviet move.

It revolved around a strong feeling that the West was being forced into fighting the cold war and would have to fight any future hot war according to ground rules laid down by the communists in order to exploit their tactical advantages. The West's policy of containment

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meant that it had been left to the communists to initiate each successive crisis, allowing them to pick the time and place for each new challenge. The West, however much on the offensive with its broad ideological, political, and economic challenge to communism, was always on the defensive in particular military crises. The 'first move' had to be ceded to the East.

The Republicans toyed with the idea of reversing this pattern by picking fights with communism where its writ had been established in a particularly illegitimate manner. But this policy of 'roll-back' never moved beyond rhetoric. The policy of containment was maintained by the Eisenhower Administration and the first move was left to the East. What was not to be tolerated was the imposition of communist rules for fighting following the first move. In Korea they had picked the point of attack and had chosen the weapons - conventional forces. The West had accommodated them by restricting fighting to the original combat zone, accepting areas crucial to the enemy's war effort but outside North Korea's territory as sanctuaries, and obliging further by resisting the temptation to use the most modern weapons in the American arsenal - atomic weapons. The consequences of this attempt to fight on communist terms meant that no benefit was gained from the nuclear programme and an excessive strain was being placed on the US economy by the attempt to match the communists in conventional forces.

An important contributory factor to the new strategy was a change in the perception of nuclear weapons. By 1953, many of the various projects initiated during the Truman years had come to fruition. The United States now had a range of nuclear capabilities, from hydrogen bombs large enough to take out a city of any size, to small weapons for battlefield use. While 'strategic' and 'tactical' nuclear weapons each had their own proponents, and were often presented as alternatives, they could be presented as two sides to a comprehensive nuclear strategy, in which the 'strategic' weapons would threaten devastation of Soviet and Chinese cities, while 'tactical' weapons would compensate for the West's lack of manpower by increasing available firepower.

Proponents of smaller, 'tactical' nuclear weapons argued that these employed the most modern explosives for traditional purposes. The military found this idea seductive. In December 1953 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that 'Today atomic weapons have virtually achieved a conventional status within our armed forces'. In a March 1955 press conference, President Eisenhower argued that

'Where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else'.

This dual approach was made possible by the fact that both tactical and strategic weapons were now being produced in large quantities. The age of nuclear plenty had arrived. In early 1954, Brodie noted that nuclear weapons 'can no longer be regarded as exceedingly scarce or costly'.[1]

The net effect of the move towards small tactical weapons, even though it was parallel to development of massive terror weapons for destroying cities, was to make nuclear weapons seem quite ordinary. As 'just another weapon' it could be used without any special qualms.

The other major reason for promoting nuclear weapons as the centrepiece of American strategy was economic. The rearmament in conventional forces was proving inordinately expensive, and was throwing the Government budget out of balance. To Democrats, subject to some Keynesian influences, this was regrettable but not a tragedy. To Republicans it was a tragedy. It could, they suggested, even be part of the communist plot – to force the West into high military expenditure and so cause economic turmoil. They wished to avoid choosing between 'security or solvency'. The belief of the fiscal conservative in the need to reduce the budgetary burden of military expenditures encouraged strategies based on nuclear rather than conventional weapons because the former promised 'a bigger bang for a buck'.

The British Conversion

Taken together, conservative economic theories and the availability of large numbers of nuclear weapons of all shapes and sizes, created formidable pressures in favour of a nuclear strategy. The final factor was the conversion of the British to such a strategy prior to the Eisenhower Administration taking office. This was a conversion that required further proselytization. The British could not introduce such a strategy by themselves. All they could do was point the way forward for the US.

Fiscal conservatism returned in Britain, in the shape of the Conservative Party, in 1951, a year before the Republican victory over the Democrats in the United States. Official British thoughts on nuclear weapons had been similar to those in America. Margaret Gowing has observed how the British decision to develop the bomb had been almost instinctive, based on:

> a feeling that Britain must possess so climacteric a weapon in order to deter an atomically armed enemy, a feeling that Britain as a great power must acquire all major new weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were a manifestation of the scientific and technological superiority on which Britain's strength, so deficient if measured in sheer numbers of men, must depend.[2]

After the Soviet test in 1949 the British had come to accept the disadvantages of a strategy based solely on nuclear weapons and even came to view with concern the common American belief that nuclear weapons could serve as a 'panacea' for all defence problems - 'something entirely new with which aggression could be quickly, easily and permanently eliminated'. The Labour Government saw atomic bombs very much as weapons of last resort and therefore supported the Truman Administration's drive for conventional rearmament in the West, despite the heavy burden it imposed on Britain's weak economy.

Winston Churchill, back in power in October 1951, was disquieted by the inflationary impact of the rearmament programme. In addition he was strongly of the opinion that nuclear weapons deserved more of a rôle in Western strategy. Churchill had always felt a proprietary interest in nuclear matters, and had often expressed his view that the main source of Western strength was the American nuclear arsenal: only this had held back the advance of communism. Once briefed in the United States on the recent advances in nuclear technology he became even more convinced of the bomb's vital rôle. Also, the scare that had prompted the massive conventional rearmament programme was now subsiding. It was evident that Korea was not just the decoy or a prologue for a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The communists would present a challenge for many years to come. Events were not moving inexorably to a great showdown. Preparation would have to be made for a long period of bad relations with the Soviet Union which would be punctuated by high and low points, including some moments of great danger.

In the summer of 1952 the British Chiefs of Staff went to Greenwich, unencumbered by staff support, and constructed a global strategy for Britain, which reflected the above concerns. They noted that there was no defence against atomic attack, and suggested that

169

the primary deterrent against this or any other aggression should be the knowledge that it would invite immediate and crushing retaliation. For this reason priority ought to be given to the long-range air forces of NATO. The Allies could not afford to build up sufficient conventional strength in Europe to defeat the Soviet Union in a clash of land armies. What was needed was sufficient forces in Europe to hold the Russians until the atomic counter-offensive made its impact felt. Given the fact that Britain was only on the verge of testing its first atomic bomb, and were therefore unable to contribute much to the Great Deterrent, the Chiefs of Staff were not so much offering guidelines for the British Government as sending a message to the United States.

When Sir John Slessor, Chief of Air Staff, arrived in Washington with the British paper in July 1952, his reception was cool. The Joint Chiefs in Washington saw it as 'a rationalization of a British intent to renege on their NATO force commitment'. In six months, with a new Administration, the atmosphere changed. The British approach, in its sense of economic realities and the forward-looking perspective of a 'long haul', was now viewed with sympathy. Strategic Air Command, in particular, saw in the British enthusiasm a recognition of the importance of airpower which was lacking amongst many of their compatriots. The British document, noted Charles Murphy with gratitude, 'gives substance to abstractions and theories on air power'. It was now recognized 'as an actuality, feared by Soviet Russia, and therefore a potent instrument for military and diplomatic action.[3]

Sir John Slessor became a major propagandist for the nuclear armed long-range bomber - 'the Great Deterrent'. In a July 1953 article he recorded his frustration at the lack of regard paid to SAC - 'ready to strike a mortally decisive blow, against which there is at present no defence' - because of the preoccupation with conventional rearmament. Yet this 'Great Deterrent' was 'the counter-threat to the vast armies and tactical air forces of our potential enemy. Moreover it gives us some degree, and an increasing degree, of initiative in the cold war, instead of always dancing to the enemy's tune'. This theme of using the Western advantage in air power to regain the initiative was a major feature of Dulles's presentation of the New Look, and reappeared in a later article by Slessor:

> We cannot rely on [the enemy] solving our problems for us by using the bomb first . . . it would suit him admirably to fight a war with the weapons in which he would have a decisive advantage . . .

170

> . . . The atomic weapon may well be used to do what thousands of high explosive bombs were formerly required to do; and the striking force need not necessarily again be restricted by another YALU. Both will depend upon whether they are to our tactical and strategic advantage rather than to that of the enemy.[4]

The New Look

Influenced by the British arguments, but also by the logic of a situation in which the new Administration expected existing military commitments to be met at low cost, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff moved towards a commitment to use nuclear weapons whenever it was deemed appropriate. If the uncertainty surrounding the question of the use of nuclear weapons could be resolved, the Chiefs argued, they would be able to relinquish requirements for forces that would only be necessary if nuclear weapons were unlikely to be used. Adoption of a nuclear strategy promised a rationalization of defence requirements, with a cut in the most expensive component of the military force structure – manpower.

On 30 October 1953 these conclusions were enshrined in a National Security Council Paper (NSC-162/2) on *Basic National Security Policy*.[5] It began by defining the basic problem of national security policy as 'meeting the Soviet threat' while, at the same time, avoiding 'seriously weakening the US economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions' (Para 1b). The description of the Soviet 'threat' was grim; any diplomatic moves of apparent peaceful intent from the East were dismissed as gestures. '[T]he basic Soviet objectives continue to be consolidation and expansion of their own sphere of power and the eventual domination of the non-communist world' (Para 3a). It also warned that the capability of the Soviet Union to attack the United States with atomic weapons and soon, hydrogen bombs, using aircraft on one-way missions, was growing. Nevertheless, there was little expectation that this growing Soviet power would tempt the Kremlin into deliberately launching a general war. 'The uncertain prospects for Soviet victory in a general war, the change of leadership, satellite unrest, and the US capability to retaliate massively, make such a course improbable' (Para 6a).

For the future it was considered essential to develop and maintain:

1. a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability for inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power;

171

2. US and Allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication; and
3. a mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in the event of general war (Para 9a).

The paper also emphasized the importance of Allies – to provide forces, to accommodate bases and to co-operate in the general conduct of the cold war. It was necessary to build up 'the strength, cohesion and common determination of the free world'. Confidence was placed in collective security systems. These would dissuade aggressors through the prospect of a united front. To create this moral strength in the free world it was necessary that allies understood the purposes and assumptions that informed US strategy.

In Europe, both Allies and adversaries had to be convinced of the 'manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked'. The US military forces now based in Europe had become an index of the commitment to the Allies. Though America's armed forces were 'over-extended', any major withdrawal of US forces from Europe or from the Far East 'would be interpreted as a diminution of US interest in the defense of these areas and would seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the coalition'. However, elsewhere, in areas 'not gripped by war conditions', Allies needed to accept that US forces should not be further extended but should have 'mobility and initiative'. Any blatant gaps should be filled with indigenous forces. Unwillingness to base more conventional forces overseas would be compensated for by a greater readiness to issue deterrent threats, even in areas other than Europe, and to employ 'tactical' nuclear weapons.

> 39a In specific situations where a warning appears desirable and feasible as an added deterrent, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China, in general terms, or with reference to specific areas as the situation requires, its intention to react with military force against any aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces.
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> b . . . In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.

Before moving on to the manner in which the judgments of this paper were publicly presented, a few points can be noted. First, the term 'massive retaliation' (or a derivative) was used a number of times. It was not invented by journalists and academics as a useful label to hang on to the Administration's policy. It was however, used solely in connection with the deterrence of Soviet moves towards a general war, most likely to begin with an assault on Europe. The doctrine extended deterrence through threat of punishment to areas other than Europe in place of a US contribution to local defence, but it was not stated that this punishment would take the form of massive retaliation.

Second, the paper anticipated the major arguments of the opponents of 'massive retaliation'. It was not oblivious to the fact that current US superiority in nuclear weapons would not last for ever. Indeed, the President personally added to the original paper a requirement to reconsider the 'emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage' if this came to 'work to the disadvantage of national security', thus anticipating a 'New New Look' of 1956. Unlike NSC-68, it was expected that when the two major powers reached 'a stage of atomic plenty and ample means of delivery' the result could be a 'stalemate, with both sides reluctant to initiate general warfare'. Or, as Churchill put it, peace could become the 'sturdy child of terror'. Drawing on the experience of the Korean War it was suggested that if general war came it would, as likely as not, be the result of miscalculation rather than deliberate intent. 'To avoid this, it will in general be desirable for the United States to make clear to the USSR the kind of actions which will be almost certain to lead to [general war]'. But it was recognized, as the Administration's opponents later claimed had not been recognized, that 'as general war becomes more devastating for both sides the threat to resort to it becomes less available as a sanction against local aggression' (Paras 6b and c).

The third feature of the new strategy was a distinction, often only implicit, between nuclear forces for strategic and for tactical purposes. There was felt to be a major qualitative difference between area bombing resulting in enormous destruction, and improved munitions, which would allow a shrinking Army to maintain or even increase its firepower. This distinction was blurred by Dulles and emphasized by many of the Administration's critics. The main innovation was to attempt to convince allies and enemies that there were to be no abnormal inhibitions on the use of either type of weapon. As Field

Marshal Montgomery, then Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR), explained in late 1954:

> I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used'. It is very definitely: 'They will be used, if we are attacked'.[6]

Dulles and Massive Retaliation

The controversy over the new policy was largely a result of John Foster Dulles's interpretation and presentation. He already had great confidence in America's strategic airpower as a means of deterring the Soviet Union from any military adventures in Europe. In December 1950, reflecting views popular in Republican circles, he had spoken of 'the capacity to counter-attack . . . by action of our own choosing' as the 'ultimate deterrent' and the 'only effective defense', and in May 1952 of 'instant massive retaliation' and the need for the 'free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing'.[7]

Dulles was not greatly involved in developing the Administration's 'New Look'. He understood it in terms of his own concepts and theories concerning the importance of punishing aggression and the value of collective security. Perhaps more important, he had a diplomat's view of the utility of nuclear power which he believed to have been validated in the first year of the new Administration in ending the stalemate in Korea.

One of the Republican complaints against the Truman Administration was that it had been too feeble in prosecuting the Korean war. The hesitation over the use of atomic weapons, plus the recognition of sanctuaries beyond the Yalu River, in Chinese territory, had meant that the Western forces were severely constrained. When the Eisenhower Adminstration took over in January 1953, the Korean Armistice talks were deadlocked. Over the next year the deadlock was broken. The Administration believed that this was due to skilful employment of nuclear threats. The first break in the deadlock came in February 1953 after 'discreet' suggestions that 'in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in

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our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula'. Then, as the talks bogged down again, more hints were dropped in July 1953 to the effect that it would not be possible to observe the self-imposed restriction on US activity and that hostilities might not, in the future, be confined to Korea. In April 1954 Dulles claimed that progress had been achieved because the communists had realized that in its absence 'the battle area would be enlarged so as to endanger the sources of aggression in Manchuria'. The enemy could not rely on their sanctuaries.[8]

This must have been in Dulles's mind when, in his speech in January 1954, he emphasized the need for the free world to keep the initiative, if necessary with nuclear weapons and against any suitable targets – not only those in the immediate combat zone – even after the Soviet Union had taken it upon itself to commence hostilities.

The speech began by surveying the events of the cold war, approving the fact that responses had been taken to communist actions, but regretting that these had been hurried. 'Emergency measures are costly; they are superficial; and they imply that the enemy has the initiative. They cannot be depended on to serve our long-term interests.'[9] It would be necessary to plan for a 'long haul', to rebuff Soviet challenges but to do this 'without exhausting ourselves':

> We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power. . . .
>
> . . . Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive.

The basic decision that had been made was to 'depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing'.

The immediate interpretation given to the doctrine was that this meant a US response, to any aggression anywhere, of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. This was not the Administration's actual policy as set out in NSC-162/2 but was an impression easily taken from Dulles's statements on reinforcing local defences by 'the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power'. The respected columnist James Reston wrote in the *New York Times* on 16 January 1954 that Washington was saying to the Chinese and Russians 'as clearly as Governments ever say these things, that in the event of another proxy or bushfire war in Korea, Indochina, Iran or anywhere else, the United States might retaliate instantly with atomic weapons against the USSR or Red China'. The same paper, on 14 March 1954, reported Vice President Nixon as saying: 'Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we choose'.

Some clarification was considered to be in order. This duly appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1954.[10] In this article Dulles recognized, as had done NSC-162/2, that the US 'air striking power', 'while now a dominant factor, may not have the same significance forever. Furthermore, massive atomic and thermonuclear reaction is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances'. He repudiated the notion that the US 'intended to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression'. Though such an option would always be available, it was only one of a wide variety of means available for responding to aggression. Exactly the most appropriate form of response to any given enemy action should not be disclosed publicly:

> It should not be stated in advance precisely what would be the scope of military action if new aggression occurred. . . . That is a matter as to which the aggressor had best remain ignorant. But he can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this respect is ours and not his.

This was in contrast to NSC-162/2 where great clarity in the description of deterrent threats had been considered necessary to avoid general war through miscalculation. In opting for ambiguity, Dulles hinted at a posture later known as 'brinkmanship', whereby caution is forced on the aggressor, uncertain as to how far to the 'brink' the

United States would be willing to go. The worth of a massive retaliatory threat, declining in the face of an equivalent threat from the Soviet Union, would be upheld by bold diplomatic action.

There was an indication of a formula that might be used to measure the amount of retaliation deemed necessary as a reponse to a given amount of aggression: 'The heart of the problem is how to deter attack. This, we believe, requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression'. This formula – that the costs to the aggressor must always outweigh his gains – was repeated thereafter. The important thing was to have the *capacity* to retaliate massively, because that would be the only fitting punishment to the greatest crime – an all-out attack on Western Europe. For lesser crimes a more appropriate measure of retaliation would have to be found. Dulles was thus talking about 'flexible retaliation'. This suggested a continuum of nuclear responses, and thus blurred any distinctions which may have been in the mind of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 'strategic' and 'tactical' weapons.

As formulated the policy attempted to introduce a certainty into adversary calculations through the threat of severe sanctions that the prospective gains of any provocative military action would be outweighed by the costs. However, this did not do justice to the variety of forms a policy of deterrence could take. If the aim was to ensure that costs outweighed gains, then an alternative to the imposition of costs was the denial of gains. This was often described as 'defence' to be distinguished from 'deterrence', but if it involved local forces sufficient to beat off any attack then it could act to deter any adventures. NATO seemed to be moving towards this sort of strategy in the early 1950s.

In reversing the trend, the 'New Look' uncoupled the response from the offending action. The West would not reply in kind to an Eastern invasion but raise the stakes of war. Thereafter Western strategy would depend on convincing the Soviet leaders that it had the nerve to do this. This problem would become progressively more difficult as the Soviet capabilities to fight at the new level increased.

The obvious analogue to a policy of deterrence in international relations was deterrence in a national legal system. In order to convince anti-social elements that 'crime does not pay' costs were made explicit through punishment designed not only to stop a particular offender from making further trouble, but also to serve as warning to others. John Foster Dulles frequently employed this analogy. In the

January 1954 speech he spoke of what he was advocating for the international community as being 'accepted practice as far as local communities are concerned':

> We keep locks on our doors; but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be-aggressors are generally deterred. That is the way of getting maximum protection at bearable cost. What the Eisenhower Administration seeks is a similar international security system.

The analogy was, however, somewhat misleading. A legal system normally involves one supreme authority capable of definitively pronouncing on matters of interpretation and of taking the responsibility for the general maintenance of law and order, because of a general monopoly of legitimate and effective violence. When challenges can be made with impunity or important constraints exist on the legitimate use of force, then there is a breakdown of law and order.

For a sanction of tough punishment to be an effective deterrent it is necessary for a would-be offender to know that there is a high chance of (a) being apprehended and (b) being punished severely. The most dire threats diminish in impact when there is little certainty that they can ever be put into effect. It is the fact that one is to be put at the mercy of the court, as much as what the court does, that constitutes the deterrent.

In strategic terms, with airpower any country could put another country at its mercy. There were no problems of making the offender available for punishment. The sanction could be applied with, in all probability, a minimum of resistance. The offender, nevertheless, would not have to be apprehended by the forces of the law (which strategically would take the form of occupation of his territory) and so would remain a free agent. Moreover, he might well have means of replying to the punishment. The fact that a transgressor maintained options other than full compliance with the dictates of international law, including the option of replying in kind to any sanction, undermined the credibility of the threat of sanctions. This represented the central problem in all deterrence theory. How credible was a threat of punishment that would literally, as the schoolmaster says as he prepared to spank a naughty schoolboy, 'hurt me as much as it hurts you'?

The Spirit of the Offence

An immediate and lasting result of the 'New Look' was that NATO strategy became oriented around a hope that nuclear weapons could be employed in such a way as to particularly favour the West. However, events in Indo-China, where there was concern that the Chinese might intervene on behalf of the Viet Minh in their war against the French, suggested that the Administration was not quite as daring with atomic weapons as it might care to think. In September 1953 Dulles warned China that any physical involvement in the dispute 'could not occur without grave consequences, which might not be confined to Indo-China'. The timing of his 'massive retaliation' speech was widely seen as being geared to Indo-China. The use of nuclear weapons was being considered at the time, to help the French out at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. It was then dismissed, but not purely because of a loss of nerve at the crunch. If the United States had decided to intervene, nuclear weapons might well have been used. The constraining factor was that this would still have involved committing large numbers of ground forces to Indo-China. Contrary to the view that the use of nuclear weapons in a tactical mode would obviate the necessity for a large number of troops, the Army insisted that such use of nuclear weapons 'would not reduce the number of ground forces required to achieve a victory in Indo-China'.[11]

How then are we to view the 'New Look'? On one level it was a revival of the spirit of the offence in military strategy. The strategic concepts of the Truman years were cautious and restrained. The communists would be only contained; the main aim was defence. In battle there should be nothing provocative, nothing that might extend the conflict into a cataclysmic war. To those reared in the tradition of total war for unconditional surrender this all seemed unnecessarily restrictive. MacArthur spoke of 'no substitute for victory', the Strategic Air Command scornfully of a 'Maginot Line mentality' as if the German circumvention of France's static defences in 1940 served as a judgment on all attempts to 'hold a line'. With a cry that the 'best defence is offence' and a conviction that the communists had far more to fear from a general war than the free world, the opponents of Truman argued that the American advantages should be capitalized to the full. The Republican Administration endorsed these sentiments but not the policies associated with them. It too, through Dulles, spoke, at length, about the need to 'seize the initiative' and refused to accept any restrictions on targets or weapons. But, though the new

Administration's policy appeared more muscular in practice, there was still a recognition of the restraints imposed by the horrendous consequences of a slide into total war, and of the growing strength of the Soviet Union's own capacity for massive retaliation.

If anything the strategy was more retrospective than prospective. It explained how the Korean War ought to have been fought. It explained how a new war might be fought during the remaining period of grace of patent nuclear superiority. Observing the influence of US airpower on Soviet conduct, it sought to exploit this to avoid meeting the cost of conventional rearmament. A nuclear strategy was far cheaper than a conventional strategy.

Because of this strong economic point in the New Look's favour, one that has remained impressive ever since, the emphasis on nuclear weapons became a permanent feature of NATO's strategy. Apart from one moment in the Kennedy Administration when serious consideration was given to dealing with the Warsaw Pact on its own terms, the notion that the West cannot afford to match the East in conventional forces became firmly established in NATO minds. American troops in Europe served to signify a US commitment to NATO – not a means of blocking a Soviet advance. Their rôle was not as a shield but as a 'trip-wire', capable of triggering the entry into a war of America's nuclear arsenal.

The economic logic remained forceful if the military logic could be only temporary. The circumstances which made the strategy plausible would pass. Dulles, however, appeared to suggest that the new posture was a statement of basic principles appropriate for the new age, and not just the coming few years. His rigid presentation offered critics a ready target. When he attempted to qualify and elaborate, he only made it worse. A flawed strategy that arguably increased the risk of nuclear war sufficed to stimulate an interest in military matters amongst intellectuals. A strategy that was also inconsistent and contradictory was a positive incitement for intellectual criticism.

"FORWARD", THE GREAT FALLACY,
THE RISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

by

MAXWELL TAYLOR

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FOREWORD

During the weeks preceding D-Day in Normandy, June 6, 1944, those of us in command of the American airborne assault were deeply concerned over new activities of the Germans in the parachute- and glider-landing areas which we planned to use in Normandy. Day after day the air photographs of the zone showed new defensive works apparently to resist an airborne attack. The photo interpreters told us that they consisted mainly of poles some eight inches in diameter and eight feet in height which were being planted in dense checkerboard patterns across many of the Norman fields. It occurred to us at once that if we studied the pattern of this poling activity, we might determine the German plan of defense. At least we would know how they expected us to land.

Night after night we pored over the new photographs at my division headquarters at Newbury in Berkshire, England. But try as we would, we were unable to find any meaningful pattern in these German efforts. The poles sprang up everywhere but there was no evidence of plan

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in the choice of site or of priority to complete the work in one area ahead of any other. Thus, we took off at dusk on June 5, still puzzled as to German intentions and dispositions.

Landing with my stick of parachutists in the darkness of D-Day morning, I assembled a handful of our troops and surrounded the first farmhouse which we found. After getting information about the Germans in the vicinity, I asked the farmer about the poling of his fields.

"I see you have poles in this small field to the west of your house, but none in that big one to the east. Why is that?"

"Oh," said the farmer, "the Germans told us to pole all of our fields by June 15. My cow never liked that west field, so I poled it first."

That was it. In this particular case, at least, there was no more rational basis for the German defensive plan than the preference of this Frenchman's cow. I suspect that a similar lack of plan had prevailed throughout the Norman countryside. While the story has its humorous side, it is a reminder of what happens when military plans and actions are controlled by other than military factors. The poles placed to the whims of the French cows had no real effect on our landing.

I have undertaken to write this book because of my conviction that the defense of the United States is presently controlled largely by nonmilitary factors or by military factors which have become outmoded. While there are

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strong arguments for a cooling period after leaving the post of Chief of Staff before committing my views to writing, I have the deep feeling that there is no time to wait. We are faced with declining military strength at a time of increasing political tension. To arrest this trend before it goes too far requires certain immediate actions to be taken—the "quick fixes" described herein. The permanent remedy calls for a complete reappraisal of our strategy by the responsible agencies of our government. If this book can suggest one possible way to solve the problem and thereby get this vital reappraisal under way, it will have served its purpose.

In setting forth the problem, I have found it necessary to talk at some length about the defense budget. This may appear a drab subject but, if it performs its proper function, the budget is far more than a compilation of dusty figures of interest only to fiscal experts. It should be a translation into dollars of the military strategy upon which our future security will depend. Since the funds it provides will influence the military programs three to four years into the future, the budget in effect mortgages the freedom of decision and action of our leaders over a similarly long period. Hence, if we are to change our ways of doing our defense business, it should be done now before another annual budget projects past mistakes even farther into the future. If our trumpet is to give a changed sound, now is the time to retune it.

My former colleagues at the Pentagon will find little new in this book. I have voiced most of these views and criticisms repeatedly within the Department of Defense during my four years as Chief of Staff. In general, for fear of inaccurate quotation, I have not tried to record in detail the counterarguments of the competent and patriotic men among my associates who have disagreed with me. Needless to say, their views are worthy of the most serious consideration before taking any of the actions I recommend herein. A final solution to our strategic needs should be a co-operative effort of the best minds of all the military services.

There may be spots in the text where the reader feels the need of more information about what took place. I have been obliged to write with a careful eye to the requirements of security and propriety. These considerations have resulted in some omissions, but I do not believe they are important to the theme.

While the responsibility for this book is my own, I have obviously been helped directly or indirectly by many able men and women. I have had the benefit of association with an understanding and courageous Secretary of the Army, Wilbur M. Brucker. He has set an example to all of us in uniform of a civilian leader willing to take responsibility and to fight stanchly for any cause in which he believed. Many officers of the Army staff have influenced my views with regard to many of the important issues discussed in this book. They have been keen and discerning critics of the logic with which I have pleaded my case before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and elsewhere. Insofar as I have allowed them, they have fulfilled the role of the perfect staff officer who sees to it that the Old Man's mistakes are neither too big nor too numerous. My inspiring association with these able men has been one of the great rewards of the position of Chief of Staff.

Thus, it is impossible to acknowledge the contribution of the many individuals to whom I am indebted for some form of assistance in writing this book. However, I cannot fail to mention my senior aide, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard W. Rogers, Warrant Officer John J. Proctor and Specialist Johnnie L. Scott, all of my immediate office. The members of my family, particularly my wife, Lydia, and my son and daughter-in-law, John and Priscilla Taylor, have been most helpful in representing and defending the nonprofessional, civilian point of view. Mr. Evan Thomas of Harper has assisted in that particularly difficult task of reducing, if not eliminating, the technical language and the stuffiness of the Pentagon which inevitably cling to the pen of a long-time denizen.

I was asked recently what in my past experience had been most helpful to me as Chief of Staff. Was it attendance at the Command and Staff College and the Army War College? Was it service alongside General Marshall at the time of Pearl Harbor? Was it command of the 101st Airborne Division in Europe in World War II or of the Eighth Army in Korea? I never hesitated in replying, "My most valuable preparation was membership in the Northeast High School Society of Debate in my pre-West Point days in Kansas City." The subsequent chapters will show the reader why.

Maxwell D. Taylor

CHAPTER I

THE GREAT FALLACY

THE WAR diary which I kept as Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division in World War II carries the following entry: "28 July 1945 (Saturday). Drove to Berchtesgaden for luncheon with General Marshall and General Patton. Attended II Corps track meet and returned with General Marshall to Berchtesgadener Hof. Heard for the first time about A-Bomb."

Here is the background of this entry. V-E Day had found the 101st Airborne Division racing across southern Bavaria with Berchtesgaden as its objective. This famous resort of Hitler remained with Berlin the last uncaptured symbols of Nazism. Although this rugged mountainous area was reportedly to be a national redoubt, organized and defended for a fight to the finish, actually it fell easily to the combined efforts of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division, the 2nd French Armored Division, and the 101st Airborne Division. The last hostile shots which I saw fired in World War II came from a German machine gun in a mountain pass just to the west of Berchtesgaden.

Once installed in this scenic spot at the foot of the Alps,

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the division began to receive many notable visitors. Some came in great haste—they were German leaders fleeing from capture by the advancing Russian forces to the east. Field Marshal Kesselring, the German Commander in Italy, General Guderian, the great Panzer leader, and many lesser lights turned themselves over to our airborne troops. Others of our callers came more leisurely—they were U.S. leaders or those of our Allies.

Under such conditions it was a great joy to me to receive word in late July, 1945, that General Marshall, with whom I had served closely on the War Department General Staff at the outset of the war, was coming from the Potsdam Conference to pay us a visit. He sent word that he wished to rest quietly in Berchtesgaden but would like to have luncheon with General Patton, whose Third Army Headquarters was at Bad Tölz some seventy miles to the west.

I relayed General Marshall's desires to General Patton and at the appointed time went out to the Salzburg airstrip to meet the Chief of Staff. Upon his arrival, I took him to the Berchtesgadener Hof and installed him in an apartment which had often housed Nazi bigwigs in the past. General Patton arrived shortly before noon and the three of us lunched quietly in General Marshall's suite. After the lunch, where the conversation turned principally upon the events of the Potsdam Conference, I took my two distinguished guests out to the local sports field, where the athletes of the II Corps and of my division were having a track meet. The three of us sat in the warm Bavarian sunshine, somewhat apart from the other spectators. During a lull, General Marshall turned to General Patton and me and said quietly, "Gentlemen, I am going to tell you something of the utmost importance. When you hear what I have to say, there will be no need to caution you as to the need for silence."

Then General Marshall proceeded to tell us a story about which we had heretofore known nothing—the story of the explosion of the first atomic weapon at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, just twelve days before. He described briefly the development of the Manhattan District under the leadership of Major General Leslie R. Groves, Jr., the great difficulties which Groves and his colleagues had overcome and the final triumph of the successful detonation. He explained jokingly—and I think it was to add to our obvious bewilderment—that this was not an "explosion" but an "implosion."

After describing the terrific yield of the detonation and some of its obvious military implications, General Marshall closed the discussion by saying—and I shall never forget the words—"Gentlemen, on the first moonlight night in August, we will drop one of these bombs on the Japanese. I don't think we will need more than two."

General Patton and I looked at each other in silence, both meditating upon the awful significance of Marshall's words. I, at least, was trying to imagine what the effect of these weapons might be on the war in the Pacific and from there passed readily to a conjecture as to the possible meaning of these weapons in future warfare. What if we had had such things to clear our way across Europe? Think of the thousands of our brave soldiers whose lives might have been spared. Now, indeed, I thought, we have a weapon which can keep the peace and never again will a Hitler or a Mussolini dare to use war to impose his will upon the Free World.

Such were my thoughts, at least; what General Patton thought I shall never know, as this was the last time that I saw him alive. But it is safe to say that we were both sensing the fascination of the Great Fallacy, that henceforth the use or the threatened use of atomic weapons of mass destruction would be sufficient to assure the security of the United States and its friends. To show that this concept is indeed a fallacy is a primary purpose of this book.

History was soon to prove that General Marshall's estimate of the effect of the new atomic weapon on Japan was correct. Two bombs did do the job. The Japanese surrendered, the victory was won, and the nuclear age had dawned. Even more than the generals at the Berchtesgaden track meet, the whole world was deeply impressed with the awesome power of the new weapons in the hands of the United States. Our own people were quick to believe that our armed forces had in the air-delivered atomic bomb the absolute weapon which would permit the United States, its sole possessor, to police the world through the threat of its use. Thus, in 1945 a new strategic creed, eventually to be known as Massive Retaliation, came into being, and later

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reached full acceptance as military orthodoxy in the so-called New Look program adopted by our government in 1953. Along the way it received a setback from the events of the Korean War, which contradicted many of its basic assumptions. But it survived and continued to thrive even under the vicissitudes which are recorded in this book. In spite of temporary reverses, Massive Retaliation remains the basic strategic concept which guides our military preparations today. While occasional statements of spokesmen for national defense sometimes seem to contradict unqualified faith in Massive Retaliation, the real strength of that faith is shown in the figures of the annual military defense budget. Here, since the end of the Korean War and in spite of its lessons, the dollars have always gone to support in top priority the requirements of Massive Retaliation and of general atomic war. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

It is my belief that Massive Retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an urgent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs. In its heyday, Massive Retaliation could offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat. From its earliest days, many world events have occurred which cast doubt on its validity and exposed its fallacious character. Korea, a limited conventional war, fought by the United States when we had an atomic monopoly, was clear disproof of its universal efficacy. The many other limited wars which have occurred since

1945—the Chinese civil war, the guerrilla warfare in Greece and Malaya, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hungary, the Middle East, Laos, to mention only a few—are clear evidence that, while our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the Great War—a World War III—it has not maintained the Little Peace; that is, peace from disturbances which are little only in comparison with the disaster of general war.

Other developments also call for a reappraisal of our military strategy. We have lost our former atomic monopoly. We are probably inferior to the USSR in numbers of ballistic missiles. We have no antiballistic missiles as a defense to offset this superiority in offense. We have made no realistic effort to cope with Communist strength on the ground. Anemia is afflicting many of our military alliances. We are playing a losing game and should change it. But this change is made difficult by the weaknesses of our strategy-making machinery and procedures. In particular, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system has proved ineffective and needs a fundamental overhaul as a preliminary to a general reappraisal of our strategy.

The strategic doctrine which I would propose to replace Massive Retaliation is called herein the Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959. The new strategy would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter general war. Otherwise, the limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in an expanding conflict which may grow into the general war we all want to avoid.

To make this change in strategy will require a lot of doing. It will call first for a clear directive from the National Security Council to the Department of Defense. It will require night work by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to translate the directive into priorities of military requirements. It will need a new kind of defense budget to see that the dollars follow the approved priorities. These actions in combination would comprise the Military Program of Flexible Response which is urgently needed to overcome the serious military disadvantages which we face vis-à-vis the Soviets in the period 1961-1964.

Any serious discussion of the problems of national security requires at the outset an agreement as to the meaning of certain basic terms. Already the expressions "general" and "limited" war call for definition. I shall use them in the early part of this book as presently defined in the strategy-making circles of the government. It should be clear, however, that I do not agree with these definitions, as my subsequent comments will indicate. But, for the present purposes, the term "general war" will designate a conflict in which the forces of the United States and the USSR are directly involved and in which atomic weapons are assumed to be used from the outset. On the other hand, "limited war" will be considered to be a conflict short of general war in which the United States forces will use atomic weapons as required to achieve national objectives. The proponents of these definitions hold that these local conflicts are likely to occur in the less-developed areas of the world outside of Europe and that only limited U.S. forces will be necessary to cope with them.

These definitions have achieved currency in official circles only after very sharp debate and continued efforts are being made to change them. The objection to the "general war" definition is that it appears to require that in any case where U.S. and Soviet forces come into contact, regardless of the dimensions or the political importance of the incident, we would initiate all-out atomic bombing as the proper response. This matter of definitions is not an academic point; it can have very practical effects. For example, insistence upon this definition can stultify sensible planning for a situation such as might arise if the USSR or its allies blocked our access to Berlin. In planning for such a contingency, the definitions can be used as an argument against using U.S. ground forces as a probe to determine Soviet intentions and thus to avoid the possibility of our being kept out of Berlin by a bluff. Since such an action might bring U.S. troops into armed conflict with Russians, it could lead to general war—if indeed we are serious about this definition of general war. Common sense will say that we are not but, as it is still in the official lexicon of the strategic planners, I will adhere to the definition except when otherwise noted.

The "limited war" definition is defective because it seems to exclude the possibility of any limited war in the NATO area of Western Europe. This argument is always cropping up in Pentagon debate, even though one limited war in the NATO area has occurred, namely the Greek Civil War in 1947, to which the U.S. made a significant contribution in military advisers and military equipment. Even though the U.S. possessed an atomic monopoly at the time, no one proposed to use atomic weapons and to expand the localized hostilities into general war. The connotation of intrinsic smallness in the definition of limited wars is objectionable because it can be used to keep the armed services from planning for limited situations much greater than the landing in Lebanon in 1958. It has even led its extreme partisans to deny that the Korean conflict qualified as a limited war, despite its obvious limitations as to geography, weapons, and political objectives.

Both definitions encourage the armed forces to a dependence upon the use of atomic weapons to a degree which is open to question. In general war, atomic weapons would be used at once; in limited war, in accord with the national interest. While there has been no occasion to test the validity of this assumption in general war, it is significant that during the Lebanon landing in 1958, the United States Army had an Honest John rocket afloat off Beirut but was not allowed to land it because it could fire an atomic warhead as well as a conventional one. In this instance, our political leaders felt that it was against the national interest even to suggest by the presence of the weapon that we might use atomic weapons in Lebanon. Additionally, the sudden destructiveness of general war and the relative insignificance of limited war, as portrayed by the definitions, are used as arguments against maintaining reserves of trained manpower and military equipment to support extended military operations. Thus, it may be fairly said that these definitions set the configuration of our military strategy. They are used to justify a strategy of Massive Retaliation and to rule out a consideration of the needs of nonnuclear war without first being themselves justified. To explain their existence requires a review of the evolution of the strategy of Massive Retaliation and the causes of the thinking behind it.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

THE DOCTRINE which under the name of Massive Retaliation eventually became the central theme of the military strategy of the United States has its origin in the theories of the Italian General Giulio Douhet prior to World War II and the influence of these theories on the thinking of the United States Air Force. General Douhet thought, and generations of Air Force officers were taught to believe, that strategic bombing of an enemy's industrial and urban centers could win a war. In World War II the U.S. Air Force as well as the Royal Air Force of Great Britain undertook to implement this doctrine. They were encouraged to massive bombing of urban targets by the early example of the attacks of the Luftwaffe on the cities of Great Britain and other Allied countries. As control of the air passed to the side of the Allies in the course of the war, they were able to make massive air attacks on German cities against little opposition. While these attacks devastated most of the urban areas of Germany, they were surprisingly ineffective in reducing the German industrial output in support of the war effort. Following World War II, an analysis was made of the effectiveness of this bombing and the results compiled in the *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*. Herein it was conclusively shown that strategic bombing in World War II had not been decisive in destroying the war production of Nazi Germany. It was a contributing but not the decisive factor in achieving the ultimate victory. Thus, the partisans of General Douhet could find but limited support for their claims in the results of the war in Europe.

The war in Japan ended on a different note. The atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided a new case for the decisive character of strategic bombing. The atomic bomb offered air power a new weapon with tremendously increased destructiveness and encouraged once more the belief that an ultimate weapon was in the hands of our Air Force which would allow the United States to impose a sort of Pax Americana on the world. The corollary to this belief was that conventional military forces would have little or no value in the new era.

Nuclear weapons began to exert an important influence on military policy immediately following World War II, although their capabilities, limitations, and political implications were only vaguely understood. But it seemed clear that they represented destructiveness at a cheap price. This point was important because of the need to replace the armed forces demobilized so thoroughly and wastefully at the end of World War II in the furor to "bring the boys home." To have rebuilt similar forces in the succeeding years would have been costly both in dollars and in political "face."

Neither the Truman Administration nor the American people were prepared to foot such a bill, particularly that part of the program which would have been a tacit admission of lack of foresight. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the idea of relying on nuclear weapons and strategic bombing for national defense had great appeal. Such a military program appeared to offer us a way out of fighting dirty, costly wars with Communist masses on the ground. It was a way to meet manpower with mechanical power. Its apparent cheapness gave rise to the slogan, "More bang for a buck." But this reliance on Massive Retaliation overlooked the fact that atomic bangs could eventually be bought for rubles as well as dollars.

In such a postwar climate, it was probably natural for the U.S. to do most of its defense spending for air power and atomic weapon systems. It is true that current events, such as the Communist-led civil war in Greece, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Russian blockade of Berlin, should have been reminders of the need to meet challenges to which the atomic bomb would be no reply. However, the lesson, if perceived, was not effective and conventional forces were sacrificed to the needs of atomic power.

Expenditures for the Army decreased steadily during Fiscal Years 1948, 1949, and 1950, while Air Force expenditures showed a sharp upward turn. Army strength dropped from eighty-nine divisions in 1945 to ten divisions in Fiscal Year 1950. The Navy and Air Force also lost conventional strength during this period, but not so much. In spite of a bitter public controversy with the Navy, the Air Force was allowed to proceed with the dubious B-36 program as a part of the expansion of long-range, nuclear strike forces.

In July, 1950, the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel, U.S. forces were thrown into battle and the war was on. The direct involvement of United States forces in this remote and relatively unknown country and the character of the subsequent military operations provided a rough jolt to the proponents of Massive Retaliation. If the dogma were right, the threat or the use of airborne atomic weapons in Korea and North China should have been sufficient to win a quick victory. But the fact was that, for reasons sufficient unto our responsible leaders at the time, the United States preferred to fight a limited war for limited objectives without the use of atomic weapons, even though our country had an absolute monopoly of these weapons at the time. This was, and still is, a hard fact for many military polemists to swallow. They can only belabor the folly of having accepted the conflict on such restricted terms. This, they say, was fighting a war with one arm tied behind our back. Had our air power been released from the shackles imposed upon it, it could have carried the war to a successful conclusion by the unrestricted bombing of the sources of the hostile military power. Be that as it may, the responsible military and civilian leaders of the government considered all these arguments at the time and, rightly or wrongly, rejected them. As a result, the decisive action in thwarting the Communist aggression was ground action conducted very much as had been the operations of World War II. In spite of the overwhelming superiority of the United Nations in the air and on the sea, it was the infantry deployed along the rugged Korean hilltops which determined the issue of victory or defeat. The fluctuations of this front line on the ground provided the measure of success in the war.

As Eighth Army Commander in Korea I was deeply impressed with these facts and shortly after the Armistice wrote to General Ridgway the following observations:

> An outstanding impression from the operations in Korea has been the ineffectiveness or inapplicability of many of our modern weapons to the requirement of the Korean type of limited war. I refer particularly to the weapons of the Air Force, the Navy and the Armor, to which certain other Army weapons and equipment may be added. The enemy, terrain, and weather combined to nullify in a large measure much of the costly equipment assembled during and after World War II in preparation for a possible World War III, to be fought principally in Western Europe. To these restrictions we added the subjective factor of our own reluctance to use atomic and other special weapons in which we have been investing a large part of the military budget.
>
> The absence of an opponent prevented the useful employ-

ment of much of our air and naval strength. Except for the MIG's in the northwest corner of the peninsula, there was no airborne enemy to combat. Similarly, at sea the mightiest war ships of the world were obliged to occupy themselves with shelling relatively unimportant targets ashore, or with maintaining a blockade against negligible enemy naval forces.

Finally, we denied ourselves the use of special weapons [i.e., atomic weapons] for a variety of reasons, some military, some political. A partial list of these deterrent causes include: reluctance to expend the surprise effect of these weapons on a secondary enemy; doubt as to their effectiveness in the terrain of Korea; fear of reprisals by enemy against Korean and Japanese targets; resistance of our allies to any action which might extend the war. Regardless of the merits of the case for and against the use of special weapons in Korea, the fact that we deliberately abstained from using them is a reminder that we may do so again in future situations, particularly as the Soviet atomic capability increases. In the end, by a tacitly agreed, mutual cancelling out of special weapons, we may be forced to rely again on conventional means.

Yet in the U.S., the ultimate effect of the Korean experience, oddly enough, was not to weaken faith in atomic air power but rather to strengthen it. By the time of the Armistice in 1953, the entire country had become heartily sick of the Korean conflict and impatient at the frustrations which it entailed. This popular dissatisfaction over the indecisive nature of the conflict became an important political factor in the presidential election of 1952. General

Eisenhower was elected on a platform which promised an early end to the repugnant stalemate allegedly the result of the mistakes of the Truman Administration.

No sooner was President Eisenhower in office than the new Administration proclaimed the New Look as the guiding military policy of the new government. In its principal aspects, the New Look was little more than the old air power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings and now formally buttressed upon Massive Retaliation as the central strategic concept. Its ready acceptance had complex and varied causes, some of which have already been mentioned. They included such things as the domestic reaction to the Korean conflict, the continued faith in the efficacy of air power, a desire for budgetary economy, and the American penchant for simple solutions. Massive Retaliation and its attendant concept of a short, violent war were consistent with all of these points. Its implementation assumed the preponderant use of air power and avoidance of the bloody, exhausting battle on the ground. The postulated shortness of the conflict encouraged the hope of savings in the costs of a conventional mobilization, while the spectacular violence of Massive Retaliation appealed to our American frontier impulse to blast the villain who presumes to oppose us.

As the New Look was elaborated in theory and practice it became a package of interrelated concepts, some military, some political. Its point of departure was the need to maintain military forces for the long pull without accepting any particular target date for complete military readiness. It placed emphasis upon the new weapons of mass destruction as the basis for providing the retaliatory striking power needed as a deterrent to any aggression, large or small. It favored a reduction of U.S. forces deployed overseas in order to create a central reserve of strategic reserves on U.S. territory. Army forces would be kept small lest we be tempted to use them to fight another Korea by conventional means. The partisans of the New Look were convinced that the U.S. should never again make that mistake and set about reducing Army forces to make it physically impossible even if our future leaders might be so inclined.

The adoption of the New Look was one of the most significant actions of the new Eisenhower Administration. It established the direction which United States military policy has followed from 1953 to the present day. Its immediate effect was the reduction of personnel strengths for the armed services for the Fiscal Years 1955 and 1956 and a sharp increase of the size and level of modernization of nuclear air forces at the expense of the conventional forces.

A first step in the implementation of the New Look was to change the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Eisenhower in his press conference of May 14, 1953, stated that he had decided to make this change as a demonstration of his Administration's new approach and its severance of ties with the past. The new appointments were Admiral Arthur Radford replacing General Omar Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Robert Carney for Admiral Fechteler as Chief of Naval Operations, General Matthew B. Ridgway for General J. Lawton Collins as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and General Nathan F. Twining replacing General Hoyt S. Vandenberg as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

There were several causes for this simultaneous replacement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the first place, the new Administration looked upon membership on the JCS somewhat differently from the Truman Administration. The new Chiefs were regarded as members of the Administration "team," working for the objectives of that team under the guidance of their civilian superiors. In formulating their military advice, it was hoped that they would take into account the views and feelings of these superiors and avoid submitting contentious or embarrassing recommendations. They were expected to accept public responsibility for the actions of the Administration in the field of military policy, regardless of their own views and recommendations. They were to avoid any impression of disunity in public or before the Congress. That dissent might invoke sanctions was clearly implied by appointing the new Joint Chiefs of Staff for no specified term, with the stated intention to review all appointments after two years. General Ridgway subsequently charged that when he dissented he was subjected to frequent pressure to conform to a preconceived politico-military party line and it was made clear to him that he was not to allow his nonconcurrence to be known to the public.*

There were domestic political reasons for moving out the old JCS. It seemed illogical to many Republicans to continue to rely upon the military advice of men identified with the military programs which the New Look intended to curtail or abolish. There was also a lurking suspicion that the incumbents in the JCS had not been the neutral military experts that they were expected to be. General Bradley, in particular, was considered suspect. Senator Taft felt that General Bradley had intervened politically in support of the Truman Administration in the matter of sending troops to Europe in 1950-51. In April, 1953, Senator Taft advocated the formation of a stand-by set of Joint Chiefs of Staff who would undertake, even before their formal appointment, a review of military policy. Senator Taft argued that General Bradley and his associates were clearly committed to, and had an intellectual vested interest in, the Truman policies. The Senator had long been opposed to the preferential treatment given the military needs of Europe and, in consequence, was happy to see Bradley replaced by Admiral Radford, who was oriented by experience toward the Pacific and Asia.

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* General M. B. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 21, 1956.

Whatever the justification for the mass exodus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this event was profoundly disturbing to most professional military men. It suggested that the Joint Chiefs belonged to the Administration in power and were expected to be the spokesmen for its military policy. This concept of role was quite different from that previously accepted. Heretofore the Joint Chiefs had been regarded as a nonpolitical body charged with giving professional advice to the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President. It had been thought that they should give their advice with limited, if any, attention to political or economic factors, since these components of the national strategy had qualified spokesmen elsewhere in the governmental structure. A new ambiguity was given to the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has existed to the present time and continues to plague the formulation of our military strategy.

When the new Joint Chiefs of Staff came into office, their first task was to determine the requirements for the implementation of the New Look. In December, 1953, they submitted their estimates in terms of budget and manpower for a stabilized military establishment up to 1957. The military manpower requirements were estimated to be about 2,800,000 men, of which a million men would be in the Army. It was felt that these forces could be supported by an annual defense budget in the neighborhood of $34 billion. These forces and budgets would be adequate only if certain assumptions proved valid, the most important of which was that the requirement for significant U.S. forces in Korea would shortly cease.

The subsequent evolution of our military establishment from 1953 to 1959 is the history of the implementation of the New Look based upon these initial estimates of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953. Its development may be followed in three general areas. The first of these is found in the formulation of basic security policy in the National

Security Council, as expressed in the annual paper of that body entitled "Basic National Security Policy," which provides broad guidance for all the departments of the government contributing to national defense. A second area is the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff translating the broad guidance of the National Security Council into specific plans and programs to produce the military forces necessary to support the approved national policy. The basic JCS document for this purpose is called the "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan" (JSOP). The final area is in the activities related to the formulation of the annual defense budget, where the allocations of financial resources are made to support the plans and programs of the JCS and the military services. In all three areas the New Look was to encounter difficulties which will be the subject of the next two chapters.

ROCKETS and MISSILES

by

HERBERT YORK

24

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5

ROCKETS AND MISSILES

There are a staggering variety of missiles in the world today. They come in a great range of sizes; they exhibit many forms and shapes, and they are designed to accomplish a wide variety of specific objectives. Some missiles are nothing more than pilotless aircraft. Their weight is supported on wings, and they are propelled by jet engines which burn common liquid fuels such as kerosene and gasoline. Missiles of this type are usually known as "cruise missiles" or "air-breathing missiles." Other missiles are shaped more like elongated bullets and are rapidly accelerated to high velocities by rocket motors. Then, like a bullet, they coast along a trajectory determined by their initial momentum and the force of gravity acting on them. Missiles of this type are called "ballistic missiles."

Some missiles are designed to be used for strategic warfare; i.e., their purpose is to eliminate the basic war-making potential of any enemy by killing his people and destroying his factories. Other missiles are designed to be used tactically: their purpose is to destroy enemy soldiers and weapons in direct combat circumstances. Still other missiles are designed to be used for defense: their purpose is to intercept and destroy attacking aircraft and missiles.

The rockets which launch manned and unmanned satellites into orbit around the earth or onto a trajectory to the moon

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are, of course, technologically identical with those which are used to launch ballistic missiles on their paths toward an enemy target. The only really important difference between the two is in the cargo. Thus it is not surprising that the technological and political histories of the space program and the missile program are tightly interwoven.

The only strategic missiles that have ever been fired in anger in modern times were the German V-1 and V-2. In the waning days of World War II these missiles were used to bombard London and various seaports in Allied hands, both in England and on the Continent.

The V-1 was a winged air-breathing cruise missile propelled by a pulse jet engine. It weighed just under five thousand pounds; its fuselage was twenty-seven feet long and thirty-three inches in diameter. It carried a one-ton chemical-explosive payload. Its rudimentary control system was preset for the range and direction of its target before takeoff, and as a consequence its accuracy was very poor. It was also quite unreliable and highly vulnerable to defensive measures. Considerably less than half of the eight thousand V-1s (or buzz bombs, as the English called them) launched toward London actually arrived there; the majority were either intercepted by British air defenses or went completely astray.

The V-2 was a ballistic missile propelled by a rocket motor using alcohol as its fuel and liquid oxygen as its oxidizer. (Rockets normally carry with them both of the chemical components necessary for the combustion: a fuel and an oxidizer. Jet-type missile engines, of course, get the oxygen they need for combustion directly from the air, as do airplane and automobile engines.) The V-2 was forty-six feet long and sixty-five inches in diameter, and it weighed 27,000 pounds. Just as the fuel was exhausted (or "at burnout," as it is usually called) the missile reached a speed of very nearly one mile per second. As a direct consequence of this speed its maximum range was approximately two hundred miles. At the time, it was the fastest vehicle that had ever been built, and it was not much slower than even today's satellite launchers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, which reach speeds in the neighborhood of five miles per second. The V-2 was steered to its target by what is called an "inertial guidance system." That means that it carried within itself a mechanism which could (1) sense how fast and in what direction it was moving and (2), based on that information, give orders to the propulsion and flight-control systems to make it arrive at a predetermined destination. The accuracy of this guidance system was such that most of the missiles landed within three to five miles of the target selected, or, to put it differently, within a distance from the target which was about two percent of the range to the target. The V-2's payload of chemical explosive was, like the V-1's, just about one ton in weight. However, entirely unlike the V-1, none of the V-2s were intercepted by British air defenses; 1,500 of them landed in England and killed more than 2,500 persons in all.

Both the V-1 and the V-2 were developed during World War II at Peenemünde, Germany, in a laboratory under the direction of General Walter Dornberger and Wernher von Braun. After the war most of the key personnel, including both Dornberger and Von Braun, plus much equipment and much documentation, were brought to the United States as part of Operation Paper Clip. Some of the persons and equipment ended up in Russian hands, and a few individuals ended up in France and Britain. Much, but by no means all, of the development which followed in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was based on the German experience and involved the participation of these former members of the Peenemünde team.

During the war none of the Allied powers carried on any program aimed at the development of large strategic missiles in the V-1 or V-2 class, but they all did develop and manufacture smaller missiles and rockets for other purposes. One of the best-known of these is, of course, the hand-held bazooka.

One of the most important, insofar as its long-range consequences were concerned, was the JATO (jet-assisted takeoff) rocket used to assist slow, heavy aircraft (such as seaplanes) in taking off.

In the United States there were several different projects for developing and producing these JATO rockets. One of these, supported by the Navy, was under the direction of Robert H. Goddard, the "father" of rocketry in this country. Others were conducted by Reaction Motors, Inc. (originally formed by members of the American Rocket Society), by GALCIT (Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology) and the Aerojet General Corporation. Some of these wartime JATO units developed thrusts in the neighborhood of three thousand pounds.

Two entirely different types of rocket motors were used for these JATO applicators; one kind used liquid propellants and the other kind used solid propellants.

In the case of liquid-propellant engines, such as propelled the V-2, two liquids, one a fuel and the other an oxidizer, are pumped into a combustion chamber. There they mix and burn, producing high temperatures and high pressures which force their combustion products to exhaust through a nozzle in the tail of the rocket with great speed. In the process of exhausting to the rear they cause the rocket to recoil in the opposite direction, thus driving it forward. The most practical of the various fuels used during the war was aniline, and the usual oxidizer was red fuming nitric acid. Both of these liquids are nasty to handle, but they have the advantage of being storable at room temperature (unlike liquid oxygen) and of igniting on contact, so that no special ignition system is needed to get things started (unlike the case when kerosene is used as the fuel).

The solid-propellant motors are more like those used in Fourth of July rockets: the fuel and the oxidizer are already mixed in a dry form, and then are lighted at one end. A narrow burning zone rapidly moves through the mixture, creating high-temperature, high-pressure gaseous combustion products as it does so. These, as in the case of the liquid rocket, exhaust rearward through a nozzle, causing the rocket as a whole to recoil and thus move forward in the process. A mixture commonly used in World War II consisted of asphalt (which acted both as the fuel and as the binder holding the mixture together) plus potassium perchlorate, a powerful oxidizer in the form of a crystalline powder.

The reason the Allies did not attempt to develop missiles for strategic bombardment was a very simple one. With our technological industrial base and with the state of the art as it existed at the time, aircraft were far superior to missiles for such purposes. Aircraft were far more flexible, they could carry much larger payloads, they had much longer ranges, and they could deliver their bombs with much greater accuracy. The V-1 and V-2 missiles were really just psychological terror weapons with very limited direct effectiveness, whereas bombardment aircraft could, in principle at least, go after specific targets such as particular factories, bridges, railroad yards, etc. Also, by the time the Germans began to use the V-weapons, the war was already going very badly for them, and these weapons may have had certain special advantages in just such a situation. For example, the V-2 could be launched from small, easily concealed pads rather than from large, easy-to-see, easy-to-disrupt airfields, and a single missile could get through; whereas the Germans at that time could no longer put up enough aircraft to gain the necessary advantage of saturation.

With the invention and demonstration of nuclear weapons at the close of the war, the whole technological picture changed. The destruction radius of even the earliest nuclear weapons against people, houses, and factories was one or two miles instead of only a hundred feet or so as in the case of even the very largest chemical bombs. This large increase in destruction radius, combined with foreseeable improvements in the accuracy of guided missiles, led weapons-systems designers to give serious consideration to the possibility of producing a new kind of weapon system: the nuclear-armed, intercontinental guided missile. It has become clear such weapons could perform at least some of the functions of bombers.

In the United States, strategic warfare was largely the responsibility of the Army Air Corps (soon to become the U. S. Air Force). Hesitantly at first, it began to explore this new possibility. Both air-breathing cruise missiles and ballistic missiles received serious attention as candidate systems.

Three air-breathing strategic missiles eventually came out of these studies. The first of these was the Snark, a subsonic, winged cruise missile with a range of five thousand to seven thousand miles. Northrup had the prime contract for the development of this missile, and Pratt and Whitney made the jet engines. It was boosted up to operational speed by two large JATO rockets. These were the solid-propellant type and generated a thrust of 33,000 pounds each. The vehicle had a gross weight of fifty thousand pounds and it could carry a payload of five thousand pounds, easily enough for the A-bombs of that day. After a long-drawn-out program, the Snark finally became operational in 1958; it was phased out only a few years later. We realized, several years before Snark became operational, that it would become obsolete by the time it was finally deployed, and repeated recommendations for dropping the project were made. However, in this case as in so many others, the momentum of the project and the politics which surrounded it made it impossible to do so.

The second of the strategic cruise missiles was Matador, for practical purposes a scaled-down Snark. It was built by the Glenn L. Martin Company; it had a gross weight of twelve thousand pounds and a range of 650 miles. It too carried a nuclear warhead. In order to be able to strike at our potential enemies, it had to be based in forward areas such as Japan and Germany. It became operational in 1955 and in the early sixties was replaced by the Mace missile, which had a longer range, greater speed, and superior accuracy.

The third of these large air-breathing winged cruise missiles was the Navaho. This missile was developed by North American Aviation under an Air Force contract. It was started much later than the first two, and consequently its design was based on a much more advanced technology. It was ninety-five feet long, it had small delta wings, and it weighed 300,000 pounds at takeoff. It was boosted into the air and accelerated up to three times the speed of sound (or about two thousand miles per hour) by three large liquid-propellant rocket engines, each one generating 135,000 pounds of thrust. After it reached that speed, ram jets took over and continued to propel it to its target a quarter or more of the way around the world. It was guided by a self-contained all-inertial guidance system. Navaho was flown for the first time in November, 1956, by which time the huge intensive programs to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles were already well under way. It was therefore again recognized, as in the case of Snark, that this weapon system would become obsolete before it was deployed. This time the fact that Navaho was less far along the road toward deployment made it possible to heed the repeated recommendations to cancel the program, and the missile was scrubbed well before it reached operational status.

Even though the Navaho was never deployed, it did play a very important role in our missile program. Its development provided the technological base for much of what was to follow. The large liquid-propellant rocket engines were the first of a long series of similar engines designed and built by Rocketdyne. Later engines in this series powered the Thor, Jupiter, and Atlas missiles and the huge rocket that started Apollo 11 on its journey to the moon more than a decade later. Also, the Navaho inertial-guidance system provided the technological basis of later, more advanced systems which were used in other missiles, aircraft, and even submarines.

In addition to these cruise-type missiles, the Air Force explored the possibility of using large rocket-powered ballistic missiles as intercontinental strategic weapons. In 1946 Con-

War broke out soon after this new missile-development group was established. As one result of this new stimulus to weapons development, the Redstone group was given the assignment to develop a longer-range ballistic missile for use in tactical warfare. After a brief period of some uncertainty, it was eventually established that this rocket should have a range of two hundred miles and carry a nuclear warhead. It was to be a mobile weapon capable of being launched under battlefield conditions by regular combat troops. The missile finally designed to meet these objectives was named the Redstone after the Arsenal. It was propelled by a slightly modified version of the 135,000-pound liquid-propellant rocket engine which was being developed by the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation for the Air Force's Navaho missile. The Redstone was the largest American rocket under development in the early fifties and, as we shall see, was to form the base for much of the program which followed. As a weapon, however, it never served any important function, and it was often referred to by other Army personnel as "the world's most expensive roadblock."

Starting in the fall of 1952, a series of closely spaced events wrought revolutionary changes in the content and style of our missile-development programs and, through them, all other military development programs as well. These were the invention and demonstration of the hydrogen bomb, the election of Eisenhower and the concomitant extensive personnel changes throughout the executive branch (the first complete change in twenty years), and the growing accumulation of intelligence reports which first indicated and then confirmed that the Soviet Union had already launched a major program for the development of large long-range rockets.

Six crash programs to develop long-range nuclear-tipped strategic missiles were born out of the confluence of these three events. These programs dominated the technological scene in this country throughout the fifties. The names of these missiles

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solidated-Vultee (later Convair) was given a contract to look into the matter further, and it began the design and development of the MX-774, an early version of what later became known as the Atlas. Soon after this work was started, and as a result of further internal reviews, the Air Force concluded that, given the existing state of the art, such a weapons system, even with a nuclear warhead, would take too long to develop and would not be competitive with other alternative approaches. The Air Force thereupon decided to discontinue any support for large long-range rockets and to concentrate its resources and energies in the more straightforward and conservative aircraft and cruise-missile programs. Consolidated-Vultee did manage to keep the program going along for a time on its own funds, but for all practical purposes the big-rocket approach to strategic weaponry was dead for the time being in the United States.

During the postwar years the Navy also conducted programs in the development of missiles for a variety of applications. These included the Rigel and then the Regulus I and the Regulus II cruise missiles which could be launched from surfaced submarines and used against either strategic or tactical targets hundreds of miles away on shore. The Navy, like the Air Force, also developed a number of air defense missiles, most of which were rocket-powered. The Army too had a vigorous program of rocket and missile development immediately after World War II. Some of these rockets were developed for the purpose of upper-air research. Other surface-to-surface rockets, including the Corporal, were intended for use in tactical warfare. And still others, including the Nike series, were intended to be used for air defense.

In 1949, the Army decided to establish its major missile-development activities at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. Among those transferred were 130 members of the original Von Braun team, as well as many military personnel and other government and contractor employees. The Korean all became well-known: Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris. The first three are ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), the next two are IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles), and the last is an SLBM (sea- or submarine-launched ballistic missile). All six programs were started within three years of each other, and for a time all six were being carried out concurrently. All six missiles had the same principal purpose: massive retaliation in the event of an attack. In retrospect it is clear that three such programs would have been entirely sufficient, and it would not have been necessary to have even these three all conducted on a crash basis. Why, then, did we overreact? The reason, once again, was the inflation of the anticipated threat and the multiplication of programs designed to counter it—in short, excessive caution and prudence inspired by the thought which is the motto of the arms race: "Let us err on the side of military safety." In addition, the personal ambition of clever men played an essential role in at least one case.

Among the new officials who came into office as a result of Eisenhower's election were Donald A. Quarles, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development (and soon after Secretary of the Air Force), and Trevor Gardner, whose title was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. Quarles had been president of the Sandia Corporation, where the final engineering of nuclear weapons is done; he was intelligent, conservative, cautious, and unflappable. Gardner was intelligent, vigorous, somewhat volatile, and impatient to make changes quickly.

Each of these two men in his own style was responsible for first initiating and then guiding the thoroughgoing reviews of the defense research and development program that soon followed the change in administration. The reviews themselves were carried out at first by a number of committees working separately in each of the military services and reporting to different levels of program management. These committees had a strongly interlocking membership, a feature of the advisory apparatus which then, as now, allowed information to travel both up and down within agencies and laterally between agencies and thus to pass over and around the various barriers of secrecy, propriety, and bureaucracy which would otherwise cripple technical progress. (This style of organization and operation, of course, also allows a few strong-minded individuals to dominate a broad part of the scene.)

After about a year, in the interest of making more rapid progress and more profound changes, the originally large number of committees were regrouped into a much smaller number and John von Neumann became the chairman of the most important of them. The "Von Neumann Committee" (under different formal names) advised the Secretary of the Air Force on the projects that were under the direct control of that service, and it advised the Secretary of Defense on all large military rocket programs, including those of the Army and the Navy. Von Neumann was extremely intelligent, and curious about everything. He looked like a cherub and sometimes acted like one; my three- and five-year-old daughters delighted in climbing on him when he came to call at the house. He was very powerful and productive in pure science and mathematics and at the same time had a remarkably strong streak of practicality. He was one of the earliest pioneers in the design and construction of large electronic computers, he developed a strong interest in the technology of nuclear and other weapons, and he made a number of elegant inventions in each of these fields. This combination of scientific ability and practicality gave him a credibility with military officers, engineers, industrialists, and scientists that no one else could match. He was the clearly dominant advisory figure in nuclear missilery at the time, and everyone took his statements about what could and should be done very seriously. Other key members of his committee were George Kistiakowsky and Jerome Wiesner (both whom later became Special Assistants to Presidents of the nited States), Simon Ramo and Dean Wooldridge (both of 1om soon left the committee to organize the Ramo-Wool- idge Corporation), and Charles A. Lindbergh. Darol Fro- an, from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and I, from e Livermore Laboratory, were also members and in an in- 'rmal sense represented the nuclear-weapons laboratories. he committee also maintained very close working relation- 1ips with the key experts in other essential subfields of tech- ology. Especially important among these was Stark Draper, 1e director of the Instrument Laboratory at M.I.T. Draper nows more by far about the science and technology of iner- al-guidance systems than anyone else in the Western world. Ie is a great optimist, and, although he is usually right, he ometimes seems to know even more than is so.

Working very closely with Gardner, Quarles, and Air Force ;enerals James McCormack and Bernard A. Schriever, the /on Neumann Committee in a series of intensive meetings in .953 and early 1954 concluded that:

1. The state of the art in the relevant branches of technol- 'gy had reached the point where a practical rocket-powered oallistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead inter- :ontinental distances and delivering it with sufficient accuracy :ould be built.

2. The Soviets had a head start of some years in this field, and therefore the United States should initiate a program with the "highest national priority" to build such a missile (the Atlas).

3. A new style of program management and technical di- rection was needed to coordinate properly the disparate fields of technology involved and to conduct concurrently the devel- opment, production, and deployment phases of the program.

In response to this third recommendation the Air Force es- tablished the Western Development Division (WDD) of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), selected then Brigadier General Schriever to command it, and gave him an unusual combination of authorities over the research, development, and procurement phases of the program. Schriever used his special authority brilliantly, and much of what we now take for granted in the methodology of systems development and systems management was pioneered under his direction. He was able to integrate a wide variety of persons and facilities effectively and with finesse. In contrast to that of the more typical project officer, his personal influence made a real and positive difference to the program. In addition, and at least as important, the Air Force gave a contract to the then spanking-new Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation to provide what the weapons trade now refers to as general systems engineering and technical direction, or, more commonly GSETD. At first this contract covered only the Atlas ICBM, but it later was extended to include all of the large Air Force ballistic missiles. The Ramo-Wooldridge organization supplied the scientific and technical expertise needed to complement and supplement the expertise in program administration and military matters which Schriever had directly on his staff. Ramo and Wooldridge assembled with remarkable speed a very strong group of scientists and engineers and did another excellent job.

Ramo and Wooldridge themselves had been members of the earlier versions of the Von Neumann Committee, and it was no coincidence that their new corporation was given this GSETD assignment as its very first job. There was absolutely nothing improper or wrong about this arrangement, but it does indicate that the "arm's-length" relationship between government and business which is generally thought of as being part of the free-enterprise system was even then missing from what years later came to be known as the "military-industrial complex." The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation at first was strictly limited to planning and technical management and was prohibited from working on any hardware development or production. However, the corporation later merged with Thompson Products (which always had been in hardware) and now operates as a major, well-known general defense contractor under the name TRW, Inc. One of its subsidiaries, TRW Systems, still performs general systems engineering and technical direction under contract to the Air Force on the Minuteman ICBM, one of the later missile programs which I will discuss shortly. (In 1960, a new, nonprofit corporation, the Aerospace Corporation, was established to provide GSETD for most Air Force missile and space programs. Many of the key personnel, including the senior vice-president technical, Allen Donovan, transferred from TRW to the new corporation in order to assure the smoothest possible transition.)

History can't be run by twice in order to check out alternatives, but I believe that without either WDD and General Schriever or the Ramo-Wooldridge group, the Atlas project would have taken more than a year longer to complete and would have cost much more as a consequence.

After the decision to go ahead with the development of large long-range rockets, or ICBMs, and after this new organizasional structure came into being, the Von Neumann Committee, then working very closely with both WDD and the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, focused its attention on the technical details of the system. By an iterative process, the committee established both the performance goals (or "specs") and a first rough outline of a design which would meet them.

The performance goals set for the Atlas, the first ICBM to be started, were the following: a one-megaton-warhead explosive yield, 5,500 nautical miles range, and five miles or better accuracy, or CEP ("circular error probable," the distance from the target within which, on the average, half of the warheads fall). The accuracy specified for this missile thus called for the warheads to land within a distance *from* the target which was only one tenth of one percent of the range *to* the target. In this sense, the accuracy required was twenty times that actually achieved by the V-2 ten years earlier. I emphasize this matter of accuracy because steady improvements in it have had a more profound effect on the arms race than any other technological factor, save only the invention of the H-bomb.

It is most instructive to examine the origin of these numbers. Draper, always a technical optimist, said he could foresee much better CEPs than five miles, and we simply took that figure as a conservative estimate. The range figure of 5,500 nautical miles is not, as one might suppose, the distance between two given points, one in the U.S.A. and one in the U.S.S.R. (Such distances vary from five miles to eight thousand miles or so.) Rather, it is precisely one fourth of the earth's circumference. It was, however, a sensible figure to focus on, being easily typical of heartland-to-heartland distances. Further, at a range of 5,500 miles the range of a rocket depends very strongly on its initial speed, so only small fractional changes in this latter quantity enable the range to be varied from, say, 3,500 miles to eight thousand miles.

The origin of the remaining performance goal, the requirement of a one-megaton yield, is much more interesting to examine. It is true that the damage radius of a one-megaton bomb is more or less compatible with the accuracy prescribed for the missile. However, the accuracy goal itself was arbitrary; the definition of damage is quite imprecise, and the radius at which a given blast pressure is generated varies only very slowly with the yield (as the cube root, in fact). Thus, the damage radius of a ten-megaton bomb and a one-hundred-kiloton bomb could equally well be said to be compatible with the prescribed accuracy. So, why 1.0 megaton? The answer is because and only because one million is a particularly round number in our culture. We picked a one-megaton yield for the Atlas warhead for the same reason that everyone speaks of rich men as being millionaires and never as being tenmillionaires or one-hundred-thousandaires. It really was that mystical, and I was one of the mystics. Thus, the actual physical size of the first Atlas warhead and the number of people it would kill were determined by the fact that human beings have two hands with five fingers each and therefore count by tens.

What if we had had six fingers on each hand and therefore counted by twelves instead of tens? As any school child who takes modern math knows, the number one-million in base twelve is fully three times as big as the number one-million in base ten. Thus, if evolution had given us six fingers on each hand, our first ICBM warhead would have had to be three times as big, the rockets to deliver them would have threatened the lives of up to three times as many human beings, and it would have taken one or two years longer to carry out their development program. Similarly, if we had had only four fingers, like some comic-strip characters, the first warheads and missiles would have been only one-fourth as large, we could have built them somewhat sooner, and the present overkill problem would not be nearly as serious as it is. The only funny thing about this story is that it is true. It really was that arbitrary, and, what's more, that same arbitrariness has stayed with us. The initiation of other, later missile programs, including the Minuteman and the Polaris, was in fact delayed until nuclear-weapons technology advanced to the point where a one-megaton warhead could be forecast for each of them too. To go further, but still to remain within the realm of the truly possible, there might never have been a large liquid-fueled Atlas at all if we had had four fingers and hence a base-eight number system. We might have gone directly to the smaller and simpler solid-propellant Minuteman, which eventually did replace the liquid missiles.

Since these performance goals were set, rationalizations for them have been worked out, and many people, including especially those in the military services, think that the yield and all the other numbers characterizing the system can be derived from complex mathematical formulae connecting explosive yield, damage radius, target vulnerability, and other numerically defined quantities.

This particular case of arbitrariness I have been discussing is by no means unique. Defense planning is full of arbitrary figures and figurings that have been thoroughly rationalized only after the fact. The number of units of many types of equipment is almost as arbitrary; so are the total numbers of men in the various services; and hence so is the total defense budget itself. I would say that the defense budget is arbitrary by at least a factor of two. The fierce arguments that can break out over a cut of, say, five percent have their origins in the very great difficulties of making changes in large traditionbound systems and not in the fact that the numbers as they originally stood were correct in any absolute sense. Thus, the real reason that this year's defense budget is so and so many billion dollars is simply that last year's defense budget was so and so many billion, give or take about five percent. The same thing, of course, applies to last year's budget and the budget of the year before that. Thus the defense budget is not what it is for any absolute reason or because in any absolute sense the total cost of everything that is supposedly truly needed comes out to be precisely that amount, but rather it is the sum total of all the political influences that have been applied to it over a history of many years, and that have caused it to grow in the way that it has grown. (The foregoing, of course, excludes special events like the Vietnam War, but even at its height that conflict has absorbed considerably less than half of the defense dollars.)

A similar situation also prevails with respect to over-all manpower needs. I became convinced when I was in the Pentagon later in the "missile gap" days that the apparent approximately ten percent shortage of technical personnel had nothing to do with the fact that there was a real need for an absolute number of persons which happened by a remarkable coincidence to be just ten percent more than we then had. Rather, the number of technical people then working could generate and sell ideas that needed ten percent more people to accomplish them. If there had been twice as many scientists and engineers in our defense programs, there would still have been about a ten percent shortage, and if there had been half as many, the shortage we would have seen would even so have been only about ten percent.

Getting back to the Atlas story, after setting the performance goals, the Von Neumann Committee, Ramo-Wooldridge, and the Western Development Division were then able to outline the basic design of the system. The committee first estimated that the "required" one-megaton explosion could be produced by a nuclear weapon which, together with the protective reentry nose cone, would weigh 3,500 pounds. (A year previously, an Air Force Science Advisory Board panel, also chaired by John von Neumann, and including Teller and me as members, had predicted that a warhead of that weight would soon become feasible.) With the fuels then available, and for a given design style, immutable laws of physics connected the payload weight with the total rocket gross weight, and this was determined to be in the neighborhood of 250,000 pounds. With this as a base, it could then be decided that two large booster engines plus one smaller sustainer engine could accomplish the task of propelling the missile. The booster engine selected was the large liquid-powered Navaho engine uprated to 150,000 pounds of thrust each, and the sustainer engine was to be of similar design but reduced in size and generating only sixty thousand pounds thrust. It was further determined that the guidance and control equipment should be of the inertial type but assisted by radar observations of the rocket made from the ground during the takeoff. Such observations helped to further refine the ability of the missile to know where it was, how fast it was going, and where it was headed. The airframe, most of which consisted of the tanks containing the propellants, was to be made of very thin steel so that it would be light enough to enable the rocket to reach the high velocity necessary for an intercontinental range. In fact, the airframe had to be so lightly constructed that it could not stand up on its own. It had to be continuously internally pressurized like a large balloon in order to hold its own weight plus the warhead and the other equipment placed up forward. In over-all dimensions, the Atlas was over eighty feet long and ten feet in diameter and weighed about a quarter of a million pounds.

Under the general technical direction of Ramo-Wooldridge, Convair (later called General Dynamics/Astronautics) was the contractor selected to build the airframe and to manage the over-all assembly of the missile, Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation was given the propulsion contract, General Electric/Syracuse was given the contract for the inertial-guidance and control subsystem, General Electric/Philadelphia was given the contract for the reentry nose cone, and Los Alamos was assigned the job of designing the nuclear warhead. I must note here with some personal chagrin that, while it had been the Livermore Laboratory that was brash enough to promise that a one-megaton warhead could be made in a small enough physical package, it was the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory that was mature enough at the time to actually provide one.

The task of developing materials and shapes suitable for the reentry nose cone, so that it could withstand the extreme conditions encountered at reentry, was often held up as the most difficult of all the problems associated with ICBMs. The public press, including the news magazines, was full of vivid stories comparing the reentering missile warhead to a meteor. I felt then that this was a grossly overestimated problem. As it finally turned out, it was necessary to approach this problem with some care, but a number of quite different but adequate solutions were discovered. As a direct result of the exaggerated views of the difficulty of this problem, much more money was spent on this aspect of the program than was really necessary.

The Atlas program was very successful in most respects. It exceeded most of its performance goals, and it met the schedule laid down at the very beginning of the program. First flight with all three engines going was in August, 1958, and resulted in a range of about 2,500 miles. By 1960 an Atlas launched out over the Atlantic reached a range of nine thousand miles, and in that same year the first units became operational. However, over-all reliability from countdown to launch to flight was never good, especially for the operational units. Perhaps only as few as twenty percent of them would have reached their targets in a real war situation during the first year ~~or so~~ of so-called operational readiness.

In 1955, immediately after the Atlas program was under way and had been given the "highest national priority," two additional missile programs were initiated by the Air Force. The responsibility for the development of the Thor and the Titan, as they were called, was placed under the same management combination, and both programs were given the very same "highest national priority."

The range goal of the Thor was set at only 1,500 miles, but its other performance goals were left to be the same as Atlas. To meet these goals it needed only one engine instead of three, its tankage could be constructed with heavier walls so that it could stand without internal pressurization, and its top speed would be enough slower so that the reentry problem would also be much simpler. It was to be a "technical fallout" of the Atlas program and therefore was to use Atlas components to the maximum extent possible. The Thor program was quite successful from a strictly technical point of view. In addition to being briefly deployed as a strategic weapon, Thors have been used as the main booster stage for launching a great many satellites into orbit.

Along with the fact that Thor was a simple, direct and therefore hopefully inexpensive "technical fallout" from the Atlas program, there were two other rationalizations given for building it. The first of these, which made considerable sense in the context of the time, was that we thought it could be deployed one or two years sooner than the Atlas, and therefore we could perhaps eliminate some or all of the time advantage the Russians had because of their earlier start. Of course, since these missiles did not have a truly intercontinental range, it would be necessary to deploy them overseas close to the Soviet Union. However, with our worldwide system of alliances, that did not appear to be a serious problem, and in 1960 they were deployed in the United Kingdom. A second rationalization put forward by a number of influential persons at the time was simply that since the Russians were believed to be working on an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), we must have one, too. It turned out be correct that the Russians were working on an IRBM of their own, and they now do have a great many of them deployed within the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet situation and the American situation are by no means symmetrical insofar as the need for missiles in this range is concerned. The Soviet Union has a great many potential enemies within 1,500 miles of its borders, whereas at the time the United States had no enemies that near its borders. Furthermore, the United States had a great deal of war materiel in the form of tactical aircraft and many other kinds of equipment deployed within 1,500 miles of the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet Union had no equipment of any kind deployed that near the United States. There was, therefore, no symmetry whatsoever as far as the possible need for such a weapon was concerned, and this argument really had no more intellectual content than the familiar household notion about keeping up with the Joneses no matter what they do.

Also in early 1955, the Air Force initiated the development of a third large liquid-fueled rocket, the Titan. Its performance goals were the same as those of the Atlas, and its over-all dimensions were very nearly the same, but its design differed in a fundamental way. In contrast to Atlas, Titan employed a straightforward two-stage design. In such a design, the first, or booster, stage accelerates the missile up to about half of the final velocity needed to reach the target. Then, with the first-stage propellants exhausted, the engines and the tankage of the first stage drop off. At that point the second-stage engine starts up and the payload is accelerated on up to full velocity. This is the style of design used for all long-range rockets except the Atlas and allows a number of simplifications over the Atlas design. The Atlas employed a modified single-stage design in which the two large booster engines were dropped off part way along but the main propellant tanks were carried along the whole way. As a result, the airframe, which consisted very largely of the propellant tankage, had to be so lightly constructed that it could not stand up on its own. It had to be pressurized internally like a large steel balloon to support its own weight plus the weight of the payload. In the case of the Titan, and of all true multistage rockets, it is possible to use heavier construction for the tankage and hence it is not necessary to rely on internal pressurization to supply the needed rigidity and strength.

We had realized when we started the Atlas back in 1954 that the Titan design was the ideal one, but we had avoided it because it required that the second-stage engine be started at altitude. At that time, there was practically no experience with starting liquid-rocket engines under such conditions—i.e., in a vacuum and perhaps in a state of free fall. The Atlas design, awkward as it otherwise was, allowed all engines to be started on the ground before launch, so at the time it seemed prudent to use it for the first approach. We anticipated even then that we would later start another program parallel to Atlas. The Titan project brought in a complete new set of contractors for all subsystems and therefore provided a backup not only for the Atlas as a whole, but, indeed, for any part of it. As it turned out, the altitude-start problem gave us no difficulty at all, and the development of Titan proceeded reasonably smoothly. The first Titan was placed in service in 1962, less than two years after the first Atlas. Eventually a later, much improved and somewhat larger version of Titan replaced both the Atlases and the first Titans in our operational inventory. In retrospect, it is clear that our approach to ICBM design was unnecessarily conservative in the way it treated unknowns such as reentry and engine starts at altitude. If we had started with the Titan design in the first place in 1954, we could have done a somewhat better job on about the same time schedule. Such an approach would have cost much less, since no second large liquid-propellant rocket system would have been needed. In 1957, the Air Force also started yet another ICBM development program, this time based on the use of solid propellants rather than liquid propellants as had been the case with the Atlas, Thor, and Titan. This new missile, called the Minuteman, eventually became the most widely deployed of all and, through the last half of the sixties, provided the main component of our strategic forces.

It had long been held that for most military purposes solid rockets were potentially superior to liquid rockets. They promised greater reliability, readiness, and ease of handling, but their relatively poorer performance in terms of net payload weight for a given total missile weight had prevented their use in long-range ICBM applications. However, by 1957, improvements in this performance factor, coupled with further reductions in the weight of one-megaton thermonuclear weapons, made this use appear to be feasible, and the Minuteman program was accordingly initiated. Even with these advances, three stages were required in order to achieve intercontinental range. The project was considered at first to be marginal, but it eventually worked out very well indeed. A Minuteman flew out of an operational underground silo in late 1961, and about year end 1962 the first Minutemen were deployed. The original version of Minuteman was approximately fifty-six feet long, had a diameter of six feet at its base, and weighed 65,000 pounds. The weight was actually determined by practical considerations involving the transportation of the fully assembled rocket over the interstate highway system. The explosive yield of its warhead was roughly the magic one megaton. The first model of this missile had a less than adequate range, but eventually the range was increased to about 6,500 miles.

The improvement in rocket performance that made intercontinental-range solid rockets feasible did not come from any so-called breakthrough in fuel performance; rather, it came from advances in the much more mundane technology of rocket-case design. In the early fifties and before, the cases containing the mixtures of solid rocket fuels had weights equal to twenty percent and more of the weight of the fuels themselves. Under such circumstances, intercontinental rockets cannot be built without an impractically large number of stages. In the late fifties techniques developed in the fiber-glass industry were adapted for making cases that would withstand the high temperatures and pressures of the burning fuels yet had weights equal to only ten percent of the fuels they contained. As is all too often the situation in the American aerospace complex, a great many people and organizations were working on the exotic problem of developing high-performance fuels, and relatively few were working on the much more important but less sexy problem of case design.

During the period in which the Air Force had been developing its missiles, the Army and the Navy had not been inactive. Determined not to stand aside and let the junior service monopolize the most crucial defense efforts of the day, they were quick to advance their own projects.

The Army's entry in the big-rocket derby was the Jupiter missile. The story of the development and the demise of the Jupiter is a textbook example of how personal determination and zeal, combined with interservice rivalry, can fuel the arms race and result in the production and the deployment of needless weapons and in the needless expenditure of billions of dollars. For all practical purposes, the Jupiter was identical to the Thor. It had the same range, the same-size warhead, the same accuracy and even the same engines. With only minor variations (its diameter was specially selected so that it could pass through Swiss railway tunnels!), it had the same physical dimensions and it was built on the same schedule. It was developed by an Army organization under the command of General John Bruce Medaris and under the technical direction of Wernher von Braun. It was officially started a few months later than the Thor, although the people who promoted it had evidently been thinking about it for quite some time.

It seems clear, from various historical accounts of the origins of the space program, that perhaps the most important driving force behind the Jupiter program was the same as one of the major reasons for the existence of the V-2: Von Braun's abiding interest in space flight. In Germany at the time of the V-2 development, it was not possible to sell large space programs to Hitler's government, but it was possible to sell terror weapons. In the United States in the early fifties, a modest space program had been authorized as part of the U.S. contribution to the International Geophysical Year. The Von Braun group submitted a proposal for launching a satellite as part of the program, but it lost out to a Navy group in what seems to have been a fair competition. It was not possible to sell yet another space program to our government, but it was possible to sell weapons of mass destruction to the military authorities. And, since long-range ballistic missiles are virtually identical with space boosters except for the payload, Von Braun was "practical" and sold these rockets which really had one purpose on the basis of another.

Of course, many rationalizations for the Jupiter program were offered. These included a purported need for a land mobile tactical weapon having a range of fifteen hundred miles and an explosive yield of a megaton, although to my knowledge no neutral study then revealed the need for anything remotely similar. Another rationalization was that this system could serve as a backup to the Thor, although, since the Thor itself was justified principally as a temporary stand-in for the Atlas, it is difficult to see now how this could have been taken very seriously, even in the context of the missile race as we then understood it. A third rationalization was that the Jupiter could serve as an intermediate-range missile to be launched by ships or submarines stationed in the open seas near the Eurasian land mass. The Navy did have, then as now, a role in strategic warfare, and, as a result, a joint Army–Navy group whose purpose was to adapt the Jupiter missile for shipboard and possible submarine use was established in November, 1955. The Navy never really liked this arrangement, since it involved having another service build a missile for its use. (The same thing was seen again years later in the TFX controversy, when Secretary McNamara tried to arrange for the design of a single aircraft suitable for both Air Force and Navy use.) Furthermore, the Navy took a very dim view of the idea of placing large liquid-fueled missiles on board ships and, even worse, on board submarines. These missiles, as then designed, had to be fueled with large amounts of liquid oxygen at the last minute, and the problems associated with this seemed to be extremely difficult.

Therefore, right from the start the Navy was on the lookout for some way out of this arrangement. The steady march of technical progress soon provided it with one. The Livermore Laboratory predicted that the package that would produce a one-megaton explosive yield could be further reduced in size. At the same time, important improvements in the performance characteristic of solid-propellant rockets were being made at Aerojet and other industrial laboratories. A special group under the leadership of Admiral William F. Raborn reviewed these advances and concluded that it had become possible to build what we now call the Polaris system.

The original Polaris was a solid-fueled rocket capable of throwing a new one-megaton warhead a distance of somewhat more than a thousand miles. It was 28.5 feet long and 54 inches in diameter and weighed 28,000 pounds. It was sized so that sixteen Polaris rockets could be fitted aboard a nuclear-powered submarine. The potentially nasty problem of handling liquid fuels, especially liquid oxygen, was completely eliminated. The joint Army–Navy committee was dissolved, and the Special Project Office, which performed brilliantly under the leadership of Admiral Raborn and then Captain Levering Smith, was set up and took over the program, now entirely within the jurisdiction of the Navy. The Polaris program itself proceeded very smoothly, and the first Polaris missiles were deployed at sea aboard the *George Washington* in November of 1960. In so doing, and despite its late start, the Polaris program became the first of our strategic missile programs to make a substantial contribution to our strategic power.

Soon after the initiation of the Polaris program, word got around that Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson did not consider the remaining rationalization sufficient justification for the existence of two nearly identical liquid-fueled IRBM programs, and that therefore one of them, probably the Jupiter, which by then had become a backup to a stopgap, would have to go. Medaris and Von Braun got wind of this potential calamity in time, and, with Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker as a more than willing ally, they were able to ward it off, though not completely. As a result of their efforts, the Jupiter program was allowed to continue, but the operational responsibility for all missiles in the intermediate and intercontinental ranges was given to the Air Force. While not a very desirable solution to the problem from the Army point of view, this did have the virtue of keeping the program alive a little longer. The Jupiter was eventually deployed as an IRBM weapon in Turkey and Italy. There, nestled in the left armpits of the Russians, so to speak, it probably helped to inspire them to deploy some of their intermediate-range ballistic missiles in a similar fashion in a corresponding location, namely, the island of Cuba.

There was some useful technological fallout from the Jupiter program. This included the successful development and testing of the cheaper ablative type of reentry nose cone, and the development of a quite different rocket system, known as Jupiter C, which was later used to launch the first United States satellites. In addition, it kept the Von Braun team employed during what would otherwise have been some lean years. Even so, it seems to me that justifying the program because of these secondary benefits is like justifying five years' study of Latin so as to more clearly understand the difference between direct and indirect objects of verbs in English. There clearly were better ways of achieving the same objectives.

Altogether, during the fifties, we had initiated six crash programs to develop long-range nuclear strategic missiles. In retrospect, it is clear that three would have been sufficient.

Which of the three would have sufficed? Why did we overreact? What were the conseqences of the overreaction?

A sufficient program would have consisted of the Titan plus the Minuteman plus the Polaris. Excessive technical conservatism led us to build both the Atlas and the Titan. The two offered the same general performance characteristics in terms of payload, range, and accuracy. We knew that the Titan design was intrinsically superior, but, because we had doubts about solving certain problems inherent in it, we started with the less risky Atlas first and did not take up the Titan until about a year later. As it turned out, both worked, but only one was needed. To be sure, hindsight is better than foresight, and probably we did the best we could under the circumstances at the time. But, even so, there is a valuable lesson here to be remembered the next time this sort of problem arises.

I regard both Thor and Jupiter to have been unnecessary. As I related above, the main justification for Thor was that it could serve as a stopgap for some period of time before the more complicated and difficult Atlas ICBM could be deployed. As things turned out, it never did so in any strategically significant sense. The same arguments apply, with greater force, to the Jupiter. Both of these rockets did later serve as booster stages for space-vehicle launchers for a time, but other alternatives were available which would have cost much less in the long run.

As a result, we spent about twice as much money and we employed about twice as many people on these development programs as we should have. Furthermore, from the point of view of military security such excesses were harmful because they caused us to stretch our resources thinner than was really necessary. The early operational versions of these missiles all had a very much lower reliability than was predicted. They were therefore rather ineffective as strategic weapons for the first several years after their deployment began. It is quite likely that if we had been able to concentrate our top talent on fewer programs, this situation would not have been quite as bad. The same thing can be said about other problems and "bugs" that took time to fix. All in all, I believe the three sufficient programs could have been accomplished significantly sooner than they were if they had not had to compete with the three excess programs.

From the point of view of arms control and the arms race, these excesses in dollars and people also had serious consequences. The extra organizations and the extra people resulted in a larger constituency favoring weapons development. This larger constituency in turn strengthened those forces in the Congress "which hear the farthest drum before the cry of a hungry child," and consequently the whole arms race spiraled faster than before. Many of the leaders within this overexpanded missile industry correctly foresaw that they would be in trouble when all of these concurrent crash development programs finally resulted in some deployed hardware. They rightly anticipated that any follow-on develop-

235

ments would have a very hard time competing with the even larger funds needed for such deployments, and they provided some of the most strident voices among those proclaiming the "missile gap" of the 1958–60 period, but that is the subject of a later chapter.

In addition to all these missile programs, there were under way in the United States in the immediate pre-Sputnik era three entirely separate programs whose objectives were orbiting artificial satellites.

One of these was the Vanguard program, under the general supervision of the National Academy of Sciences. Its objective was the orbiting of a small artificial satellite as part of the United States contribution to the IGY, or International Geophysical Year. This rather special year was eighteen months long, extending from mid-1957 through 1958. The Navy, which was assigned the specific responsibility for developing the launch vehicle, was told to make it no bigger than absolutely necessary and to avoid interfering with any military-rocket programs. These two requirements together almost foredoomed it to failure, though it did eventually successfully launch three very small payloads weighing three, twenty-one, and one hundred pounds.

The second U. S. satellite program then under way was under the direction of the Air Force. It was actually a collection of a number of projects with different specific military objectives. In the immediate post-Sputnik days we usually described these as "communications relay," "navigation aids," "weather," "reconnaissance," "early warning," etc. From the first the payloads involved were scheduled to weigh over one thousand pounds, and eventually they in fact weighed many thousands of pounds. They were scheduled for first flight in 1959, when the IGY would be over.

These Air Force satellites were to be launched into space with large rockets consisting of either Thor or Atlas as the first stage plus a special upper stage called Agena. The Agena was built by Lockheed on an Air Force contract let in 1956. It went through a series of modifications during its service as the workhorse of the military space program. On February 28, 1959, a Thor-Agena combination injected a 1,450-pound satellite into orbit.

The third pre-Sputnik satellite program was bootlegged by the Army. The Von Braun group had earlier submitted a proposal for a rocket for launching the IGY satellite to the committee duly charged with launcher selection. In what I understand to have been a fair competition, the winner was the Navy's Vanguard proposal. However, the Medaris–Von Braun group was not one to be stopped by a mere decision of higher authority, and they went ahead and designed a new satellite launcher which they named the Jupiter C. Writing in 1960 about the controversy over this matter, Medaris recalled that, after a successful cancer operation in 1956, he developed "the ultimate conviction that the Lord still had work for me to do or my life would not have been spared."

This Jupiter C was not really a Jupiter; rather, it was a Redstone plus upper stages consisting of clusters of small solid rockets. Its ostensible purpose was testing nose-cone materials for Jupiter, but the actual velocity attained (and not accidentally) was more nearly that of an Atlas, the development of which was the sole responsibility of the Air Force. Even on its very first launch, it carried an additional dummy stage, "filled with sand instead of power," which if properly filled and fired could have been used to send it into orbit well in advance of Sputnik and the IGY. According to Medaris in his book *Countdown for Decision*, it was given the name Jupiter C so that it could benefit from the high priority the real Jupiter had. On January 31, 1958, Jupiter C was used to launch America's first satellite, the Explorer I, weighing just thirty-one pounds, into orbit.

CONSEQUENCES (A CASE IN POINT)

by

ROBERT J. DESUTTER, JR.

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3. Consequences (a case in point).

The Soviet Union is not just a tightly closed society then, but one that engages in deception as a regular component of its strategy and diplomacy. To say that the U.S. "does not trust the Soviets," as has long been the government's declaratory policy in matters related to arms control, is nevertheless only partially true. The U.S. seeks relief from anxiety through arms control, which intensifies the relevance of Soviet deception, and thereby invests more reliance in trust than most Americans would like to acknowledge. Furthermore, there is the problem of selective perception, as discussed in the preceding section, whereby public opinion often takes in only what it wants to believe. The Soviets, on the other hand, have often argued that arms control *should* be based on trust, but show little evidence that the value of such romanticism is of major importance in their worldview. The history of the bilateral relationship has been one in which the U.S. yields from the outset the advantages of political intimidation that result

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[58] David Sullivan attributes the quote to British Intelligence. See his "Lessons Learned from SALT I and II...", p. 360.

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from ambiguity in crucial information, and in which the U.S.S.R. thereafter manipulates that information and fully exploits the advantage granted.

The principal consequence for the U.S. has been a political environment of perpetual uncertainty and confusion, in which surprises regarding Soviet intentions have been the rule rather than the exception. As Edward Teller once explained in testimony against the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

> This has been a time of extremely rapid development, and it has been a time full of surprises. At no time did we know what the next step would bring.... Most of us believed [in 1945] and U.S. intelligence firmly and unequivocally predicted, that the Russians would not have a nuclear explosion for many years. The first Russian test was a complete surprise.... I got very worried about the next surprise that might be in store for us, and we started on the next step which the majority of scientists said could not be done, the thermonuclear explosion. You know that within a short time that succeeded, with an effect almost a thousand times as great as the first explosion, and that, in turn was followed within a few months with the Russians producing something that looked very much like a thermonuclear explosion. Again, in contradiction to all expectations, to all predictions, to the explicit statements of the intelligence community.[59]

According to Richard Barnet, however, Teller should

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[59] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Executive Session M, 88th Congress, 1st Session, August 20, 1963, pp. 418-19.

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have been even more surprised because the Soviets not only acquired a thermonuclear weapon but tested one months before the U.S. did.[60]

Teller's testimony went on to describe other surprises such as the 1957 Sputnik launch and the newly discovered possibilities associated with clandestine underground nuclear testing.[61] But there were well known intelligence overstatements by the U.S. during those years as well. In 1955, for example, as a result of the Soviets' mere reuse of the same bombers over and over again during the May Day parade, the U.S. grossly overestimated subsequent Russian bomber production.[62] But far more relevant because of its impact on American intelligence estimates of the ensuing quarter century was the famous "missile gap" of the late 1950s.

What has since been commonly dismissed as a case of partisan politics, interservice rivalries, and a

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[60] Richard J. Barnet, The Giants; America and Russia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), p. 110.

[61] Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban, p. 419.

[62] Les Aspin, "Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed Record," Strategic Review, Summer 1980, p. 31. The incident has been reported by numerous other sources but Aspin gives numbers. According to this article, the Air Force projected 600-700 Soviet bombers by 1959; the NIE predicted "about 500 bombers by mid-1960." By 1961, however, the Soviets had deployed only 190 long range bombers, p. 31.

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general inclination toward threat exaggeration, began with the Soviets' remarkable Sputnik launch in 1957 and continued through the Presidential election of 1960. The "missile gap" will be examined in some detail here, however, because it demonstrates the effectiveness of Soviet secretiveness, deception, and strategic disinformation. Not only did the incident achieve "surprise," as defined by the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, but it manifested the effectiveness with which the Soviets could manipulate the fears and anxieties of American society less than sixteen years after Pearl Harbor and less than twelve years after the end of global war. It will be shown that American "distrust" of Soviet strategic intentions was nevertheless as much a result as it was a cause of the missile gap controversy, and that conceptual ambiguity not only enabled the initial problem but also perpetuates its impact today.

In August of 1957, the Soviets tested the world's first ICBM. Two months later they demonstrated that the same booster could place a 184 pound satellite into an 18,000 mile per hour earth orbit -- and could therefore deliver payloads anywhere within a 4000 mile surface radius.[63] The question of hostile applications of such technology quite naturally arose; Khrushchev then promptly exploited these anxieties by making outrageous public statements about the ongoing and forthcoming development of Soviet ICBMs. Even Les Aspin, a consistent critic of Air Force and CIA treatment of the missile controversy, acknowledges that the Soviets knew at the time what the U.S. would know only in retrospect -- that Khrushchev's claims were intentionally misleading.[64] With the full support of the Party, the Government, all sectors of the social system, and, of course, the Soviet media, Khrushchev began emphasizing the enormous destructiveness of nuclear weapons and describing his new ICBM as the "ultimate weapon." Persuaded by these claims (or else himself part of the masque), Mao-tse-tung began urging strong communist support for "wars of liberation," which he said could be safely fanned now that American power was neutralized.[65]

According to Aspin, the Air Force warned in 1957 that the Soviets could indeed deploy 500 ICBMs by 1960 and 1000 by 1961. In the same National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA had said that no more than 100 ICBMs could be produced by 1960, and no more than 500 by 1961. Aspin explains the disparity as disagreement over when the SS-6 would begin mass production. When Soviet testing was interrupted in April 1958, the Air Force is said to have interpreted the halt as the beginning of deployment, while the CIA saw it as evidence of technical difficulty. Renewed testing in 1959 is said to have supported the CIA position.[66] In either case, Khrushchev's verbal bellicosity was itself a good reason to plan for the worst. In 1957, he issued an ultimatum to the West to vacate Berlin, a proclamation of his own global policy in support of wars of national liberation, and continual claims that the correlation of forces had shifted to the socialist world.

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[63] Walter Lafeber, American, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1975 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1976), p. 199.

[64] Aspin, p.32.

[65] Lafeber, p.200-01.

By 1959, speaking to the Twenty-First Party Congress, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union had initiated "mass production of ICBMs."[67] President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy publicly dismissed any negative implications these claims may hold for American security,[68] but Khrushchev's efforts continued. Speaking to Polish members of the World Federation of Free Trade Unions, he boasted that:

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[66] Aspin, p.32.

[67] "Khrushchev Says Rocket Success Shifts World Balance to Soviet," New York Times, January 28, 1959, p. 1.

> I have told the Americans: You have no Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. You have only missiles that can send up oranges [an allusion to the small size of the recent Vanguard I satellite]. We have missiles that can send up tons. Imagine the kind of bombs that could be contained in our missiles compared with the kind that could be contained in yours . . . We have much better equipment than the United States which will never be able to catch up.[69]

Similarly, a month later, Soviet radio broadcasts began pointing out that missile bearing submarines "could enter Hudson Bay...and bombard the industrial heartland of America."[70]

There were good reasons of course to reject

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[68] "President Voices Pride in Missiles," New York Times, January 29, 1959, p. 6. Eisenhower referred specifically to American development of "airbreathing missiles of the pilotless bomber variety." See also Jack Raymond, "Great Debate on ICBM," New York Times, January 31, 1959, p. 3, in which McElroy spells out the DOD logic according to which the decision not to match Soviet ICBM output had been made.

[69] "Khrushchev Gives a Solemn Pledge Not to Start a War," New York Times, July 17, 1959, pp. 1-2.

[70] "Soviet Reminds U.S. of Submarine Might," New York Times, August 19, 1959, p. 6. This comment came 24 hours after Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, had raised the possibility that the Soviets may have ballistic missile submarines (while the U.S had not yet deployed Polaris).

Khrushchev's claims as examples of the bluster that had come to typify his manner. McElroy, while acknowledging that the Soviets had deployed ICBMs in combat roles before the U.S. could, argued in July that the Soviets "could not have more than ten" such missiles and that "bugs" would delay the deployment of Atlas ICBMs for only two more months. Moreover, said McElroy, U.S. retaliatory power was more than a match in the meantime.[71] But the complexion of the entire debate changed in September 1959 when the Soviets successfully launched an 858 pound satellite on a 35 hour flight to the moon -- the first object sent by man from one cosmic body to another -- and accurately predicted its arrival within less than a minute and a half.[72] The U.S., which had tried unsuccessfully to accomplish such a feat five times,[73] was understandably stunned by the clear technological breakthrough. Even those who had been downplaying Khrushchev's claims now acknowledged that it left virtually no doubt about the potential range and accuracy of a Soviet ICBM. An equally well placed missile, it was estimated, could deliver its payload within less than five and a half miles of a target[74] -- more than sufficient accuracy to destroy a SAC base.

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[71] "McElroy Indicates Soviet ICBM Lead," New York Times, July 27, 1959, p. 6.

[72] "Soviet Rocket Hits Moon...Signals Received Till Moment of Impact," New York Times, September 1, 1959, p. 1.

[73] "Feat Impresses Experts on ICBM," New York Times, September 1, 1959, p. 17.

Less than three months later, the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published The Soviet Union and NATO -- The Military Balance, the first of what has since become a widely cited annual strength assessment pamphlet. The IISS, whose exaggerations of Soviet ICBM strength outdistanced any American overstatements before or since, credited the Soviets with a hundred missile bases and a missile service of 200,000 men, and the U.S. with 4 Thor IRBM bases (in Great Britain) and 3 Jupiter bases (2 in Italy, 1 in Turkey), with fifteen missiles at each site. The Soviet force was said to be composed not only of 1000 mile range T-4s and 1600 mile range T-3s, but with an unstated number of 5000 mile range T-2s as well. These were said to be deployed along the Baltic coast, throughout East Germany, the South Ukraine and in the Carpathian mountains between the Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania.

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[74] Ibid. See also "Pentagon Sees Russians' Shot as Confirming ICBM Capability," New York Times, September 15, 1959, p. 20.

Far from discouraging these estimates, Khrushchev pointed out that his stockpile of hydrogen bombs was now "formidable," that his many rocket bases were "well concealed," and that a lead of "several years" in rocket development and production assured the Soviets of "unassailability" well into the future.[75] As he went on to specify before the Supreme Soviet:

> The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government can inform you, Comrade Deputies, that, though the weapons we now have are formidable weapons indeed, the weapon we have today in the hatching stage is even more perfect and even more formidable. The weapon which is being developed . . . is a fantastic weapon.[76]

As 1960 came and election year politics began to heat up, the record reflects the anachronistic scene of liberal Democratic senators hammering an annoyed Republican president for not building ICBMs fast enough. The first and most vociferous of these "hawks," Senator Stuart A. Symington, referred in February to a "3 to 1" Soviet lead that "is being increased."[77] Referring to a statement made four years earlier by a Republican senator, to the effect that, in addition to bombers, SAC had a "growing stockpile of ICBMs," Symington accused the Administration of having misled the people. Far from narrowing this "missile gap," said Symington, "we haven't got any ICBMs." A former Secretary of the Air Force, Symington was commended by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D. Texas) for his forthrightness as Johnson joined him in the charges against the Administration.[78]

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[75] "Khrushchev Says Soviet Will Cut Forces a Third; Sees Fantastic Weapon; Strength Cited," New York Times, January 15, 1960, p. 1.

[76] "Excerpts from the Address made by Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet," New York Times, June 15, 1960.

[77] "Symington Says President Misled Nation on Arms," New York Times, February 20, 1960, p. 1.

John F. Kennedy's initial reactions during the presidential campaign were more restrained than were those of his competitors for the Democratic nomination. Well prior to the election year, Kennedy had recorded his opposition to "massive retaliation" and its implausibility, especially during the coming year "in which our own offensive and defensive missile capabilities will lag so far behind those of the Soviets as to place us in a position of great peril."[79] But for Kennedy, the danger lay not so much in a crudely calculated numerical weapons inferiority, as in "our unwillingness and inability to strike the first blow."[80] The gap, according to Kennedy, would be represented by a shift in what he called the "deterrent ratio," a reflection of the zero-sum connotation he attributed to deterrence. American second strike capability during this "missile-lag period" would certainly enable the destruction of "a portion of their homeland," said Kennedy in 1958 on the Senate floor, and this would remain true "no matter how great their defenses or how decimated our retaliatory power."[81] But this punitive capability was fairly irrelevant to Kennedy, because

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[78] Ibid.

[79] John F. Kennedy, "The Missile Gap," (Speech presented on the floor of the Senate, August 14, 1958) The Strategy of Peace, ed. by Allan Nevins, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 34.

> our experience with the illogical decisions of Adolph Hitler should have taught us that these considerations might not deter the leaders of a totalitarian state -- particularly in a moment of recklessness, panic, irrationality, or even cool miscalculation.[82]

War, according to Kennedy, was more of an instrument than an objective of Soviet foreign policy -- "a means of securing power and influence, of advancing [their] views and interests."[83] Thus the Soviets could be expected during the years of the gap "to use their superior striking ability to achieve their objectives in ways which may not require launching an attack." The threat was therefore politically relevant to whatever extent it limited American warfighting ability:

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[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., p.37.

[82] Ibid. Emphasis mine.

[83] Ibid.

> [Soviet] missile power will be the shield from behind which they will slowly, but surely advance through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence, and vicious blackmail of our allies. The periphery of the free world will slowly be nibbled away.... Each Soviet move will weaken the West; but none will seem sufficiently significant by itself to justify our initiating a nuclear war which might destroy us.[84]

Kennedy's initial reaction during the campaign was thus to disassociate himself from the simplistic numerical comparisons of Symington et.al. In one of his first informal campaign remarks, Kennedy simply acknowledged the difficulty created by Soviet secrecy:

> I think the President and the Administration have acted in good faith and [that] he's not going to play with the security of the United States. But I do think it is extremely difficult to make a correct assessment with precision as to what a dictatorship is doing. Therefore I should err on the side of safety.[85]

Later the same day, speaking before 150 college newspaper editors, Kennedy chided the Administration for not moving quickly enough on arms control. But his principal theme throughout the campaign was that, in the absence of thorough information about the Soviets' true capability, it was probably best to take Khrushchev at his word; and that the "minimum conditions for our survival" therefore required higher defense spending. In what was perhaps the first crude outline of what became his doctrine of "flexible response," he proposed the following priorities for an increased defense budget:

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[84] Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[85] "Kennedy Disputes Defense Policies," New York Times, February 22, 1960, p. 8.

1. An emergency air alert program to make SAC bombers more survivable.
2. A stepped up approach to the Polaris and Minuteman programs and an acceleration of Atlas production.
3. A commitment to rebuilding conventional Army and Marine forces "to prevent brush fire wars that our capacity for nuclear retaliation is unable to deter."[86]

The impact of the missile gap controversy was clearly significant both in its contribution to public perceptions of a Soviet threat and in the 1960 Presidential election itself. But it would be incorrect to conclude from this that public or private reactions were inappropriate given official Soviet statements and the secretive character of the arsenal being described. As far as the election year political hype so often associated with the "missile gap" phenomenon goes, Theodore White's Pulitzer Prize winning The Making of the President 1960 gives little if any importance to the issue. According to White, for example, missile comparisons were not even worthy of mention during the famous Kennedy-Nixon debates.[87] Moreover, despite whatever wrong conclusions the intelligence community may have come to regarding the late 1950s threat, no American President ever publicly encouraged policies responding directly to those projections. As noted throughout this discussion, the President and his defense spokesmen, perhaps due to intelligence photos from the U-2, consistently downplayed the issue while Eisenhower was in the White House. Similarly, once elected, Kennedy made no more claims as to the existence of a gap. Defense policies during Kennedy's brief tenure as President were as closely related to his earlier opposition to massive retaliation as they were to errors in the counting of global range missiles.

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[86] "Kennedy Pursues Rise in Arms Fund," New York Times, March 1, 1960. I have paraphrased except as noted.

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[87] Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum House, Inc., 1961), pp. 317-344.

What is noteworthy for purposes of this project, however, is the fluctuation of reactions from the immediate to the long term aftermath of the missile gap controversy. On November 19, 1961, a year after the election of Kennedy, Administration officials announced that the most recent National Intelligence Estimate indicated an American lead in ICBMs. It was noted that the U.S. now had four operational squadrons of Atlas missiles and would deploy eighteen more Atlas and Titan missiles by the end of 1961. Soviet ICBM strength, by comparison was projected to be "between thirty and seventy-five" by that same time.[88] But on the same day that the new information was released, Soviet military leaders claimed new deliverable warheads in the 100-megaton range.[89] Since the Soviets were known actually to have tested a nuclear device of fifty to sixty megatons some three weeks earlier, the new claim was more than plausible. In making the announcement, the Soviets claimed to be "superior to the U.S. in both rocket attack and rocket defense" and furthermore that

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[88] Jack Raymond, "U.S. Missile Lead Claimed in Study," New York Times, November 19, 1961, p. 1, and Hanson W. Baldwin, "New Figures Close 'Missile Gap'," New York Times, November 26, 1961, part IV, p. 4.

[89] "100-Megaton Rocket Reported by Russia," New York Times, November 19, 1961, p. 44.

"the backbone of the Soviet fleet was missile-firing atomic submarines."[90]

The second interesting reaction to the announced "end" of the missile gap was that of the American news media. The New York Times, the principal source of reporting cited throughout this discussion of the missile controversy, typified the nation's leading editorial reactions. The Times editorial writers were clearly not relieved by the November 19 revelation as they reflected on it the following day. Acknowledging first the "considerable margin of uncertainty" surrounding estimates of Soviet strength, The Times reluctantly conceded that Army, Navy and Air Force concurrence "cannot be dismissed lightly." After expressing this skepticism, the editorial went on to ask suspiciously:

> And if the conclusion is correct, the question immediately arises why the Soviet Union has not built as many ICBMs as it could have. Was this because of economic or technical difficulties? Or is there a political explanation?...The new evaluation of relative Soviet-American ICBM capabilities cannot lead to complacency. The Soviet Union, like ourselves, has a diversified and most powerful military machine equipped with many missiles of different ranges...[91]

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[90] Ibid.

[91] "Missile Gap in Reverse," New York Times, editorial, November 20, 1961, p. 30.

A week later, The Times was able to be more specific in expressing its concerns:

> The issue became one in part because Air Force intelligence estimates of Soviet missile capabilities, which were always far higher than other estimates, were used as political and propaganda footballs.[92]

The latter editorial, like the one of November 20, then went on to articulate several profound reflections on the experience:

> 1. Intelligence estimates, which deal with many unknown factors, can rarely be 100 percent accurate.... [But] national defense is too important to national security to become the football of service pressures or partisan politics.
>
> 2. The Defense Department, under Secretary McNamara, is establishing -- partly because of the very differences that led to the synthetic 'missile gap' -- a unified Defense Intelligence Agency. Ironically, unless this agency is very carefully developed, guided and restrained its 'cure' could be worse than the evils it is intended to remedy. For it is far safer to have differing intelligence estimates -- even if they can be exploited for petty ends -- than to force intelligence estimates to conform to the mold of policy.
>
> 3. Finally, despite the present assessment that the United States -- across the board -- is equal or superior to Russia in missile numbers and technology, this is no time to relax.... [Russia] is striving, as we are, to reach first the next great

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[92] "That Missile Gap," New York Times, editorial, November 27, 1961, p. 28.

> milestone in military development -- a 'missile killer' system. *The price of freedom is militarily high; we must not only remain strong but we must convince our friends and enemies that we are, in fact, the strongest power on earth.*[93]

Thus *The New York Times* recognized not only that there may be strategic dimensions beyond those reflected in long range missile comparisons, but also that American threat assessment skills would be severely jeopardized if the wrong lessons were learned from errors in assessing a closed society's arsenal.

It is unfortunate that experts in subsequent years and decades would prove less insightful than *The New York Times* had been in 1961. As Albert Wohlstetter has thoroughly documented, centralized intelligence estimates since 1962 have suffered from precisely the "cure" that the *Times* was concerned about.[94] Although the Air Force's estimates of Soviet ICBM growth would continue to exceed those of other intelligence agencies, for example, these analyses would be reflected in National Intelligence Estimates only as footnotes, and even they would consistently understate the Soviet ICBM buildup of the ensuing twenty years. Nevertheless, widely accepted dogma for these two decades would have it that a "worst plausible case" dynamic -- or a systematic bias in threat analysis -- was characteristic of American intelligence work. According to this logic, institutional self interest, of which the missile gap was simply an early but typical example, has two common byproducts. On the one hand such bias causes the national security community to aggrandize itself by "erring on the side of caution." On the other hand such overreactions necessitate Russian reactions ("action-reaction") and thus stimulate "another round in the arms race," for which the U.S. is thus responsible.

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[93] *Ibid*., emphases mine.

[94] See for example Albert Wohlstetter, "Racing Forward or Ambling Back?" in *Defending America*, Introduced by James R. Schlesinger (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), pp. 110-168, or "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race," United States Strategic Institute, report 75-1.

Cases in point are abundant. Roger and Earl Molander, for example, carried the message around the country throughout 1982 that:

> The 'bomber gap' was replaced by the 'missile gap.' (This pattern is characteristic of worst case analysis: gaps never seem to go away; they just change their focus.) The reaction of the U.S. military establishment was dramatic. The U.S....ICBM program received a big boost, and by 1960 more than a hundred Atlas ICBMs had been deployed...[95]

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[95] Roger C. Molander and Earl A. Molander, Nuclear War: What's In It For You? (New York: Pocket Books, 1982), p. 68.

Subtly or blatantly, these explanations attribute fear and uncertainty not to Soviet secretiveness or disinformation, or even to the Soviets' publicly exaggerated characterizations of their arsenal, but to self-generated anxieties or purely mechanistic impulses that can be terminated by unilateral American policy changes. The motive for denying that such termination is plausible, according to Jerome Wiesner, has been that "continuing competition...absorbs quantities of time, energy, and resources that no static environment would demand."[96] Thus Wohlstetter cites, from the litany of metaphors used to dismiss any political relevance in arms competition: "runaway technology," "uncapped volcanoes," "treadmills to nowhere," "worst case analyses," "and so on."[97]

Accordingly, the already difficult task of measuring Soviet power took on a whole new set of burdens as a result of the missile gap: it became absolutely anathema to the intelligence community's credibility to overstate any portion of the present or future arsenal to which American defense policy must respond. Underestimates, however, were to become entirely forgivable in the popular culture. Thus it is routinely overlooked that throughout the period of ICBM overestimates in the late 1950s, the U.S. was severely underestimating the intermediate and medium range missiles (IR/MRBMs) that the Soviets were deploying within range of Western Europe.[98] As Americans collectively exhaled over the discovery of a token ICBM threat in 1961 (most sources now say ten or fewer), Europeans took little comfort as the anticipated missiles turned out instead to be over 700 IR/MRBMs deployed in the late 1950s and early 1960s.[99] The reversal in priorities may have been the Soviet plan all along -- with Khrushchev's claims as diversions. More likely, however, the shift in emphasis simply reflected an initial Soviet strategic decision whereby targets in the U.S. were less attainable and of less immediate value than those in the rest of NATO. In

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[96] National Citizen's Commission, Report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, White House Conference on International Cooperation, November 28 - December 1, 1965.

[97] Wohlstetter, "Racing Forward or Ambling Back?" p. 112.

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[98] Ibid., p. 116.

[99] Daniel O. Graham, Shall America Be Defended? (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1979), p. 89. Graham thinks the Soviets committed themselves in 1957-58 to an MR/IRBM force of some 750 launchers and 2000 missiles. See also Richard J. Whalen, "The Shifting Equasion of Nuclear Defense," Fortune, June 1, 1967, pp. 85-183.

either case, even those intelligence analysts who opposed the larger ICBM forecasts were stunned by the magnitude of the IR/MRBM buildup.[100]

According to William T. Lee, this misunderstanding was partially attributable to a traditional American propensity for "mirror imaging" its own targeting priorities; but, more specifically, the explanation goes back to the old problem of conceptual ambiguity. According to Lee, weapons are not "strategic" for American analysts unless they are "intercontinental."[101] Even the words "missile gap" (as opposed to the more accurate "ICBM gap" thought to exist) betray this inclination. For the Soviets, with their different history, geographic setting, and ideological orientation, however, "strategic" problems begin at the empire's border:

> From Moscow to Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and so forth, is a strategic distance to [the Soviets]. To the Soviets, North America is not _the_ measure of strategic distance, but only one of the more remote strategic areas.[102]

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[100] William T. Lee, "Intelligence: Some Issues of Performance," in _Arms, Men, and Military Budgets; Issues for Fiscal Year 1978_ (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 303-4.

[101] Lee, p. 305.

[102] _Ibid_., pp. 305-6.

Preoccupation with the uniquely American concept of what is strategic not only obscured perceptions from 1957 to 1961, but has also distorted today's revisionist view of the controversy as well. Notwithstanding Kennedy's Inaugural commitment to "pay any price" on behalf of "any friend,"[103] the association between a missile's range on the one hand and its strategic significance on the other, came to be regarded as natural. Individually and collectively, such images would dominate security analyses for the ensuing generation. Above all, however, once the "action-reaction" myth became connected with the image of "worst case analysis," the American intelligence community had lost its capacity to be taken seriously.

In this detailed review of the so called "missile gap," we have seen examples of many of the deceptive traditions attributed earlier to the Soviet Union. The controversy is worthy of research and analysis for a variety of reasons, partially because of its status as a "classic case" of conceptual ambiguity, propaganda, disinformation and strategic deception, and partially because of the long term "lessons learned" and their impact on subsequent U.S. intelligence credibility.

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[103] John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961, State Department Bulletin, February 6, 1961.

FAREWELL ADDRESS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

and

INAUGURAL ADDRESS: JOHN F. KENNEDY

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1961

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DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: Farewell Address

A "new" Eisenhower seemed to emerge during 1959 and 1960, when the President, at last in health, and acting without the advisers — Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams — who had dominated the early years of his administration, began to use the powers of his office to implement his policies and to check the rise of certain influential factions in the government. One group that particularly worried Eisenhower was the alliance that he dubbed the "military-industrial complex." He warned on several occasions, most notably in his Farewell Address of January 17, 1961, that advances in technology combined with the growing defense needs of the country had created an opportunity for the military establishment and the armaments industry to exert undue and improper influence on the formation and conduct of national policy. The warning was especially striking coming from Eisenhower, product as he was of the military and good friend, as it had been assumed, of "Big Business." Eisenhower's Farewell Address is reprinted here.

Source: *Bulletin*, February 6, 1961.

My Fellow Americans:

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leavetaking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President and all who will labor with him Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the nation.

My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis, when long ago a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate postwar period and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the nation should go forward. So my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling on my part of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts, America is today the strongest, the most influential, and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this preeminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches, and military strength but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

Throughout America's adventure in free government our basic purposes have been to keep the peace, to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology — global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully there is called for not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle — with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense, development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture, a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research — these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs — balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped-for advantage, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable, balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual, balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must

Werner Wolff from Black Star

President Eisenhower speaking before the United Nations in October 1960

be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 3.5 million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for, the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of the federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system — ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we — you and I, and our government — must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written, America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war, as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years, I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But so much remains to be done. As a private citizen I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

So, in this, my last good night to you as your President, I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I, my fellow citizens, need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease, and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth; and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

2.

JOHN F. KENNEDY: Inaugural Address

January 20, 1961, in Washington was a cold, windy day. A brilliant sun shone on snow that had fallen the night before. A rabbi, a Protestant minister, a Catholic cardinal, and a Greek Orthodox archbishop prayed for guidance; all four emphasized freedom of religion. Robert Frost, a friend of the Kennedy family, read a poem. The man who stepped to the rostrum to take the oath as chief executive was the youngest man ever to be elected President. Many noted his youthfulness, and as they spoke of the hopes for his administration they did so in terms of a new kind of politics that would be appropriate to the needs of a new generation of citizens, and of a new world. "The inauguration of JFK as 35th President of the U.S. will stand," asserted Commonweal, *"as one of the most dramatic political events of this century." The even more dramatic event that was to occur on November 22, 1963, would cause people to remember the Inaugural Address of that January day with a special regard. The address is reprinted here.*

Source: *Bulletin*, February 6, 1961.

WE OBSERVE TODAY not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom — symbolizing an end as well as a beginning — signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three-quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe — the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans — born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage — and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

This much we pledge — and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do — for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom — and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required — not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge — to convert our good words into good deeds — in a new alliance for progress — to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.



Ted Spiegel from Rapho Guillumette

John F. Kennedy, photographed in Seattle, Sept. 1960

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support — to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective — to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak — and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request — that both sides begin anew the quest for peace before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course — both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.

So let us begin anew — remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us.

Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms — and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and commerce.

Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah — to "undo the heavy burdens . . . [and] let the oppressed go free."

And if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

All this will not be finished in the first 100 days. Nor will it be finished in the first 1,000 days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.

In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again — not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need — not as a call to battle, though embattled we are — but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation" — a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility — I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it — and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans — ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world — ask not what America will do for you but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

THE MISSILE GAP

by

JOHN F. KENNEDY

28

268 A

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6. *The Missile Gap*

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38

IN THE SENATE
AUGUST 14, 1958

Mr. President, four hundred years ago the British crown and people realized with a sense of shock that they had lost Calais forever. Long considered an impregnable symbol of British supremacy in Europe, this last foothold of English power on the Continent was surrendered to the French in 1558. It is said that when Mary of England died, in the same year, the word "Calais" was engraved upon her heart—but that she was, in the words of *The Cambridge Modern History*, an eminent example "of the inadequacy of deep convictions and pious motives to guide the state aright." Once they had recovered from their initial panic, the British set about adjusting their thinking and their policies to the loss they had suffered. With their gateway to the Continent gone, they sought new power and influence in the seas. A navy was built, new trade routes promoted, a new maritime emphasis established; and when the Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588, the panic and pessimism that had followed the loss of Calais were forgotten as Britannia ruled the waves. The old power, the foundation for old policies, was gone—but new policies had brought a new power and new security.

The time has come for the United States to consider a similar change, if we, too, are to depend on something more than deep convictions and pious motives to guide the state aright. For we, too, are about to lose the power foundation that has long stood behind our basic military and diplomatic strategy.[4]

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[4] Senator Kennedy's plea for realism in facing an imminent period of national peril caused a sensation in Congress. Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana, as Mr. Kennedy notes elsewhere in this book, threatened to have the galleries cleared on the ground that the speech was disclosing information inimical to the national interest. Actually, its statements as to the coming disparity between American and Russian strengths in long-range missiles were familiar to experts. Lieutenant General James Gavin, whom Mr. Kennedy quotes, had resigned from the army to present his views on this and other subjects to the public. His book, ***War and Peace in the Space Age***, was soon being widely reviewed.

Mr. Kennedy's point that President Eisenhower's complacency over the deterrent power of our nuclear weapons was outdated, and that the "deterrent ratio" in the years 1960-1964 would probably be weighted heavily against us, has been supported by other careful students of the

269

That foundation—one of the key premises upon which our leaders of diplomacy, defense, and public opinion have based their policy making—has been, since Hiroshima, our nuclear power. We have possessed a capacity for retaliation so great as to deter any potential aggressor from launching a direct attack upon us. Spokesmen for both parties, in the Senate and elsewhere, have debated our preparedness upon the assumption that this "ultimate deterrent" would deter any Soviet attack. Our retaliatory power, said the President in his 1958 State of the Union message, is "the most powerful deterrent to war in the world today," offering any potential aggressor "the prospect of virtual annihilation of his own country." Possession of similar striking power by the Soviet Union has not altered this basic premise—it is instead described now as the result of a "nuclear stalemate," a point of mutual "saturation" or a "balance of terror."

The hard facts of the matter are that this premise will soon no longer be correct. We are rapidly approaching that dangerous period which General Gavin and others have called the "gap" or the "missile-lag period"—a period, in the words of General Gavin, "in which our own offensive and defensive missile capabilities will lag so far behind those of the Soviets as to place us in a position of great peril."

The most critical years of the gap would appear to be 1960-64.

This is not to say that during that period we will not retain a nuclear capacity sufficient to rain "virtual annihilation" upon the U.S.S.R. But in view of our unwillingness and inability to strike the first blow, the successful use of that capacity—and the prospects for success must be overwhelming to deter a Russian attack—actually depends upon the proper balance of six factors:

a. The striking power of the Soviet Union that could be brought to bear upon our retaliatory power in a surprise attack. In the years of

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situation. George Kennan has argued that the very idea of nuclear deterrence must be questioned. If the use of a deterrent would mean national suicide—and a nuclear war would be precisely that—can it be considered a shield against a power which might stand a better chance of survival than we would? Another American expert, Raymond L. Garthoff, states in a book on *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* that the Russians are convinced that atomic weapons alone cannot win a war, and that simple and effective means of defense can be found against them. In other words, Russian fear of nuclear weapons would in certain circumstances not be a deterrent to Russian action. This might be particularly true in a period when the Soviet Union would enjoy a clearly superior fire power in missiles. Senator Kennedy's demand for hard thinking upon what may be a very hard period ahead of us could not have been more timely.—A.N.

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the gap this will rest primarily upon their missiles—IRBM's and ICBM's.

b. The adequacy of American defenses to reduce the successes of that Soviet striking power. This will include our distant early warning system, antimissile missiles when available and other interceptor and defense devices.

c. The vulnerability of American retaliatory power to destruction by any Soviet weapons penetrating our defense. Exposed missile bases and planes wing-to-wing on the ground are prime examples of this factor, although in a sense it also covers our "destruction tolerance"—the amount of devastation we could endure and still fight back.

d. The retaliatory power of the United States, its size affecting the amount of such power remaining and available after the initial Soviet attack.

e. The adequacy of Soviet defenses to reduce the success of our retaliation.

f. The vulnerability of the Soviet Union and its tolerance of destruction, as a measure of what the Soviets will still be able and willing to do after our retaliation.[5]

In short, what might be called the deterrent ratio—in terms of a somewhat oversimplified mathematical formula—requires that the sum of (a), (c), and (e) be no greater than the sum of (d), (b), and (f)—if we are to have a stalemate. But as the missile striking

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[5] Despite Premier Khrushchev's talk of peaceful coexistence, and the certainty of good observers that Russia does not want war, the Soviet military budget for 1960 was the same as for 1959, exceeding 96 billion rubles. Soviet spokesmen called attention to the "stabilization" of arms expenditures, declaring that inasmuch as the budget as a whole had risen, this meant a relative diminution. Perhaps it did. But the true scope of Russian spending for armaments remained, as always, a well-guarded secret, on which official statistics threw little light. What was certain was that the U.S.S.R. had made tremendous progress in military matters, and especially in the development of long-range missiles. The Soviet was also increasing her already great expenditures on science and technological inquiry.

Mr. Kennedy had repeatedly made clear his conviction that the United States should be ready to enter into any international conference which offered any prospect of promoting world peace. But in this speech he asked the country to face the fact that the time lay just ahead when it would negotiate from comparative weakness rather than comparative strength; to grasp the truth that the old assumption that America always had superior bargaining power at the diplomatic table was a false assumption. We could regain our position of strength not by pushing up national income, but only by sacrifice and laborious planning.—A.N.

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power of the Soviet Union increases and our retaliatory power lags—as the adequacy of our continental defense falls behind that of the Soviets—as we fail to reduce sufficiently the vulnerability of our attack installations and planes, as contrasted with the wide dispersal of Soviet-Red Chinese power—and uncertain as we are about the destruction tolerance of our people, whose political institutions and way of life are not prepared by tradition for the devastation of battle, again unlike the Soviets—then we must realize that the deterrent ratio during 1960-64 will in all likelihood be weighted very heavily against us.

These are not easy facts to face—and once faced, their implications are not easily comprehended. But the facts must be faced—and soon. Our peril is not simply because Russian striking power during the years of the gap will have a slight edge over us in missile power—they will have several times as many: intermediate-range missiles to destroy our European missile and SAC bases; and intercontinental missiles to devastate our own country, installations, and Government; and history's largest fleet of submarines, and possibly long-range supersonic jet bombers, to follow up this advantage. If by that time their submarines are capable of launching missiles, they could destroy 85 per cent of our industry, forty-three of our fifty largest cities, and most of the nation's population.

We shall have no such supply of missiles with which to retaliate—particularly after our few exposed IRBM bases in Europe and the Mediterranean are attacked. We shall rely to a great extent on manned bombers—bombers which face a problem of sufficient alert and sufficient dispersal to avoid decimation, particularly if current Middle East trends should curtail our base operations in that area—bombers that lack an adequate refueling system to penetrate Soviet borders without some two to four refuelings from our inadequate tanker supply.

Even then we shall encounter a Soviet air defense, and dispersal or concealment of vulnerable power, far superior to our own—a margin, according to some estimates, which the Soviets will be able to maintain at a level two to four times greater than our own. Indeed, our own DEW system and other continental defense bulwarks—many of which the Soviets will hope to knock out before or during the first blow—were planned for manned bombers, and must be redesigned and rebuilt before they are adequate for the missile age.

In short, the deterrent ratio might well shift to the Soviets so heavily, during the years of the gap, as to open to them a new shortcut to world domination. A portion of their homeland would still almost inevitably be destroyed, no matter how great their defenses or how decimated our retaliatory power. And without doubt world opinion would not tolerate such an attack. But our experience with the illogical decisions of Adolf Hitler should have taught us that these considerations might not deter the leaders of a totalitarian state—particularly in a moment of recklessness, panic, irrationality, or even cool miscalculation.

Surely we realize that the possibilities of serious miscalculation of war by inadvertence, of having both sides caught in a course which would lead to an all-out war which neither originally contemplated, of the calling of a bluff or of the sudden spreading of a limited war, are very real possibilities, if we but recall the Soviet Union's miscalculations on Korea in 1950, our own miscalculation of the Red Chinese reaction in 1951, our near intervention at Dienbienphu in 1954, the Soviet threats of rocket war at the time of the Suez invasion in 1956, and the possibilities of massive intervention by both sides which the situation in Iraq would have posed this year, had that struggle continued for very long. For many years, now, we have been living on the edge of the crater. We know full well the lack of communications between ourselves and our adversaries, the mutual suspicion and hostility, the increased risks taken by the Soviets as their striking power grows. Let no one think, therefore, that a Soviet attack, inadvertent or otherwise, is impossible, because of the H-bomb damage which we would still hope to rain upon the Soviets.

The Soviets, moreover, will be as well aware as we of their advantage during the years of the gap. We cannot expect them to sit idly by, and make no profitable use of it, while we strive to catch up. If General Gavin is correct in estimating Russian lead time to be twice as short as ours—five years, as compared to ten—we may not even catch up in 1964, or thereafter. We cannot expect them to give us the same advantage—by sitting by until our missile power equals their own—that we gave to them during the years of our atomic monopoly.

But nuclear destruction is not the only way in which the Soviets will be able to use their advantages in striking power. War is not so much an objective of foreign policy, as an instrument—a means of securing power and influence, of advancing a nation's views and interests. In the years of the gap, the Soviets may be expected to use their superior striking ability to achieve their objectives in ways which may not require launching an actual attack. Their missile power will be the shield from behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance—

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through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies. The periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away. The balance of power will gradually shift against us. The key areas vital to our security will gradually undergo Soviet infiltration and domination. Each such Soviet move will weaken the West; but none will seem sufficiently significant by itself to justify our initiating a nuclear war which might destroy us.

Throughout the years of the gap, a direct Soviet attack may be our greatest danger. But it is these other avenues of Soviet advance—with a thrust more difficult to interpret and oppose, yet inevitably ending in our isolation, submission, or destruction—which may well constitute the most likely threat.

Four hundred years ago, the English lost Calais. That event altered the course of British diplomatic and military policy, and changed the direction of British public opinion. The acceptance of the loss, and the adjustment of policy, were not easily or quickly accomplished; but they occurred eventually.

There is every indication that by 1960 the United States will have lost its Calais—its superiority in nuclear striking power. If we act now to prepare for that loss, and if, during the years of the gap, we act with both courage and prudence, there is no reason why we, too, cannot successfully emerge from this period of peril more secure than ever.

Unfortunately, our past reliance upon massive retaliation has stultified the development of new policy. We have developed what Henry Kissinger has called a Maginot-line mentality—dependence upon a strategy which may collapse or may never be used, but which meanwhile prevents the consideration of any alternative. When that prop is gone, the alternative seems to many to be inaction and acceptance of the inevitability of defeat. After all, once the Soviets have the power to destroy us, we have no way of absolutely preventing them from doing so. But every nation, whatever its status, needs a strategy. Some courses of action are always preferable to others; and there are alternatives to all-out war or inaction.

But the adjustment is made more difficult by our traditional failure to link our national strategy and our thinking to our military status. We have extended our commitments around the world, without regard to the sufficiency of our military posture to fulfill those commitments. Changes in our defense status are rarely reflected in our diplomatic policies, pronouncements, and planning. The State and Defense Departments negotiate with each other at arm's length, like so many Venetian envoys, without decisive leadership to break through the excess of bureaucratic committees, competition, and complacency. We think of diplomacy and force as alternatives to each other—the one to be used where the other fails—as though such absolute distinctions were still possible.

Today, we are approaching the years of the gap as though the situation were normal, and as though other assumptions were unchanged—or, in some quarters at least, as though the problem were one of arms alone. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

In the years of the gap, our threats of massive retaliation will lose most of their impact.

In the years of the gap, our exercises in brink-of-war diplomacy will be infinitely less successful.

In the years of the gap, every basic assumption held by the American public with regard to our military and foreign policies will be called into question. Among the assumptions to be invalidated will be the following ten, which probably are most fundamental to our thinking in the twentieth century:

1. American arms and science are superior to any others in the world.

2. American efforts for world-wide disarmament are a selfless sacrifice for peace.

3. Our bargaining power at any international conference table is always more vast and flexible than that of our enemy.

4. Peace is a normal relation among states; and aggression is the exception—direct and unambiguous.

5. We should enter every military conflict as a moral crusade requiring the unconditional surrender of the enemy.

6. A free and peace-loving nation has nothing to fear in a world where right and justice inevitably prevail.

7. Americans live far behind the lines, protected by time, space, and a host of allies from attack.

8. We shall have time to mobilize our superior economic resources after a war begins.

9. Our advanced weapons and continental defense systems, established at a tremendous cost and effort, will protect us.

10. Victory ultimately goes to the nation with the highest national income, gross national product, and standard of living.

All of these concepts will be altered or questioned in but a few years.

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It is unthinkable that we approach the years of the gap with the same sense of normalcy, the same slogans and economics, the same assumptions, tactics, and diplomatic strategy.

Although other peoples have learned to live for years exposed to enemy attack, I realize that it is hard for us to accept the reality of our danger. I realize that we are reluctant to re-examine policies arduously reached, or to believe that these problems cannot be postponed. But it is precisely this substitution of our preferences for our responsibilities that has led us to the brink of the gap. Our missile lag is not the cause of the gap—it is but another symptom of our national complacency, our willingness to confuse the facts as they were with what we hoped they would be, to appeal at the same time to those who wanted a quick solution and those who wanted a less burdensome one. The people have been misled; the Congress has been misled; and some say with good reason that on occasion the President himself has been misinformed and thus misled.

Perhaps the most serious result of this complacency—and the one we must first reverse—was our willingness to place fiscal security ahead of national security. We tailored our strategy and military requirements to fit our budget—instead of fitting our budget to our military requirements and strategy. We facilitated the adoption of this popular course through a variety of appealing shibboleths proclaimed to the nation each year by the President:

> Maximum safety at minimum cost (1953 State of the Union).
>
> Sustained military capability at the lowest possible cost (1955 budget message).
>
> Our defenses have been reinforced at sharply reduced costs (1956 State of the Union).
>
> We cannot afford to build military strength by sacrificing economic strength (1954 budget message).
>
> Future defense costs must be held to tolerable levels (1957 budget message).
>
> Adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy (1953 State of the Union).

In recent years we have heard a good deal about an alleged quotation from Lenin, who is supposed to have stated that the destruction of the capitalistic world would come about as a result of overspending on arms. I would say that has probably been the most valuable quotation the Communists have had other than "Workers of the World, Unite " But the fact of the matter is that was not said by Lenin. However, this slogan, which has been spread before us during this decade, has caused us constantly to emphasize economic considerations rather than military considerations, and has been used as an authority for that policy. Although Lenin never stated it, I should think that in the future it would rank high among the slogans which had proved to be useful in the effort to destroy the capitalistic system.

There were many others. The rationale was simple:

> To build excessively . . . could defeat our purposes and impair or destroy the very freedom and economic system our military defenses are designed to protect (1956).
>
> Any program that endangers our economy could defeat us (1957).
>
> To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another (1953).

The fact of the matter is that during that period when emphasis was laid upon our economic strength instead of our military strength, we were losing the decisive years when we could have maintained a lead against the Soviet Union in our missile capacity. These were the vital years we lost, the years the locusts have eaten, and it is quite obvious we obtained economic security at the expense of military security, and that this policy will bring us into great danger within the next few years.

I have never been very persuaded by this argument. It has always seemed to me that the converse was much more persuasive—that to emphasize budgetary limitations without regard to our military position was to avoid an inconvenient effort by inviting the disaster that would destroy all budgets and conveniences. Surely our nation's security overrides budgetary considerations—the President himself indicated this was true in times of war. Then why can we not realize that the coming years of the gap present us with a peril more deadly than any wartime danger we have ever known? And most important of all—and most tragically ironic—our nation could have afforded, and can afford now, the steps necessary to close the missile gap.

But our task now is not to fix the blame for the past, but to fix a course for the future.

Our attention is logically and necessarily directed first at the short-range military steps necessary to keep the deterrent ratio from shifting still further to the Red side and to lessen their advantage, if possible. Here other Senators have distinguished themselves in thoughtful addresses or committee action—including in particular the majority leader (Mr. Johnson), the junior Senator from Missouri (Mr. Symington), and the junior Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson).

More air tankers to refuel our SAC bombers and more air-to-ground missiles to lessen the need for their deep penetration of Soviet territory are among the first steps to be taken while we expedite our longer-range ICBM and IRBM developments, and our progress on atomic submarines, solid fuels, the Polaris, and the Minuteman. Our continental defense system, as already mentioned, must be redesigned for the detection and interception of missile attacks as well as planes.

It should be obvious from our Lebanon experience that we lack the sea and airlift necessary to intervene in a limited war with the speed, discrimination, and versatility which may well be needed to keep it limited—and without weakening our ultimate retaliatory power. We need to reverse what General Gavin describes as the "critical cut" in our military manpower begun in 1954.

Finally, if we do not take care, we will create a second gap—between the date when our present ready weapons are obsolescent and the date when our ballistic missiles are operational in any sufficient quantity. To prevent this short-term gap, and to make certain that we have ended the missile lag by 1964, when we shall have mass production, we hope, of the Minuteman solid-fuel missile, may well require a complete re-examination of our traditional systems of evaluating, budgeting, researching, assigning, developing, and procuring weapons.

But discussions of new armaments are not enough—and too late to halt the gap. The gap will begin in 1960. And while stepped-up defense efforts are essential to insure its close in 1964 and thereafter, and to lessen its impact in between, the years of the gap demand something more than a purely military answer.

A Maginot-line reliance upon the military answer of massive retaliation has frustrated policy discussions to date, as mentioned—we must now be prepared to demonstrate that we have other courses besides military action and no action at all. For absence of power no more dictates an absence of policy than the presence of power. On the contrary, ancient man survived the more powerful beasts about him because his wisdom—his strategy and his policies—overcame his lack of power. We can do the same. We dare not attempt less, nor do we dare rely wholly upon those same policies in effect during the years of our retaliatory lead.

What is the fundamental approach to formulating a strategy from a basically but only temporarily disadvantageous position? It is first, of necessity, to work for a real peace—for a reduction of armaments, a

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reduction of tensions, and a reduction of areas of dispute. The goal of universal disarmament—at least in the area of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles—takes on an urgency not heretofore demonstrated by American negotiators who felt they held most of the trump cards. We must redouble our efforts in that regard—and the work of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, headed by the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey), has made a major contribution in illuminating areas where our efforts might be redoubled.

But that failing—as well it might, once the Soviets are in the driver's seat, though we must never stop trying—the question again arises as to what basic strategy we employ during the years of the gap.

The best and most recent example is that provided by the Soviets themselves during the years of their gap—when American might was superior. While we would not imitate the Communists per se, they demonstrated the classic strategy of the underdog—and soon we will be the underdog. It is basically a strategy of making the most of all remaining advantages and making the most of the enemy's weaknesses—and thus to buy the time and opportunity necessary to regain the upper hand. This will require not only strong leadership in Washington but also expert ambassadors in the field—men equal to the best of any other nation, who are skilled in the needed techniques of probe and prudence, and whose judgments and reports are more reliable than some of those which misled us in Indochina and other difficult areas in years gone by.

Twentieth-century America is not accustomed to this underdog strategy—although it was expertly practiced by our Founding Fathers in time of peace as well as war. And we can practice it now.

Consider for a moment the advantages we retain even after our retaliatory lead is lost:

We retain an economic and industrial advantage, of little use once a bomb is dropped, but of considerable use now in building situations of strength and good will in such key areas as India and Tunisia. There is no need to waste this advantage in a drawn-out recession—and the Congress has an important opportunity to utilize this advantage in an action this week on the Development Loan Fund—the best hope for nations seeking the capital necessary to outstrip their population increases.

We retain an ideological advantage, better equipped than any nation in the world to export the revolutionary ideas of the Declara-

279

tion of Independence, and thus lead, not frustrate, the nationalist movement against imperialism of any variety, East and West. Particularly after our recent excursion in the Middle East, we are regarded in too many parts of the world as an enemy of popular rule—when we had every right to enjoy the cleanest, strongest reputation in this regard of any nation on earth.

We retain a geographical advantage, essential to adequate dispersal and warning systems, and to the encouragement of local resistance to the Red tide. Although, as Mr. Dulles has said, we cannot make popularity our goal, we must shape our attitudes and procedures in a way that will not cost us our geographical advantage. We do not retain that advantage simply through paper alliances with the reactionary, unpopular governments which have no indigenous support; and recent events in the Middle East should also have taught us that, to maintain that geographical advantage, no commitment at all is better than one which we cannot or should not honor, which the local populations did not request, which our allies do not support, and which is politically or militarily unfeasible.

How well we learned that lesson, to be more precise and to compare strength, may soon be tested in the case of Quemoy and Matsu. I do not think there is greater folly than to leave our commitment in that area as vague as the Secretary of State has left it. If the Chinese should assume we are not going to come to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, and it is the intention of the United States to come to the aid of those islands, we could find ourselves embroiled in a struggle which could lead to a major political action and perhaps to disaster for all of us, East and West.

As we approach the years of the gap, the U.S.S.R. will also retain weaknesses for us to probe—chief among them being the Achilles' heel of the satellite nations. The Congress and Administration must reverse those policies, last affirmed by a one-vote margin in June, which hamstrung our flexibility in attempting to wean the satellites from the Soviets, and to drive new wedges into each new crack in the Iron Curtain.

There is no point now in consolidating the Red bloc with our talk of massive retaliation—now we must seek ways of dividing it.

In short, to sound the alarm is not to panic—it is not to sell America short. It gives the enemy no encouragement he did not already possess. But the sound of the alarm does warn us that time is running out—that no matter how complex the problems, how discouraging the prospects, or how unpopular the decisions, these facts must be faced.

Complacency or hysteria will not help. Sustained and informed constructive effort will help—not to provide all the answers for the future, but to help assure us that there will be a future.

In Gibbon's volumes on *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* he stated that the Romans maintained the peace by a constant preparation for war and that they indicated to the enemies on their periphery they were as little disposed to endure injury as to offer it. I do not say we should only prepare for war. But we should certainly use all elements of national policy—economic, diplomatic, and military—in order to prepare us for the most serious test in our nation's history, which will be impending in the next five years.

No Pearl Harbor, no Dunkirk, no Calais is sufficient to end us permanently if we but find the will and the way.

In the words of Sir Winston Churchill in a dark time of England's history: "Come then—let us to the task, to the battle and the toil—each to our part, each to our station. . . . Let us go forward together in all parts of the [land]. There is not a week, nor a day, nor an hour to be lost."

OPEN SKIES

by

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

29

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95. *"Open Skies"*. July 21, 1955.

Eisenhower's "open skies" address at Geneva made the familiar U.S. point that there could be no disarmament without verification. The President proposed that the Soviet Union and United States give each other military blueprints of each other's countries, and that each open its country to aerial inspection. Thus there could be no surprise attack. Although Eisenhower said this "would be but a beginning," the Soviet leaders, and some others, complained that no promise of actual arms reduction accompanied the proposal. The Russians condemned it as "control without disarmament," just as Western leaders had since 1946 criticized the Russians for demanding "disarmament without control."

Statement by President Eisenhower at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government: Aerial Inspection and Exchange of Military Blueprints, July 21, 1955[1]

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. It is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces—but also of homes, and industries and lives—than ever known or even imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problems of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

After our victory as Allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our armament was at a very low level. Then events occurred beyond our borders which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

The American people are determined to maintain and if necessary increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people. It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food, and clothing, and shelter, more of education and larger enjoyments of life.

Therefore the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own government. From these studies, which are continuing, a very important principle is emerging to which I referred in my opening statement on Monday.[2]

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[1] *Documents on Disarmament*, 1945-1959, I, Doc. 120. *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), pp. 56-59.

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.

The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting.

Questions suggest themselves.

How effective an inspection system can be designed which would be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the other nations of the world? How would such a system operate? What could it accomplish?

Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted?

We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping than can be insured by effective inspection.

Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this Conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

I should address myself for a moment principally to the Delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

Now from my statements I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Subcommittee on Disarmament in discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step by step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

The successful working out of such a system would do much to develop the mutual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.

The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress to lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace—with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world *can* be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure and tested road.

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[2] *Geneva Conference*, pp. 18-22.

THE COURSE OF POST-WAR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

by

MICHAEL WRIGHT

30

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The Course of Post-War Disarmament Negotiations[1]

THE PHASE OF U.S. MONOPOLY OVER ATOMIC WEAPONS 1945–1949

THE atomic age opened in August 1945 with the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Amid the relief at the unexpected curtailment of Japanese resistance there was widespread concern at the new power of destruction seen to exist. The need for disarmament and for the strengthening of international institutions was generally and rightly felt to merit more positive attention than it had received immediately after World War I.

The principal international institution, the United Nations, established at San Francisco in June 1945, was in some ways an improvement on the defunct League of Nations, especially in that it originally included all the great powers. One notable feature was the provision in the Charter whereby each of the five great powers were given a right of veto on any action proposed at the Security Council. Yet whatever its shortcomings the U.N. did at least come into existence; whereas any rapid measures of agreed disarmament proved to be wholly beyond reach.

Hopes for disarmament were at first high. One great power, the United States, had a complete monopoly of nuclear weapons—a unique global advantage without parallel in history. But this power, with unexampled generosity, offered to surrender that advantage provided only that a system of strict international control of all atomic energy was instituted. The cause of the failure of the world to obtain a nuclear arms ban in 1946 was the unexpected attitude of the Soviet Union which refused to accept the American offer. Had the plan been generally adopted there would have been no nuclear arms race and no fall-out.

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[1] The author is indebted to Mr. David Carlton, Research Student in Disarmament at King's College, London, for most of the work in compiling Chapter One, and for assistance in documentation throughout

The sequence of events was as follows. In November 1945 President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and the Canadian Premier MacKenzie King issued a declaration offering to share nuclear secrets for peaceful purposes and to institute through U.N.O. an effective control system for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Largely as a result of this initiative the U.N. General Assembly in January 1946 set up the (U.N.) Atomic Energy Commission for this purpose. It consisted of the permanent members of the Security Council with the addition of Canada.

As the United States was then the only nation in possession of nuclear arms it was appropriate that she should be the first to present an outline proposal for their control and elimination. This took the form of the Baruch Plan of June 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, the United States representative on the (U.N.) A.E.C. The plan was in fact closely modelled on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report issued in Washington earlier in the year, and this had been largely the brain-child of Robert J. Oppenheimer. The essence of these proposals was that the United States offered to relinquish possession of nuclear weapons and the national control of all fissionable material even for peaceful purposes. There were, however, two main conditions. First, all other countries would have to agree to a scheme for international ownership and control of all nuclear developments, including those for peaceful purposes. Second, a satisfactory veto-free control body, the projected International Atomic Development Authority (I.A.D.A.) would have to be functioning before the United States would agree to relinquish its stockpile of atomic weapons.

Certain criticisms have been levelled at the nature of the conditions laid down by the United States. For example, it has been alleged that international ownership and control of all peaceful nuclear expansion might have had the result of keeping less advanced nuclear states (including, of course, at that time, the Soviet Union) in a condition of permanent inferiority. Neither the discussions in the United Nations in 1946 nor the temper of American opinion at the time support a suggestion of this kind. The people who were generous enough to propose relinquishing all national control of nuclear development when their country was alone in the field were not likely to seek to pack a jury; nor could any such manoeuvre have succeeded.

Other criticisms of the Baruch plan were even more far-fetched. For example, it was sometimes suggested that the

United States would in the end find some excuse for refusing to relinquish her stockpile, having meantime gained valuable military information about the Soviet Union. The answer to this kind of innuendo is surely to be found in the conduct and record of the United States in the international field in the immediate post-war years. Far from using overwhelming military superiority for the purpose of aggression or domination, as anti-American propagandists would lead others to expect, her conduct was more passive and pacific than that of the weaker Soviet Union. Even American man-power was reduced at a rapid rate which was far from being matched on the Russian side.[1]

What in fact was the Soviet reaction to the Baruch Plan? With remarkable candour they rejected it summarily and made it clear that they did not want a ban on nuclear weapons except on terms that would have given no semblance of satisfactory verification arrangements. They showed their hand on this occasion with the same indifference to world opinion, and the same lack of any attempt to put a gloss on their actions, which they displayed in 1961 when they resumed testing unilaterally and proceeded to explode a 60-megaton bomb which they claimed could be adapted to give a 100-megaton explosion, in defiance of an appeal from the United Nations. It has fairly been said that the Baruch Plan could have controlled the nuclear threat in its infancy, and that it is one of the tragedies of history that the Soviet Union chose to reject it and to adopt instead a policy that led to the thermo-nuclear arms race.

The Soviet counter-proposals presented to the (U.N.) A.E.C. in June 1946 amounted to a demand for unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United States with only the promise of discussions on control aspects to follow. There was no guarantee that such discussions would ever prove fruitful; on the contrary there were many indications that the U.S.S.R. would allow only minimum inspection facilities and would definitely insist on great power unanimity for international action against a violator.

Here then was already an impasse on nuclear arms. In 1948 after tedious and seemingly interminable wrangles the (U.N.) A.E.C. adjourned and reported back to the U.N. General Assembly on its failure to reach agreement. The Baruch Plan was then overwhelmingly endorsed by the Assembly but, as the

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[1] For an account of American policy at this time see Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (Viking Press, New York, 1951)

386

Soviet bloc voted against it, inevitably became a dead letter.

Meanwhile in the sphere of conventional armaments no greater success had been achieved. In February 1947 a U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments was set up with the same members as the (U.N.) A.E.C. The Soviet Union called for a straight one-third cut in all the armed forces of the great powers; and sought to link the question of conventional arms with that of nuclear weapons. The United States, for some reason never made clear, seemed to be reluctant to contemplate disarmament in the conventional sphere until the Baruch Plan had been settled—in spite of their considerable disadvantage vis-à-vis Moscow in respect of conventional forces. The result was total deadlock.

STALEMATE, 1950–1953

The first successful Soviet atomic test took place in 1949—somewhat earlier than had been expected in the West. Having put an end to the American monopoly, the Russians perhaps no longer felt the same need to play for time. Be that as it may, early in 1950 they withdrew from both the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commissions of the U.N. These events together with the worsening international situation made prospects of disarmament seem even more remote. The Soviet attitude showed no signs of changing; while that of the United States hardened, especially as hope faded of ever being able to discover all the stocks of fissionable material by then in existence.

In January 1952 the U.N. General Assembly recommended that the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the Conventional Armaments Commission should be united in order to bring back the Soviet Union to the conference table. All the powers involved agreed on this step at least, and the U.N. Disarmament Commission was accordingly established. It was, however, no more successful than its predecessors in bridging the gap between East and West. The Soviet Union still asked for a 'Ban the Bomb' treaty as a first step, without offering any adequate verification provisions. On the conventional side she continued to call for a one-third cut without being prepared to reveal her actual manpower level until this principle had been unconditionally accepted. The West countered with a specific proposal of 1·5 million men for the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and Communist China, 800,000 for Great Britain, and 700,000 for France.[1] These proposals were rejected by the Soviet Union. The impasse consequently remained unchanged as both sides concentrated on developing the more advanced thermo-nuclear weapons (i.e. hydrogen bombs).

RENEWED EFFORTS: THE DISARMAMENT SUB-COMMITTEE 1954–1957

Meanwhile in 1953 an event of far-reaching importance had occurred in the Kremlin: the death of Stalin. This, in conjunction with relief at the ending of the Korean War, opened the way for a lessening of tension between East and West. The results included the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, the Geneva Summit Meeting of 1955, and some resumption of activity in the field of disarmament.

The first sign of a possible new Soviet approach to the disarmament question came early in 1954 when Moscow fell in with Western proposals for the creation of a five-man subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission consisting of the three fully-fledged nuclear powers together with France and Canada. A smaller negotiating body certainly improved the chance of progress, but at first none ensued. In June 1954 France and Great Britain in an attempt to meet the Soviet position presented their three-stage plan for a comprehensive and balanced disarmament convention. In the first stage there was to be a simple freeze of conventional forces. This was to be followed in the second stage by 50 per cent of the projected conventional cut, accompanied by a 'cut-off' in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Not until the third stage were nuclear stockpiles to be destroyed and then only after the remaining 50 per cent of the conventional cut had been effected. Control measures were to be developed progressively at each stage.

The Russians began by rejecting the Anglo-French proposals out of hand, and called instead for an immediate ban on nuclear arms and the familiar one-third all-round reduction in conventional forces. Later in 1954 they agreed to take the Anglo-French proposals as a basis for discussion and thereby kept the sub-committee in being. In March 1955, the Western powers, in a move which proved to have been too hastily improvised, offered to destroy all nuclear weapons halfway through stage III in their plan (i.e. after 75 per cent of the conventional forces had been disbanded). Then with a surprising lack of military foresight, they offered new force levels. The U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Communist China were to have 1½ million men, Great Britain and France 650,000 each; West Germany was not specifically mentioned but was presumably to remain an insignificant military power. Perhaps this additional incentive was a deciding factor in leading the Soviet Union to perform the turn round that followed. At all events on 10th May 1955 Mr. Malik accepted the proposals in two important respects. First, he dropped the one-third reduction demand and fell in with the West's projected force levels. Second, he accepted the West's stage-by-stage plan, abandoning the former Soviet insistence on an immediate ban on nuclear arms. This has been characterized by Mr. Noel-Baker as 'The Moment of Hope'[1]—and so in some senses it was. On the other hand, the Soviet proposals were vague and pessimistic on the problems associated with control, and were complicated by an attempt to link control with political problems and with the existence of foreign bases. But the West failed to concentrate on these aspects of the Russian proposals. Instead, the United States made it apparent that she had changed her mind on the proposals offered only three months earlier. After a Western-inspired adjournment, Mr. Harold Stassen, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant on Disarmament, told the subcommittee that the United States placed a reservation on all its previous offers. Her allies with some reluctance took much the same line. The impression was thereby given that because of Pentagon pressure the West was unwilling to take yes for an answer.

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[1] At this juncture the West still believed itself to hold a commanding lead in the nuclear weapons field

Subsequent efforts of the Eisenhower administration to persuade the Soviet Union to accept alternative proposals met with little favour in Moscow. The President's own Open Skies proposal (advanced at the Geneva Summit in July 1955) was dismissed as 'inspection without disarmament'. Equally unacceptable to the Russians was the revised Anglo-French plan of March 1956 which made no specific suggestions for force levels and did not provide for the destruction of nuclear weapons even at the end of the disarmament process, ostensibly because of the Soviet Union's own admission on 10th May 1955 that even the most determined international control authority could probably never be certain that all fissionable material had been discovered.

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[1] P. Noel-Baker *The Arms Race* (Stevens, London, 1958) p. 12

In the latter half of 1956 and during 1957 the disarmament sub-committee turned to the consideration of possible partial measures, particularly in the conventional field. Perhaps as a result of her increasing nuclear strength, the U.S.S.R. consented for the first time to discuss force levels in isolation. But agreement proved impossible, the Russians objecting that the Americans were asking for higher force levels at the end of the partial plan than previously. The United States specified 2½ million for herself, the U.S.S.R. and China; 700,000 each for France and Great Britain; and up to 500,000 for others (including presumably West Germany). The Soviet Union, after making the most of this increase in Western demands, indicated a willingness to accept the new levels only on the obviously unacceptable condition that they were accompanied not merely by a removal of all foreign bases but also by an undertaking by all powers to destroy nuclear stocks within two years.

Subsequent proposals and counter-proposals were all in the form of package deals rejected by one side or the other. Arguments on a separate test ban also ran into difficulties; the U.S.S.R. wanted a self-policing ban, while Great Britain at one stage expressed opposition to a test ban not linked to a cut-off in production of nuclear weapons. In September 1957 these tedious negotiations were brought to an end when the sub-committee adjourned. Subsequently at the U.N. Assembly the Soviet Union called for a completely new arrangement, rejected the offer of a 25-man commission, and suggested instead an all-nation disarmament commission (eighty-two in all). As 1957 drew to a close deadlock was therefore once again practically total.

THE LATEST PHASE 1958–1963

But in 1958 events took a new and more encouraging turn. In March the Soviet Union, after completing a long series of tests which caused a great deal of fall-out, announced that she was suspending nuclear weapon tests unilaterally. This led to fresh effort[illegible] rive at an East-West test ban agreement.

In [illegible] nd August 1958 an experts' conference[1] on nuclear test control problems, attended by representatives from the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, and four other countries, reached the hopeful conclusion that given an adequate international control system, which they outlined, with fixed control posts, over-flights, and on-site inspection, all tests could be adequately monitored as regards the atmosphere, underwater, and underground, leaving the monitoring of tests in space to be further considered. The report was endorsed and accepted by Moscow, Washington, and London. Accordingly, in October 1958 a 3-Power test ban conference opened at Geneva to draw up an appropriate treaty between the only three nuclear powers at that time: the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. The negotiations lasted, with some interruption in 1961–2, until they came under the umbrella of the 18-nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva which opened in March 1962. In August 1963 the partial test ban treaty was signed in Moscow by the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. Most other nations adhered, with the exception of France, Communist China, and Albania. + Cuba

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[1] For [illegible] onclusions of this Conference see Appendix I

From October to December 1958 a Surprise Attack Conference was held in Geneva which failed to reach any agreement. The Soviet Union showed no inclination to offer or accept any useful measures unless they were linked to the liquidation of all foreign bases and measures of disarmament.

In August 1959 the foreign ministers of the four major powers met in Geneva and decided to make a new effort on general disarmament. Accordingly the U.N. General Assembly in September 1959 established a 10-nation Disarmament Conference which opened in March 1960. It was composed of equal numbers of N.A.T.O. and Warsaw Pact states. Rival plans for general and complete disarmament had been put forward originally by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Khrushchev at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1959—and both were advanced again at the 10-nation conference in somewhat modified form. The two sides were far apart on problems of timing, control measures, and the means of achieving balance throughout the various projected stages of disarmament. After the failure of the Summit Meeting in May 1960 the Soviet bloc representatives walked out of the 10-nation conference in June.

The next significant development came in June 1961 when bilateral Soviet-American talks took place on the general problems of disarmament. By September Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy were able to publish a joint statement of agreed principles. In December 1961 the General Assembly endorsed the principles and set up an 18-nation Disarmament Conference (including eight non-aligned states) to consider the problems in further detail. When this met in March 1962 both the Soviet Union and the United States tabled more thorough and detailed plans for general and complete disarmament than hitherto.

In general, then, the negotiations during the years 1958 to 1963 led to exploration of the problems of a nuclear test ban and of disarmament in greater depth and detail than had ever been undertaken before. Discussion round the conference table between Communist and Western countries, much of it with the participation of representatives of unaligned countries, has thrown new light on the factors involved. In the following chapters an attempt is made to give an account of the principal elements which have emerged.

THE BASIC NEED

by

MICHAEL WRIGHT

31

292A

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The Basic Need

SOVIET rejection in 1946 of the American proposal contained in the Baruch plan, that all nuclear development whether of weapons or otherwise should be taken for ever out of national hands and placed under an international agency, was a turning point. It marked the failure to extend into the peace years the wartime co-operation between the Soviet Union and her former Western allies. In place of a relationship of at least reasonable confidence and forbearance, there grew up a deepening political distrust of the intentions and good faith of the other side. This distrust soon extended to doubting the value of the other side's signature to a treaty unless its loyal execution could be impartially verified. Since this distrust, if genuinely held, is the principal barrier to the conclusion of a complete test ban or of a treaty for partial or total disarmament, it is desirable to have a close look at the reasons advanced by the two sides.

Distrust of Communist policy by the West rests partly on Communist doctrine and partly on Communist actions. Since Franklin Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 the pragmatic leaders of the Western democracies have been apt to pay less attention to doctrine than to actions, a course of doubtful wisdom in that Communist actions can often be predicted and usually explained at least partly in terms of doctrine. In any case Western leaders have avoided treating the Soviet Union as impossible to negotiate with, even though her policies are avowedly designed to promote the disruption of the social systems of the Western countries, and although she rejects the codes of international conduct normally accepted by the non-Communist world (except where she judges such rejection to be tactically and temporarily injudicious). When the Soviet Union shows signs of observing normal international rules the West usually prefers to welcome and even to encourage the development by turning a blind eye to the ideological basis of the Soviet State. For a time, of course, this attitude of the West found a natural justification in a sense of wartime comradeship. But even if it is wise at least up to a point to judge the Soviet Union by actions and to overlook doctrine, it cannot be said that Communist actions have been such as to inspire confidence; and while the Soviet interpretation of the doctrine of the inevitability of war has changed, Soviet dedication to world revolution has not. It is noteworthy that in the 18-Power negotiations at Geneva in 1962 and 1963 the Soviet Government steadfastly refused to admit that the goal of general and complete disarmament is a 'disarmed and peaceful world'; 'disarmed' yes, but 'disarmed and peaceful' Moscow has rejected even though the word 'peaceful' has appeared earlier in the preamble to the agreed disarmament principles of 20th September 1961.

In fact, the Communists continue to preach the inevitability of the victory of Communism over capitalism and of the establishment of the socialist system on a world scale. As Mr. Khrushchev put it in April 1962:

> 'Sooner or later Communism will win everywhere in the world and consequently Communism will "bury" capitalism.'

The Communists are committed to pursuing policies designed to accelerate this 'inevitable' process. The policy of peaceful co-existence was originally conceived by the Soviet leadership as a means of providing a breathing space in which to increase their forces before the inevitable conflict with world capitalism. As Stalin said in 1927:

> 'We cannot forget Lenin's statement that as regards our work of construction very much depends on whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable. . . . Therefore the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the existence of the two opposed systems.'

But the advent of weapons of mass destruction has caused Soviet (although not yet Chinese) leaders to re-think the doctrine of the inevitability of war, which they now state to be no longer valid. Moscow's new concept, which Mr. Khrushchev defined at the 22nd Party Congress, is called 'peaceful co-existence'. It connotes the victory of world Communism without war through the superiority of the Communist economic system, a victory which must of course be pursued by all means short of war and remains inevitable.

But whether the new Moscow concept of peaceful co-existence involves the abandonment of other Communist dogma is a

394

different question. The classic Communist view is that compromises in negotiation are merely tactical measures in the struggle with the capitalist system. Lenin wrote in 1920:

> 'The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to "tack", to make agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to accelerate the coming into power . . . and subsequent loss of power of . . . the representatives of petty bourgeois democracy.'

In the light of these statements the Soviet claim that it has 'no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries because their way of life is an inalienable right of every nation' (Khrushchev, October 1960) is scarcely convincing.

Nor does the Soviet record inspire confidence. Soviet annexations in 1940 of the Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are classic illustrations. The Baltic States were allocated as a Soviet sphere of influence by the Nazi-Soviet agreement of September 1939. By the summer of 1940, Soviet troops had entered these territories under various pretexts, elections had been held from which all non-union independent candidates were barred as 'public enemies', and Communist governments set up. The states were then declared to be Soviet republics and incorporated in the Soviet Union.

In a different category but even more disturbing as a warning of future possibilities was the establishment of Communist dictatorships over the countries of Eastern Europe during the years 1945–8. Ex-enemy states (Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria) were taken over by minority Communist parties protected by Soviet occupation forces, in breach of specific provisions in the Peace Treaties of February 1947 to the effect that they were to be given democratic political systems. In Poland, the Moscow-orientated 'Lublin Government' established itself in power having arrived in the baggage of the Red Army; it made the merest pretence of compromising with the Polish Government-in-Exile before driving the latter's representatives out of the uneasy coalition. Many of the anti-Nazi underground leaders of the traditional Polish political parties had already been lured to Moscow for 'negotiations' and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for allegedly impeding the Red Army.[1]

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[1] For details of the developments in Poland see E. J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland* (Willey, New York, 1958)

But the climax came with the Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Here, with no Soviet forces in the country and elections imminent, the minority Communist leaders in the coalition government provoked a political crisis through arbitrary action by their Minister of the Interior against non-Communist police officials. When twelve non-Communist ministers resigned from the government in protest, the Communists under Gottwald consolidated their authority by force.[1] Two of the leading Czech democratic politicians who chose to continue at their posts, President Benes and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, died shortly afterwards, the latter from unnatural causes. The brutality of this *coup* in what had been held to be the stronghold of East European democracy demonstrated Communist intentions beyond any possible further doubt, and helped to speed the negotiations which led to the formation of N.A.T.O. in 1949. Ironically enough the *coup* has been upheld by the Soviet government since 1956 as a model for future 'peaceful parliamentary transition to socialism' (notably by Mikoyan at the 20th Party Congress).

Parallel to their expansion in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union consistently refused to implement the four-power machinery agreed upon in 1945 for the control of Germany. Soviet obstruction culminated in the Soviet withdrawal from the Allied Control Council in March 1948 and from the Berlin Kommandatura in July the same year. This was immediately followed by the imposition of a complete blockade of Berlin in an attempt to force the Western powers out of the city, an attempt which was only defeated by the allied airlift.[2] In the autumn of 1948 the Soviet authorities began their re-arming of the Soviet Zone of Germany by the creation of para-military police units in violation of the four-power agreements for the disarmament and de-militarization of Germany. These units were subsequently built up into a strong military force which by the spring of 1950 numbered nearly 50,000 men. By January 1956, when the East German Constitution was amended to authorize the creation of a 'National People's Army', East Germany already had a fully trained and well equipped force of some 130,000–140,000 men.

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[1] For an account of the fall of Czechoslovakia see J. Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-48* (Princeton University Press, 1959)

[2] See W. P. Davison, *The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1958)

In contrast the German Federal Republic by that date was holding its first parade of 1,600 raw recruits for the newly established *Bundeswehr.*

In the Far East the attack on South Korea by the Communist North in the summer of 1950 leading to the prolonged hostilities in that country finally dispelled any lingering illusions there may have been in the West about Communist intentions. It led directly to the massive Western re-armament programmes designed to offset the long lead which the Communist Bloc had gained in all but nuclear weapons as a result of the Soviet refusal to disarm after 1945 and of the Soviet re-equipment programmes introduced since the War.

To these reasons for Western distrust of Communists can be added many others, among them the repression in Hungary in 1956; the abrupt walkout of the Communist delegates from the 10-power Disarmament Conference at Geneva in June 1960; the resumption of nuclear testing in September 1961 by the Soviet Union after nearly three years abstention by both sides while negotiations were still continuing; the repudiation by the Soviet Union in November 1961 of everything they had agreed upon during three years of negotiation for a nuclear test ban; and Soviet and Chinese actions in Cuba and India respectively. The list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Whether these statements and actions on the Communist side justify the deep-seated distrust they have aroused in the West may by some be regarded as a matter for debate. But the distrust created, whether justified or not, is a political fact to be reckoned with in the field of disarmament. Above all it means that the West does not trust the Soviet Union to observe a comprehensive nuclear test ban or a disarmament agreement without adequate and impartial international verification.

It is not so easy for any Westerner to attempt to define the reasons for the distrust of the Western powers expressed by the Soviet Union; but whatever the true causes the Communist countries profess on their side a profound lack of confidence in Western intentions towards the Communist world. This is clearly illustrated by the incessant Communist propaganda against the policies of containment, and of negotiation from a position of strength, associated with the late John Foster Dulles. Soviet fears may also have been genuinely heightened by the success of Western re-armament programmes, by the American lead in nuclear weapons, and above all by the re-emergence of West Germany as a major force in Europe. This professed Soviet distrust can be illustrated by almost daily quotations from *Pravda* and other Soviet newspapers. For example, a *Pravda* editorial stated in 1963:

> 'The bellicose circles of the imperialist powers, above all the United States and Western Germany, have not renounced their mad plans for "rolling back" Communism, even by military means.'

More specifically they claim that the West is preparing for War. West German re-armament and N.A.T.O. bulk large in these expressions of fear. L. I. Brezhnev, the Soviet President, said on 2nd October 1962:

> 'There still exist in the world forces of imperialism which are trying to kindle the flames of a new world war. The imperialists of the United States of America now head these forces. With their support the West German militarists are again raising their heads. The strategists of N.A.T.O., like poisonous spiders, are weaving a black web of conspiracies against peace.'

In the Communist vocabulary N.A.T.O. is always the aggressive N.A.T.O. bloc. A particular target for invective as supposed evidence of hostile intentions towards the Soviet Union is the stationing of American forces outside their countries in places where they could help to defend small and frightened neighbours of the Soviet Union against surprise attack. These are represented as 'daggers pointed at the heart of the Soviet Union'.

In further justification of their claims the Communists have elevated 'anti-Communism' into a distinct policy of the West. 'Not to see the grievous consequences of the policy of anti-Communism', wrote *Pravda* on 23rd February 1963, 'means either to be politically blind or to be an open accomplice of imperialism.' In addition the Communists seize on statements by Western personalities of small or no responsibility, often retired officials or members of the Armed Services, as proof of their charges against Western policies. They quote at length from newspapers of any shade of independent opinion and imply that they have the same authority as an article in *Pravda* or a statement put out by the Tass Agency. They also make use of inter-party debates in free democratic countries. If, for example, the Leader of the Opposition in Great Britain makes an election speech with perhaps a slightly exaggerated criticism of, say, the slum clearance policy of the government, he may for domestic purposes paint as black a picture as possible; the Soviet propaganda machine will use this to claim that the condition of the masses under capitalism is intolerable. Similarly, if an American Senator in opposition makes a tough speech on foreign policy, his words are misinterpreted as indicating that the United States is contemplating hostile action against the Soviet Union. It may be argued that Communist fears of the Western powers, while ill-founded and based on faulty ideological theories, are nevertheless sincere. Alternatively it may be the case that the misrepresentation is deliberate and calculated on the part of the foremost Soviet leaders. But however that may be, and from whatever causes it may spring, the ostensible distrust of the West professed by Communist leaders is a factor which must be reckoned with. Certainly, if these alleged suspicions of the West have the force of political dogma, or if the Soviet leaders—or any significant section of them—have come to believe their own propaganda, then this is a fact that profoundly affects the chances of definitive disarmament and verification agreements being reached.

Since it is relevant to the problem of disarmament, it should further be borne in mind that lack of confidence is not confined to relationships between the Great Powers, or between Western and Communist countries. Many other countries, large and small, aligned and unaligned, distrust each other, especially in many cases their immediate neighbours. The relations of fear and suspicion between Israel and the United Arab Republic, and between India and Pakistan, are cases in point; in differing degrees there are parallels in Africa, in Latin America and indeed throughout the world. These fears and suspicions lead the countries harbouring them to acquire more and more arms for their defence; and if partly the effect they are also largely the cause of the arms race.

If, then, there exists in the world such deep suspicion, it is fair to ask whether re-establishment of trust in the observance of agreements by others can ever precede the re-establishment of general political confidence. Another way to put it is to ask whether a full nuclear test ban or a disarmament agreement can ever precede a settlement of those political questions which at any given moment are the principal causes of international tension. It may in fact prove to be the case that a full test ban and disarmament can only follow and reflect rather than precede and create a political *détente*. Certainly if a political *détente* came first the attitude of the two sides could be expected to become more reasonable and practical, and disarmament agreements less difficult to negotiate. But to argue from this that attempts to ban all nuclear weapon tests, or to disarm, should be laid aside until the political outlook is fairer is to ignore the horrible compulsion of the development of nuclear weapons and the risk of their spread to more and more countries. It is this which is the driving force, and rightly so, in the minds of those most closely concerned with the problem. To wait may be a counsel of despair or folly. *Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis*—the rustic waits for the river to run dry before trying to cross it.

If this view is accepted and if attempts to call a halt are to be pursued without waiting for the political climate to improve first, then any full test ban or far-reaching disarmament agreement must be effectively and internationally verified. The fact must be faced that in the prevailing atmosphere of international suspicion nations, at any rate Western nations, will not incur the risk to their national security inherent in these steps without what they judge to be adequate verification of observance by others. This can and does hold true of small countries as well as of powerful states. It is a central fact in the disarmament nexus.

The necessity of international verification both for a test ban and disarmament has been repeatedly endorsed by the U.N. Assembly and by unaligned countries. For example, General Assembly Resolution 1649 of 8th November 1961 urged states to renew their efforts to conclude a treaty which 'should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms'. The resolution was approved by a vote of seventy-one in favour, fifteen abstentions and only the Soviet bloc and Cuba voting against. On disarmament Western countries and particularly the United States and the United Kingdom have been categoric on the need for verification. The United States' disarmament plan provides for thorough international verification when general and complete disarmament is achieved, and for adequate verification during the three intervening stages. The Soviet Government has made its own statements on this matter. Briefly, they endorse the principle but deny the practice. No. 6 of the statement of principles agreed between Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy on 20th September 1961 on behalf of the Soviet Union and the United States, and endorsed by the United Nations Assembly, reads as follows:

> '6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.'[1]

On the surface that sounds like full acceptance of the principle of adequate international verification. But in fact it is something quite different. When Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy were negotiating the statement of agreed principles the United States government wished to include the following clause in paragraph 6:

> 'Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limits and reductions take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.'

This was rejected by Mr. Zorin in his famous letter of 20th September 1961, which contains the following sentences:

> 'While strongly advocating effective control over disarmament and wishing to facilitate as much as possible the achievement of agreement on this control, the Soviet Union is at the same time resolutely opposed to the establishment of control over armaments. It appears from your letter that the United States is trying to establish control over the armed forces and armaments retained by states at any given stage of disarmament. However, such control, which in fact means control over armaments, would turn into an international system of legalized espionage, which would naturally be unacceptable to any state concerned for its security and the interests of preserving peace throughout the world.'[2]

In other words the Russian agreement was limited to verification of arms destroyed. It would be difficult to gather this from the statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, at the opening meeting of the 18-nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva on 15th March 1962 at which he said:

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[1] See Appendix II

[2] See Appendix III

> 'The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed upon will be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process of general and complete disarmament has begun. Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least of all states which have established close military alignments, are pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we expect others to take us at our word. The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament.'

It would also be difficult to appreciate the truth about the Soviet attitude from a first perusal of Article 2 of the Soviet disarmament plan submitted on the same day.[1] The relevant clauses in Article 2 read:

> '1. The states parties to the treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III, and IV, of the present treaty.
>
> 2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.
>
> 3. To implement control over disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all states parties to the treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the international disarmament organization and its bodies are laid down in Part V of the present treaty.
>
> 4. In all countries parties to the treaty the international disarmament organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of states.
>
> This staff shall exercise control, on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by states with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their production and to reduce or disband their armed forces.'

This also does not turn out to mean what it seems to say. As will be shown further below, this article is explained by the Soviet government as intended to cover only arms destroyed, and not arms retained.

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[1] See Appendix IV. (A later version but in this respect unchanged)

In fact, of course, the need to be satisfied that other signatory states are observing their obligations not merely to destroy, but not to replace or conceal, is inherent in any form of disarmament agreement, since successful and secret evasion of an agreement may place the security of innocent powers at the mercy of the successful violator. But the risks involved and the need to be satisfied of observance by others have been made more compelling by the development of modern arms. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, wars were fought with what have now come to be called conventional weapons; disarmament was a matter of being satisfied that conventional weapons were not being illicitly or secretly produced or concealed. When only conventional weapons were in question no country or group of countries could acquire in secret and within a short period striking power capable of inflicting decisive and almost instantaneous damage upon an enemy. There had to be production on a large scale of powerful warships, heavy artillery, tanks, bomber aircraft and so forth. Numbers of men had to be trained to use them, and their maintenance under arms or their call up from civilian occupations could not be concealed. None of these preparations could easily by kept secret; almost inevitably they had to be spread over a number of years and became known to other countries. The re-armament of Germany after the First World War contrary to treaty agreements was known to other countries; they did not lack the knowledge of the build-up, but the will to stop it.

In the inter-war years disarmament negotiations were concerned not at all with the problem of verification. Nor did the issue of surprise attack cause any difficulties. The only disarmament conventions which were signed and ratified were the Naval Agreements of 1922 (Washington) and 1930 (London); these contained no paragraphs referring to verification, or for that matter to sanctions in the event of a breach. In fact all the parties prior to the rise of Hitler had at least a residue of trust in one another. The trouble arose rather out of their inability in most cases (especially in regard to land armaments) to reach agreement on yardsticks whereby differing military strengths were to be evaluated. Given that, because of geographic differences, nations had differing requirements, how was a fair

303

ratio to be arrived at? The French argued against power parity with the Germans, since they claimed that Germany's '*potentiel de guerre*' was greater in terms of population, economic resources, and so forth.

On the surface the chances of disarmament were indeed much greater between 1919 and 1932 than they were in 1963. There was not the same basic suspicion on a global scale; the dominating distrust was between Germany and France, and this in the Briand-Stresemann era seemed to be of diminishing significance. Furthermore, the acute need for balance in the disarmament process did not exist in its present form, since no power could hope in the pre-nuclear age to gain an advantage by sleight of hand that would allow it to hold up the world to ransom.

The picture has now changed. Diversion of fissile material for nuclear warheads could easily be concealed without a system of international verification. Secret laboratory work on nuclear weapons could be followed by tests carried out at very short notice, or without any advance notice at all, and if detected might in some circumstances be identifiable only by on-site inspection.

These considerations add up to the fact that, in a disarmed world, attack in overwhelming strength by modern weapons could be prepared in secret and launched with the prospect of decisive success unless an adequate system of international verification exists. When account is taken of this situation against the background of the deep and widespread distrust in the political field, it becomes more and more inescapable that adequate international verification is the key to disarmament. It is futile to talk about any far-reaching disarmament as if it were a possibility in itself; disarmament and verification must at least in the present state of the world go hand in hand. The compulsion is not simply to disarm but to disarm and verify.

But in fact and in practice the issue of verification presents itself differently to the Western world and the Communist world. The United States, the United Kingdom and most of their friends and partners are states which are open societies. Except in times of war or acute emergency there is freedom of the press, freedom of speech and no censorship or control of news. Parliamentary representatives have various privileges and immunities in making information public. Secrecy is difficult to preserve, and there is an instinctive dislike of secrecy rather than of verification. In spite, therefore of the fact that the Soviet Union has admitted that concealment of nuclear weapons and fissile material is hard to guard against, and in spite of their statement that they will not take the word of the West over disarmament, they may calculate that in open societies a degree of self-verification operates automatically.

But in a closed Communist society the position is widely different. The controls and powers of the state are such that large-scale evasions of disarmament obligations could be concealed without undue difficulty except from strict international verification. Western countries accordingly require such verification if their basic requirement is to be met, namely that of being satisfied that an agreement is kept by others; and although they may dislike it, they accept strict international verification themselves. Communist countries look at it otherwise. Any form of international verification, the presence on Soviet soil of any foreign observers or inspectors even from neutral countries, is extremely distasteful to the Soviet Union. Secrecy was a characteristic of life in Russia under the Czars; it is still more so in Communist Russia. The reason adduced by the Soviet government is fear of espionage by Western countries who may be meditating an attack on the Soviet Union. Even a neutral inspector, it appears, even a Dag Hammarskjöld or a U Thant, might turn out to be James Bond in disguise.

This Soviet attitude has been carried to the point that Soviet agreement on international verification during all the stages before total disarmament is specifically stipulated by Moscow to be limited to three fields:

(i) verification of arms destroyed

(ii) verification at any factories where the Soviet Government declares that arms production has ceased

(iii) verification at any missile sites declared by the Soviet Government to be the only missile sites remaining, including verification of missiles upon them.

In other words the Soviet Union does not agree that there should be international verification of replacement, of production, of remainders, or of non-concealment of weapons.

Probing of the meaning of article 2 of the Soviet disarmament plan, quoted above, has revealed that it has been intentionally drafted to contain these reservations. To put it shortly, the Soviet government agrees that if it undertakes to destroy 1,000 bombers, their destruction may be witnessed by international observers; but refuses to allow verification that the 1,000 bombers are not replaced by other bombers or that weapons are not being concealed. How this can be reconciled with Mr. Gromyko's statement at Geneva that 'the Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations which have been agreed upon would be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which would permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the progress of general and complete disarmament has begun' has never been explained.

The truth about this professed Soviet dislike of international verification is hard to judge. Is it fear, and if so, of what? Of identification of missile sites or of possible targets for hostile missiles? Fear of the exposure of weakness? Of aggressive preparations being found out? Of opportunities for the spread of non-Communist ideas? Or is it simply an excuse for scuttling any disarmament measures? Whatever the reason, the attitude appears strangely antiquated in a twentieth century world; yet whether pretended or real it is a state of mind to be reckoned with. The political fact that the West has no such Victorian inhibitions does not alter the political fact that the Communist world has them or affects to have them.

But there is a second difference in the approach to verification on the part of Western countries and Communist countries which has proved troublesome. This is the refusal of the Soviet government to admit the concept of an international civil servant, or to agree that even a neutral can act or verify impartially. Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations lays down that:

> '1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary General and the staff shall not seek to receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.
>
> 2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.'

The concept of an international civil servant, either seconded from the service of his own country or volunteering to serve an international organization, was developed under the League of Nations. There grew up a body of men and a code of behaviour and loyalty which was one of the more valuable legacies of the League. But although embodied in the Charter, the concept has increasingly been called in question by the Soviet government.

The truth is of course that the Russians are not 'bourgeois internationalists' and there can be no real compromise, as distinct from temporary and tactical accommodation, for men with a global objective of world revolution. They can hardly endorse the traditional principle of non-interventionism except as a temporary expedient; nor can they fundamentally accept the idea that other nations are entitled to solve their internal problems in any way they choose. Hence when they pay lip service to normal diplomatic practice in international organizations, and in particular to Article 100 of the U.N. Charter, it is important to grasp that it is in reality only lip service and nothing more.

The fact is that it is difficult for a Communist to act even for a time as a loyal international civil servant, subordinating loyalty to Communist interests in a given situation to over-riding loyalty to the international organization he is serving; and Communist governments may find it distasteful to admit that nationals of non-Communist countries can practice loyalty to an international organization whereas a Communist cannot. However that may be, the Soviet government since 1961 has professed to believe that experience of the working of the United Nations has shown that there is no such thing as a reliable international civil servant. No individual, even a national of a neutral state, so the Soviet government has recently maintained, can be trusted to act impartially, to adopt norms of thought and behaviour —which are not either Communist or anti-Communist. There is no such thing, Mr. Khrushchev has said, as a neutral man. Therefore, the new Soviet doctrine runs, the U.N. Secretariat itself should be organized strictly on a troika basis, namely equal thirds from Communist, Western and unaligned states; there should be three Secretaries General instead of one; and decisions must be taken unanimously by the three, that is to say each of the three should have a veto. The Soviet government claimed in 1961 that the same doctrine should apply to a control organization for a nuclear test ban. No single individual, the Russian argument ran, even from an unaligned country, could be trusted to act impartially as chief Executive Officer; there must be three co-equal administrative heads, acting by agreement in every case. Subordinate echelons down the line should be organized in the same way. This involves the concept of an international verification organization in which the individual members would to a greater or lesser degree be representing their national interests instead of being loyal to the organization and to nothing or no one else. This is entirely contrary to the concept of an international civil servant enshrined in the Charter. Moreover a system in which at any or all executive levels there must be the unanimous consent of three co-equals before an order is carried out can only lead to administrative paralysis.

When Dag Hammarskjold died on 18th September 1961 and the question arose of his replacement as Secretary General of the United Nations, Moscow did not press its demand for a troika, and while reserving its position agreed to the appointment of U Thant. Whether this was in fact only a temporary and tactical retreat from the demand for a troika remains to be seen. What is significant in the context of disarmament is that the Soviet draft treaty imples, although without posing it specifically, a demand for a troika in a control commission; and when it comes to the command of a peace-keeping force, the Russians are definite that there must be a troika.

The position, therefore, is that Western countries offer strict international verification in their own territories at all stages of a comprehensive nuclear test ban or of a disarmament agreement; they offer to satisfy the other side by any requisite form of impartial and international verification that they are observing their treaty obligations; and they require equal satisfaction from the other side in return. They are also prepared to trust an internationally staffed control organization to carry out impartially and loyally the tasks laid down for it; what they require is that it should be administered effectively and be able to work without a veto by anyone on its operation. By contrast the Soviet Union does not offer strict international verification before there is total disarmament, nor any verification that arms are not being concealed, nor will it apparently trust an international verification organization unless it works on a troika basis.

There are many other difficult issues in the field of disarmament which remain unresolved. Many of these centre

71

round the practical application to be given to No. 5 of the agreed principles, namely that 'all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty should any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all'. The application of this principle, to which both sides subscribe and which they constantly invoke, raises formidable problems especially in respect of the timing of the destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Nonetheless it is the question of verification and verification machinery which is the most refractory. Here is the main gap separating the two sides, whether over a full test ban or over disarmament. In trying to determine whether and how the gap can be bridged it may be useful to examine more precisely what it is that needs to be verified, and what means of verification exist.

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THE PREVENTION OF WAR

by

BERTRAND RUSSELL

32

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The Prevention of War

Bertrand Russell OCTOBER 1946

The atomic bomb has set a problem to mankind which must be solved if any tolerable existence is to be possible for the human race. The problem is that of abolishing large-scale war, not at some distant future date but quickly, before there has been time for another vast conflict to break out.

If the next great war were to occur within the next two or three years, it would probably lead to a quick victory for the United States and its allies, since no other power would have atomic bombs. But if there is no war in the near future, there will have been time for Russia to manufacture atomic bombs—and not only Russia, but many other nations, great and small. It must be assumed that bombs will soon become much cheaper and much more destructive than those dropped on the Japanese. In addition to bombs, there is the possibility of spraying large regions with radioactive substances which will exterminate all life in their neighborhood. Given a little carelessness, life on this planet may be made impossible.

It is to be expected that, if war comes, it will begin with a surprise attack in the style of Pearl Harbor. The aggressor will hope for a knock-out blow so severe as to make retaliation impossible. If Great Britain were the target, it is probable that this hope would be realized, for Great Britain is peculiarly vulnerable to atomic attack, owing to the smallness of its area and the density of its population. It is to be expected that during the first day or two London, Glasgow, and all the major centers of population will be wiped out; industrial production will be paralyzed, and about half the inhabitants will perish. To carry on the war after such a blow would be totally impossible.

The situation will be slightly less catastrophic, though still appalling, if the attack is directed against the United States. In the first 24 hours, New York, Washington, Chicago, and all the main centers of population will cease to exist; President and Congress will have undergone a diabolic alchemy, and a considerable percentage of the inhabitants of the United States, including most of those who are important in industry, will perish. The bomb will be borne by rockets, and it will be a matter of guesswork to infer what government is responsible. Some of the survivors will clamor for peace at any price, while others will proclaim that they would rather die than submit to so foul a blow. If the nation's store of atomic bombs has been successfully safeguarded, probably the resisters will prevail; there will be fierce revenge, many nations will be drawn in, and destruction will continue until disorganization makes the further manufacture of atomic bombs impossible. If one side succeeds first in this aim, it may consider that it has won a victory, but it will be a "victory" far more disastrous to the "victor" than any defeat known to history.

Let us consider for a moment what will be involved in the meantime in safeguarding atomic bombs and rockets. It will be necessary to keep their location secret, which will mean virtually a prison camp for those who work in connection with them. It will involve a constant suspicion of treachery, leading to a prohibition of foreign travel for all but the most highly trusted public servants, as already in Russia. It will involve a complete cessation of freedom for all scientific workers whose activities have any bearing on the warlike utilization of atomic energy. It will require apparatus and crews always ready, day and night, to retaliate upon whoever is considered the most probable enemy, as soon as there is any report of an atomic bomb being dropped. These crews must be told that, in a crisis, they are not to wait for orders, since the statesmen and the higher command will probably be wiped out. In the atmosphere of mutual suspicion thus generated diplomats will meet to discuss such important questions as who is to have the oil of Persia or the tin of Malaya; as they talk, they will be wondering which side will get in first with its Pearl Harbor. Sooner or later, nerves will give way, and the explosion will occur.

If utter and complete disaster is to be avoided, there must never again be a great war, unless it occurs within the next few years. Is it possible to establish a system which will secure this result before we suffer the penalty of our folly and our cleverness?

It is entirely clear that there is only one way in which great wars can be permanently prevented, and that is the establishment of an international government with a monopoly of serious armed force. When I speak of an international government, I mean one that really governs, not an amiable façade like the League of Nations or a pretentious sham like the United Nations under its present constitution. An international government, if it is to be able to preserve peace, must have the only atomic bombs, the only plant for producing them, the only air force, the only battleships, and, generally, whatever is necessary to make it irresistible. Its atomic staff, its air squadrons, the crews of its battleships, and its infantry regiments must each severally be composed of men of many different nations; there must be no possibility of the development of national feeling in any unit larger than a company. Every member of the international armed force should be carefully trained in loyalty to the international government.

The international authority must have a monopoly of uranium and of whatever other raw material may hereafter be found suitable for the manufacture of atomic bombs. It must have a large army of inspectors who must have the right to enter any factory without notice; any attempt to interfere with them or to obstruct their work must be treated as a *casus belli*. They must be provided with airplanes enabling them to discover whether secret plants are being established in empty regions near either Pole or in the middle of large deserts.

The monopoly of armed force is the most necessary attribute of the international government, but it will, of course, have to exercise various governmental functions. It will have to decide all disputes between different nations, and will have to possess the right to revise treaties. It will have to be bound by its constitution to intervene by force of arms against any nation that refuses to submit to the arbitration. Given its monopoly of armed force, such intervention will be seldom necessary and quickly successful. I will not stay to consider what further powers the international government might profitably possess, since those that I have mentioned would suffice to prevent serious wars.

There is one other method by which, in theory, the peace of the world could be secured, and that is the supremacy of one nation or of one closely allied group of nations. By this method Rome secured the peace of the Mediterranean area for several centuries. America at this moment, if it were bellicose and imperialistic, could compel the rest of the world to disarm, and establish a worldwide monopoly of American armed forces. But the country has no wish for such enterprises, and in a few years the opportunity will be gone. In the near future, a world war, however terrible, would probably end in American victory without the destruction of civilization in the Western hemisphere, and American victory would no doubt ead to a world government under the hegemony of the United States—a esult which, for my part, I should welcome with enthusiasm.

But if, as seems more likely, there is no world war until Russia has an dequate supply of atomic bombs, plans for world peace will have to eckon with Russia and America as roughly equal powers, and an internaional government, if it is to be established before the outbreak of an tterly disastrous war, will have to be created by agreement rather than by orce.

Short of actual force, however, the government of the United States, with he support of Great Britain and a number of other powers, could do a reat deal towards the creation of an international government. An alliance ould be formed, consisting in the first place of all North and South Amera, the British Commonwealth, France, Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, nd Spain (after dealing with Franco). This alliance should proclaim cerin international purposes, and declare its willingness to be joined by any ower that subscribed to those purposes. There should be both military d economic inducements to join the alliance: military, in that the allice as a whole would undertake the defense of all its members; economic, a lower tariff for trade within the alliance than for trade with countries

312

outside it, and also in advantages as regards loans and access to raw materials. There should be a gradual increase in the closeness of the alliance and a continually greater amalgamation of military resources. Every possible effort should be made to induce Russia to become a member of the alliance. In this way international government might grow up gradually.

There is, however, a strong body of opinion which favors a different course. Instead of trying to create a strong organization which would at first not include Russia, those who favor this opinion prefer a weak organization, the United Nations, of which Russia is already a member. If this is to be anything more than a weak evasion of the problem, it must be supplemented by a vigorous attempt to alter the constitution of the United Nations. At present, there is machinery for preventing Finland from attacking Russia, but none for preventing Russia from attacking Finland. There is, in fact, nothing to hinder a great power from waging aggressive war, whether against another great power or against a small defenseless neighbor. The only wars prevented by the organization of the United Nations are those that are not at all likely to occur.

If the United Nations Organization is to serve any useful purpose, three successive reforms are necessary. First, the veto of the great powers must be abolished and majorities must be declared competent to decide on all questions that come before the organization: second, the contingents of the various powers to the armed forces of the organization must be increased until they become stronger than any national armed forces; third, the contingents, instead of remaining national blocks, must be distributed so that no considerable unit retains any national feeling or national cohesion. When all these things have been done, but not before, the United Nations Organization may become a means of averting great wars.

All this may seem utopian, and perhaps it is. Politicians and diplomats are trained in evasion and ambiguity; most of them will prefer to offer a sham which can be obtained with little effort rather than an effective measure that is sure to encounter strenuous opposition, but they will dress up the sham so skillfully that many people will be deceived. Those to whom the survival of mankind is more important than victory in the next election must strive to enlighten the public while there is still time, and perhaps we can succeed.

The men of science, to whom politics is an alien art, find themselves suddenly faced with great responsibilities which they do not know how to fulfill. By their discoveries they have put immense powers, for good or evil, into the hands of ordinary men who have not the training required for a rapid change in age-old mental habits. The political world is complex, and understanding nuclei is no help in understanding diplomacy. But the same intelligence which enabled physicists to understand nuclei will enable them to understand politics, provided they realize that the problems are complex and that slap-dash solutions will not work.

Although people speak of the "Big Three" or the "Big Five," there are in fact two powers, the United States and the USSR, which far surpass all others in strength. Other powers are, some of them satellites of the one, some of the other, some hesitantly neutral. All other important powers, including Great Britain, are, I think, prepared to acquiesce in the limitations of national sovereignty that are called for by the atomic bomb. This is not owing to any superior wisdom, but because their national sovereignty is already at the mercy of the Big Two. (For example, the British have to submit to Bretton Woods, and the Chinese, unless vigorously supported by America, to the loss of Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railway.) The problem of establishing an international authority is therefore a problem of which the solution rests with America and Russia.

Russia, since it is a dictatorship in which public opinion has no free means of expression, can only be dealt with on the governmental level. Stalin and Molotov, or their successors, will have to be persuaded that it is to the national interest of Russia to permit the creation of an effective international government. I do not think the necessary persuasion can be effected except by governments, especially the government of the United States. Nor do I think that the persuasion can be effected by arguments of principle. The only possible way, in my opinion, is by a mixture of cajolery and threat, making it plain to the Soviet authorities that refusal will entail disaster, while acceptance will not.

Persuasion in the United States, where there is freedom of propaganda, is a different matter. If things do not go as we might wish, the fault is usually not with the politicians, though they get the blame; the fault is with public opinion, to which the politicians, as democrats, quite legitimately give way. What is needed is an immense campaign of public education. The average American voter, very naturally, is annoyed by the way in which the follies of Europe and Asia compel America to go to war; in his emotions he is an isolationist, even when hard facts have convinced his reason that isolationism is no longer practicable. He wishes the Atlantic were still as wide as in Washington's day, and is apt to forget the arguments against isolationism whenever business is prosperous.

To meet this difficulty it is necessary to bring home, not only to administrators or congressmen but to the average American citizen, the dangers to which, within a few years, America will be exposed, and the impossibility of warding off the dangers except by a partial surrender of sovereignty. The first reaction of nine people out of ten will be to urge that America should have more bombs than anyone else, so that an attack by any other nation would be obviously folly. The fallacy in this point of view must be made plain to all and sundry. It must be pointed out that America has already been involved in two world wars as a direct result of the fear of being involved: both in 1914 and in 1939 Germany would not have gone to war if America had pronounced in advance against neutrality. It must be made clear that the same thing would inevitably happen again: a war between Russia and China or between Russia and Great Britain would be sure to in-

314

volve the United States. Next, the utter disaster of an atomic war must be made clear, and it must be demonstrated that there is no defense against a surprise attack. Finally it must be proved that there is no hope in Kellogg Pacts, declarations of universal goodwill, alliances, or paper prohibitions of the use of atomic bombs. All this must be set forth in speech and in writing throughout the length and breadth of the land, by men having no motive except public spirit and the hope that the world in which they have lived may still exist in their children's time.

If such a campaign is to succeed, it requires three things: a definite program, an organization, and the enthusiasm of a great moral crusade. Without this last nothing can be achieved, for although, from a purely rational point of view, self-preservation is a sufficient motive for all that needs to be done, self-preservation alone will not overcome the obstacles to rational thinking that are presented by ancient habits of hatred, suspicion, and envy. We shall have to realize that what injures a foreign nation does not necessarily benefit our own. We shall have to learn to feel a little uncomfortable if we wallow in plenty while millions die of hunger and cold. We shall have to feel that domination brings less happiness than cooperation, and that mutual hostility, which was always wicked, has now become suicidal folly.

But I would not have it thought that our campaign should be mainly negative, or based entirely upon an appeal to fear. The appeal to fear has its function, especially in providing an initial shock which may compel attention. But the ultimate and most valid appeal should be to hope. There is no need of great wars, no need of the horror of populations reduced to utter misery, harried and starved in a vast campaign of retribution. There is no reason why poverty and want should continue anywhere in the world. There is no reason why national education in almost every country should encourage false beliefs which promote warlike feeling. There is no reason why increase in the efficiency of production should be used, not to raise the standard of life, but to increase the proportion of human effort that is devoted to mutual extermination. All these evils depend for their continued existence upon war and the national hostilities bred by the fear of war. If once the fear of war were removed, the whole human race could quickly attain a level of happiness and well-being surpassing that of the most fortunate in any earlier time. If the atomic bomb shocks the nations into acquiescence in a system making great wars impossible, it will have been one of the greatest boons ever conferred by science.

But it is time to return from these high hopes to the very different world in which for the present we have to live. I shall assume that such a campaign as I have indicated has had a considerable measure of success in America and Great Britain. (It will encounter less opposition in Great Britain, because the British realize that Great Britain will be wiped out in the next great war, if it occurs.) It remains to ask ourselves what, in that case, we ought to do about Russia.

The policy most likely to lead to peace is not one of unadulterated pacifism. A complete pacifist might say: "Peace with Russia can always be preserved by yielding to every Russian demand." This is the policy of appeasement, pursued with disastrous results by the British and French governments in the years before the war that is now ended. I myself supported this policy on pacifist grounds, but I now hold that I was mistaken. Such a policy encourages continually greater demands on the part of the power to be appeased, until at last some demand is made which is felt to be intolerable and the whole trend is suddenly reversed. It is not by giving the appearance of cowardice or unworthy submission that the peace of the world can be secured.

In dealing with the Soviet government, what is most needed is definiteness. The American and British governments should state what issues they consider vital, and on other issues they should allow Russia a free hand. Within this framework they should be as conciliatory as possible. They should make it clear that genuine international cooperation is what they most desire. But although peace should be their goal, they should not let it appear that they are for peace at any price. At a certain stage, when their plans for an international government are ripe, they should offer them to the world, and enlist the greatest possible amount of support; I think they should offer them through the medium of the United Nations. If Russia acquiesced willingly, all would be well. If not, it would be necessary to bring pressure to bear, even to the extent of risking war, for in that case it is pretty certain that Russia would agree. If Russia does not agree to join in forming an international government, there will be war sooner or later; it is therefore wise to use any degree of pressure that may be necessary. But pressure should not be applied until every possible conciliatory approach has been tried and has failed. I have little doubt that such a policy, vigorously pursued, would in the end secure Russian acquiescence.

The issue is the most momentous with which mankind has ever been faced. If it is not solved, war will exterminate the civilized portion of mankind, except for such remnants as may have been engaged in exploring the Antarctic continent or investigating the theology of Tibetan Lamas. These will be too few to reestablish civilized communities. If mankind, in the course of a millennium or two, slowly climbs back to its present intellectual level, it is to be presumed that it will again inflict a similar catastrophe upon itself. If any of the things that we value are to survive, the problem must be solved. How it can be solved is clear; the difficulty is to persuade the human race to acquiesce in its own survival. I cannot believe that this task is impossible.

ON ALBERT EINSTEIN'S SUPPORT FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT

by

VAVILOV, ET AL

33

316 A

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14

On Albert Einstein's Support of World Government

Sergei Vavilov, A. N. Frumkin, A. F. Ioffe,
Nikolai N. Semenov FEBRUARY 1948

The famous physicist Albert Einstein is known not only for his remarkable scientific discoveries. In recent years the venerable scientist devoted much attention to social and political problems. He issues statements through radio and press and heads a number of social organizations. He several times raised his voice against Hitlerite barbarians and, during the postwar period, against the danger of new war, in defense of stable peace, and against dreams of militarists to subjugate American science completely.

Soviet scientists as well as all Soviet public opinion welcomed this activity of the scientist who is moved by sincere humanitarianism even when in individual cases he did not hold a sufficiently consistent and clearly defined position. However, in a number of Einstein's latest statements there are aspects which appear to us to be not only incorrect but also dangerous and harmful for the cause of peace for which Einstein wants to fight.

We consider it our duty to speak frankly about this so as to introduce complete clarity into the most important question of methods for successful struggle for peace. It is from this point of view that one must approach the slogan of "world government" which Professor Einstein has lately been defending.

In the motley company of supporters of this slogan, alongside frank imperialists who are trying to use it to conceal their plans of unlimited expansion, there are not a few representatives of the intelligentsia of capitalist countries who are carried away by the seeming simplicity of the idea and who don't realize its real consequences. These pacifist and liberally inclined people believe "world government" may be a panacea for securing stable peace.

Supporters of "world government" are widely using allegedly radical phrases to the effect that state sovereignty in the atom age has allegedly become a survival of old times and that this, as Belgian delegate Spaak said at the General Assembly of the United Nations, is "an old outmoded idea" and even "reactionary idea." It is difficult to imagine statements which could be further from the truth.

First of all, the ideas of "world government" and "superstate" are not at all a product of the "atom age." They have a long history. It is enough to recall they were promoted at the origin of the League of Nations.

Furthermore, in the present historic epoch such ideas have never been progressive. They reflect the fact that capitalist monopolies which are dominant in the principal industrial countries have not enough room within the framework of their own countries. They need world markets, world sources of raw materials, and regions for investment capital. Domination of monopolies in political life and in the state machine of great powers permits use of this machine for their struggle for spheres of influence and for economic and political enslavement of foreign countries which must give the monopolists a chance to be bosses of foreign territory as well as at home.

We know this perfectly from our own country's past of not so long ago. Under Tsarism, foreign capitalists greedily flocked to Russia, with its reactionary regime which was subservient to capital, with its low wages and tremendous natural resources. French, English, Belgian, and German firms plunderingly made themselves at home in our country, receiving tremendous profits which were unthinkable in their own countries. They chained Tsarist Russia to the capitalist West with chains of enslaving loans. Money received from foreign banks of the Tsarist government suppressed the revolutionary movement in the country, handicapped the development of Russian science and culture and organized Jewish pogroms.

The great October Socialist revolution smashed the chains of economic and political dependence of our country on world capitalist monopolies. The Soviet government for the first time made our country a truly free and independent state; it advanced, with a tempo unprecedented in the history of humanity, the development of our socialist economy, technique, science and culture; and it made our country a reliable bulwark of peace and security of the people. Our people defended this independence in battles within our borders against a bloc of imperialist states and in the great battles of the patriotic war against the German Fasicst invaders. And now the advocates of the "world superstate" invite us to surrender this independence voluntarily in the name of a certain "world government" which with a high-sounding trademark conceals world domination by capitalist monopolies.

Are not these proposals ridiculous? They are absurd not only to the Soviet Union. After the Second World War a number of countries broke away from the capitalist system of oppression and enslavement. Peoples of these countries are strengthening economic and political independence and are not permitting foreign interference in their internal life. Furthermore, the rapid growth of the national liberation movement in colonies and dependent countries awakened the national self-consciousness of hundreds of millions of people who do not want to live in the old way like slaves.

Monopolies of imperialistic powers, having lost some juicy objectives of exploitation, are running the risk of losing others and trying through every means to liquidate the state sovereignty of peoples who liberated themselves from domination—sovereignty which stands in their way—and to prevent the true liberation of colonies. For this purpose imperialists are using all sorts of methods of military, political, economic, and ideological struggle.

In carrying out this social order the ideologists of imperialism are trying to discredit the very idea of national sovereignty. In doing so they often advance pompous plans of "world state" which would allegedly do away with imperialism, wars, enmity between nations, would secure realization of all human laws, etc.

Thus the imperialist forces which aspire to world domination use a guise of allegedly progressive ideas which attract certain circles of the intelligentsia in capitalist countries—scientists, writers, and others.

In his open letter addressed this September to the delegations of members of the United Nations, Einstein advances a new version of limitation of state sovereignty. He proposes to reorganize the General Assembly of the United Nations, turning it into a continuously working World Parliament, possessing greater authority than the Security Council, which Einstein (repeating in this question what the armor-bearers of American diplomacy are saying every day) says is allegedly paralyzed as a result of exercise of the veto right. The General Assembly, reorganized according to Einstein's plan, would have the right to pass final decisions, throwing aside the principle of unanimity of the great powers. Einstein proposes that delegations to the United Nations be elected by popular vote and not be appointed by governments of individual countries as at present. At first sight this proposal may appear to be progressive and even radical. Actually it does not improve the existing situation at all.

Let us try to imagine elections to such a "World Parliament."

At present the greater part of the human race still lives in colonial or dependent countries where the governors, troops, and financial-industrial monopolies of a few imperialistic powers are the bosses. "Popular vote" in such countries would amount to appointment of delegates by colonial administrators or by military authorities. Without looking far for an example, it is enough to recall the comedy of the "referendum" in Greece carried out by its monarchist-fascist rulers under protection of the bayonets of English troops. But the situation is only slightly better in countries where there formally exists a general election right. In the countries of bourgeois democracy, dominating capital, through thousands of tricks, barriers, and traps, limits universal suffrage and makes freedom an illusion. Does not Einstein know that in the latest elections to the United States Congress only 39 per cent of the voters participated, that millions of Negroes in Southern states are actually deprived of election rights or are forced not infrequently under threat of lynching to vote for their worst enemies, like the late Negro baiter and reactionary of the worst type, Senator Bilbo?

Special taxes, examinations and other tricks are being used to prevent from voting millions of immigrants, workers looking for jobs, and the poorest farmers. We are not even speaking of mass buying of votes and the role of the reactionary press, which in the hands of the millionaires who own the newspapers is a powerful weapon for influencing the masses.

All this shows what "popular election" to the World Parliament proposed by Einstein would look like under existing conditions of the capitalist world. Its composition would not be any better than the present composition of the General Assembly. It would be a crooked mirror of the true mind of the masses of people, of their aspirations and hopes for stable peace.

As is known, the American delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations and in various committees is widely using the notorious voting machine, taking advantage of the fact that the vast majority of members of the United Nations are in a dependent position regarding the United States and are forced to adapt their foreign policy to the demands of Washington. Thus, for instance, a number of countries of Latin America with monoculture agriculture are in a state of servile dependence on American monopolies, which fix the prices for their produce. No wonder that, under pressure of the American delegation in the General Assembly, there is created a mechanical majority which votes on orders from the real bosses.

In a number of cases, American diplomacy for understandable reasons prefers to put through certain measures not on behalf of the State Department but under the flag of the United Nations. This, for instance, was so in the case of the notorious Balkan commission and the Commission for Supervision of Elections in Korea. For the purpose of completely turning the United Nations into a branch of the State Department, the American delegation is putting through a project for creation of a "Little Assembly" which would actually replace the Security Council with its principle of unanimity of great powers which prevents realization of imperialistic plans.

Einstein's project would actually lead to the same results, and thus not only would not help secure stable peace and international collaboration but would serve only as cover for a drive against peoples who have created a system which does not permit foreign capital to draw its usual profits. This is the road to unlimited expansion of American imperialism, and this is the way to disarm ideologically peoples who are defending their independence.

Such is the irony of fate which led Einstein actually to support plans and aspirations of the worst enemies of peace and international collaboration. Einstein has gone so far as to say that if the Soviet Union refuses to join such an organization, organized along new lines, other states will have a full right to enter this road without the Soviet Union, giving the latter a chance to join in the future as a member of this organization or as an "observer."

His proposal really differs little from statements of the frank heralds of American imperialism, no matter how far from them Professor Einstein actually may be. These statements actually amount to this—if one does not succeed in turning the United Nations completely into a weapon of policy of the State Department of the United States, into a cover for imperialistic plans and schemes, it is necessary to blow up this organization from inside and create in its place a new "international" organization without the participation of the Soviet Union and the new democracies.

Does not Einstein realize that this sort of plan would be fatal for the cause of international security and international collaboration?

We believe Albert Einstein has entered a false and dangerous road in pursuing the mirage of a "universal state" in a world where there exist different social, political, and economic systems. This fact does not at all prevent economic and political cooperation between states of different social and economic structure, provided these differences are soberly taken into consideration. But Einstein resorted to unrealistic political projections which play into the hands of the worst enemies of honest international collaboration and stable peace. The road which Einstein urges the members of the United Nations to enter does not lead toward a strengthening of international security but into a blind alley of new international complications. Such a road is only profitable for those circles of monopolistic capital to which these complications offer a promise of new war orders and new profits.

Because we value Einstein so highly as one of the greatest scientists and as a socially minded person who is trying by means that are within his power to conduct a struggle for peace, we consider it our duty to say all this with full frankness and without any diplomatic embellishments.

EINSTEIN REPLIES

by

ALBERT EINSTEIN

34

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15

Einstein Replies

Albert Einstein FEBRUARY 1948

Four of my Russian colleagues have published a benevolent attack upon me in an open letter carried by the *New Times*. I appreciate the effort they have made, and I appreciate even more the fact that they have expressed their point of view so candidly and straightforwardly. To act intelligently in human affairs is possible only if an attempt is made to understand the thoughts, motives, and apprehensions of one's opponent so fully that one can see the world through his eyes. All well-meaning people should try to contribute as much as possible to improving such mutual understanding. It is in this spirit that I should like to ask my Russian colleagues and any other readers to accept the following answer to their letter. It is the reply of a man who anxiously tries to find a feasible solution without having the illusion that he himself knows "the truth" or "the right path" to follow. If in the following I express my views somewhat dogmatically, I do it only for the sake of clarity and simplicity.

Although your letter, in the main, is clothed in an attack upon the non-socialistic foreign countries, particularly the United States, I believe that behind the aggressive front there lies a defensive mental attitude which is nothing else but the trend toward an almost unlimited isolationism. The escape into isolationism is not difficult to understand if one realizes what Russia has suffered at the hands of foreign countries during the last three decades—the German invasions with planned mass murder of the civilian population, foreign interventions during the civil war, the systematic campaign of calumnies in the Western press, the support of Hitler as an alleged tool to fight Russia. However understandable this desire for isolation may be, it remains no less disastrous to Russia and to all other nations; I shall say more about it later on.

The chief object of your attack against me concerns my support of "world government." I should like to discuss this important problem only after having said a few words about the antagonism between socialism and capitalism, for your attitude on the significance of this antagonism seems to dominate completely your views on international problems. If the socio-economic problem is considered objectively, it appears as follows: Technological development has led to increasing centralization of the economic

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mechanism. It is this development which is also responsible for the fact that economic power in all widely industrialized countries has become concentrated in the hands of relatively few. These people, in capitalist countries, do not need to account for their actions to the public as a whole; they must do so in socialist countries, in which they are civil servants similar to those who exercise political power.

I share your view that a socialist economy possesses advantages which definitely counterbalance its disadvantages whenever the management lives up, at least to some extent, to adequate standards. No doubt, the day will come when all nations (as far as such nations still exist) will be grateful to Russia for having demonstrated, for the first time, by vigorous action the practical possibility of planned economy in spite of exceedingly great difficulties. I also believe that capitalism, or, we should say, the system of free enterprise, will prove unable to check unemployment, which will become increasingly chronic because of technological progress, and unable to maintain a healthy balance between production and the purchasing power of the people.

On the other hand we should not make the mistake of blaming capitalism for all existing social and political evils, and of assuming that the very establishment of socialism would be able to cure all the social and political ills of humanity. The danger of such a belief lies, first, in the fact that it encourages fanatical intolerance on the part of all the "faithfuls" by making a possible social method into a type of church which brands all those who do not belong to it as traitors or as nasty evildoers. Once this stage has been reached, the ability to understand the convictions and actions of the "unfaithfuls" vanishes completely. You know, I am sure, from history how much unnecessary suffering such rigid beliefs have inflicted upon mankind.

Any government is in itself an evil insofar as it carries within it the tendency to deteriorate into tyranny. However, except for a very small number of anarchists, everyone of us is convinced that civilized society cannot exist without a government. In a healthy nation there is a kind of dynamic balance between the will of the people and the government which prevents its degeneration into tyranny. It is obvious that the danger of such deterioration is more acute in a country in which the government has authority not only over the armed forces but also over all the channels of education and information as well as over the economic existence of every single citizen. I say this merely to indicate that socialism as such cannot be considered the solution to all social problems but merely as a framework within which such a solution is possible.

What has surprised me most in your general attitude, expressed in your letter, is the following aspect: You are such passionate opponents of anarchy in the economic sphere, and yet equally passionate advocates of anarchy, e.g., unlimited sovereignty, in the sphere of international politics. The proposition to curtail the sovereignty of individual states appears to you in itself reprehensible, as a kind of violation of a natural right. In addition, you try to prove that behind the idea of curtailing sovereignty the United States is hiding her intention of economic domination and exploitation of the rest of the world without going to war. You attempt to justify this indictment by analyzing in your fashion the individual actions of this government since the end of the last war. You attempt to show that the Assembly of the United Nations is a mere puppet show controlled by the United States and hence the American capitalists.

Such arguments impress me as a kind of mythology; they are not convincing. They make obvious, however, the deep estrangement among the intellectuals of our two countries which is the result of a regrettable and artificial mutual isolation. If a free personal exchange of views should be made possible and should be encouraged, the intellectuals, possibly more than anyone else, could help to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the two nations and their problems. Such an atmosphere is a necessary prerequisite for the fruitful development of political cooperation. However, since for the time being we depend upon the cumbersome method of "open letters" I shall want to indicate briefly my reaction to your arguments.

Nobody would want to deny that the influence of the economic oligarchy upon all branches of our public life is very powerful. This influence, however, should not be overestimated. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president in spite of desperate opposition by these very powerful groups and was reelected three times; and this took place at a time when decisions of great consequence had to be made.

Concerning the policies of the American government since the end of the war, I am neither willing, nor able, nor entitled to justify or explain them. It cannot be denied, however, that the suggestions of the American government with regard to atomic weapons represented at least an attempt toward the creation of a supranational security organization. If they were not acceptable, they could at least have served as a basis of discussion for a real solution of the problems of international security. It is, indeed, the attitude of the Soviet government that was partly negative and partly dilatory which has made it so difficult for well-meaning people in this country to use their political influence as they would nave wanted, and to oppose the "war mongers." With regard to the influence of the United States upon the United Nations Assembly, I wish to say that, in my opinion, it stems not only from the economic and military power of the United States but also from the efforts of the United States and the United Nations to lead toward a genuine solution of the security problem.

Concerning the controversial veto power, I believe that the efforts to eliminate it or to make it ineffective have their primary cause less in specific intentions of the United States than in the manner in which the veto privilege has been abused.

324

Let me come now to your suggestion that the policy of the United States seeks to obtain economic domination and exploitation of other nations. It is a precarious undertaking to say anything reliable about aims and intentions. Let us rather examine the objective factors involved. The United States is fortunate in producing all the important industrial products and foods in her own country, in sufficient quantities. The country also possesses almost all important raw materials. Because of her tenacious belief in "free enterprise" she cannot succeed in keeping the purchasing power of the people in balance with the productive capacity of the country. For these very same reasons there is a constant danger that unemployment will reach threatening dimensions.

Because of these circumstances the United States is compelled to emphasize her export trade. Without it, she could not permanently keep her total productive machinery fully utilized. These conditions would not be harmful if the exports were balanced by imports of about the same value. Exploitation of foreign nations would then consist in the fact that the labor value of imports would considerably exceed that of exports. However, every effort is being made to avoid this since almost every import would make a part of the productive machinery idle.

This is why foreign countries are not able to pay for the export commodities of the United States, payment which, in the long run, would indeed be possible only through imports by the latter. This explains why a large portion of all the gold has come to the United States. On the whole, this gold cannot be utilized except for the purchase of foreign commodities, which because of the reasons already stated, is not practicable. There it lies, this gold, carefully protected against theft, a monument to governmental wisdom and to economic science! The reasons which I have just indicated make it difficult for me to take the alleged exploitation of the world by the United States very seriously.

However, the situation just described has a serious political facet. The United States, for the reasons indicated, is compelled to ship part of its production to foreign countries. These exports are financed through loans which the United States is granting foreign countries. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine how these loans will ever be repaid. For all practical purposes, therefore, these loans must be considered gifts which may be used as weapons in the arena of power politics. In view of the existing conditions and in view of the general characteristics of human beings, this, I frankly admit, represents a real danger. Is it not true, however, that we have stumbled into a state of international affairs which tends to make every invention of our minds and every material good into a weapon and, consequently, into a danger for mankind?

This question brings us to the most important matter, in comparison to which everything else appears insignificant indeed. We all know that power politics, sooner or later, necessarily leads to war, and that war, under present circumstances, would mean a mass destruction of human beings and material goods the dimension of which are much, much greater than anything that has ever before happened in history.

Is it really unavoidable that, because of our passions and our inherited customs, we should be condemned to annihilate each other so thoroughly that nothing would be left over which would deserve to be conserved? Is it not true that all the controversies and differences of opinion which we have touched upon in our strange exchange of letters are insignificant pettinesses compared to the danger in which we all find ourselves? Should we not do everything in our power to eliminate the danger which threatens all nations alike?

If we hold fast to the concept and practice of unlimited sovereignty of nations it only means that each country reserves the right for itself of pursuing its objectives through warlike means. Under the circumstances, every nation must be prepared for that possibility; this means it must try with all its might to be superior to anyone else. This objective will dominate more and more our entire public life and will poison our youth long before the catastrophe is itself actually upon us. We must not tolerate this, however, as long as we still retain a tiny bit of calm reasoning and human feelings.

This alone is on my mind in supporting the idea of world government, without any regard to what other people may have in mind when working for the same objective. I advocate world government because I am convinced that there is no other possible way of eliminating the most terrible danger in which man has ever found himself. The objective of avoiding total destruction must have priority over any other objective.

I am sure you are convinced that this letter is written with all the seriousness and honesty at my command; I trust you will accept it in the same spirit.

FOREWARNED -- BUT NOT FOREARMED

by

EUGENE RABINOWITCH

35

226A

Forewarned—but Not Forearmed

Eugene Rabinowitch OCTOBER 1949

The President's announcement of an atomic explosion somewhere in the Soviet Union has been followed by a chorus of reassuring official and unofficial comments. Americans have been advised to be calm, to lose no sleep, to avoid hysteria. They have been told that this development has been expected, and consequently accounted for in our military and political planning. We have heard that the expression, "atomic explosion," may not even signify the explosion of an atomic bomb; perhaps a great catastrophe, or an act of sabotage has occurred in a Soviet atomic plant.

Almost unanimously our statesmen and commentators have told us that although the Soviet scientists may have "cracked" (or as some have insinuated, their spies may have stolen) the secret of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union does not possess another important secret—the know-how needed for production, which is available only to American industry.

Therefore, we are told, the Soviet production of atomic bombs has no chance of equaling ours, particularly since we have had a four-year head start. Even if a "Beria bomb" has been exploded somewhere in the wastes of Siberia, our writers and commentators tell us it is an inferior product of amateur handiwork compared to the improved "Eniwetok bombs," now "mass-produced" in America.

Furthermore, it is said, the Soviet Union, although able to make reasonable facsimiles of our four-motored bombers which fell into its hands during the war, does not possess at the present time, and will not be able to develop in the near future, means of delivering atomic bombs to our shores. Their planes do not begin to match our present world-girdling, six-motored bombers or the jet bombers and rockets now on the drafting boards of our engineers.

Whistling in the dark to a different tune, some optimists suggest that now, with their "atomic inferiority complex" gone, the Soviet negotiators will prove more reasonable than before, and an agreement on effective atomic disarmament can perhaps be reached. Some, who ascribed to the American "take it or leave it" attitude at least a part of the blame for the deadlock of the UN atomic control negotiations, hope that the end of

American monopoly will make our attitude more pliable, and thus facilitate agreement.

Scientists have never been, and cannot be now, intent on creating public hysteria. More than anyone else, they believe in a calm, rational approach to all problems confronting humanity. However, this approach has to begin with an open-minded appraisal of the facts; in taking stock of the situation, we can see little that justifies swallowing of the proffered bromides. We do not advise Americans that doomsday is near and that they can expect atomic bombs to start falling on their heads a month or a year from now; but we think they have reason to be deeply alarmed and to be prepared for grave decisions.

The fact that the present development has been freely predicted by no means proves that we are prepared to meet it. Like metastasis in an incurable cancer, it may merely mean that the deadly disease is taking its foreseeable course unchecked.

Whatever the type of the Soviet atomic explosion, it signifies that the Soviet scientists and engineers have been able to produce more-than-critical amounts of fissionable elements (plutonium, or uranium-235, or uranium-233), since no smaller amount will explode under any conditions. In the (unlikely) case of an accidental explosion of an atomic explosives plant (such as a uranium-graphite production pile), an explosion of sufficient energy to cause effects detectable at some distance could be produced, if at all, only by a plant of considerable size. This means that from the production point of view, the Soviet project is considerably ahead of the French and British projects, which have so far only constructed small experimental piles.

The hypothesis that the one batch of atomic explosives whose explosion we have detected was the product of a small-scale fabrication effort and that the Russians are not able to maintain production of these materials on a level comparable to ours, has no basis—except its convenience for us. When we exploded our first test bomb at Alamogordo, we had in operation two large isotope separation plants at Oak Ridge, plus several plutonium production piles at Hanford. Without constructing facilities of a similar order of magnitude, the Russians would not have been able to accumulate, within the short period their facility could have been operating, enough material even for a single bomb. If they have mastered the difficulty of building one plant big enough to produce a critical amount of atomic explosives, there is no obvious reason why they should not have built this plant as big or even bigger than we did in 1945.

The extensive use of slave labor could have considerably reduced the effort by eliminating the costly and extensive safety installations provided in all our facilities.

To sum up, whatever kind of isotope separation of plutonium production plants the Soviet engineers have constructed, we have no reason to believe that these have not been built on the same scale as ours; and we have equally little reason to believe that these facilities are not being expanded and multiplied at a rate equal to, or exceeding, that of our rate of growth after 1945. This type of expansion has nothing in common with the "mass-production" symbolized by conveyor-belt assembly of automobiles in Detroit—a development on which American industry is supposed to have a lasting monopoly.

In his recent testimony before the Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Mr. Lilienthal spoke of our progress in the fabrication of atomic bomb elements—an operation which, he said, has now been converted from "custom type work" by scientists to "industrial production" by technicians. These statements may have been responsible for the belief—apparently shared by some of our statesmen—that atomic bombs are now being "mass-produced" in the United States. It was, however, repeatedly stated by well-qualified men that the "bottleneck" of atomic bomb production is the production of atomic explosives, plutonium or light uranium, and not their incorporation into bombs. The Russian experience in mass ordnance production has been long, extensive, and quite successful, from the days of Ivan the Terrible's siege of Kasan to the days when Soviet artillery was massed almost wheel to wheel at the banks of the Oder to blast open the path to Berlin.

A real handicap the Soviet Union may be facing in serial production of atomic bombs is shortage of raw materials. The enormous and hectic effort which Soviet mining engineers apparently put into the exploitation of the notoriously exhausted uranium mines on the German-Czech border, may signify that no really extensive uranium sources have as yet been discovered elsewhere in the Soviet-dominated area; but this is an uncertain inference, and even if it is true, continued prospecting may change the situation at any time.

Finally, while it is true that the Soviet Union so far has been far behind the United States in the development of long-range aircraft, the fact that the USSR has been able to produce a better heavy tank than any we put into production in the last war, is an indication that this backwardness might have been due to a difference in emphasis at least as much as to a difference in engineering capacity. It will take the Soviet Union time to catch up in her present handicap in this field—perhaps, more time than she will need to catch up with our production of atomic bombs.

However, she might move ahead of us in the development of other and perhaps more ingenious methods of delivery of atomic bombs or other atomic weapons to our cities or harbors, by large rockets, submarines, or by sabotage. It is true that we have aviation bases and fleet bases surrounding the Soviet Union, while Soviet bases are far from our shores. But these bases are quite close to the cities and harbors of nations of Western Europe which form an integral part of our defense, and whose destruction or defection will make our task in any future war immensely more difficult.

In the earliest analyses of the relative position of the Soviet Union and the United States in the case of an atomic arms race, made by atomic scientists in 1945, it was pointed out that the population and industry distribution in the United States, and the relative difficulty of changing this distribution radically in a politically and economically free country, make the United States (and even more so the countries of Western Europe) more vulnerable to atomic bombs than the Soviet Union. The harbors and air bases on whose operation we must rely in overseas warfare, can be made unfit for operation by a few atomic bomb hits or a few atomic mines.

All this adds up to the sober conclusion that we have no reason to assume that, without a renewed prodigious effort on our own part, the Soviet Union will not be able to draw even, or even forge ahead of us in the number and strategic value of its atomic armaments within a relatively short time—a period of the order of five to ten years. . . .

Not only is our leadership in atomic offense threatened, we are even more in danger of falling behind the Soviet Union in our capacity for defense. It is easy for a radio commentator to pun, in commenting on Truman's announcement of the Soviet atomic bomb that "if we could detect them, we can deflect them." The fact is that the most important defense against atomic bombs is not to be where the bombs explode, and this means planned decentralization and scattering of population and industry. For those who must remain, the most important thing is detailed preparedness, advance assignment of functions to everybody in the case of a disaster, and brutal disregard for individual danger and losses of "expendable" men and women. In all these respects, a free republic will have great difficulty in competing with a ruthless police state, and its disciplined and indoctrinated populace.

It has been stated by responsible speakers that since the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb was foreseen, our military and political plans have been made accordingly. As a minor concession, it is admitted that the Soviet bomb explosion came two or three years earlier than our planners expected. (Some voices have been heard asking for congressional investigation of those responsible for this error in timing.) Let us set the record straight. The forecasts of Szilard, Urey, Langmuir, Seitz, Bethe, and others have been remarkably close. They gave about five years as the time the Soviet scientists would need to produce their first atomic bomb. Among men familiar with the American atomic bomb project, only military and scientific administrators—General Groves, Dr. Vannevar Bush, President Conant—were more reassuring. Overawed by the size and complexity of the industrial and organizational effort they were directing, they refused to believe that an industrially backward Soviet Union would be able to duplicate American achievement in less than fifteen to twenty years—if ever.

In the last two or three years, with American public opinion becoming increasingly skeptical about the capacities of the Soviet system, and with the news of "purges" indicating a worsening climate for scientific progress in the USSR, many American scientists have become more complacent about the probable rate of Soviet atomic development. What they have failed to take into account is the possibility that a politically powerful head of the Soviet atomic energy project—reputedly, the police boss Beria himself—could have very well kept this project completely protected from all interference by party-line hacks, such as have been permitted to play havoc with the development of biology in the Soviet Union.

The most authoritative forecast to be made public in the last two years—the report by the President's Air Policy Commission ("Finletter report")—has not succumbed to this complacency. Its conclusion that the Soviet Union might be expected to acquire a substantial number of atomic bombs—sufficient to require a complete change in American world strategy—by 1952 still appears reasonable, since three years is a reasonable time to allow from the first atomic explosion to the assembling of a substantial stockpile of bombs.

Thus, if the American military planners had followed the considered advice given by the atomic scientists in 1945 and 1946, and the advice of the President's Air Policy Commission, their timetable should not have been off by more than a year. If this were the whole measure of our present predicament, we would be well off indeed.

However, our difficulties are much more serious. We have not evolved a valid military and political answer to the Soviet acquisition of atomic bombs, not because we did not expect this contingency to arise for one or two more years, but because no planning for this emergency is possible along the conventional lines of national military and political thinking—military planning which sees security in the acquisition of a maximum amount of arms, ships, and trained men, and political thinking which looks for security to the acquisition of the greatest number of treaty-bound allies.

When in 1945 atomic scientists tried to look ahead, they saw first a brief period of American monopoly. Even during this period, they saw the fear of atomic war casting a dark shadow on international relations, increasing the mistrust between the rival political groups. Beyond the first period, they saw a period of open atomic arms race, forcing the two antagonists to increase their isolation from each other, to organize themselves into increasingly tightly regimented garrison states, and to push their bases for offense and defense as far away from their vital centers as possible. At the end of this period, they could see nothing but a sudden discharge of the accumulated tension in the storm of an atomic war.

As the only way to stop this ominous development in its tracks, they saw the establishment without delay of an international control of atomic energy. The scientists put all their hopes in this solution, not because they thought it to be easy or even probable, but because it seemed to them the only remedy capable of stopping the aggravation of the disease at an early stage. This idea has been accepted in principle by all nations—but it was not put into operation, mainly because the most revolutionary power proved to be also the most reactionary and unimaginative. The world has reached the end of the first period with the chances of international control dimmer than ever, and with the worst apprehensions about the deterioration of international relations fully confirmed.

There seems no reason to believe that the developments of the second period—that of an open atomic arms race—will not take the dreadful course anticipated since 1945. While we must do all we can to keep ahead in this race, we must continue looking for a large-scale imaginative political solution, which alone could stop the inexorable trend leading to atomic war. The conditions for renewed international control negotiations might not be better now than they were before, but they are sufficiently different to justify a complete review of the policy in this field, and an unprejudiced exploration of any new possibility which may offer itself.

The American middle-range policy of organizing and arming the Atlantic powers must likewise be reviewed. This policy was (and is) aimed at the creation of a defensive barrier—a "conventional" military force able to stop the advance of the Soviet Army across Europe, and so to protect the economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe. The American hope was to achieve this military balance of power on the continent of Europe before the Soviet Union acquired substantial atomic armament. It was tacitly assumed that if this aim were achieved in time, even the subsequent appearance of Soviet atomic arms would not upset the balance.

The creation of a conventional military force in Western Europe has since been initiated and has progressed in a somewhat leisurely, but not entirely unsatisfactory, manner. Probably it will be speeded up under the impact of the recent news. An Allied army may yet come into existence two or three years from now, capable of stemming the advance of Soviet armies in Western Europe; although, to achieve this result, a much more active American participation might prove to be needed than mere appropriations of money for arming French, British, Italian, Greek, or Turkish divisions. However, even assuming that a vigorous building up of the Atlantic Pact army will take place with the utmost dispatch (and will not provoke the Soviet Union into seeking an early military decision), can this be considered adequate political planning for ten or twenty years ahead?

The Soviet possession of atomic bombs will put extreme strain on the political stability of the Atlantic alliance. General de Gaulle, in his reaction to Truman's announcement, was quick to note that the value of the American alliance to France has dropped overnight with the revelation that the Soviet Union has atomic bombs. It might take time until realization of this change will become general, and the disrupting forces generated by the fear of Soviet bombs begin exercising their full power on the political developments in Western Europe. Communists and their willing or unwilling allies will undoubtedly use all their influence to fan the natural desire of the French, British, and Belgians to stay out at all costs, rather than to serve as "cushions" in atomic warfare between the U.S. and USSR.

The political disruption of the Atlantic community by the threat of Soviet atomic bombings may render the most expert and effective military planning of European defense illusory. This gloomy perspective must be analyzed without passion or prejudice. Different new departures in our long-range political planning can be considered: One is to prevent the disruption of the Atlantic alliance by an early conversion of its temporary and limited bonds into absolute, indissoluble bonds of a federal state.

Another way out—long advocated by Miss Dorothy Thompson in her column, and developed by Dr. Szilard in an article—is to dissolve the bonds of the Atlantic alliance and to create a truly neutral Western Europe, armed to defend its neutrality against all comers, including America, in the case of an U.S.-Soviet war.

We are not prepared to advocate here any one of these radical solutions; we merely mention them as examples of the type of radical new decisions in foreign policy which America may have to make to prevent collapse of its present policy of limited alliance. Satisfaction with the progress of our military planning in Europe (and Asia), no less than satisfaction with the progress of our atomic energy project, would be dangerous smugness at the moment when the distant rumbling of the first Soviet atom bomb shows the world well advanced toward the abyss of an atomic war.

A CASE FOR GRADUATED UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT

by

CHARLES E. OSGOOD

36

2233A

29

A Case for Graduated Unilateral Disengagement

Charles E. Osgood APRIL 1960

Today we are faced with the potentially lethal combination of nuclear weapons against which there is no defense and international tensions from which there seems to be no respite. Most Americans, and I believe most Russians as well, are fully aware of the dangers in the present course. Yet they feel impelled toward it with a certain inevitability. "We must learn to live with it," our newspapers tell us; editorials complain about the cost of military preparations, but conclude that "we must grin and pay it."

I will try to analyze some of the dynamics of human thinking which, paradoxically, are driving us in a direction we do not wish to go. The analysis leads to certain suggestions for policy. These are made in the broadest possible terms. I do not believe the academician is equipped with the information or experience needed to make detailed policy proposals in concrete situations. What he can do best is raise questions about the assumptions underlying policy, ask that they be reexamined rather than taken for granted, and offer what may be novel ways of viewing policy problems in the hope of contributing to the discovery of alternatives not previously believed to exist.

Criteria. If the long-term goals of a nation are not made explicit, decisions are likely to be made opportunistically in defense of the status quo. What has merely become habitual is easily seen as somehow natural and essential. What are our goals? What are we "fighting for?" To answer this question we must distinguish between two quite different wars and opponents. One is the "hot war" with Russia as a nation—a war in which we are in danger of becoming involved. Our long-term goal here is, quite simply, survival. This may be a rather ignoble value, but it is a necessary precondition for securing any other goals. The availability of nuclear weapons with awesome capacities for destruction, to say nothing about biological weapons, may not alter the nature of international conflict or its goals, but it certainly must change radically the weights we use in evaluating alternative strategies.

The other conflict is the "cold war" with communism and other totalitarian systems. This war goes on steadily in the minds of men, and it is fought as much within as across the borders of nations. Our long-term goal here is to preserve and extend our way of life. Stripped to its essential, this is a way of life in which the state is subservient to the individuals who compose it. The development of such a political philosophy, based on the dignity of individual human beings, was a most remarkable step along the path to becoming civilized; it was hard come by and is all too easily lost. Again, in the interest of short-term goals and in defense of the status quo, we have often lost sight of the fact that this way of life was itself a major socio-political revolution, and it is still under way.

There are, of course, many case-hardened statesmen and well-disciplined political theorists who will say that the underlying source of international tensions is still what it always has been—the struggle for power—and weapons, whether they be clubs or atomic warheads, are simply instruments for effecting a change in the balance of power. Although the manifest behaviors of nations may often conform to this Neanderthal conception of international relations, I think that the Neanderthalic bluster nearly always has masked a deeper anxiety. Today, perhaps more than ever before in world history, mutual insecurity rather than the struggle for power has become the underlying source of tension.

Current policy alternatives. Keeping in mind these two criteria—reducing the threat to our biological survival and maintaining our way of life—as well as sheer feasibility, we may now consider the major alternatives currently being discussed.

The decision to wage preventive war implies a sufficient lead in the armament race to minimize the possibility of punishing reprisal, and, since such a war must begin with a surprise attack, this decision must be reached by other than democratic procedures. Unfortunately, on both counts this strategy is much more available to Russia than to ourselves, particularly during the next critical decade. Even if we were to gain a sufficient lead, and an elite were to make the decision for us, this solution would not serve to maintain or extend our way of life—we would have to exhaust ourselves policing a hostile globe.

The backbone of our present policy is mutual deterrence through fear of retaliation. The underlying notion is that, with each side capable of destroying the other with massive retaliation, neither side will make the initial move, and a prolonged if uneasy "peace" can be maintained. This does not reduce the nuclear threat—indeed, it is this threat which, paradoxically, is supposed to guarantee peace. Quite to the contrary, it serves to generate an arms race, since the habitual response to external threat is to demand more and better armaments. I have come to the somber conclusion that we would not be able to maintain a favorable position in this race without giving up our way of life as rapidly as possible. Then we would be able to channel the energies of our people into military preparations, order our young people into training in the physical sciences, and make decisions and changes in strategy without democratic processes.

335

There are also three grave uncertainties to which the proponents of this policy haven't paid sufficient attention: one is the Nth country problem—international tension and instability will increase geometrically with the number of countries capable of mounting a nuclear attack. Another is the unpredictability of human behavior under stress—mutual deterrence assumes rationality on all sides, but as retaliation time reduces, decisionmaking must be dispersed over more and more (potentially unstable) people. Finally, there is the seldom-asked question—when and how does it end? Mutual deterrence contains no provisions for its own resolution.

The complete unwieldiness of massive retaliation as an instrument of everyday foreign policy has led us toward the limited war conception, e.g., the Kissinger Plan. The underlying notion here is that the threat of full-scale nuclear war will prevent nations from unleashing it, thereby allowing "war as usual" to be used as an instrument of policy. However appealing the idea of "gentlemanly war" may be to military men, it is inconceivable under present conditions, with whole populations involved in fighting and producing under the whip of mass communications. As to the idea that the very horror of nuclear war will prevent its occurrence, one wonders why this horror in times of relative peace hasn't led us promptly into agreements on nuclear disarmament. The proponents of limited war would ask us to literally flirt with the danger of all-out nuclear war with no more protection than fear itself.

The only problem with mutual disarmament—the ideal solution in all other respects—is the feasibility of successful negotiations when international tensions are running high. Under such conditions logic, which requires both sides to accept a course in which neither gains or loses, tends to be superseded by psycho-logic, which operates under the guidance of "one-upmanship" and pays more attention to the folks back home than the folks across the table. There are two psychological mechanisms particularly that work against successful negotiation. One is biased perceptions of what is equitable. In keeping with literally hundreds of experiments, both within the laboratory and outside of it, what is seen as fair, just, and balanced by the representatives of one nation (given its life history and present world view) is necessarily seen as somewhat unfair, unjust, and unbalanced by those of the other (with its quite different life history and world view). The other is the self-fulfilling prophecy. Each side predicts that the other will prove unreasonable and try to gain advantage in the "cold war," behaves according to its prediction, and then says, "I told you so!" when nothing comes of it. Mutual disarmament requires commitments prior to action. Commitments of any magnitude seem unlikely in the present atmosphere of fear and distrust, as the long and dismal history of unsuccessful negotiations testifies.

The essential irrationality and danger in our present course is apparent, yet we feel impelled along it. No one wants war in a nuclear age, yet no one seems able to avoid an inevitable spiraling toward it. Why should this be

336

so? What forces operate in times of controversy between human groups to push ordinary disagreement toward mutual destruction?

Foreshortened perspective. The more intelligent a species or individual, the greater the capacity for delay, foresight, and striving for remote goals. But emotion has the effect of primitivizing this capacity. The motivational conditions of controversy, e.g., our present tensions—arms-race dilemma, are precisely those designed to restrict our perspective. Taking the long view through space and time, we see that the events which today are shaking the very fabric of our lives are all transpiring on the knife-thin edge of a little pebble in the sky, and we realize that the organizations among men we call "nations" must come and go—this being as true for what we now call "Russia" and "The United States" as it was for Rome and Babylon. This is not said to minimize the seriousness of our present problems, or in any sense of defeatism but rather to emphasize different goals. A wide perspective makes it possible to substitute more remote goals for immediate ones.

Relativity of social judgment. "Man is the measure of all things," it has been said—but surely this is true only to the extent that his science is primitive. One can trace at least three stages in clear social thinking. At the most primitive level we unconsciously project our own frame of reference onto others; if Alter claims to be "straight" what to Ego is obviously "crooked," Alter must be lying, evil, or at least abnormal in some way. At the second stage we recognize the relativistic nature of Alter's frame of reference, but not our own; this produces a more humane approach toward social problems, a "forgive *them* for *they* know not what they do" attitude. At the third stage we realize the equally relativistic nature of our own frame of reference; this is the sensitive—not "ugly"—American who realizes that his own neutral points on clean-dirty, tasty-distasteful, or even moral-immoral scales of judgment are no more "natural" than those of the Mexican or Hindu. What this means is not that there are no external criteria for distinguishing good from bad, but rather that we must search for such criteria because social judgments are very liable to bias.

Emotional restriction of alternatives. Rational behavior requires understanding one's ultimate goals, weighing the consequences of alternative means to these goals, and then selecting among the alternatives in terms of their success probabilities. Many laboratory and field experiments, both with animals and humans, demonstrate that intense emotion causes a reduced awareness of alternatives—and if there is no awareness of the existence of certain alternatives, they cannot be weighed. Today nations are lumbering down the one habitual path to "security"—bigger and better armaments—gathering as they go tensions which make it less and less possible to see other alternatives. Being habitual, this course is assumed to be "realistic." Anthropologists are familiar with cultures that, through blind adherence to practices that once were realistic, have gradually committed suicide. I think we are in exactly the same spot. We are practicing rites and rituals of international relations that were developed in and appropriate to the past—firmly believing them to be realistic—in a present age that renders them suicidal.

Psycho-logic. Human thinking abhors incongruity. In striving to maintain internal consistency among one's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, the dictates of what may be called "psycho-logic" rather than logic are often followed—particularly when dealing with matters outside one's field of special competence. If we like Ike, and he praises some congressman from Timbuktu, then it is congruent for us to also feel favorably disposed toward this congressman, even though we know absolutely nothing else about him. If Khrushchev were to praise the sound ideas of some presidential "hopeful"—popularly known as the "kiss of death"—then, quite illogically, we might find ourselves a little suspicious of this candidate. It is psycho-logic rather than logic that leads people to conclude that Nehru must be pro-Communist because he insists on India's neutrality.

Psycho-logic runs rampant when we try to come to grips with problems of international conflict, and it is one of the main blocks to rational thinking in our present situation. It is the chief dynamism in the production of Bogey Man conceptions of the enemy. Given the belief that *we* are good, kind, fair, and so on—a necessary and generally valid assumption—and the logical opposition between *We* and *They*, between *Friend* and *Enemy*, psycho-logic dictates that the enemy must be bad, cruel, unfair, and so on. The failure of the Russians to see eye to eye with us on many issues, their purges, their atheism, and so on, support and strengthen the Bogey Man conception, which in turn serves to explain their un-American and anti-American behaviors. We know that we would not take advantage of a defenseless people if they were to lay down their weapons, but we are certain that they would leap to destroy us in similar circumstances.

Many recent travelers to Russia, including statesmen and scholars, have been impressed by the "mirror image" of our attitudes that they find among the people and leaders there. "Why do you Americans want war?" our informal ambassadors are asked. And when they answer that we most certainly do not want war, the Russians ask, "Then why do your leaders prepare for war? Why do they ring us about with missile bases?" When our travelers ask them why they maintain a great army and are building up nuclear weapons for long-range attack, they reply, of course, that we leave them no choice. I believe that we must accept these protestations of good faith as genuine. They blame their aggressive behavior on us just as we blame ours on them.

I'm sure it would be unrealistic to completely discount real differences between the Russians and ourselves—for example, those concerning the value of the individual which stem from our ideological conflict. But I am equally sure that this bogey has been overdrawn in the workings of our own mental dynamics—particularly by those who fail to draw any distinction between Soviet Communism and German Nazism. The Soviet bogey can be cut down to a more realistic size and shape.

Most of the discussion of policy in a nuclear age has been framed in technological terms and carried on more by physicists and engineers than by social scientists. But nuclear technology merely exaggerates the problem; it neither explains our difficulties nor offers any real solutions. In the last analysis, it is certainly true that today we are plagued with problems of human nature and human relationships. Our understanding and control of the physical world has far outstripped our understanding of and ability to control ourselves. The present generation is faced with the consequence of this unbalance.

Requirements for solution of the policy problem. In search for a long-term solution, we must first ask ourselves this: what are the conditions that support the communist (or any other totalitarian) way of life as against our own way? Here I will merely list some of these conditions. *Economic scarcity:* When people exist near a bare subsistence level, little energy is left over for the development of those uniquenesses which make people important as individual human beings. *Social inequality:* Totalitarian systems display gross inequalities in civil, political, and social rights, based on the distribution of power if nothing else. *Educational deficiency.* Limited or biased education prevents people from acquiring the tools needed to better their state. *Information restriction:* The free flow of communication, both within and across national boundaries and both among individuals and via the mass media, provides the diversity of viewpoints in which lies the vitality of the democratic system and the freedom of choice people need to govern themselves. Such freedom is the anathema of totalitarianism. *External threat:* Threat from outside the group impels people to accept subservience to the state and to forego individual freedoms, in the interest of what they perceive as the common goal—namely, survival. This is admittedly an incomplete list, but it will serve to set the problem.

Secondly, we must ask ourselves: how can these conditions be changed within the existing set-up of competing sovereign states? When scientists, working on their own much smaller-scale problems, want to change something, they operate on the conditions which produce the phenomenon. In our present, infinitely larger-scale problem we would like to so modify the background conditions in communist and other states as to foster and support a more democratic way of life. But the world situation today is one of extremely high mutual threat perception between two coalitions of essentially sovereign states. It is a bipolar power situation aggravated by a fundamental ideological conflict. This situation has led to intense security measures, and both sides have erected "iron curtains" through which only carefully metered driblets of information can pass.

I therefore see rational policy as requiring two phases. *Phase I—reversal* *of the tensions–arms-race spiral.* Before any other policies can be employed effectively, mutual threat perception must be reduced to a level where the arms race can be halted and put in reverse. Not only is this necessary to escape from the very real danger of mutual annihilation, but it is also the only sure way to dissolve the "iron curtains" that hamper the use of other strategies. *Phase II—maintaining the peace.* It is my contention that our way of life flourishes in peacetime and the totalitarian way in wartime. If I am right, then anything that continues the peace works in our favor.

It is obvious that many of the conditions that support the communist way of life—economic scarcity, social inequality, educational deficiency, and information restriction—cannot be directly manipulated through the "iron curtains" that separate East and West. (But the Russians have been doing a very good job of modifying these conditions, and in so doing have been modifying themselves—whether they know it or not.) On the other hand, we can manipulate the condition of external threat. This is at least partly under our control, because we ourselves, in our words and actions, contribute to the level of threat which the Russians perceive. We can behave so as to raise this threat or so as to lower it; we can change it abruptly or in gradual stages. Solution of the critical, but very sensitive and difficult, Phase I—reversal of the tensions–arms-race spiral—hinges on our intelligent manipulation of the condition of external threat.

Assumptions underlying graduated unilateral disengagement. I use the term disengagement (rather than disarmament) to emphasize the fact that we are considering a much wider range of acts than the term "disarmament" implies. This policy is based on the assumption that the Russian people and leaders are sufficiently like us to accept an unambiguous opportunity to reduce the probability of mutual nuclear destruction. It also assumes that the Russian leaders are susceptible to moral pressures, both from without and from within—since such pressures are an index of the success or failure of their system. It assumes that—unlike mutual negotiations that can easily be twisted into cold war propaganda—unilateral *acts* of a tension-reducing nature are relatively unambiguous. It assumes that each unilateral act which is reciprocated makes the next such sequence easier to accomplish. Finally, it assumes that the Communists are as convinced that their way of life will win out in nonmilitary competition for men's minds as we are (or should be) that ours will.

Nature of this policy. To be maximally effective in inducing an enemy to reciprocate, a unilateral act: (1) should, in terms of capacity for military aggression, be clearly disadvantageous to the side making it; (2) should be such as to be clearly perceived by the other side as reducing his external threat; (3) should not increase an enemy's threat to our heartland; (4) should be such that reciprocal action by the other side is clearly available and clearly indicated; (5) should be announced in advance and widely publicized to ally, neutral, and enemy countries—as regards the nature of the act, its purpose as part of a consistent policy, and the expected reciprocation; (6) but should not demand prior commitment to reciprocation by the other side as a condition for its commission.

The initial acts of unilateral disengagement would be small in magnitude of risk, should they not be reciprocated, but would increase in magnitude of risk potential as reciprocations were obtained. The initial series of unilateral acts would be designed to be cumulative in their tension-reducing effect upon the enemy, but noncumulative in their effect upon our capacity to deliver massive retaliation should this policy fail—that is, the acts would not be such as to weaken us progressively in the same area, or in the "survival" area at all.

Note the essential differences between this policy and Kissinger's "limited war" proposal: although both policies rely upon the capacity for massive retaliation as a psychological buffer, "limited war" would use nuclear deterrence as the support for tension-*increasing* acts ("war as usual") whereas "graduated unilateral disengagement" would use nuclear deterrence as the support for tension-*reducing* acts. Furthermore, where the policy I am proposing holds out some hope for ultimate elimination of the massive nuclear deterrent itself, the Kissinger Plan offers no such hope.

I am not going to try to indicate what the precise nature of such a series of graduated unilateral acts should be. Their selection, ordering, and timing demands a great deal of information which only people in government have. Also, alternative acts must be available at each stage—one to be made if the Russians have reciprocated (larger step) and another to be used if they have not (smaller step). However, I am sure that if we put even a small part of the total energy we are now pouring into weapons production into an intensive study of the possibilities for unilateral actions, effective programs could be devised. American man and Russian man have been moving out *against* each other along a narrow and teetering seesaw, each trying to match every aggressive step by the other with an outward step of his own, in order to maintain the unstable balance. It is equally possible for them to move gradually *toward* each other, step by step, until they meet at the middle and the danger is past. In sum, what I am proposing is a "primer" to initiate a reversal in the tensions-arms race dilemma.

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR

by

ALBERT WOHLSTETTER

37

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THE first shock administered by the Soviet launching of sputnik has almost dissipated. The flurry of statements and investigations and improvised responses has died down, leaving a small residue: a slight increase in the schedule of bomber and ballistic missile production, with a resulting small increment in our defense expenditures for the current fiscal year; a considerable enthusiasm for space travel; and some stirrings of interest in the teaching of mathematics and physics in the secondary schools. Western defense policy has almost returned to the level of activity and the emphasis suited to the basic assumptions which were controlling before sputnik.

One of the most important of these assumptions—that a general thermonuclear war is extremely unlikely—is held in common by most of the critics of our defense policy as well as by its proponents. Because of its crucial rôle in the Western strategy of defense, I should like to examine the stability of the thermonuclear balance which, it is generally supposed, would make aggression irrational or even insane. The balance, I believe, is in fact precarious, and this fact has critical implications for policy. Deterrence in the 1960s is neither assured nor impossible but will be the product of sustained intelligent effort and hard choices, responsibly made. As a major illustration important both for defense and foreign policy, I shall treat the particularly stringent conditions for deterrence which affect forces based close to the enemy, whether they are U.S. forces or those of our allies, under single or joint control. I shall comment also on the inadequacy as well as the necessity of deterrence, on the problem of accidental outbreak of war, and on disarmament.[1]

II. THE PRESUMED AUTOMATIC BALANCE

I emphasize that requirements for deterrence are stringent. We have heard so much about the atomic stalemate and the receding probability of war which it has produced that this may strike the reader as something of an exaggeration. Is deterrence a necessary consequence of both sides having a nuclear delivery capability, and is all-out war nearly obsolete? Is mutual extinction the only outcome of a general war? This belief, frequently expressed by references to Mr. Oppenheimer's simile of the two scorpions in a bottle, is perhaps the prevalent one. It is held by a very eminent and diverse group of people—in England by Sir Winston Churchill, P. M. S. Blackett, Sir John Slessor, Admiral Buzzard and many others; in France by such figures as Raymond Aron, General Gallois and General Gazin; in this country by the titular heads of both parties as well as almost all writers on military and foreign affairs, by both Henry Kissinger and his critic, James E. King, Jr., and by George Kennan as well as Dean Acheson. Mr. Kennan refers to American concern about surprise attack as simply obsessive;[2] and many people have drawn the consequence of the stalemate as has Blackett, who states: "If it is in fact true, as most current opinion holds, that strategic air power has abolished global war, then an urgent problem for the West is to assess how little effort must be put into it to keep global war abolished."[3] If peace were founded firmly on mutual terror, and mutual terror on symmetrical nuclear capabilities, this would be, as Churchill has said, "a melancholy paradox;" none the less a most comforting one.

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[1] I want to thank C. J. Hitch, M. W. Hoag, W. W. Kaufmann, A. W. Marshall, H. S. Rowen and W. W. Taylor for suggestions in preparation of this article.

Deterrence, however, is not automatic. While feasible, it will be much harder to achieve in the 1960s than is generally believed. One of the most disturbing features of current opinion is the underestimation of this difficulty. This is due partly to a misconstruction of the technological race as a problem in matching striking forces, partly to a wishful analysis of the Soviet ability to strike first.

Since sputnik, the United States has made several moves to assure the world (that is, the enemy, but more especially our allies and ourselves) that we will match or overmatch Soviet technology and, specifically, Soviet offense technology. We have, for example, accelerated the bomber and ballistic missile programs, in particular the intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The problem has been conceived as more or better bombers—or rockets; or sputniks; or engineers. This has meant confusing deterrence with matching or exceeding the enemy's ability to strike first. Matching weapons, however, misconstrues the nature of the technological race. Not, as is frequently said, because only a few bombs owned by the defender can make aggression fruitless, but because even many might not. One outmoded A-bomb dropped from an obsolete bomber might destroy a great many supersonic jets and ballistic missiles. To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second. In the last year or two there has been a growing awareness of the importance of the distinction between a "strike-first" and a "strike-second" capability, but little, if any, recognition of the implications of this distinction for the balance of terror theory.

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[2] George F. Kennan, "A Chance to Withdraw Our Troops in Europe," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1958, p. 41.

[3] P. M. S. Blackett, "Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations" (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 32.

Where the published writings have not simply underestimated Soviet capabilities and the advantages of a first strike, they have in general placed artificial constraints on the Soviet use of the capabilities attributed to them. They assume, for example, that the enemy will attack in mass over the Arctic through our Distant Early Warning line, with bombers refueled over Canada—all resulting in plenty of warning. Most hopefully, it is sometimes assumed that such attacks will be preceded by days of visible preparations for moving ground troops. Such assumptions suggest that the Soviet leaders will be rather bumbling or, better, coöperative. However attractive it may be for us to narrow Soviet alternatives to these, they would be low in the order of preference of any reasonable Russians planning war.

III. THE QUANTITATIVE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE UNCERTAINTIES

In treating Soviet strategies it is important to consider Soviet rather than Western advantage and to consider the strategy of both sides quantitatively. The effectiveness of our own choices will depend on a most complex numerical interaction of Soviet and Western plans. Unfortunately, both the privileged and unprivileged information on these matters is precarious. As a result, competent people have been led into critical error in evaluating the prospects for deterrence. Western journalists have greatly overestimated the difficulties of a Soviet surprise attack with thermonuclear weapons and vastly underestimated the complexity of the Western problem of retaliation.

One intelligent commentator, Richard Rovere, recently expressed the common view: "If the Russians had ten thousand warheads and a missile for each, and we had ten hydrogen bombs and ten obsolete bombers, . . . aggression would still be a folly that would appeal only to an insane adventurer." Mr. Rovere's example is plausible because it assumes implicitly that the defender's hydrogen bombs will with certainty be visited on the aggressor; then the damage done by the ten bombs seems terrible enough for deterrence, and any more would be simply redundant. This is the basis for the common view. The example raises questions, even assuming the delivery of the ten weapons. For instance, the targets aimed at in retaliation might be sheltered and a quite modest civil defense could hold within tolerable limits the damage done to such city targets by ten delivered bombs. But the essential point is that the weapons would not be very likely to reach their targets. Even if the bombers were dispersed at ten different points, and protected by shelters so blast resistant as to stand up anywhere outside the lip of the bomb crater—even inside the fire ball itself—the chances of one of these bombers surviving the huge attack directed at it would be on the order of one in a million. (This calculation takes account of the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile.) And the damage done by the small minority of these ten planes that might be in the air at the time of the attack, armed and ready to run the gauntlet of an alert air defense system, if not zero, would be very small indeed compared to damage that Russia has suffered in the past. For Mr. Rovere, like many other writers on this subject, numerical superiority is not important at all.

For Joseph Alsop, on the other hand, it is important, but the superiority is on our side. Mr. Alsop recently enunciated as one of the four rules of nuclear war: "The aggressor's problem is astronomically difficult; and the aggressor requires an overwhelming superiority of force."[4] There are, he believes, no fewer than 400 SAC bases in the NATO nations alone and many more elsewhere, all of which would have to be attacked in a very short space of time. The "thousands of coördinated air sorties and/or missile firings," he concludes, are not feasible. Mr. Alsop's argument is numerical and has the virtue of demonstrating that at least the relative numbers are important. But the numbers he uses are very wide of the mark. He overestimates the number of such bases by a factor of more than ten,[5] and in any case, missile firings on the scale of a thousand or more involve costs that are by no means out of proportion, given the strategic budgets of the

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[4] Joseph Alsop, "The New Balance of Power," *Encounter*, May 1958, p. 4. It should be added that, since these lines were written, Mr. Alsop's views have altered.

[5] *The New York Times*, September 6, 1958, p. 2.

great powers. Whether or not thousands are needed depends on the yield and the accuracy of the enemy missiles, something about which it would be a great mistake for us to display confidence.

Perhaps the first step in dispelling the nearly universal optimism about the stability of deterrence would be to recognize the difficulties in analyzing the uncertainties and interactions between our own wide range of choices and the moves open to the Soviets. On our side we must consider an enormous variety of strategic weapons which might compose our force, and for each of these several alternative methods of basing and operation. These are the choices that determine whether a weapons system will have any genuine capability in the realistic circumstances of a war. Besides the B-47E and the B-52 bombers which are in the United States strategic force now, alternatives will include the B-52G (a longer-range version of the B-52); the Mach 2 B-58A bomber and a "growth" version of it; the Mach 3 B-70 bomber; a nuclear-powered bomber possibly carrying long-range air-to-surface missiles; the Dynasoar, a manned glide-rocket; the Thor and the Jupiter, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the Snark intercontinental cruise missile; the Atlas and the Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles; the submarine-launched Polaris and Atlantis rockets; and Minuteman, one potential solid-fueled successor to the Thor and Titan; possibly unmanned bombardment satellites; and many others which are not yet gleams in anyone's eye and some that are just that.

The difficulty of describing in a brief article the best mixture of weapons for the long-term future beginning in 1960, their base requirements, their potentiality for stabilizing or upsetting the balance among the great powers, and their implications for the alliance, is not just a matter of space or the constraint of security. The difficulty in fact stems from some rather basic insecurities. These matters are wildly uncertain; we are talking about weapons and vehicles that are some time off and, even if the precise performances currently hoped for and claimed by contractors were in the public domain, it would be a good idea to doubt them.

Recently some of my colleagues picked their way through the graveyard of early claims about various missiles and aircraft: their dates of availability, costs and performance. These claims are seldom revisited or talked about: *de mortuis nil nisi bonum.* The errors were large and almost always in one direction. And the less we knew, the more hopeful we were. Accordingly the missiles benefited in particular. For example, the estimated cost of one missile increased by a factor of over 50—from about $35,000 in 1949 to some $2 million in 1957. This uncertainty is critical. Some but not all of the systems listed can be chosen and the problem of choice is essentially quantitative. The complexities of the problem, if they were more widely understood, would discourage the oracular confidence of writers on the subject of deterrence.

Some of the complexities can be suggested by referring to the successive obstacles to be hurdled by any system providing a capability to strike second, that is, to strike back. Such deterrent systems must have (a) a stable, "steady-state" peacetime operation within feasible budgets (besides the logistic and operational costs there are, for example, problems of false alarms and accidents). They must have also the ability (b) to survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their mission, (e) to penetrate enemy active defenses, that is, fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (f) to destroy the target in spite of any "passive" civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself.

Within limits the enemy is free to use his offensive and defensive forces so as to exploit the weaknesses of each of our systems. He will also be free, within limits, in the 1960s to choose that composition of forces which will make life as difficult as possible for the various systems we might select. It would be quite wrong to assume that we have the same degree of flexibility or that the uncertainties I have described affect a totalitarian aggressor and the party attacked equally. A totalitarian country can preserve secrecy about the capabilities and disposition of his forces very much better than a Western democracy. And the aggressor has, among other enormous advantages of the first strike, the ability to weigh continually our performance at each of the six barriers and to choose that precise time and circumstance for attack which will reduce uncertainty. It is important not to confuse our uncertainty with his. Strangely enough, some military commentators have not made this distinction and have founded their certainty of deterrence on the fact simply that there are uncertainties.

Unwarranted optimism is displayed not only in the writings of journalists but in the more analytic writings of professionals. The recent writings of General Gallois[*] parallel rather closely

[*] General Pierre M. Gallois, "A French General Analyzes Nuclear-Age Strategy," *Réalités*, Nov. 1958, p. 19; "Nuclear Aggression and National Suicide," *The Reporter*, Sept. 18, 1958, p. 23.

Mr. Alsop's faulty numerical proof that surprise attack is astronomically difficult—except that Gallois' "simple arithmetic," to borrow his own phrase, turns essentially on some assumptions which are at once inexplicit and extremely optimistic with respect to the blast resistance of dispersed missile sites subjected to attack from relatively close range.[7] Mr. Blackett's recent book, "Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations," illustrates the hazards confronting a most able analyst in dealing with the piecemeal information available to the general public. Mr. Blackett, a Nobel prize-winning physicist with wartime experience in military operations research, lucidly summarized the public information available when he was writing in 1956 on weapons for all-out war. But much of his analysis was based on the assumption that H-bombs could not be made small enough to be carried in an intercontinental missile. It is now widely known that intercontinental ballistic missiles will have hydrogen warheads, and this fact, a secret at the time, invalidates Mr. Blackett's calculations and, I might say, much of his optimism on the stability of the balance of terror. In sum, one of the serious obstacles to any widespread rational judgment on these matters of high policy is that critical elements of the problem *have* to be protected by secrecy. However, some of the principal conclusions about deterrence in the early 1960s can be fairly firmly based, and based on public information.

IV. THE DELICACY OF THE BALANCE OF TERROR

The most important conclusion is that we must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack which the Soviets can deliver with little warning, and the growth of a significant Russian capability for an essentially warningless attack. As a result, strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960s, we may not have the power to deter attack. Whether we have it or not will depend on some difficult strategic choices as to the future composition of the deterrent forces as well as hard choices on its basing, operations and defense.

Manned bombers will continue to make up the predominant part of our striking force in the early 1960s. None of the popular remedies for their defense will suffice—not, for example, mere increase of alertness (which will be offset by the Soviet's increasing capability for attack without significant warning), nor simple dispersal or sheltering alone or mobility taken by itself, nor a mere piling up of interceptors and defense missiles around SAC bases. Especially extravagant expectations have been placed on the airborne alert—an extreme form of defense by mobility. The impression is rather widespread that one-third of the SAC bombers are in the air and ready for combat at all times.[*] This belief is belied by the public record. According to the Symington Committee Hearings in 1956, our bombers averaged 31 hours of flying per month, which is about 4 percent of the average 732-hour month. An Air Force representative expressed the hope that within a couple of years, with an increase in the ratio of crews to aircraft, the bombers would reach 45 hours of flight per month—which is 6 percent. This 4 to 6 percent of the force includes bombers partially fueled and without bombs. It is, moreover, only an average, admitting variance down as well as up. Some increase in the number of armed bombers aloft is to be expected. However, for the current generation of bombers, which have been designed for speed and range rather than endurance, a continuous air patrol for one-third of the force would be extremely expensive.

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[7] See footnote, p. 228.

On the other hand, it would be unwise to look for miracles in the new weapons systems, which by the mid-1960s may constitute a considerable portion of the United States force. After the Thor, Atlas and Titan there are a number of promising developments. The solid-fueled rockets, Minuteman and Polaris, promise in particular to be extremely significant components of the deterrent force. Today they are being touted as making the problem of deterrence easy to solve and, in fact, guaranteeing its solution. But none of the new developments in vehicles is likely to do that. For the complex job of deterrence, they all have limitations. The unvaryingly immoderate claims for each new weapons system should make us wary of the latest "technological breakthroughs." Only a very short time ago the ballistic missile itself was supposed to be intrinsically invulnerable on the ground. It is now more generally understood that its survival is likely to depend on a variety of choices in its defense.

It is hard to talk with confidence about the mid and late-1960s. A systematic study of an optimal or a good deterrent force which considered all the major factors affecting choice and dealt adequately with the uncertainties would be a formidable task. In lieu of this, I shall mention briefly why none of the many systems available or projected dominates the others in any obvious way. My comments will take the form of a swift run-through of the characteristic advantages and disadvantages of various strategic systems at each of the six successive hurdles mentioned earlier.

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[*] See, for example, "NATO, A Critical Appraisal," by Gardner Patterson and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Princeton University Conference on NATO, Princeton, June 1957, p. 32: "Although no one pretended to know, the hypothesis that one-third of the striking force of the United States Strategic Air Command was in the air at all times was regarded by most as reasonable."

The first hurdle to be surmounted is the attainment of a stable, steady-state peacetime operation. Systems which depend for their survival on extreme decentralization of controls, as may be the case with large-scale dispersal and some of the mobile weapons, raise problems of accidents and over a long period of peacetime operation this leads in turn to serious political problems. Systems relying on extensive movement by land, perhaps by truck caravan, are an obvious example; the introduction of these on European roads, as is sometimes suggested, would raise grave questions for the governments of some of our allies. Any extensive increase in the armed air alert will increase the hazard of accident and intensify the concern already expressed among our allies. Some of the proposals for bombardment satellites may involve such hazards of unintended bomb release as to make them out of the question.

The cost to buy and operate various weapons systems must be seriously considered. Some systems buy their ability to negotiate a given hurdle—say, surviving the enemy attack—only at prohibitive cost. Then the number that can be bought out of a given budget will be small and this will affect the relative performance of competing systems at various other hurdles, for example penetrating enemy defenses. Some of the relevant cost comparisons, then, are between competing systems; others concern the extra costs to the enemy of canceling an additional expenditure of our own. For example, some dispersal is essential, though usually it is expensive; if the dispersed bases are within a warning net, dispersal can help to provide warning against some sorts of attack, since it forces the attacker to increase the size of his raid and so makes it more liable to detection as well as somewhat harder to coördinate. But as the sole or principal defense of our offensive force, dispersal has only a brief useful life and can be justified financially only up to a point. For against our costs of construction, maintenance and operation of an additional base must be set the enemy's much lower costs of delivering one extra weapon. And, in general, any feasible degree of dispersal leaves a considerable concentration of value at a single target point. For example, a squadron of heavy bombers costing, with their associated tankers and penetration aids, perhaps $500,000,000 over five years, might be eliminated, if it were otherwise unprotected, by an enemy intercontinental ballistic missile costing perhaps $16,000,000. After making allowance for the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile, this means a ratio of some ten for one or better. To achieve safety by *brute* numbers in so unfavorable a competition is not likely to be viable economically or politically. However, a viable peacetime operation is only the first hurdle to be surmounted.

At the second hurdle—surviving the enemy offense—ground alert systems placed deep within a warning net look good against a manned bomber attack, much less good against intercontinental ballistic missiles, and not good at all against ballistic missiles launched from the sea. In the last case, systems such as the Minuteman, which may be sheltered and dispersed as well as alert, would do well. Systems involving launching platforms which are mobile and concealed, such as Polaris submarines, have particular advantage for surviving an enemy offense.

However, there is a third hurdle to be surmounted—namely that of making the decision to retaliate and communicating it. Here, Polaris, the combat air patrol of B-52s, and in fact all of the mobile platforms—under water, on the surface, in the air and above the air—have severe problems. Long distance communication may be jammed and, most important, communication centers may be destroyed.

At the fourth hurdle—ability to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete the mission—several of our short-legged systems have operational problems such as coördination with tankers and using bases close to the enemy. For a good many years to come, up to the mid-1960s in fact, this will be a formidable hurdle for the greater part of our deterrent force. The next section of this article deals with this problem at some length.

The fifth hurdle is the aggressor's long-range interceptors and close-in missile defenses. To get past these might require large numbers of planes and missiles. (If the high cost of overcoming an earlier obstacle—using extreme dispersal or airborne alert or the like—limits the number of planes or missiles bought, our capability is likely to be penalized disproportionately here.) Or getting through may involve carrying heavy loads of radar decoys, electronic jammers and other aids to defense penetration. For example, vehicles like Minuteman and Polaris, which were made small to facilitate dispersal or mobility, may suffer here because they can carry fewer penetration aids.

At the final hurdle—destroying the target in spite of the passive defenses that may protect it—low-payload and low-accuracy systems, such as Minuteman and Polaris, may be frustrated by blast-resistant shelters. For example, five half-megaton weapons with an average inaccuracy of two miles might be expected to destroy half the population of a city of 900,000, spread over 40 square miles, provided the inhabitants are without shelters. But if they are provided with shelters capable of resisting over-pressures of 100 pounds per square inch, approximately 60 such weapons would be required; and deep rock shelters might force the total up to over a thousand.

Prizes for a retaliatory capability are not distributed for getting over one of these jumps. A system must get over all six. I hope these illustrations will suggest that assuring ourselves the power to strike back after a massive thermonuclear surprise attack is by no means as automatic as is widely believed.

In counteracting the general optimism as to the ease and, in fact, the inevitability of deterrence, I should like to avoid creating the extreme opposite impression. Deterrence demands hard, continuing, intelligent work, but it can be achieved. The job of deterring rational attack by guaranteeing great damage to an aggressor is, for example, very much less difficult than erecting a nearly airtight defense of cities in the face of full-scale thermonuclear surprise attack. Protecting manned bombers and missiles is much easier because they may be dispersed, sheltered or kept mobile, and they can respond to warning with greater speed. Mixtures of these and other defenses with complementary strengths can preserve a powerful remainder after attack. Obviously not all our bombers and missiles need to survive in order to fulfill their mission. To preserve the majority of our cities intact in the face of surprise attack is immensely more difficult, if not impossible. (This does not mean that the aggressor has the same problem in preserving his cities from retaliation by a poorly-protected, badly-damaged force. And it does not mean that *we* should not do more to limit the extent of the catastrophe to our cities in case deterrence fails. I believe we should.) Deterrence, however, provided we work at it, is feasible, and, what is more, it is a crucial objective of national policy.

What can be said, then, as to whether general war is unlikely? Would not a general thermonuclear war mean "extinction" for the aggressor as well as the defender? "Extinction" is a state that badly needs analysis. Russian casualties in World War II were more than 20,000,000. Yet Russia recovered extremely well from this catastrophe. There are several quite plausible circumstances in the future when the Russians might be quite confident of being able to limit damage to considerably less than this number—if they make sensible strategic choices and we do not. On the other hand, the risks of not striking might at some juncture appear very great to the Soviets, involving, for example, disastrous defeat in peripheral war, loss of key satellites with danger of revolt spreading—possibly to Russia itself—or fear of an attack by ourselves. Then, striking first, by surprise, would be the sensible choice for them, and from their point of view the smaller risk.

It should be clear that it is not fruitful to talk about the likelihood of general war without specifying the range of alternatives that are pressing on the aggressor and the strategic postures of both the Soviet bloc and the West. Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. The balance is not automatic. First, since thermonuclear weapons give an enormous advantage to the aggressor, it takes great ingenuity and realism at any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium. And second, this technology itself is changing with fantastic speed. Deterrence will require an urgent and continuing effort.

V. THE USES AND RISKS OF BASES CLOSE TO THE SOVIETS

It may now be useful to focus attention on the special problems of deterrent forces close to the Soviet Union. First, overseas areas have played an important rôle in the past and have a continuing though less certain rôle today. Second, the recent acceleration of production of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and the negotiation of agreements with various NATO powers for their basing and operation have given our overseas bases a renewed importance in deterring attack on the United States—or so it would appear at first blush. Third, an analysis can throw some light on the problems faced by our allies in developing an independent ability to deter all-out attack on themselves, and in this way it can clarify the much agitated question of nuclear sharing. Finally, overseas bases affect in many critical ways, political and economic as well as military, the status of the alliance.

At the end of the last decade, overseas bases appeared to be an advantageous means of achieving the radius extension needed by our short-legged bombers, of permitting them to use several axes of attack, and of increasing the number of sorties possible in the course of an extended campaign. With the growth of our own thermonuclear stockpile, it became apparent that a long campaign involving many re-uses of a large proportion of our bombers was not likely to be necessary. With the growth of a Russian nuclear-delivery capability, it became clear that this was most unlikely to be feasible.

Our overseas bases now have the disadvantage of high vulnerability. Because they are closer than the United States to the Soviet Union, they are subject to a vastly greater attack by a larger variety as well as number of vehicles. With given resources, the Soviets might deliver on nearby bases a freight of bombs with something like 50 to 100 times the yield that they could muster at intercontinental range. Missile accuracy would more than double. Because there is not much space for obtaining warning—in any case, there are no deep-warning radar nets—and, since most of our overseas bases are close to deep water from which submarines might launch missiles, the warning problem is very much more severe than for bases in the interior of the United States.

As a result, early in the 1950s the U.S. Air Force decided to recall many of our bombers to the continental United States and to use the overseas bases chiefly for refueling, particularly post-strike ground refueling. This reduced drastically the vulnerability of U.S. bombers and at the same time retained many of the advantages of overseas operation. For some years now SAC has been reducing the number of aircraft usually deployed overseas. The purpose is to reduce vulnerability and has little to do with any increasing radius of SAC aircraft. The early B-52 radius is roughly that of the B-36; the B-47, roughly that of the B-50 or B-29. In fact the radius limitation and therefore the basing requirements we have discussed will not change substantially for some time to come. We can talk with comparative confidence here, because the U.S. strategic force is itself largely determined for this period. Such a force changes more slowly than is generally realized. The vast majority of the force will consist of manned bombers, and most of these will be of medium range. *Some* U.S. bombers will be able to reach *some* targets from *some* U.S. bases within the 48 states without landing on the way back. On the other hand, some bomber-target combinations are not feasible without pre-target landing (and are therefore doubtful). The Atlas, Titan and Polaris rockets, when available, can of course do without overseas bases (though the proportion of Polaris submarines kept at sea can be made larger by the use of submarine tenders based overseas). But even with the projected force of aerial tankers, the greater part of our force, which will be manned bombers, cannot be used at all in attacks on the Soviet Union without at least some use of overseas areas.

What of the bases for Thor and Jupiter, our first intermediate-range ballistic missiles? These have to be close to the enemy, and they must of course be operating bases, not merely refueling stations. The Thors and Jupiters will be continuously in range of an enormous Soviet potential for surprise attack. These installations therefore re-open, in a most acute form, some of the serious questions of ground vulnerability that were raised about six years ago in connection with our overseas bomber bases. The decision to station the Thor and Jupiter missiles overseas has been our principal public response to the Russian advances in rocketry, and perhaps our most plausible response. Because it involves our ballistic missiles it appears directly to answer the Russian rockets. Because it involves using European bases, it appears to make up for the range superiority of the Russian intercontinental missile. And most important, it directly involves the NATO powers and gives them an element of control.

There is no question that it was genuinely urgent not only to meet the Russian threat but to do so visibly, in order to save the loosening NATO alliance. Our allies were fearful that the Soviet ballistic missiles might mean that we were no longer able or willing to retaliate against the Soviet Union in case of an attack on them. We hastened to make public a reaction which would restore their confidence. This move surely appears to increase our own power to strike back, and also to give our allies a deterrent of their own, independent of our decision. It has also been argued that in this respect it merely advances the inevitable date at which our allies will acquire "modern" weapons of their own, and that it widens the range of Soviet challenges which Europe can meet. But we must face seriously the question whether this move will in fact assure either the ability to retaliate or the decision to attempt it, on the part of our allies or ourselves. And we should ask at the

355

very least whether further expansion of this policy will buy as much retaliatory power as other ways of spending the considerable sums involved. Finally, it is important to be clear whether the Thor and Jupiter actually increase the flexibility or range of response available to our allies.

One justification for this move is that it disperses retaliatory weapons and that this is the most effective sanction against the thermonuclear aggressor. The limitations of dispersal have already been discussed, but it remains to examine the argument that overseas bases provide *widespread* dispersal, which imposes on the aggressor insoluble problems of coördination.

There is of course something in the notion that forcing the enemy to attack many political entities increases the seriousness of his decision, but there is very little in the notion that dispersal in several countries makes the problem of destruction more difficult in the military sense. Dispersal does not require separation by the distance of oceans—just by the lethal diameters of enemy bombs. And the task of coördinating bomber attacks on Europe and the eastern coast of the United States, say, is not appreciably more difficult than coördinating attacks on our east and west coasts. In the case of ballistic missiles, the elapsed time from firing to impact on the target can be calculated with high accuracy. Although there will be some failures and delays, times of firing can be arranged so that impact on many dispersed points is almost simultaneous—on Okinawa and the United Kingdom, for instance, as well as on California and Ohio. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that these far-flung bases, while distant from each other and from the United States, are on the whole close to the enemy. To eliminate them, therefore, requires a smaller expenditure of resources on his part than targets at intercontinental range. For close-in targets he can use a wider variety of weapons carrying larger payloads and with higher accuracy.

The seeming appositeness of an overseas-based Thor and Jupiter as an answer to a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile stems not so much from any careful analysis of their retaliatory power under attack as from the directness of the comparison they suggest: a rocket equals a rocket, an intercontinental missile equals an intermediate-range missile based at closer range to the target. But this again mistakes the nature of the technological race. It conceives the problem of deterrence as that of simply matching or exceeding the aggressor's capability to strike first.

A surprising proportion of the debate on defense policy has betrayed this confusion. Matching technological developments are useful for prestige, and such demonstrations have a vital function in preserving the alliance and in reassuring the neutral powers. But propaganda is not enough. The only reasonably certain way of maintaining a reputation for strength is to display an actual power to our friends as well as our enemies. We should ask, then, whether further expansion of the current programs for basing Thor and Jupiter is an efficient way to increase American retaliatory power. If overseas bases are considered too vulnerable for manned bombers, will not the same be true for missiles?

The basis for the hopeful impression that they will not is rather vague, including a mixture of hypothetical properties of ballistic missiles in which perhaps the dominant element is their supposedly much more rapid, "push-button" response. What needs to be considered here are the response time of such missiles (including decision, preparation and launch times), and how they are to be defended.

The decision to fire a missile with a thermonuclear warhead is much harder to make than a decision simply to start a manned aircraft on its way, with orders to return to base unless instructed to continue to its assigned target. This is the "fail-safe" procedure practised by the U.S. Air Force. In contrast, once a missile is launched, there is no method of recall or deflection which is not subject to risks of electronic or mechanical failure. Therefore such a decision must wait for much more unambiguous evidence of enemy intentions. It must and will take a longer time to make and is less likely to be made at all. Where more than one country is involved, the joint decision is harder still, since there is opportunity to disagree about the ambiguity of the evidence, as well as to reach quite different interpretations of national interest. On much less momentous matters the process of making decisions in NATO is complicated, and it should be recognized that such complexity has much to do with the genuine concern of the various NATO powers about the danger of accidentally starting World War III. Such fears will not be diminished with the advent of I.R.B.M.s. In fact, widespread dispersion of nuclear armed missiles raises measurably the possibility of accidental war.

Second, it is quite erroneous to suppose that by contrast with manned bombers the first I.R.B.M.s can be launched almost as simply as pressing a button. Count-down procedures for early missiles are liable to interruption, and the characteristics of the liquid oxygen fuel limits the readiness of their response. Unlike JP-4, the fuel used in jet bombers, liquid oxygen cannot be held for long periods of time in these vehicles. In this respect such missiles will be *less* ready than alert bombers. Third, the smaller warning time available overseas makes more difficult any response. This includes, in particular, any active defense, not only against ballistic missile attacks but, for example, against low altitude or various circuitous attacks by manned aircraft.

Finally, passive defense by means of shelter is more difficult, given the larger bomb yields, better accuracies and larger forces available to the Russians at such close range. And if the press reports are correct, the plans for I.R.B.M. installations do not call for bomb-resistant shelters. If this is so, it should be taken into account in measuring the actual contribution of these installations to the West's retaliatory power. Viewed as a contribution to deterring all-out attack on the United States, the Thor and Jupiter bases seem unlikely to compare favorably with other alternatives. If newspaper references to hard bargaining by some of our future hosts are to be believed, it would seem that such negotiations have been conducted under misapprehensions on both sides as to the benefits to the United States.

But many proponents of the distribution of Thor and Jupiter—and possibly some of our allies—have in mind not an increase in U.S. deterrence but the development of an independent capability in several of the NATO countries to deter all-out attack against themselves. This would be a useful thing if it can be managed at supportable cost and if it does not entail the sacrifice of even more critical measures of protection. But aside from the special problems of joint control, which would affect the certainty of response adversely, precisely who their legal owner is will not affect the retaliatory power of the Thors and Jupiters one way or the other. They would not be able to deter an attack which they could not survive. It is curious that many who question the utility of American overseas bases (for example, our bomber bases in the United Kingdom) simply assume that, for our allies, possession of strategic nuclear weapons is one with deterrence.

There remains the view that the provision of these weapons will broaden the range of response open to our allies. In so far as this view rests on the belief that the intermediate-range ballistic missile is adapted to limited war, it is wide of the mark. The inaccuracy of an I.R.B.M. requires high-yield warheads, and such a combination of inaccuracy and high yield, while quite appropriate and adequate against unprotected targets in a general war, would scarcely come within even the most lax, in fact reckless, definition of limited war. Such a weapon is inappropriate for even the nuclear variety of limited war, and it is totally useless for meeting the wide variety of provocation that is well below the threshold of nuclear response. In so far as these missiles will be costly for our allies to install, operate and support, they are likely to displace a conventional capability that might be genuinely useful in limited engagements. More important, they are likely to be used as an excuse for budget cutting. In this way they will accelerate the general trend toward dependence on all-out response and so will have the opposite effect to the one claimed.

Nevertheless, if the Thor and Jupiter have these defects, might not some future weapon be free of them? Some of these defects, of course, will be overcome in time. Solid fuels or storable liquids will eventually replace liquid oxygen, reliabilities will increase, various forms of mobility or portability will become feasible, accuracies may even be so improved that such weapons can be used in limited wars. But these developments are all years away. In consequence, the discussion will be advanced if a little more precision is given such terms as "missiles" or "modern" or "advanced weapons." We are not distributing a generic "modern" weapon with all the virtues of flexibility in varying circumstances and of invulnerability in all-out war. But even with advances in the state of the art on our side, it will remain difficult to maintain a deterrent, especially close in under the enemy's guns.

It follows that, though a wider distribution of nuclear weapons may be inevitable, or at any rate likely, and though some countries in addition to the Soviet Union and the United States may even develop an independent deterrent, it is by no means inevitable or even very likely that the power to deter all-out thermonuclear attack will be widespread. This is true even though a minor power would not need to guarantee as large a retaliation as we in order to deter attack on itself. Unfortunately, the minor powers have smaller resources as well as poorer strategic locations.[*] Mere membership in the nuclear club might carry with it prestige, as the applicants and nominees expect, but it will be rather expensive, and in time it will be clear that it does not necessarily confer any of the expected privileges enjoyed by the two charter members. The burden of deterring a general war as distinct from limited wars is still likely to be on the United States and therefore, so far as our allies are concerned, on the military alliance.

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[*] General Gallois argues that, while alliances will offer no guarantee, "a small number of bombs and a small number of carriers suffice for a threatened power to protect itself against atomic destruction." (*Réalités*, *op. cit.*, p. 71.) His numerical illustrations give the defender

There is one final consideration. Missiles placed near the enemy, even if they could not retaliate, would have a potent capability for striking first by surprise. And it might not be easy for the enemy to discern their purpose. The existence of such a force might be a considerable provocation and in fact a dangerous one in the sense that it would place a great burden on our deterrent force which more than ever would have to guarantee extreme risks to the attacker—worse than the risks of waiting in the face of this danger. When not coupled with the ability to strike in retaliation, such a capability might suggest—erroneously, to be sure, in the case of the democracies—an intention to strike first. If so, it would tend to provoke rather than to deter general war.

I have dealt here with only one of the functions of overseas bases: their use as a support for the strategic deterrent force. They have a variety of important military, political and economic rôles which are beyond the scope of this paper. Expenditures in

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some 400 underground launching sites (*ibid.*, p. 22, and *The Reporter, op cit.*, p. 25) and suggest that their elimination would require between 5,000 and 25,000 missiles—which is "more or less impossible"—and that in any case the aggressor would not survive the fallout from his own weapons. Whether these are large numbers of targets from the standpoint of the aggressor will depend on the accuracy, yield and reliability of offense weapons as well as the resistance of the defender's shelters and a number of other matters not specified in the argument. General Gallois is aware that the expectation of survival depends on distance even in the ballistic missile age and that our allies are not so fortunate in this respect. Close-in missiles have better bomb yields and accuracies. Moreover, manned aircraft—with still better yields and accuracies—can be used by an aggressor here since warning of their approach is very short. Suffice it to say that the numerical advantage General Gallois cites is greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, he exaggerates the destructiveness of the retaliatory blow against the aggressor's cities by the remnants of the defender's missile force—even assuming the aggressor would take no special measures to protect his cities. But particularly for the aggressor—who does not lack warning—a civil defense program can moderate the damage done by a poorly organized attack. Finally, the suggestion that the aggressor would not survive the fall-out from his own weapons is simply in error. The rapid-decay fission products which are the major lethal problem in the locality of a surface burst are not a serious difficulty for the aggressor. The amount of the slow-decay products, strontium-90 and cesium-137, in the atmosphere would rise considerably. If nothing were done to counter it, this might, for example, increase by many times the incidence of such relatively rare diseases as bone cancer and leukemia. However, such a calamity, implying an increase of, say, 20,000 deaths per year for a nation of 200,000,000, is of an entirely different order from the catastrophe involving tens of millions of deaths, which General Gallois contemplates elsewhere. And there are measures that might reduce even this effect drastically. (See the RAND Corporation Report R-322-RC, *Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense*, July 1, 1958.)

connection with the construction or operation of our bases, for example, are a form of economic aid and, moreover, a form that is rather palatable to the Congress. There are other functions in a central war where their importance may be very considerable and their usefulness in a limited war might be substantial.

Indeed nothing said here should suggest that deterrence is in itself an adequate strategy. The complementary requirements of a sufficient military policy cannot be discussed in detail here. Certainly they include a more serious development of power to meet limited aggression, especially with more advanced conventional weapons than those now available. They also include more energetic provision for active and passive defenses to limit the dimensions of the catastrophe in case deterrence should fail. For example, an economically feasible shelter program might make the difference between 50,000,000 survivors and 120,000,000 survivors.

But it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that because strategic deterrence is inadequate by itself it can be dispensed with. Deterrence is not dispensable. If the picture of the world I have drawn is rather bleak, it could none the less be cataclysmically worse. Suppose both the United States and the Soviet Union had the power to destroy each others' retaliatory forces and society, given the opportunity to administer the opening blow. The situation would then be something like the old-fashioned Western gun duel. It would be extraordinarily risky for one side *not* to attempt to destroy the other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed by striking first but this is the sole way it can reasonably hope to emerge at all. Evidently such a situation is extremely unstable. On the other hand, if it is clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his aggression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though he can administer great damage. A protected retaliatory capability has a stabilizing influence not only in deterring rational attack, but also in offering every inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.

The critics who feel that deterrence is "bankrupt" sometimes say that we stress deterrence too much. I believe this is quite wrong if it means that we are devoting too much effort to protect our power to retaliate; but I think it is quite right if it means that we have talked too much of a strategic threat as a substitute for many things it cannot replace.

VI. DETERRENCE, ACCIDENTS AND DISARMAMENT

Up to now I have talked mainly about the problem of deterring general war, of making it improbable that an act of war will be undertaken deliberately, with a clear understanding of the consequences, that is, rationally. That such deterrence will not be easy to maintain in the 1960s simply expresses the proposition that a surprise thermonuclear attack might *not* be an irrational or insane act on the part of the aggressor. A deterrent strategy is aimed at a rational enemy. Without a deterrent, general war is likely. With it, however, war might still occur.

In order to reduce the risk of a rational act of aggression, we are being forced to undertake measures (increased alertness, dispersal, mobility) which, to a significant extent, increase the risk of an irrational or unintentional act of war. The accident problem is serious, and it would be a great mistake to dismiss the recent Soviet charges on this subject as simply part of the war of nerves. In a clear sense the great multiplication and spread of nuclear arms throughout the world, the drastic increase in the degree of readiness of these weapons, and the decrease in the time available for the decision on their use must inevitably raise the risk of accident. The B-47 accidents this year at Sidi Slimane and at Florence, S. C., and the recent Nike explosion are just a beginning. Though incidents of this sort are not themselves likely to trigger misunderstanding, they suggest the nature of the problem.

There are many sorts of accidents that could happen. There can be electronic or mechanical failures of the sort illustrated by the B-47 and Nike mishaps; there can be aberrations of individuals, perhaps quite low in the echelon of command; there can be miscalculations on the partof governments as to enemy intent and the meaning of ambiguous signals. Not all deterrent strategies will involve the risk of accident equally. One of the principles of selecting a strategy should be to reduce the chance of accident, wherever we can, without a corresponding increase in vulnerability to a rational surprise attack. This is the purpose of the "fail-safe" procedures for launching SAC.

These problems are also relevant to the disarmament question. The Russians, exploiting an inaccurate United Press report which suggested that SAC started en masse toward Russia in response to frequent radar "ghosts," cried out against these supposed Arctic flights. The United States response, and its sequels, stated correctly that such flights had never been undertaken except in planned exercises and would not be undertaken in response to such unreliable warning. We pointed out the importance of quick response and a high degree of readiness in the protection of the deterrent force. The nature of the fail-safe precaution was also described.

We added, however, to cap the argument, that if the Russians were really worried about surprise attack they would accept the President's "open skies" proposal. This addition, however, conceals an absurdity. Aerial photography would have its uses in a disarmament plan—for example, to check an exchange of information on the location of ground bases. However, so far as surprise is concerned, an "open skies" plan would have direct use only to discover attacks requiring much more lengthy, visible and unambiguous preparations than are likely today.[10] The very readiness of our own strategic force suggests a state of technology which outmodes the "open skies" plan as a counter to surprise attack. Not even the most advanced reconnaissance equipment can disclose an intention from 40,000 feet. Who can say what the men in the blockhouse of an I.C.B.M. base have in mind? Or, for that matter, what is the final destination of training flights or fail-safe flights starting over the Pacific or North Atlantic from staging areas?

The actions that need to be taken on our own to deter attack might usefully be complemented by bilateral agreements for inspection and reporting and, possibly, limitation of arms and of methods of operating strategic and naval air forces. But the protection of our retaliatory power remains essential; and the better the protection, the smaller the burden placed on the agreement to limit arms and modes of operation and to make them subject to inspection. Reliance on "open skies" alone to prevent surprise would invite catastrophe and the loss of power to retaliate. Such a plan is worthless for discovering a well prepared attack with I.C.B.M.s or submarine-launched missiles or a routine mass training flight whose destination could be kept ambiguous. A tremendous weight of weapons could be delivered in spite of it.

Although it is quite hopeless to look for an inspection scheme which would permit abandonment of the deterrent, this does not mean that some partial agreement on inspection and limitation might not help to reduce the chance of any sizable surprise attack. We should explore the possibilities of agreements involving limitation and inspection. But how we go about this will be conditioned by our appreciation of the problem of deterrence itself.

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[10] Aerial reconnaissance, of course, could have an *indirect* utility here for surveying large areas to determine the number and location of observation posts needed to provide more timely warning.

The critics of current policy who perceive the inadequacy of the strategy of deterrence are prominent among those urging disarmament negotiations, an end to the arms race and a reduction of tension. This is a paramount interest of some of our allies. The balance of terror theory is the basis for some of the more light-hearted suggestions: if deterrence is automatic, strategic weapons on one side cancel those of the other, and it should be easy for both sides to give them up. So James E. King, Jr., one of the most sensible writers on the subject of limited war, suggests that weapons needed for "unlimited" war are those which both sides can most easily agree to abolish, simply because "neither side can anticipate anything but disaster" from their use. "Isn't there enough stability in the 'balance of terror,' " he asks, "to justify our believing that the Russians can be trusted—within acceptable limits—to abandon the weapons whose 'utility is confined to the threat or conduct of a war of annihilation'?"[11]

Indeed, if there were no real danger of a rational attack, then accidents and the "*n*th" country problem would be the only problems. As I have indicated, they are serious problems and some sorts of limitation and inspection agreement might diminish them. But if there is to be any prospect of realistic and useful agreement, we must reject the theory of automatic deterrence. And we must bear in mind that the more extensive a disarmament agreement is, the smaller the force that a violator would have to hide in order to achieve complete domination. Most obviously, "*the abolition* of the weapons necessary in a general or 'unlimited' war" would offer the most insuperable obstacles to an inspection plan, since the violator could gain an overwhelming advantage from the concealment of even a few weapons. The need for a deterrent, in this connection too, is ineradicable.

VII. SUMMARY

Almost everyone seems concerned with the need to relax tension. However, relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks is good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard, which almost everyone thinks is bad. Relaxation, like Miltown, is not an end in itself. Not all danger comes from tension. To be tense where there is danger is only rational.

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[11] James E. King, Jr., "Arms and Man in the Nuclear-Rocket Era," *The New Republic*, September 1, 1958.

What can we say then, in sum, on the balance of terror theory of automatic deterrence? It is a contribution to the rhetoric rather than the logic of war in the thermonuclear age. The notion that a carefully planned surprise attack can be checkmated almost effortlessly, that, in short, we may resume our deep pre-sputnik sleep, is wrong and its nearly universal acceptance is terribly dangerous. Though deterrence is not enough in itself, it is vital. There are two principal points.

First, deterring general war in both the early and late 1960s will be hard at best, and hardest both for ourselves and our allies wherever we use forces based near the enemy.

Second, even if we can deter general war by a strenuous and continuing effort, this will by no means be the whole of a military, much less a foreign policy. Such a policy would not of itself remove the danger of accidental outbreak or limit the damage in case deterrence failed; nor would it be at all adequate for crises on the periphery.

A generally useful way of concluding a grim argument of this kind would be to affirm that we have the resources, intelligence and courage to make the correct decisions. That is, of course, the case. And there is a good chance that we will do so. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such decisions more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they may *not* be made. They *are* hard, *do* involve sacrifice, *are* affected by great uncertainties and concern matters in which much is altogether unknown and much else must be hedged by secrecy; and, above all, they entail a new image of ourselves in a world of persistent danger. It is by no means *certain* that we shall meet the test.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACE

by

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

38

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11 The Technological Arms Race

Not everyone previously convinced of the inevitability of nuclear stalemate was ready, because of *Sputnik*, to adopt the opposite view. Many of those who had warned throughout the mid-1950s of the dangerous illusion of perpetual Western nuclear superiority saw the evident growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities as doing no more than confirming expectations. The folly of a strategy of massive retaliation was even more evident. Proponents of limited war felt their case to be strengthened. '[T]he first effect of the Sputnik on American policy has been to emphasize the thermo-nuclear stalemate and to strengthen the case for supplementing or replacing massive retaliation by limited atom war – and for giving tactical atomic weapons to America's allies', wrote British MP Denis Healey.[1]

In the United States the Army remained insistent on the need to prepare for a limited war and saw no reason to doubt the existence of a nuclear stalemate: 'It would seem that we will have a stalemate just so long as both sides retain the capacity to destroy a large segment of the other side's homeland whether or not the enemy attacks first and with surprise.' The assumption that a surprise first strike could win a war was described as 'wishful'. 'This would be a highly doubtful venture in any event and from the standpoint of the US an immensely risky one as well, because we forfeit from the outset the option of surprise under our form of government'.[2]

The Administration appeared to be moving towards a greater appreciation of limited war capabilities, sensing less value in the threat of massive retaliation. Dulles now wrote that it might well be

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'feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power'. This was more because of an 'alteration' in the character of nuclear weapons, which made them suitable for clean, tactical use against conventional aggression, than any changed assessment of Soviet nuclear power.[3]

The official view was that the balance would be stable for the foreseeable future. By 1956 the Administration had begun to come to terms with the balance of terror. In August of that year, Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles articulated a doctrine of 'sufficiency'. War had become an 'unthinkable catastrophe' from which 'neither side can hope by a mere margin of superiority in airplanes or other means of delivery to escape'. The absolute destructive power available to each side had resulted in a substantial invulnerability' to interdiction. A 'sufficiency' of force was that required to perform the essential retaliatory mission, and was already possessed by the United States. It would take 'some unforeseen technological breakthrough', perhaps in the field of air defence, to cause these requirements to change. It was not expected that technological changes would 'occur in such a revolutionary fashion'.[4] The balance of terror was tending towards a stable equilibrium. Technology was not seen as a particularly disruptive force.

When *Sputnik I* was launched, Administration spokesmen dismissed it as a 'gimmick', and attempted, unsuccessfully, to reassure the public that essential needs of national defence were being seen to and there was no need to panic. To many at the time this appeared to show extraordinary complacency; the Administration seemed unaware of the vast changes taking place in the strategic environment, unable to share the sensation and excitement of being in the midst of a technological revolution. Yet, in retrospect, the Eisenhower Administration stands out as having a more accurate assessment of the state of the strategic balance and the likely impact of technology than its critics. The programmes to which it gave high priority stabilized the balance while the more exotic programmes resulted in few changes in the military situation.[5]

This chapter will look at the developing vision of a technological arms race, particularly as it related to first-strike capabilities. Through the second half of the 1950s increasing but excessive emphasis was placed on technological change. A retrogressive tendency was introduced, resulting in an exaggerated appreciation of both the evolving technology and its impact on the strategic balance. It came to be assumed that the series of startling innovations of the past two decades set a pattern for the future; if sufficient funds and ingenuity were applied to any given problem it could be solved; the results of the growing expenditure and scientific talent being applied to military problems could be spectacular; and also (and here came the major mistake) that any improvement in technology would result in a corresponding improvement in the state of the strategic art. A tendency for strategy to lag behind technology was noted and deplored, with lectures on the need to anticipate the coming technologies so that they could be better exploited. Persistent innovation was confused with strategic revolution.

Exemplary of this sort of tendency was Herman Kahn, a devotee of science fiction since his youth and mesmerized by expectations of fantastic technical progress. He described as 'one of the most startling things that ever happened to me' his participation in 1950 on a Technical Advisory Board when he 'first came in contact with the philosophy which is willing to ask any question and tackle any philosophy'. The final one-third of his book *On Thermonuclear War* (virtually a transcript of a popular series of lectures) consisted of a set of predictions for the future. Kahn described eight wars, each one a 'technological revolution ahead of its predecessor'. The first two were the familiar World Wars I and II; the second two were hypothetical conflicts of 1951 and 1956; the final four were speculations. As the date for World War VIII was put at 1973, it can be seen that Kahn was expecting at least four technological revolutions in the means of modern warfare in the coming thirteen years. Some of the predictions were remarkably accurate, others remarkably inaccurate or at least premature. One example of the former was the prediction that there would be a landing and take-off by manned vehicles from the moon by 1969. But this illustrates the difficulty with Kahn's technological expectations. Putting a man on the moon was achieved through a well-funded crash programme which had been made a national priority. The same is true of many other of Kahn's accurate predictions. His major error was to assume that dramatic scientific breakthroughs and their immediate and rigorous exploitation was the natural state of affairs, not requiring any extraordinary effort.

Kahn recognized that certain feasible developments would be eschewed. Some would be deemed impractical because they 'cost a little too much';[6] others because of a failure to perceive the need for them, a result of the adoption of a misguided doctrine. He considered it quite likely that the US would content itself with a limited deterrent capability, one which provided no options for taking the nuclear initiative. The US might fail by neglect to do enough in boosting air defence, air offence and civil defence. By 1961, given the 'possible Soviet lead in missiles, their interest in a cheap but useful civil defense program and a sober attitude towards the risks of war and peace', the Russians could have the upper hand. Eventually Kahn suspected there would be less inhibitions about exploiting technology. He described and prescribed a frantic search for methods for improving all capabilities. It must be remembered that Kahn's basic assumption was that thermonuclear war would be an ever-present possibility and that though, if it ever came, the results would be tragic, the amount of tragedy could be reduced by the proper precautions. Thus any avenue which promised an amelioration of the effects of enemy attack was worth exploring.

The growing expectations of continual achievement in new technologies that would destabilize the strategic balance can be detected in two official reports written in 1954–5 and 1957 by panels of experts. Both were prepared under the auspices of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization for presentation to the National Security Council. The first was the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel on 'Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack'. The second was the report of the Security Resources Panel on 'Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age'. They were known as the Killian and Gaither Reports after their respective Chairmen. Each included a forward-looking timetable, anticipating the course of the arms race in the coming decades.

The Killian Report

The Killian Report, presented to the NSC in February 1955, characterized the current period as particularly dangerous. The US had a growing offensive capability not yet quite of 'multi-megaton' dimensions, but the US lacked reliable early warning and defensive capabilities and Strategic Air Command (SAC) was not properly protected against the rapidly improving Soviet offensive capabilities. Neither side could mount an atomic strike which would 'surely be decisive', but the USSR might be tempted to attack before the US forces had achieved the ability to deliver warheads measured in 'multi-megatons'.

Soon this would be achieved. Despite improvements in defences both sides would be vulnerable to surprise attack. The difference was that 'The US can mount a surprise attack; the USSR cannot'. For a 'period of short duration', possibly up to 1960, the US military position relative to that of the USSR would be favourable so that it could hope to emerge from war a 'battered victor'. 'Our military superiority may never be so great again.' It was suggested that the possibilities for exploiting this situation for political benefit should be explored.

By the time the Russians had acquired their own 'multi-megaton' weapons, the Americans should have improved their defences and reduced the vulnerability of SAC. There was a warning that, if the US was laggard in this regard, it could be placed 'in danger of surprise attack and possibly defeat'. This situation could arise as early as 1958, especially if the Russians made faster progress than the Americans with their ICBM programme. The first to win this race would gain an important relative advantage. Not surprisingly, the report impressed upon policy-makers the urgency of speeding up the US ICBM programme and of protecting the existing SAC bases.

Eventually the two super-powers would reach a position where 'attack by either side would result in mutual destruction'. A surprise attack would produce no dividends:

> The ability to achieve surprise will not affect the outcome because each country will have the residual offensive power to break through the defenses of the other country and destroy it regardless of whether the other country strikes first.

In the 1960s, when this prediction came true, a state of mutual assured destruction came to be considered reassuringly stable. Killian's group of experts were less than pleased with the prospect. It would be 'fraught with danger', involving 'a period of instability that might easily be upset by either side'. With no defences capable of alleviating an attack 'a world catastrophe might occur'. Such a condition would be best avoided or escaped if at all possible. To this end it was necessary to 'push all promising technological developments'.

> Should we arrive at a condition where the contest is drawn and neither contestant can derive military advantage, we need not assume that this state is unchangeable or that one country or the other cannot move again into a position of relative advantage. *We see no certainty, however, that the condition of stalemate can be changed through science and technology.* This does not mean that

370

> some new unimagined weapon or development, far afield from any present weapon system, might not provide an advantage to one side or the other.[7]

It could be argued that this statement was too dogmatic. Antiballistic missiles, multiple warheads with extraordinary accuracies, satellites and so on had yet to come. Nevertheless, a form of stalemate was created, perhaps because many developments neutralized each other. The nuances of the strategic relationship have changed enormously. Yet this picture of a stalemate impervious to technological breakthroughs captured the reality of the evolving relationship more accurately than some of the more dramatic presentations that became more popular later in the decade.

The Gaither Report

The Gaither Report, presented to the National Security Council in 1957, shared the Killian Report's anxiety over the race to deploy ICBMs, and the vulnerability of the US deterrent: 'The current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack during a period of lessened world tension (i.e. a time when SAC is not on a SAC 'alert' status), and the threat posed to SAC by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action.' In order to maintain the US advantage and to prevent 'both the Russians and our allies', believing that the US will 'feel increasing reluctance to employ SAC in any circumstance other than when the United States is directly attacked', active and passive civil defence measures were urged, including 'a program to develop and install an area defence against ICBMs at the earliest possible date'.

In its timetable of future relative strength, the Report confirmed the accuracy of the earlier Killian prediction of the 1956–60 period as being one of comparative US advantage. 'This could be the time to negotiate from strength, since the US military position vis-a-vis Russia might never be so strong again'. The precondition would be an adequate 'alert' status for SAC. Without such, a surprise Soviet attack 'might also completely disarm' the 'air atomic strike capability' of the US. Similarly inadequate protection for the Soviet equivalent to SAC would leave them vulnerable. With neither properly protected 'a surprise attack could determine the outcome of a clash between these two major powers'.[8]

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The most worrisome prediction, erroneous as it turned out, was that the USSR was leading in the race for a significant ICBM capability. If successful this would render SAC vulnerable. The period 1959–62 was thus described as 'very critical'. By the mid-1960s SAC should be protected, an early warning capability developed and a start made on anti-ICBM defences. In such circumstances, the only way in which either side could avoid total destruction would be 'a nationwide fall-out shelter program'.

Neither of the two reports believed that the first strike need be critical if appropriate measures were taken in time. The latter report derived its sense of urgency from the fact these measures had yet to be taken. One of the briefings to the Gaither Committee was by Albert Wohlstetter who presented them with a similar analysis to that later published in *Foreign Affairs* on 'The delicate balance of terror'. Where they differed was on the feasibility of defence. The Killian Report saw little likelihood of defences adequate to permit survival against a full-scale attack, or that there could be much escape from a condition of stalemate. Here the Gaither Report diverged. Starting from the early 1970s it envisaged dramatic improvements in the quantity and quality of long-range ballistic missiles, but also in 'means for detecting and defending against missile attacks'. It continued:

> The missiles in turn will be made more sophisticated to avoid destruction; and there will be a continuing race between the offense and the defense. Neither side can afford to lag or fail to match the other's efforts. There will be no end to the technical moves or countermoves.

The strategic balance was seen to tend not towards stability but to an 'extremely unstable equilibrium', for 'a temporary technical advance (such as a high-certainty missile defense against ballistic missiles) could give either nation the ability to come near to annihilating the other'.[9]

A situation could develop, indeed could be developing, in which groups of military technologists would be pitting their wits against each other, attempting to gain strategic advantage through technical innovation. There would be no definitive solutions to military problems. Though recent innovations had aided the offence, there was no reason in principle why future innovations should not favour the defence. Then, in solving one problem for the defence, a new one would be created for the offence. The solution to this would put new demands on the defence and so on. Thus ICBMs would render any progress in conventional air defence systems irrelevant, but it was conceivable that one day an effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) could be developed. Putting ICBMs in concrete shelters might protect them from incoming enemy missiles, but only until the enemy missiles improved their accuracy.

There were two quite distinct views presented in the Reports concerning the likely and desirable character of the evolving strategic relationship between the two super-powers. The Killian Report pointed to the development of parallel capabilities for destruction, and viewed this with gloom because the United States would have lost its advantage and a false move by either side could result in complete catastrophe. In early 1955 to recognize that the world's two greatest powers could literally wipe out each other and much else besides, and that there was no obvious way out of this impasse, was profoundly disturbing. This was especially dangerous given the hostility between these two powers and the American responsibility for holding back Soviet expansionism.

By 1957 the desire for US superiority was still strong but there was a growing fear of Soviet superiority, in which case a balance of terror was preferable. There was concern over an offence-defence duel, fuelled by persistent technological innovations. This was viewed with gloom because of the prospect of an unending arms race driven by the prospect of moments of terrifying weakness as well as moments of transitory superiority. Henry Kissinger articulated these fears in a 1960 article:

> Technology is volatile. The advantage of surprise can be overwhelming. The forces-in-being are almost surely decisive at least in all-out war. A major cause of instability is the very rate of technological change. Every country lives with the nightmare that even if it puts forth its best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough on the part of its opponent.[10]

George Kennan spoke of a dismal future if this weapons race was allowed to run its course:

> The technological realities of this competition are constantly changing from month to month and from year to year. Are we to flee like haunted creatures from one defensive device to another,

each more costly and humiliating than the one before, cowering underground one day, breaking up our cities the next, attempting to surround ourselves with elaborate shields on the third, concerned only to prolong the length of our lives while sacrificing all the values for which it might be worth while to live at all?[11]

Mutual Fears of Surprise Attack

Thus, by the late 1950s, prominent strategic and military figures both in the United States and the Soviet Union were advocating the development of a capacity for pre-emptive attacks. In both countries technological progress was being monitored carefully and anxiously for further indications of some imminent breakthrough that would provide one side or the other with a decisive advantage. Such a situation involved obvious dangers. To prepare for pre-emption, each side would have to build up large counter-force capabilities with an instant readiness to fire. Such an effort could suggest to the other side preparations for an unprovoked first strike, so providing an incentive to pre-empt. With both nervous about a surprise attack, even in the absence of any crisis or aggression, a climate of fear and mutual distrust could develop which could end in an unnecessary race to pre-empt. Kissinger warned in the article cited above how measures taken for self-defence could be 'indistinguishable to the other side from a desire to launch a surprise attack'. The structure of strategic forces 'may contribute to instability regardless of the intentions of the two sides'.

Fears such as these were not novel. The start of World War I was widely believed to have been accelerated because of the extra tensions generated by the rush to be the first to mobilize. There was a developing view of the cold war as a consequence of mutual fear and distrust rather than objective conflicts of interests. The precautionary measures taken by one side (based on its fears) provided cause for the fears of the other, in turn confirming the original fears. The cold war came to be seen as self-sustaining. The concern now was that a similar spiral of misperception could result in an unnecessary hot war.[12]

The possibility that war could be stimulated by purely military calculations had previously been associated with neglect. Inadequate military precautions by the peacefully inclined were seen as a temptation for aggressors. For example, failure to protect strategic forces offered an opportunity that men in the Kremlin would find hard to resist. In 1954 Brodie had spoken of how a 'vulnerable strategic air force . . . is not merely of no value as a deterrent, it positively invites an attack that might otherwise not be contemplated'. On the same theme Kahn explained how 'We do not want a potential enemy's high command contemplating for months or years a possible opportunity to eliminate most of his supposed trouble at one blow'.[13]

Now this was taken a stage further. Thomas Schelling demonstrated how the calculations of two sides normally able to resist the temptation to launch a surprise attack, could look quite different in a crisis. He called this 'the reciprocal fear of surprise attack'.

> If surprise carries an advantage, it is worth while to avert it by striking first. Fear that the other may be about to strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to strike gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the other's motive. But, if the gains from even successful surprise are less desired than no war at all, there is no 'fundamental' basis for an attack by either side. Nevertheless, it looks as though a modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow – a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack – might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motive for attack being produced by successive cycles of 'He thinks we think he thinks we think . . . he thinks we think he'll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must'.[14]

For such a cycle to start, two conditions would have to obtain. First strikes would have to carry a sizeable and perhaps decisive premium and both sides would require the capability to launch such a strike – otherwise the fear of pre-emption would not be mutual. This second condition added to the premium attached to the first strike, for it could now deny the enemy the benefit of his first strike. For the temptation to pre-empt to arise, there would have to be a high state of tension between the two and a reasonable chance of an outbreak of war from another cause. As Glenn Snyder noted: 'It is very hard to believe that any country would deliberately accept the *certainty* of severe retaliatory damage in preference to the *uncertain* prospect of being the recipient of a first strike.'[15]

A successful pre-emptive attack would have to reduce the potential damage of the enemy's retaliatory strike to be disarming. Counter-force capabilities required large forces. If the other side had only a moderate force, they could be saturated by a sufficiently large attack and so removed. But in such circumstances the adversary would not have a counter-force option of his own, so there would be no *mutual* fear of surprise attack and the need for pre-emption would not arise. This need would only arise if the adversary enjoyed comparable counter-force capabilities. But then the problems of a disarming first strike would be that much greater. Indeed a strike of this sort would only be conceivable if each attacking weapon could destroy more than one of the equivalent weapons. The exchange must favour the offence. The only factor that could possibly alter this calculation would be the deployment of an effective ABM system which might obstruct the enemy's retaliation. However, if ABMs were used to provide defence of the retaliatory forces, rather than cities, then the demands on the first strike would be increased further.

Technology and Stability

In terms of the model of an offence-defence duel there were therefore two profoundly destabilizing possibilities that would do grave damage to any stalemate. The first was the ability to launch a sudden disarming, counter-force attack taking out more offensive weapons than were being used to execute the attack. The second was the ability to block an incoming missile attack with active defensive measures. A possible third was civil defence measures sufficient to absorb an attack, reducing its effects to manageable levels.

The Gaither Report depicted an ABM as one of the most unsettling possibilities for the future, representing it as the logical next stage in the arms race. The early designs for air defence in the nuclear age had been concerned with bomber attacks. During the 1950s a defensive anti-aircraft system was developed in the United States. This involved a line of radars on sea and land to provide distant early warning, a variety of guided interceptors with supporting control facilities to get them to the right place at the right time, and a national command and control mechanism, intended to tie the local units together. Unfortunately, by the time the system had been developed, it had been rendered obsolete by the imminent arrival of ICBMs.

Study of ways to cope with this new threat began in 1956. The design of interceptor missiles was not the most serious problem. The real difficulty lay in detecting, identifying, tracking and predicting the trajectory of an incoming missile in sufficient time for the interceptor to be launched to meet it. To achieve this feat major improvements would be needed in a category of technological breakthroughs on a par with that of the ICBM itself. Herman Kahn noted that the statement: 'in the air and missile age the offense has an intrinsic advantage over the defense', was 'only true, if at all, because our sensors are not reliable. . . . A breakthrough in this field comparable to the invention of radar in 1935 might well make all forms of air offense incredibly costly'.[16]

Even then, as every commentator was quick to point out, the requirements for successful defence would be exacting. The opportunities for deception and confusion by the offence would be considerable, while the tolerance of failure would be minimal. Kahn approved of air defence, even given its limitations, because it would impose constraints on the offence, 'forcing the enemy to use a high-performance bomber, to put only a small number of bombs on the bomber, and to confine himself to saturation and deceptive tactics'. Its main value would be in complementing the vast civil defence effort he believed to be vital.

Whereas an effective active defence was considered a possibility, if not a probability, for the future, the specific protection of the retaliatory forces was a problem of the moment. The point was that the vulnerability of US bombers to surprise attack was not necessary and could be rectified by prompt action. The anxiety about the threat to SAC came not so much from the development of a Soviet doctrine of and capabilities for surprise attack, but because of the lack of interest in the SAC hierarchy in doing much to reduce the vulnerability of its bombers. Wohlstetter and his colleagues at RAND proposed providing each aircraft with a concrete shelter placed just below the ground as the optimum way of dealing with the problem. This was too defence-minded for the Air Force who preferred to concentrate on pre-emption to destroy Soviet offensive systems. The only precaution they would accept was continual airborne alert.[17]

The intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) – *Thor* and *Jupiter* – being deployed in Europe to provide an early missile threat to the Soviet Union were as, if not more, vulnerable because of their fixed locations, lack of protection, slow reaction time (because of liquid fuelling), and proximity to the Soviet Union.

The *Minuteman* ICBMs, then under development, would be less vulnerable. Dispersal would mean that it would not be possible for the enemy to destroy more than one with a single shot of his own. Protection in underground silos would ensure that the enemy's warhead would have to be extremely accurate to ensure destruction. Solid fuels would permit rapid launching and so a continuous high-alert status (hence the name *Minuteman*). The chances of survival could be further increased through mobility. Here the *Polaris* missiles, to be launched from submarines, also under development in the late 1950s, came into their own.

A Navy document of 1958 spoke of how the 'fortress concept' of hardened shelters and active defences merely promoted an arms race.

> It challenges the enemy in an area (endless production of higher-yield, more-accurate missiles) where he is ready and able to respond impressively. Fortress-busting is always possible, since any fixed defenses, including all foreseeable anti-ICBM defenses, can be overwhelmed by numbers.

Mobility and concealment, on the other hand, would discourage an arms race:

> Numbers of missiles will avail the enemy nothing, if he does not know the location of his target. We in effect take an initiative which he can overcome only by maintaining hour-to-hour fire-comb surveillance of all our land areas *and* the vast oceans.

The *Polaris* submarines, with their locations unknown and unpredictable, would be a 'comparatively cheap retaliatory system', according to Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations. 'It won't be necessary to maintain large residual forces of Polaris submarines against the possible destruction of surprise attack'. A force of invulnerable submarines carrying nuclear weapons could guarantee deterrence, releasing resources to prepare for limited war, a much more plausible eventuality than all-out nuclear exchanges.[18]

Not everyone was so convinced, including many in the Navy hierarchy who saw a strategic nuclear force as diverting funds away from the large surface ships they preferred. Another objection was the expense involved in basing missiles in submarines. Wohlstetter was concerned with the fragility of the communications links, a concern that extended to all mobile systems, whether missiles under the sea or on railroads (there was a plan to put *Minuteman* on rails) or bombers on airborne alert. The Air Force, not pleased to have another service poaching missions, argued that submarines might well be extremely vulnerable to counter-force attacks, especially given the size of the Soviet submarine fleet. Snyder noted, somewhat blandly, 'If the Soviets were to find a way to locate, identify, and trail all our Polaris submarines "on station" around the Soviet periphery, they might be able to destroy them all nearly simultaneously'.[19] Kahn suggested other means for disabling submarines including indiscriminating area attacks on the ocean, perhaps using mines on the sea-bed.

Kahn's main objection was that opting for mobility would entail the acquisition of a lower performance system. The expense would mean that fewer would be bought and those that were bought would have only small and inaccurate warheads. Fixed ICBMs would also exhibit these weaknesses to some degree. The result might well be to degrade the capacity for counter-city attacks (especially if the enemy had taken civil defence precautions) and preclude counter-force attacks altogether, so that the missiles might be inadequate for retaliation. Wohlstetter provided an example of five half-megaton weapons with an average inaccuracy of two miles. These weapons would destroy half the population of a city of 900,000 spread over 40 square miles. If the population were provided with shelters capable of resisting an over-pressure of 100 pounds per square inch, 60 weapons would be needed. If deep rock shelters were available, the requirement could be pushed up to 1000. (*Minuteman*, when it arrived, had about twice the yield and half the inaccuracy that Wohlstetter postulated.)

The short-range IRBMs, however, were suitable for counter-force attacks. Rathjens calculated that, as guidance depended on the early powered portion of the missile's flight, errors would increase with distance; a 1500-mile range IRBM should only have a quarter the delivery error of a 5500-mile ICBM. As IRBMs would be less than half the price of ICBMs, on a cost basis they might well be in the order of 35 times as effective as ICBMs against hard-point targets (i.e. bomber and missile bases). However, Rathjens added 'that it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the closeness of [IRBM] bases to the Iron Curtain would make them appallingly vulnerable'.

The effort to reduce vulnerability would require a loss of offensive capability. This is why it was felt that missiles should not completely displace bombers. Bombers could carry a greater and more differentiated payload and deliver it with higher accuracies. They could assess damage and even engage in some searches for the most appropriate victims. With men in control, a versatility was available that could not be found with a missile moving inexorably towards a single pre-planned target. Virtue could even be detected in a bomber's lack of speed; in a crisis they could be put on alert and even sent part of the way to their targets, thus signalling resolve, with the option of recall still available. Above all, they could find and attack discrete military targets, possibly including protected ICBMs.[20] Their main disadvantages in a counter-force rôle were that they could not achieve surprise and their vulnerability to air defences.

For those enamoured by counter-force and first-strike strategies the bomber was an attractive instrument of nuclear warfare. Going over completely to missiles would signal a commitment to second-strike strategies, a reduction of ambitions, a recognition that only a limited number of exceptional threats could be deterred. It would cast doubt on the extension of deterrence to other nations.

Missiles would not be very good at fighting one another. Counter-force attacks by missiles against other missiles were likely to be costly and ineffectual because of the opportunities for protection. Active defence by anti-missile missiles was also liable to be ineffectual because of the speed of the attacking weapons. The only real dual left was between the offence and passive measures for the protection of cities and economic facilities. If it were possible to afford these targets some protection comparable to that being provided for the nuclear forces themselves, then the small warheads of the missile force would have their destructive potential reduced, perhaps to levels acceptable for the defender. If, however, bombers were maintained to provide a greater range of options and more destructive power for the offence, they would also provide a greater opportunity for missile attacks. Air defence missile systems might well get sufficient warning to intercept an attacking bomber force; bombers sitting idle and in the open at air bases provided relatively easy targets for ICBMs.

As long as bombers and IRBMs existed the tasks that all strategic forces could and would be required to perform were many and various. If it were decided to concentrate solely on long-range missiles then matters would be greatly simplified. Such a decision might result from improvements in the quality and quantity of missiles, so that counter-city missions, if not counter-force missions, could be performed with greater ease and effectiveness. The replacement of bombers by ICBMs by the other side would make the counter-force mission less feasible. The situation would then become more and not less stable. With no bombers and IRBMs there would be little incentive to get forces launched at the slightest hint of an enemy strike lest they be caught on the ground. The premium on surprise attacks would be drastically reduced with both sides sure that their forces would survive a first strike and then be able to inflict a devastating retaliatory blow. As James King noted the 'dominance of the offensive', a theme that also runs right through Brodie's book *Strategy in the Missile Age*, was linked to 'the nuclear phase of the Air Age', and was likely to be replaced by the 'dominance of the deterrent' in the missile age.[21]

All this indicated the error of assigning to technology a predominantly disruptive rôle. With the move from the established bombers to the novel long-range missiles, some qualities would be gained while others would be lost. The net result would be to enhance strategies based on second strikes at the expense of those based on first strikes. One consequence of this move would be to dampen fears of a cycle of mutually reinforcing fears of surprise attacks; it would clearly take a number of missiles in a counter-force strike to be sure of destroying a single enemy missile. In such circumstances, even if one believed that war was extremely likely, rather than pre-empt it might be better to let the enemy strike first. Even if an attacker used up all his striking force, he would still not be able to obliterate the retaliatory force. The damage caused by retaliation even by a reduced force – so long as it was specifically directed at the cities of the aggressor – would probably be greater than the indirect damage to one's own cities resulting from an all-out counter-force attack.

The advantages of the resultant stability were such that some argued that the US should move to embrace it, even at the expense of renouncing counter-force as an objective, and even encouraging the development of invulnerable Soviet systems, so that they need not feel anxious about US surprise attacks. Oskar Morgenstern stated the principle: 'In order to create a nuclear stalemate under conditions of nuclear plenty it is necessary for *both* sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces.'[22]

Others balked at this. Snyder wrote that, given the US need to 'present the Soviets with at least some risk that we would strike first if sufficiently provoked', it could not 'be in the US interest . . . for the Soviets to make their weapons invulnerable to our counter-force fire'. In order to be able to fight all-out war more efficiently and deter less than all-out Soviet attacks on Europe, Snyder advocated keeping some IRBMs and bombers in the force, despite their vulnerability.[23]

With the US provision of credible nuclear threats providing the basis of NATO's strategy, Snyder's concern was understandable. Yet, with the declining opportunities for counter-force attacks that would result as the Russians took steps to protect their own forces, there would be a corresponding decline in the attractiveness of any strategy that could require taking the nuclear initiative. Instead of technology offering new ways out of this dilemma, it was confirming the stalemate.

CHAPTER 11

1. Denis Healey, 'The Sputnik and western defence', *International Affairs*, xxxiv:2 (April 1954), p. 147.
2. 'The meaning of Stalemate', *Army* (August 1958).
3. John Foster Dulles, 'Challenge and response in US policy', *Foreign Affairs*, xxxvi:1 (October 1957).
4. Cited in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 101.
5. Herbert York wrote in 1970: 'Surprising as it may seem, the wild outbursts of ideas inspired by Sputnik and the missile-gap psychology has produced nothing of direct value to our current strategic posture more than twelve years later'. *Race to Oblivion*, p. 144.
6. As an example he adds: 'I have not seen any figures, but I surmise that relatively thin margins of cost prevent us from doing such extraordinary projects as melting ice caps and diverting ocean currents' (this is for 1965!). *On Thermonuclear War*, p. 484.
7. Emphasis in the original. Quotations from report are taken from section reproduced in James R. Killian Jr., *Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower*, pp. 71–9.
8. In both Killian and Gaither Reports 'decisive' was defined as: (1) ability to strike back is essentially eliminated; or (2) civil, political or cultural life are reduced to a condition of chaos; or both (1) and (2).
9. Security Resources Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, Washington DC: November 1957 (declassified January 1973). Though the President was not happy with the report, in a speech he made a week after its presentation to the National Security Council he showed signs of having been influenced by this forecast of the shape of things to come:

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> I assure you . . . that for the conditions existing today they [the US military forces] are both efficient and adequate. But if they are to remain so for the future, their design and power must keep pace with the increasing capabilities that science gives both to the aggressor and the defender.

Quoted in Morton Halperin, 'The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process', *World Politics*, XIII:3 (April 1961), p. 370.

10. Henry Kissinger, 'Arms control, inspection and surprise attack', *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII:3 (April 1960), p. 557.
11. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West*, p. 54.
12. See J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National Security Policy* (Ohio State University Press; 1962).
13. Brodie, *The Reporter* (18 November 1954); Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, p. 192. Senator John Kennedy wrote (in the middle of his Presidential Campaign), reviewing Basil Liddell Hart's book, *Deterrence or Defence?* for the *Saturday Review* on 3 September 1960: 'We have no right to tempt Soviet planners and political leaders with the possibility of catching our aircraft and unprotected missiles on the ground, in a gigantic Pearl Harbor'.
14. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
15. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, p. 108. Snyder also noted that if the enemy was only allowed the second strike, and if his strategic forces were not eliminated, his attack was much more likely to be counter-city than it would have been as a first strike, so, perhaps, increasing the severity of the damage.
16. Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, p. 495. (He considered this a possibility for 1969).
17. Bernard Brodie, 'The Development of Nuclear Strategy', *International Security*, II:4 (Spring 1978), p. 68. Brodie, though sympathetic to Wohlstetter's motives, adds that he 'could never accept . . . that the balance of terror . . . ever has been or ever could be delicate'
18. The quotations are from an unclassified summary of *National Policy Implications of Atomic Parity* (Naval Warfare Group Study, Number 5, 1958) and a speech by Admiral Burke to the Press Club on 17 January 1958. They are taken from George Lowe, *The Age of Deterrence*, a rendition of the arguments against the Air Force view from the viewpoint of a Navy partisan. For similar arguments see George Fielding Eliot, *Victory without War: 1958–61* (Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute, 1958).
19. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, p. 88 (pp. 85–95 provides a thorough discussion of the issues discussed in this section). See also George Rathjens Jr, 'NATO strategy: total war', in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
20. Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
21. J. King, 'Air Power in the Missile Gap', *op. cit.*, p. 635.
22. Oskar Morgenstern, *The Question of National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 74.

23. Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 94–5. He also made the valid point that a mixed force complicates the enemy's counter-force attacks and his air defence problem. There would be a diversity of targets and a diversity of sources of retaliatory attacks.

VOLUME I

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